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SECTION OF TAXATION

I. Introduction
This Article is an expanded version of luncheon remarks delivered at a symposium on the Commerce Clause at Georgetown Law School.1 A few things
became clear after my address on the Indian Commerce Clause and state
taxation. Many people at the Conference had only a faint memory that
such a clause even existed. To most state tax practitioners and academics,
“the Commerce Clause” meant the Interstate Commerce Clause and, perhaps secondarily, the Foreign Commerce Clause, but certainly not the Indian

Alva P. Loiselle Professor of Law, University of Connecticut Law School. B.S., summa cum
laude, University of Michigan; J.D., magna cum laude, Harvard Law School.
This Article has its origins in Nell Newton’s appointment as Dean of the University of
Connecticut Law School. Dean Newton (currently Dean of Notre Dame Law School) is an
eminent authority in the field of Indian law and has inspired generations of teachers and
scholars. She encouraged me to teach a course on Indian taxation. Fortunately, my colleague
Bethany Berger, a leading figure in Indian law, agreed to co-teach it. Betsy Conway, Legal
Counsel for the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation, subsequently taught the course with me.
Both have patiently educated me, while sometimes politely disagreeing with my views. In a
sense, this Article continues a conversation with each.
Professor Berger gave unselfishly of her time in reviewing major parts of this Article. She
provided a much needed reality check on my understanding of Indian law. I have also benefited from the wisdom and insight of Professor Lofty Becker, Professor Robert Clinton, Betsy
Conway, Professor Mark Cowan, Professor Richard Collins, Professor Paul Finkelman, Frank
Katz, Scott Gould, Professor Erik Jensen, Professor Kent Newmyer, Steve Shiffrin, Cathleen
Shine, and Professor Carol Weisbrod. Professor Matthew Fletcher read the entire manuscript
and as numerous places in the footnotes show, provided invaluable suggestions. Mai Lin Pomp
Shine provided her typical understanding of the competing demands on a father.
With no slight to those previously mentioned, Professor Richard S. Kay deserves special recognition. Professor Kay is a scholar of constitutional interpretation and comparative constitutional law. He would not claim to be either a tax scholar or an Indian law expert. Nonetheless,
he read all of the manuscript, providing wonderful improvements, and saved me from numerous missteps. In addition, he suggested the title for the Article.
Special recognition is also due Debra Herman and Jeff Glickman. Besides being two great
lawyers, Debra was the Editor-In-Chief of this Journal and Jeff was the Managing Editor.
Those titles do not capture their enthusiasm, patience, and courtesies extended to me.
Many students participated in various ways in researching and editing the manuscript.
Jess Hamilton, Stephen Higgins, Chris Houlihan, Brian Hughes, Tony Mantia, Erin Martell,
Keegan McClure, Matt Stein, and Jonathan Zellner have earned my respect and gratitude.
Jeremy Paul, long-time friend and current Dean of the University of Connecticut Law
School, has provided his typical, unfailing support, both material and otherwise.
In an Article of this length, it is inevitable that errors remain. They are my responsibility and
hopefully as they are brought to my attention I will learn from them.
1
The symposium was co-sponsored by Georgetown University Law Center and the ABA
Section of Taxation’s State and Local Tax Committee in May 2007.
The length of this Article might suggest that lunch turned into dinner, and dinner into
breakfast, but my remarks were within the mandate I was given: “have a good opening, have
a good closing, and keep the two close together.” I knew far less then, which made it easier to
obey my mandate.
*
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Commerce Clause.2
True, a small group of “Indian law”3 insiders has long existed. These specialists have traditionally serviced tribes endowed with natural resources. More
recently, revenue generated across the country from Indian gaming,4 hotels,
restaurants, manufacturing, industrial parks, gas stations, cement factories,
timber operations, smokeshops, or sports franchises5 has created legal work
for firms that traditionally did not practice Indian law.
This new group of practitioners has quickly learned what the more experienced firms have long known: the issues raised by the taxation of Indi-

2
U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8 provides that Congress shall have the power to “regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” To avoid
confusion, this Article will refer specifically to the Foreign Commerce Clause, the Interstate
Commerce Clause, and the Indian Commerce Clause. The “Commerce Clause” will refer to
all three collectively.
3
“The term ‘Indian Law’ is a catchall with various meanings, but it refers primarily to that
body of law dealing with the status of the Indian tribes and their special relationship to the
federal government, with all the attendant consequences for the tribes and their members, the
states and their citizens, and the federal government.” William C. Canby, American Indian
Law 1 (5th ed. 2009). Judge Canby also provides a perceptive discussion of who is an Indian.
Id. at 9–11.
4
Gaming, of course, drives many of the contemporary issues involving the Indians: land
claims, recognition of tribes, and involvement in lobbying. Despite the importance of gaming, the states are prohibited from taxing it. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(4) (2010). For a general
discussion of gaming, see Canby, supra note 3 at 332–72; Stephen L. Pevar, The Rights of
Indians and Tribes 319–32 (3rd ed. 2002).
5
Richard J. Ansson, Jr. & Lodine Oravetz, Tribal Economic Development: What Challenges
Lie Ahead for Tribal Nations as They Continue to Strive for Economic Diversity?, 11 Kan. J.L. &
Pub. Pol’y 441, 445 (2002). Some tribes even have commercial dealings with foreign countries. The Japanese, for example, opened an automobile testing facility on the Ak-Chine reservation in Arizona. Sharon O’Brien, American Indian Tribal Governments 230 (1989).
“As tribes take advantage of federal economic development programs and as reservations’
reserves of natural resources become increasingly more valuable, there is more on Indian reservations to tax.” Russel Lawrence Barsh, Issues in Federal, State, and Tribal Taxation of Reservation
Wealth: A Survey and Economic Critique, 54 Wash. L. Rev. 531, 533 (1979) [hereinafter Barsh,
Reservation Wealth]. Traditionally, “[t]he road to economic and social development for Indian
Nations in the United States [was] impeded by an intractable host of tangible and intangible
barriers. Territorial remoteness, an inadequate public infrastructure base, capital access barriers, land ownership patterns, and an underskilled labor and managerial sector combine[d]
with paternalistic attitudes of federal policymakers to stifle Indian Country development and
investment.” Robert A. Williams, Jr., Small Steps on the Long Road to Self-Sufficiency for Indian
Nations: The Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act of 1982, 22 Harv. J. on Legis. 335,
335–36 (1985).
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ans, the tribes,6 and those doing business with them are sui generis—and
complicated, even by tax standards. To be sure, state tax lawyers are used to
multijurisdictional issues. Taxes are levied by sewer, water, school, and transit
districts; cities; counties; states; and the national government—tribal taxes
would seem to add merely one more level.
Although comforting, this view would be misleading. Indian taxation drags
lawyers into areas outside their normal comfort zone. Practitioners need to
master treaties between the federal government and the tribes;7 state enabling
6
There are currently 564 tribes recognized by the federal government. Frequently Asked
Questions, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior (last updated Sept.
14, 2010), http://www.bia.gov/FAQs/index.htm. Some tribes are recognized by their states
but not by the federal government. For a discussion of what constitutes an Indian tribe, see
Canby, supra note 3, at 3–9.
“Between 1954 and 1962, Congress terminated federal recognition of more than one
hundred tribes and bands. While all but one of these were recognized again in later years,
several were forced to forfeit their ancestral lands.” L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm:
Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 812 (1996) [hereinafter Gould,
Consent].
7
Nearly 400 18th and 19th century treaties exist. A list of treaties appears in 2 Indian
Affairs: Laws and Treaties (Charles J. Kappler ed. 1905), available at http://digital.library.
okstate.edu/kappler/Vol2/TOC.htm. Luckily, the number dealing with taxation is much
smaller. Research on a tax issue may nonetheless involve treaties that predate the Constitution
and laws adopted by the first Congress. See Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law 1
(Nell Jessup Newton ed. 2005) [hereinafter Cohen’s Handbook]. For a general discussion,
see Canby, supra note 3, at 115–37.
In the early days, the government needed to pacify the stronger and more numerous
Indians. The Indians were militarily important and the early treaties reflected this reality. After
the Revolutionary War, and especially after the War of 1812, the United States no longer worried about the Indians allying with the British. Cohen’s Handbook, supra, at 74. William
Henry Harrison, while Governor of the Indiana Territory, defeated the Northwest tribes at the
Battle of the Thames where the Indians had allied themselves with the British in the War of
1812. After the War of 1812, “the last vestiges of tribal resistance to United States hegemony
east of the Mississippi were suppressed in conjunction with the defeat of Great Britain, eastern
tribalism’s former historical ally against United States’ imperialism.” Robert A. Williams, Jr.,
Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in the
Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 Ariz. L. Rev. 237, 257 (1989) [hereinafter
Williams, Barbarism].

Prior to 1815, Indians negotiated treaties from a position of some power, for the
tribes had the option of allying with either the United States or the British. The
young American nation was most concerned with bare survival for many years; it
needed the support of the Indians, or at least their assurances against hostility. Thus
the tribes were a power to be reckoned with. As the Supreme Court expressed it:
“[T]he early journals of Congress exhibit the most anxious desire to conciliate the
Indian nations . . . The most strenuous exertions were made to procure those supplies on which Indian friendships were supposed to depend; and everything which
might excite hostility was avoided”. . . When the War of 1812 ended and the British
withdrew from the Continent, the tribes lost much of their bargaining leverage. The
negotiations became increasingly one-sided. After 1815, United States Indian policy
became necessarily responsive to the westward expansion, and treaties were used to
remove the Indian tribes from the path of the ever-advancing white civilization. From
the Indians’ point of view, it was a Hobson’s choice. Theoretically, they could keep
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4
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their land and be overrun by white settlers. Or, they could sell their land, their ancestral heritage, and remove to a new site.
Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: “As
Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth”—How Long a Time is That?, 63 Cal. L.
Rev. 601, 608–09 (1975); see discussion infra notes 229−99.
In 1871, Congress prohibited the practice of entering into treaties with Indian Tribes. 25
U.S.C. § 71 (2010). The prohibition was accomplished by a rider to an appropriation bill.
Michael Minnis, Judicially-Suggested Harassment of Indian Tribes: The Potawatomis Revisit Moe
and Colville, 16 Am. Indian L. Rev. 289, 297 (1991). This statute had no effect on existing
treaties. “No obligation of any treaty lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or
tribe prior to March 3, 1871, shall be hereby invalidated or impaired.” 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2010).
The prohibition on the treaty power is constitutionally suspect because the Constitution vests
in the President, not Congress, the power to make treaties. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2;
William C. Canby, Jr., American Indian Law in a Nutshell 121 (5th ed. 2009).
One leading treatise describes the prohibition on treaty-making as reflecting the jealousies
of the House of Representatives, which has no role to play with treaties, unlike the Senate,
which must ratify all treaties. See Cohen’s Handbook, supra, at 74. “The House wanted a
larger piece of the action than that of simply appropriating funds for treaty arrangements made
by others.” Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 12 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 3, 52
(1987) [hereinafter Ball, Constitution]. Another commentator described the House as being
angry about being excluded from making Indian policy. Minnis, supra, at 297. After 1871,
Congress continued to negotiate agreements with the Indians—the difference being that such
agreements were now adopted as statutes and not treaties. Robert N. Clinton, There is No
Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 Ariz. St. L. J. 113, 168 (2002) [hereinafter Clinton,
Supremacy].
Reservations were confirmed by bilateral agreements enacted after 1871, when the
United States renounced formal treaty making with tribes; these agreements were
negotiated in the field between federal and tribal representatives and then approved
through the normal legislative process involving both houses rather than through the
procedure for treaties, which involved only the Senate’s advice and consent.
Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law 8 (1987) [hereinafter
Wilkinson]. The reality was that, after 1871, the federal government continued to deal with
the Indians, not through treaties, but through agreements, statutes, and executive orders.
Cohen’s Handbook, supra, at 75. Between 1855 and 1919, when Congress ended the practice, reservations were created through executive orders. Id. at 76.
In Cherokee Tobacco v. Georgia, the Court upheld a federal statute taxing tobacco produced
anywhere in the United States, notwithstanding that a treaty exempted sales of tobacco on
tribal land from federal taxes. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1871). The Court held that treaties
could be implicitly abrogated by subsequent federal law, the so-called “last in time” doctrine.
Id. at 621. The “last expression of the sovereign will must control.” Chae Chan Ping v. United
States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889). Violation of the treaty was a nonjusticiable, political question. Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616, 621; see Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,
187 U.S. 553 (1903); United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986) (“We have required
that Congress’s intention to abrogate Indian treaty rights be clear and plain.”). Even if that
intention is clear, Professor Milner Ball argues that “Congress cannot by legislation choose to
transfigure a treaty relationship with another nation and elect to govern that nation by statute.” Ball, Constitution, supra, at 53. Wilkinson and Volkman describe the abrogation policy
as follows: “Congressional power to abrogate is based on the notion that a treaty represents
the political policy of the nation at the time it was made. If there is a change of circumstances
and the national interest accordingly ‘demands’ a modification of its terms, then Congress may
abrogate a treaty in whole or in part.” Wilkinson & Volkman, supra, at 604. Things are even
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4
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acts; numerous Indian-specific statutes and executive orders that often reflect
polar swings in Congressional policy;8 special Indian canons of construction;9
the unique patchwork pattern of land ownership on reservations;10 and concepts like “Indian sovereignty”11 that serve as a ubiquitous, amorphous, and
more dire without a treaty. In Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, the Warren Court held that
the government could take the aboriginal lands of Indians in Alaska without just compensation. 348 U.S. 272 (1955). For an insightful discussion, see Nell Jessup Newton, At the Whim
of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31 Hast. L. J. 1215, 1241–44 (1980).
8
“Federal Indian policy is completely reversed periodically.” Ball, Constitution, supra note
7, at 16.
9
See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 7, at 119–24; Erik M. Jensen, Taxation and Doing
Business in Indian Country, 60 Me. L. Rev. 1, 28 (2007); see infra notes 130, 251, 257, 532,
541, 619, 936, 1057.
10

Over the course of two hundred years the United States has used various procedural devices to recognize tribes and, thus, to establish reservations. Although
some 389 treaties were negotiated, treaty making is not as dominant as it is often
thought to be. Of the 52 million acres of trust land now held by tribes and individual
Indians, only about 20 million were originally recognized by treaty. The majority of
Indian land was set aside in reservation status by procedures that amount to treaty
substitutes . . . Indian reservations have also been established by unilateral congressional statutes and by the Interior Department acting pursuant to delegated authority
from Congress. The largest amount of trust land, 23 million acres, was established
by yet another means, the promulgation of executive orders between 1855 and 1919.
In turn, more than 90 percent of that executive order land was later confirmed by
statute. In several cases, individual reservations contain some or all of these various
kinds of land.
Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 8. For a discussion of allotment, which also affects the pattern of
land ownership, see infra notes 235, 364, 376−77, 592, 620, 675, 1277, 1359.
11
In his classic and iconic treatise on Indian law, Felix S. Cohen described the issue of sovereignty in 1941 as follows:
The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of Indian tribal powers is marked
by adherence to three fundamental principles: (1) An Indian tribe possesses, in the
first instance, all the powers of any sovereign state. (2) Conquest renders the tribe
subject to the legislative power of the United States and, in substance, terminates the
external powers of sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its power to enter into treaties with
foreign nations, but does not by itself affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e.,
its powers of local self-government. (3) These powers are subject to qualification by
treaties and by express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus expressly qualified,
full powers of internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian tribes and in their duly
constituted organs of government.
Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 123 (1st ed. 1941). Professor Milner
Ball describes Cohen as having an “undoubted salutary effect upon the Supreme Court. But
Cohen also engaged in harmful fiction that has been equally influential. . . . Cohen’s conquest
myth—it is historical as well as juridical myth—supplies a basis for exercise of power over
Indians that the Court had not imagined until then. Cohen of course offers no clue about the
date or means of such an event.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 43–44. “The 1982 revision of Cohen republishes the statement of the conquest myth, with embellishment . . . tribes
have been incorporated as well as conquered.” Id. at 44. Ball characterizes the 1982 edition as
“neglect[ing] minimum standards of scholarship.” Id. at 45.
The first edition of Cohen’s seminal work was published in 1941 by the federal government.
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Cohen was then Assistant Solicitor in the Department of the Interior. The audience was government administrators and it became widely cited by the Court and others in the field.
Kevin K. Washburn, Felix Cohen, Anti-Semitism and American Indian Law, 33 Am. Indian
L. Rev. 583 (2008–09) (book review), tells the fascinating story behind the treatise. The treatise has its roots in 1939, when Cohen was detailed to the Department of Justice to run the
Indian Law Survey, a job that he initially resisted. The Survey was apparently intended to
be a litigation manual. Id. at 600. After acquiescing, Cohen received a one-year posting as
Special Attorney. Id. at 599. Cohen was fired that same year, along with members of his staff
that had Jewish surnames, in what seems to be part of an anti-Semitic purge. Id. at 599–600.
After being fired, Cohen returned to his regular position as Associate Solicitor for Indian
Affairs at the United States Department of the Interior. Id. at 583–84. The Survey became
the Handbook of Federal Indian Law and completed under the imprint of the Department of
Interior. Id. at 584.
In 1958, the Bureau of Indian Affairs published a new edition, which deviated in key parts
from the first edition. In 1972, the University of New Mexico Press reprinted the 1941 version
of Cohen because of the unhappiness with the 1958 edition. The foreword to the reprinted
version explains that
[i]n the early fifties, both the executive and the legislative branches of the Federal
Government determined to follow a new policy concerning Indians: a policy of terminating all tribes and ending Federal services to Indians. [The 1941 edition] which
had been originally published under the auspices of the Department of the Interior,
then proved embarrassing . . . The response of the Department of the Interior
was simple: rewrite Cohen’s book and discredit the original under the guise of a
revision . . . Many of the carefully considered arguments that were made by Cohen
were omitted . . . From a well-reasoned, balanced discussion of the countless undecided questions . . . the [1958 edition] deteriorated into a volume with a new and
constant theme: the Federal Government’s power over Indian Affairs is plenary.
Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 77 (citing Robert L. Bennett & Frederick M. Hart, Foreword
to Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law v (University of New Mexico Press
1971)). For a discussion of the role of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Department of the
Interior, see Canby, supra note 3, at 52–61. Professor Williams, never one to mince words,
refers to the “legendary incompetence of the Bureau.” Robert A Williams, Jr., Learning Not to
Live With Eurocentric Myopia: A Reply to Professor Laurence’s Learning to Live With the Plenary
Power of Congress Over the Indian Nations, 30 Ariz. L. Rev. 439, 450 n.51 (1988).
The first edition is sometimes cited as having a 1942 date (as the citations by others
throughout this article suggest). The first edition was actually published in 1940, intended to
be temporary, and had a limited circulation within the Department of the Interior. The first
publicly available printing was in 1941 with a small circulation. A larger run was made in
1942. Foreword to Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1942), supra note
7, at 1.
The 1958 edition has been “repudiated by some scholars.” L. Scott Gould, Tough Love for
Tribes: Rethinking Sovereignty after Atkinson and Hicks, 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 669, 671 n.14
(2003) [hereinafter Gould, Tough Love]. “Termination was the policy that [the 1958 edition]
sought to advance with its revision of history and law.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 78.
See also Matthew L. M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Indian Problem, 59 Hastings L. J. 579,
592 n.85 (2008) [hereinafter Fletcher, Indian Problem], who refers to the 1958 edition as
“disgraced” and “disgraceful.”
Washburn, supra, at 584, notes that “[s]ome scholars refuse to count the 1958 revision by
the Department of the Interior, which was ideologically motivated and, many believed, bastardized Cohen’s 1942 work,” citing Clinton, supra note 7, at 232.
A board of editors put out a revised edition in 1982 and in 2005. Cohen, who died in
1953, only authored the 1941 edition and would likely disagree with parts of the subsequent
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malleable backdrop in many cases.12 Bread-and-butter issues for state tax lawyers—like apportionment and discrimination—take on new meanings. The
Indian tax cases tolerate results that would violate the Interstate Commerce
Clause.13 The formative Supreme Court cases on Indian taxation often reflect
the composition of the bench and sympathies (or lack thereof ) of individual

editions. Unfortunately, the Court and others treat the editions as if they were all authored
by Cohen, despite significant differences among them. See Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at
13. The 1982 edition has been criticized for “mak[ing] no . . . attempt to survey the history
of judicial conceptions of the legal position of tribes in relation to the American federalist system.” William Walters, Review Essay: Preemption, Tribal Sovereignty, and Worcester v. Georgia,
62 Or. L. Rev. 127, 128 n.9 (1983).
Louis F. Claiborne, who as a long-time deputy Solicitor General participated in many
Supreme Court cases involving the Indians, offers a less romantic view of sovereignty than that
found in the Cohen treatises.
Until very recently, there were serious obstacles to headlining the term “Indian sovereignty.” First, to speak of “sovereign Tribes” within States was undiplomatic, to put it
mildly. Second, “sovereign” seemed an ill-fitting word to describe wholly dependent
collections of Indians, sometimes of unrelated Tribes, merely subsisting on government “hand-outs” on arbitrarily assigned reservations, often with no governmental
structure of their own. Third, to claim tribal sovereignty appeared to be inconsistent with the State jurisdiction within Reservations had to be conceded (e.g., the
McBratney rule and the taxability of non-Indian land), not to mention the “plenary”
power of Congress. And, finally, in McClanahan, if not earlier, the Court had relegated the Indian sovereignty doctrine to the role of a mere “backdrop.” I may add that
talk of “sovereignty” tends to create unreal expectations in the Indian community. All
these problems still exist. But the significant rebirth of tribal institutions makes the
claim of sovereignty more persuasive.
Louis F. Claiborne, The Trend of Supreme Court Decisions in Indian Cases, 22 Am. Indian L.
Rev. 585, 595 (1998).
12
“[T]he doctrine of American Indian tribal sovereignty is a legal and conceptual conundrum.” Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic
Dependent Nation, 83 Or. L. Rev. 1109, 1110 (2004).
The British government recognized the sovereignty of Indian tribes. Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556 (1832). The first white settlers had no choice but to recognize Indian
sovereignty because they needed the help and support of the more numerous and powerful
tribes. As circumstances changed, the Indians became dispensable. Short-term alliances out of
political expediency, only to be broken later, are hardly unusual. Compare the Stalin-Hitler
Non-Aggression Pact, which Germany discarded when the alliance with the Soviet Empire was
no longer needed. According to Professor Deloria, “America has yet to keep one Indian treaty
or agreement despite the fact that the United States government signed over four hundred such
treaties and agreements with Indian tribes.” Vine Deloria, Jr., Custer Died for Your Sins:
An Indian Manifesto 28 (1969).
13
See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134 (1980), discussed infra notes 740−915 and accompanying text; Cotton Petroleum v. New
Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989), discussed infra notes 1131−1270 and accompanying text.
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justices for the Indians.14 Add to this the difficulty of obtaining up-to-date
information on tribal tax codes, and the result is a labyrinth of unpredictability.15
While the topic of my conference presentation and hence the subject of
this Article is the Indian Commerce Clause and state taxation16—and not a
14
See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the
Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1573 (1996) [hereinafter Getches, Conquering]
(“[Tribes] now . . . are left to the vicissitudes of Court majorities that depend on the perceptions of culturally alien Justices in individual cases.”); Matthew L. M. Fletcher, The Supreme
Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 121, 124–25 (2006) [hereinafter Fletcher,
Supreme Court] (“[T]he federal courts have had fewer and fewer authorities to rely on to decide
disputes, opening the door for the Supreme Court to exercise additional latitude in deciding
Indian cases according to its own preferences.”); Robert N. Clinton, Book Review, 47 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 846, 848 (1980) (reviewing Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood
Henderson, The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty (1980)) (“[T]he Supreme
Court’s approach to the question of the Indian tribes’ role in American legal theory has vacillated between theories of subjugation of the tribes to the states, and protection of tribal
autonomy from state encroachments.”).
15
Jensen, supra note 9, at 24 (“Because much American Indian law doctrine does not mesh,
one can ‘prove’ almost any proposition by finding the right case or statute to cite and ignoring
contrary authority.”); Scott A. Taylor, An Introduction and Overview of Taxation and Indian
Gaming, 29 Ariz. St. L. J. 251, 251 (1994) (“It is often very difficult to predict the tax
consequences that will attach to a particular transaction that takes place in Indian Country.
This lack of certainty is grist for the lawyer’s mill because it increases the likelihood of litigation involving large sums of money.”); Robert G. Natelson, The Original Understanding of
the Indian Commerce Clause, 85 Denv. U. L. Rev. 201, 204 n.5 (2007) (“That Indian law is
chaotic seems to be one of the few points of agreement among commentators on the subject.”);
Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian
Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 Yale L. J. 1, 4–5 (1999) [hereinafter Frickey, Common
Law] (“Given the lack of guidance in positive law, the complexity of the issues, and the tangled
normative questions surrounding the colonial displacement of indigenous peoples to construct
a constitutional democracy, it is also not surprising that the resulting decisional law is as incoherent as it is complicated.”); Russel Lawrence Barsh, Omen: Three Affiliated Tribes v. Moe and
the Future of Tribal Self-Government, 5 Am. Indian L. Rev. 1, 56–57 (1977) [hereinafter Barsh,
Omen] (“[J]udges and lawyers share an education that excludes mature consideration of tribal
government. Few law textbooks in general use accord Indian law serious treatment. Ignorance
is a powerful helpmate of confusion. In an appeal in which the advocates and judges have
only briefly investigated an unfamiliar topic, we can expect what is in fact in evidence in the
Supreme Court record: abused precedents, citations to inconsistent chains of precedent, essential cases and statutes overlooked, significant social and economic facts disregarded.”); Philip
P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 31, 33 (1996) [hereinafter
Frickey, Domesticating] (“[F]ederal Indian law is a snarl of doctrinal complications . . .”).
16
As expounded below, the Indian Commerce Clause can be read as granting Congress the
exclusive power to regulate commerce with the tribes (subject to state police powers). In sharp
contrast, the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clauses were not intended to grant Congress
the exclusive powers of regulating these areas but left room for state intervention that went well
beyond just police powers (although at one point the Court viewed the Interstate Commerce
Clause as granting exclusive powers to Congress). See infra notes 190, 447. Under the Interstate
and Foreign Commerce Clauses, the challenge for the courts has been to sort out acceptable
state statutes from those that impose unreasonable or discriminatory burdens on commerce.
Courts will strike down state statutes under the dormant or negative Interstate or Foreign
Commerce Clause. Those Clauses, like the Indian Commerce Clause, represent a positive
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treatise on all aspects of state taxation17 (and nothing on federal taxation)18—I
would disserve the reader by not straying a bit afield. To cut to the chase, the
Court has emasculated and denigrated the Indian Commerce Clause, preventing implementation of the Founders’ vision. Readers would have every
right to feel that slogging their way through this lengthy Article was not
worth the effort if that were the only message at the end of the journey. And
so, with the encouragement of the conference organizers and journal editors, I have interpreted my charge broadly to sketch the contours of other
Indian tax doctrines so that the reader will have a feel for the signposts and
boundaries. I have focused on a selection of prominent U.S. Supreme Court
cases, mostly involving state taxation; many more could have been discussed.
My goal is not to be exhaustive (or exhausting), but rather suggestive and
illustrative.19
Unlike an article on, say, the Interstate Commerce Clause, I have not
or explicit delegation by the Constitution to Congress. There is no explicit language in the
Constitution that prohibits the states from burdening commerce in unacceptable ways.
Nonetheless, under the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clauses, the positive delegation to
Congress has come to mean that the Court can strike down unacceptable state actions. In other
words, the positive delegation implies negative constraints on certain state actions, hence the
term “negative” Commerce Clause. The “Dormant” in “Dormant Commerce Clause” refers to
Congress not having exercised its power to prohibit a state statute.
Justice Scalia, who is skeptical about the existence of a negative or Dormant Interstate
Commerce Clause, views
[t]he least plausible theoretical justification of all [for the doctrine] is the idea that in
enforcing the negative Commerce Clause the Court is not applying a constitutional
command at all, but is merely interpreting the will of Congress, whose silence in certain fields of interstate commerce (but not in others) is to be taken as a prohibition
of regulation. There is no conceivable reason why congressional inaction under the
[Interstate] Commerce Clause should be deemed to have the same pre-emptive effect
elsewhere accorded only to congressional action.
Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 262 (1987) (Scalia, J. dissenting). “It is astonishing that we should be expanding our beachhead in this impoverished
territory, rather than being satisfied with what we have already acquired by a sort of intellectual
adverse possession.” Id. at 265. For a rebuttal, see Dan. T. Coenen, Constitutional Law: The
Commerce Clause 214 n.19 (2004); Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law 403–05 (2nd ed.
2002). For an argument that the term “dormant” is a misnomer, see Julian N. Eule, Laying the
Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 Yale L. J. 425, 425 n.1 (1982). Although Justice Scalia
expressed his view in the context of the Interstate Commerce Clause, presumably he would
extend it to the Indian Commerce Clause.
17
For a concise summary of state taxation of Indians and those doing business with them
(especially given the page constraints imposed on the contributing authors), see Cohen’s
Handbook, supra note 7, § 8; see also Canby, supra note 3, at 286–331; Pevar, supra note 4,
at 188–207.
18
For a readable and sophisticated treatment of the federal issues, see Mark J. Cowan,
Leaving Money on the Table(s): An Examination of Federal Income Tax Policy towards Indian
Tribes, 6 Fla. Tax Rev. 345 (2004).
19
I have left one area in particular, state taxation of tribally-owned land or land owned
by members of the tribe, to Professor Jensen, who makes sense of this complicated subject.
Jensen, supra note 9, at 13–16, 83–84. See also Robert L. Pirtle, et al., Taxation and
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assumed a shared tax culture and history that would otherwise allow me to
mention a chestnut like Complete Auto20 and move on, secure that everyone
was intimately familiar with that watershed case. Accordingly, I have presented the seminal Indian tax cases in detail. I have also indulged myself
in the occasional tangent when I thought there was something of particular
interest to state tax academics and practitioners. Most writing on Indian taxation has been dominated by Indian law scholars and academics more schooled
in federal than state tax. Yet, as I hope to demonstrate, state tax lawyers and
academics have a unique and useful perspective for analyzing many of the
precedent-setting Supreme Court cases.
Finally, I have let the justices speak in their own voices more than is typical in the academic literature. My own experience, especially in the field of
Indian taxation but also more generally, is that too often an author’s paraphrasing and description of a case fails to capture the nuances, texture, layers, and subtleties that characterize an opinion. Too many authors force the
reader to print out a case and read it alongside their articles.21
Given the theme of this Article, Section II opens with a detailed and lengthy
history of Colonial America, the Crown, and their dealings with the Indians.
Section II ends with the adoption of the Articles of Confederation, with a
special focus on Article IX—the precursor to the Indian Commerce Clause.
Section III surveys the Constitutional Convention and the birth of the Indian
Commerce Clause and contrasts that Clause with the Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Clauses. It highlights two competing schools of interpretation of
the Indian Commerce Clause.22 These Sections make a credible case that the
Indian Commerce Clause was not meant to be interpreted in pari materia with
the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Foreign Commerce Clause. Compared with these other Clauses, the Indian Commerce Clause was drafted and
formulated at a different time during the Constitutional Convention, had
its unique roots in the Articles of Confederation, and was apparently tagged
onto the already drafted Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clauses, more for
stylistic convenience than for substantive reasons.
Section IV presents the early U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, covering
1831-1899. Both tax and non-tax cases are analyzed. Section V covers the
modern cases, starting in 1959. Together Sections IV and V showcase the
seminal cases involving state taxation of Indians and those doing business
Indian Affairs 57–65 (1999). I also leave a discussion of estate and inheritance taxes to id.
at 65–69.
20
Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
21
There are other mundane stylistic decisions. Unless otherwise noted footnotes within quotations are mine. Citations within quotations are also eliminated unless particularly relevant
to this Article.
22
This Part relies heavily on the research of Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian
Commerce Clause, 27 Conn. L. Rev. 1056 (1995) [hereinafter Clinton, Dormant], and Robert
G. Natelson, supra note 15. Their work is a paragon of research and rich in citations to the
leading materials. No one can write on the history of the Indian Commerce Clause without
paying them homage.
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with them and, to a lesser extent, those involving tribal taxation.
Section VI provides a conclusion and attempts to answer why the promise
of the Indian Commerce Clause has gone unfulfilled. The section also provides some guidance in negotiating the “labyrinth of unpredictability.”
II. The Early Days
A. Colonial America and the Crown
The story of the Indian Commerce Clause starts well before the Constitutional Convention and even long before the Articles of Confederation. The
story reflects a consistent and ongoing theme: to what extent should the
Crown and its colonies, and, later, the Continental Congress, the Constitutional Congress, the states, and today’s national government, control Indian
affairs? Early on, this theme was drenched in blood and fraud,23 and reflected
a power struggle for Indian loyalty, land,24 and trade.25
23
Scott A. Taylor, A Judicial Framework for Applying Supreme Court Jurisprudence to the
State Income Taxation of Indian Traders, 2007 Mich. St. L. Rev. 841, 849 (2007) [hereinafter
Taylor, Framework] (“Early experience showed that the violence between colonists and the
various tribes often arose out of fraudulent trade practices by the Europeans.”).
24
Writing about the 1985 term of the U.S. Supreme Court, Professor Milner S. Ball stated
“[d]irectly or indirectly, land was implicated in all the term’s cases. Tribal identity and religion
are tied to the land, and land is, more than anything else, the immediate reason for conflict
between Indians and non-Indians,” a comment that could be extended to most other periods
in the history of the country. Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 14. “[C]laims of competing
states [for land] based on their crown charters unleashed distrust and political alliances with
land speculators’ greed that undermined the national union: ‘This virus of sectional rivalry
would have been hazardous even in a stable, vigorous government; it was almost fatal to the
new union.’” Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court’s Indian Law Decisions: Deviations from
Constitutional Principles and the Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. Pa. J. Const. L.
405, 411 (2003) (quoting Thomas Perkins Abernethy, Western Lands and the American
Revolution 366 (1939)). “Once tribes felt their own subsistence needs threatened by English
agrarian expansion or encroachment, Indian-English contact was transformed into IndianEnglish confrontation over tribal land claims.” Williams, Barbarism, supra note 7, at 249.
25
King James granted the Virginia Company, whose stock was held by English merchants
and investors, the right to establish colonies in North America. The charter granted by King
James provided that “in propagating of Christian Religion to such People, as yet live in
Darkness and miserable Ignorance of the true Knowledge and worship of God, and may in
time bring the Infidels and Savages, living in those Parts, to human Civility, and to a settled
and quiet Government . . . .” Documents of American History 8 (Henry S. Commager ed.,
10th ed. 1988). “With sincere convictions, although without much actual success in the end,
the English colonizers placed conversion of the Indians a major justification for their undertaking.” Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and
the American Indians 9 (1984) [hereinafter Prucha, The Great Father]. In the early 17th
century, a group of investors organized a company to establish the Jamestown colony. David
H. Getches, Charles F. Wilkinson, & Robert A. Williams, Jr., Cases and Materials
on Federal Indian Law 53 (5th ed. 2005) [hereinafter Getches, Cases and Materials].
From Jamestown, English settlers established several other colonies. By 1625, there were nineteen settlements throughout the region of Virginia. Herbert Eugene Bolton & Thomas
Maitland Marshall, The Colonization of North America 1492–1783, at 123 (1920).
The “Indians almost universally chose to greet the British with friendship and assistance.”
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During the very early days of the country, the British “generally adhered
to the view that, as separate peoples, the Indians were politically and legally
autonomous within their territory.”26 But in New England and Virginia “the
colonists claimed the right to appropriate uncultivated land of the Indians
as vacant waste.”27 Thus, the tension that was to mark early dealings with
the Indians soon emerged. The British needed the militarily powerful Indians as allies in its martial struggles with other foreign powers, especially the
French.28 The British settlers, however, needed land and were not above taking it through deceit, corruption, and violence, as well as through generous
interpretations of legal doctrine governing title to Indian land.29 By contrast,
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Indian Tribes: A Continuing Quest, reprinted in
Native Americans and Public Policy 14 (Fremont J. Lyden and Lyman H. Legters eds.
1992). The early British colonies were never far from disaster, and the Indians provided them
with lifesaving aid on a number of occasions, only to have their “overt friendliness . . . viewed
by the colonists with inexplicable suspicion.” Id. One contemporary recounting of a Virginia
Colony, on the edge of starvation, captures the ambivalence with which such aid was accepted
from the Indians:
All accounts agree that for some reason the Indians did daily relieve them for some
weeks with corn and flesh. The supplies brought from England had been nearly
exhausted; the colonists had been too sick to attend to their gardens properly, and
this act of the Indians was regarded as a divine providence at the time . . . What was
the real motive for the kindly acts of the Indians may not be certainly known, but it
probably boded the little colony a future harm.
Id. at 15.
26
Clinton, supra note 14, at 851. Several million Indians lived in communities throughout
North and South America when Christopher Columbus arrived on the island now known as
San Salvador. Paul Stuart, Nations Within A Nation 51 (1987). The Indians of North
America were divided into distinct tribes with different ways of life. By 1700, Europeans were
aware of more than fifty distinct tribes, about half living west of the Mississippi and about half
living east. Edward H. Spicer, A Short History of the Indians of the United States
14–15 (1969).
Professor O’Brian notes that at the time of European discovery, there were more than 600
tribes consisting of approximately five million people. Sharon O’Brian, American Indian Tribal
Governments 14 (1989).
27
Id.
28
France and Britain fought over control of the lucrative fur and pelt trade. For a fuller
discussion, see Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 849.
29
The Indians did not have the same concept of private land ownership as did the European
invaders. Property that the Indians claimed often had no clearly demarcated boundaries. More
generally, the biggest obstacle to successful Indian-white treaties was a cultural one. Indian
cultures did not embrace concepts of private property or exclusive ownership in the European
sense, and the colonists could not overcome their ethnocentrism to recognize this. All treaties
were written on the assumption that the Indians originally owned the land, a concept foreign
to all tribes. The great majority of treaties were thus fundamentally flawed from their inception. Alan Axelrod, Chronicle of the Indian Wars: From Colonial Times to Wounded
Knee 34–35 (1993). To the Indians, “land was ‘given,’ not ‘taken;’ it was the mother to be
respected, not the wanton daughter to be debauched; it existed prior to each man’s brief mortal
stay on earth, and would remain after it. It could be used, but not abused. It has to be enjoyed,
but not alienated. In the spiritual assumptions of most Indian groups land served the role of
source and sustainer of life; ‘she’ played the role of mother to her ‘children.’” To the Europeans,
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the French were more interested in the fur trade and less interested in acquiring land for agriculture.30
Predictably, war and conflict marked this early period. Many of the wellknown 17th century Indian wars, such as the Pequot War (1637) and King
Philip’s War (1675–76), were attributable to “greed on the part of colonial
officials in the implementation, or rather, misapplication, of a body of legal
doctrine.”31 The colonists, however, used these Indian uprisings as an excuse
to retaliate and seize Indian land.32
Initially, the British left the management of the Indians to the colonists—an inherent conflict of interest because the colonists “had the most
to gain financially by striking unfair or even fraudulent business arrangements with surrounding Indian tribes and by engaging in fraud and duress
in land cessions.”33 Unsurprisingly, this benign neglect by the British proved
unworkable, and the Crown was forced to intervene. In response to pleas by
the Indians, the British issued admonitions and directives, but control from
a distance was difficult.34 The colonies typically ignored these Royal declarations and scoldings, claiming that the British did not have jurisdiction to
intervene—a charge that, in various forms, would become a major theme in
the early power struggle over controlling the Indians.

land was a commodity to be owned, bought, and sold. Neither fully understood the concept of
the other. Prucha, The Great Father, supra note 25, at 15. Even worse, European views on
land ownership supported the belief that their society was morally, culturally, and religiously
superior to that of the Indians. Ralph W. Johnson, Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian
and United States Policy Toward Indians, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 643, 647 (1991).
Puritan leaders in Massachusetts viewed the Indians as owning only land they “actively and
regularly cultivated.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1065. Whether sincerely held or not,
this view of ownership happily coincided with the self-interests of the colonists.
Dean Washburn reports that Felix Cohen appreciated the Indians’ “collective forms of ownership, viewing their structures as obstacles to concentrations of wealth and economic power.”
Kevin K. Washburn, Felix Cohen, Anti-Semitism and American Indian Law, 33 Am. Indian L.
Rev. 583, 587 (2008–09) (book review).
30
Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 7, at 18. By contrast, the Spanish sought gold and agricultural products. Lyle N. McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World 78–80
(1984). Queen Isabella encouraged her colonies to become as profitable as possible, id. at
78–79, by subjugating Indian labor. Prucha, The Great Father, supra note 25, at 12. The
Spanish crown also committed itself to converting the Indians to Catholicism. Id. The Spanish
“carried on large-scale missionary efforts to Christianize the Indians, and the Church was
as significant as the state in the development of Spanish America. The predominantly male
Spanish colonists, moreover, took Indian women as wives and concubines, incorporating the
Indians biologically as well as socially into Spanish society.” Id. Nothing similar occurred with
the British.
31
Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1066. For a general discussion of the Indian wars
during the colonial period, see Wilcomb E. Washburn, The Indian in America, 126–45
(1975).
32
Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 7, at 18.
33
Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1064.
34
Id. at 1067.
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As the French in the North and West,35 and the Spanish in the South36
35
The French were mainly interested in the fur trade, William T. Hagan, American
Indians 13 (1993), and the French traders cultivated relationships with the Indians in order
to draw upon their special hunting skills. There were few women among the early French settlers. Mason Wade, French Indian Policies, in 4 Handbook of North American Indians:
History of Indian-White Relations 24 (Wilcomb E. Washburn ed. 1988). Accordingly,
the hunters intermarried with the Indians, which helped the French achieve closer bonds of
friendship than did the English or Spanish.
36
When Spain learned of Columbus’s discovery, the Crown immediately sent diplomatic
envoys to ask Pope Alexander VI to confer ownership of the New World to Spain. Columbus
and His Discoveries, 2 Narrative and Critical History of America 13–14 (Justin Windsor
ed. 1967). The Pope, a Spaniard by birth, has been described as a “corrupt ecclesiastical politician of the infamous Borgia family who owed not only papal office but also much of his family’s great wealth to the favors of the Castillian Crown.” Getches, Cases and Materials supra
note 25, at 46. Pope Alexander obligingly issued the Bull Inter Caetera Divinae, granting the
New World to Spain. The proclamation conferred on Spain the sole right to “colonize, civilize,
and Christianize” the New World’s indigenous people. Because of the risk of excommunication
from the Catholic Church, no other Christian European monarch would interfere openly with
Spain’s newly conferred rights.
Spain’s first official policy toward the Indians was the Requerimiento, which the Crown
required conquistadors to read aloud to the Indians, unfortunately in Spanish, before commencing any hostilities towards the Indians. The Requerimiento informed the Indians that
“God had given charge of ‘the whole human race’ to the Pope in Rome, who had donated all
their lands to the King and Queen of Spain.” The Declaration threatened the Indians’ complete
destruction if they did not acknowledge the Pope and Spanish monarchs as supreme and allow
the preaching of Christianity. Getches, Cases and Materials, supra note 25, at 47.
In 1532, in a series of university lectures, Dominican priest and scholar Francisco de Victoria
attacked the policy of the Requerimiento. Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights
in the United States, 31 Georgetown L. J. 1, 11 (1942). Victoria was head professor of theology at Salamanca University. Lyle N. McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World
472 (1984). His lectures became a primary source for the basic principles of post-16th century
Spanish colonial law, as well as for modern international and U.S. law on the treatment of
indigenous people. Getches, Cases and Materials, supra note 25, at 48.
He argued that “the aborigines in question were true owners, before the Spaniards came
among them, both from the public and the private point of view.” Francisco de Victoria,
De Indis Et De Jure Belli Reflectiones, § 1-336, at 128 (1917) (Ernest Nys, ed., Photo
reprint 1995). According to Victoria, the Spanish had no right of discovery to the land because
it was already inhabited by persons who possessed natural legal rights as free and rational
people, and not even the Pope had the power to partition the property of the Indians. Spanish
claims on the basis of “discovery” or papal grant were illegitimate. The Spanish could obtain
land through just war or voluntary consent. As long as the Indians respected the Spaniards’
rights to travel and to carry on trade, no justifiable cause for war existed. The Spanish did,
however, have a right under natural law to exploit the Indian’s land without harming them.
If the Spanish were not granted this right, they could avail themselves of the “rights of war.”
Victoria suggested that Spain become the Indians’ guardian. The guardianship concept would
reappear in American Indian jurisprudence. See infra notes 214−15 and accompanying text;
notes 352, 434. Cohen credited Victoria for providing a “humane and rational basis for an
American law of Indian affairs.” Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the
United States, supra, at 11.
France “disputed the right of the Pope to partition the world . . . claiming that a monopoly on trade in any area could be maintained only by permanent occupation in the region.”
William John Eccles, France in America 3 (1990). In 1533, France convinced “Pope
Clement VII that the Bull Inter Caetera of Alexander VI, which granted the New World to
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increasingly threatened the colonies in the early 1700s, the Crown tried to
exercise more control, especially as the colonies fought among themselves
for hegemony over the Indians.37 British merchants, protesting certain colonial laws that adversely impacted their interests, also pressured the Crown to
intervene.38 In response, the Crown became more involved in land disputes
between the Indians and the colonies.39
King George III established a boundary between Indian and non-Indian
lands. Like most royal attempts to deal with the Indians, however, the boundary was short-lived and ineffective, and Virginia, Connecticut, and Massachusetts subjugated many eastern tribes.40 Regardless of whether the Crown
may have had paternalistic intentions or, less benignly, simply needed the
Indians as allies against the French, it was outmaneuvered by the colonies.
The colonies sought “to regulate sales of guns and liquor to the Indians” and
to control the fur trade—a significant part of the colonial economy.41 Ever

Spain, governed only the then known lands, and not those subsequently discovered by the subjects of other crowns.” Id. The other European powers were now encouraged to send explorers
and settlers to the New World.
37
In 1703, a Mohegan Indian filed suit with the Queen in Council arguing that colonial
land grants by Connecticut officials violated the Tribe’s aboriginal title. The case dragged on for
more than 70 years and the Mohegans ultimately lost title to most of the land they claimed.
See Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1068. Professor Clinton thinks this case triggered
increased oversight and control of Indian affairs by the British. Id. Professor Natelson disagrees
with reading the case as “evidence the framers intended federal jurisdiction over Indian affairs
to be exclusive.” Natelson, supra note 15, at 262–65. The reality is that this case is just one
piece of a mosaic.
38
Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1072.
39
Professor Clinton views 1723 as a turning point. Previously, the
role of the British government . . . involved financially supporting the trade and diplomatic initiatives, gifts, and military defense preparations undertaken by the colonial
authorities . . . After 1723, however, the great cost of Indian gifts and other aspects of
the Indian trade and increased security concerns caused the Board of Trade to assume
a more active role . . . .
Id. at 1069. The Indians often viewed the gifts as “tribute” or “protection money” in exchange
for their neutrality or aid. The Europeans, however, often viewed their gifts as symbolic of
Indian dependence. Where the gifts consisted of guns, they were a practical method of arming Indian auxiliaries. Wilcomb E. Washburn, Red Man’s Land White Man’s Law 48
(1995) [hereinafter Washburn, Red Man’s Land]. In addition to munitions, gifts included
food, toys, jewelry, clothing, wampum, and liquor. Walter R. Borneman, The French and
Indian War 27 (1995). “[P]resents were the most aggressive marketing inducements of the
age, designed to win and keep commercial and political relationships . . . Both France and
England expended large sums to provide these gifts but . . . English presents were more abundant and of higher quality . . .” Id. This difference in views about the nature of the gifts nicely
captures the conflicting mindsets of the Europeans and the Indians.
40
Clinton, supra note 14, at 851.
41
Timothy Joseph Preso, A Return to Uncertainty in Indian Affairs: The Framers, The Supreme
Court, and the Indian Commerce Clause, 19 Am. Indian L. Rev. 443, 445 (1994). The colonies
attempted to assert control through the use of licensing systems. Id. See also infra note 71.
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land-hungry,42 the colonists illegally encroached upon the tribes.
These actions generated ill will toward both the British and the colonies
as the Indians failed to distinguish between “paternalistic” laws passed by
the British and their failed implementation by the colonies. One result was
that the powerful Six Nation Confederacy of the Iroquois (“Confederacy”)
did not generally support the British during King George’s War (1744–48)
between England and France.43 That war demonstrated the need for a united
front in dealing with the tribes, especially because of the ongoing threat of
Indian uprisings.
Reacting to the power of the Confederacy and motivated by the need to
retain the loyalty of the Indians in the struggle with France for control over
North America,44 seven of the thirteen colonies sent representatives, including Benjamin Franklin, to Albany, New York, to deal with tribal relations.45
At the resulting Albany Congress of 1754, Franklin proposed centralizing
power over the Indians in a Union of the Colonies, which would have had to
be adopted by an Act of Parliament. This proposed union was an early recognition of the need for a centralized power to deal with the Indians and is often
cited as one of the first proposals for a confederated colonial government.46
Franklin’s plan called for organizing the colonies under a President General
and Grand Council.47 Significantly, the first substantive power he proposed
provided:
That the President General with the advice of the Grand Council, hold or
direct all Indian Treaties in which the General Interest or Welfare of the
Colonys [sic] may be concerned; and make Peace or declare War with the
42
One of the primary crops of the early English settlements was tobacco, which exhausted
the soil and required new land. Herbert Eugene Bolton & Thomas Maitland Marshall,
The Colonization of North America 1492–1783 at 121 (1920). The English found it easier to take over Indian fields, which had already been cleared, than to do the work themselves.
Axelrod, supra note 29, at 10. This encroachment was often resisted with force. Prucha, The
Great Father, supra note 25, at 13. As one Indian Chief politely put it, because “you are heare
[sic] strangers, and come into our Countrey [sic], you should rather conform yourselves to
the Customes [sic] of our Countrey [sic], than impose yours upon us . . . .” Paula Mitchell
Marks, In a Barren Land: American Indian Dispossession and Survival 10 (1998).
Marks claims that when fighting broke out, the Indians witnessed a new kind of warfare that
involved the killing of noncombatants and destruction of food and property. Id.
43
Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1075. In Europe, King George’s War was known as
the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–48) and principally involved England and Austria
against France and Prussia. The British attacked the French in Canada, captured Louisbourg
in Nova Scotia, but gave it back in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.
44
Id. at 1076. Indian hostility was so great “that in 1754 a Mohawk leader threatened to
sever the traditional ties between the Six Nations of the Iroquois and the colony of New York.”
Preso, supra note 41, at 445.
45
Preso, supra note 41, at 445.
46
A Congressional resolution described Ben Franklin and George Washington as greatly
admiring the concepts of the Six Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy and that the confederation of the 13 Colonies was influenced by the political system developed by the Confederacy.
H. R. Con. Res. 331, 100th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1988). See also infra note 94.
47
Preso, supra note 41, at 445.
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Indian Nations. That they make such Laws as they judge necessary for the
regulating all Indian Trade. That they make all purchases from Indians for
the crown, of lands . . . not within the bounds of particular Colonies, or
that shall not be within their bounds when some of them are reduced to
more convenient dimensions . . . .48

The Albany Congress wanted the Crown to appoint Indian agents who
would live with the Indians to oversee trade so that it served the greater good
rather than private interests; void illegal land purchases and require purchases
of land to be made by the colonies; and address Indian complaints of fraud.49
Despite the enormous intellectual effort and promise of the Albany Plan, the
colonies and the King ignored it. Nonetheless, the message was clear: Indian
relations needed to be centralized.50
That message was not lost on the Crown. In 1755, the Crown appointed
Indian superintendents to control political relations with the Indians.51 They
were subordinated to the commander-in-chief of British forces in America.
The superintendents marked a significant undercutting of the powers of the
colonies.52
In 1761, England prohibited the colonies from issuing further grants of
Indian lands and instructed the colonial governors to order all settlers on such
lands to leave.53 The Crown took increasing control of Indian land cessions,
which, prior to the war, had been marked by fraud and coercion and had
alienated many Indians. The Crown appointed two superintendents to negotiate treaties and regulate trade with the Indians.54 When the British obtained
formerly French-controlled territory as part of the spoils of war, the Indians
48
Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1078–79 (citing 6 Documents Relative to the
Colonial History of the State of New York 890 (E.B. O’Callaghan ed. 1955) [hereinafter
Documents]); see also Robert Newbold, The Albany Congress and Plan of Union of
1754, at 186 (1955).
49
Obviously, not all colonial officials were out to defraud the Indians. One official who was
notable for his integrity in dealing with the Delaware Indians was William Penn. Alan Taylor,
American Colonies 268–69 (Eric Foner ed. 2001) [hereinafter Taylor, Colonies].
50
Professor Natelson acknowledges that the Albany Plan provided for central governance
over the Indians. Natelson, supra note 15, at 226. He notes, however, that the

Albany Plan would have granted to the central authority control over those Indian
treaties “in which the general interest of the Colonies may be concerned,” leaving, presumably, Indian affairs with only local impact in the hands of individual
colonies . . . . Colonial police power apparently would have remained largely intact,
but subject to being overridden by central trade regulation.
Id. (citation omitted). Issues of taxation would not fall within the police power, at least as that
term has been interpreted under the Interstate Commerce Clause.
51
Preso, supra note 41, at 446. Apparently, the Crown was responding to a proposal of the
English Board of Trade that all Indian affairs should be centralized. Documents, supra note
48, at 903–06.
52
Wilcomb E. Washburn, Indians and the American Revolution, http://www.americanrevolution.org/ind1.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2010) [hereinafter Washburn, American Revolution].
53
Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 7, at 19.
54
Id.
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responded with the uprising known as Pontiac’s War or Rebellion (1763-66).
That incident convinced the Crown of the need to accelerate its control over
the Indians.55
Accordingly, King George III issued the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The
Proclamation was intended in part to win the loyalty of the Indians, who
generally favored the French in the French and Indian Wars (1754–63),56 and
to promote the fur and pelt trade.57 The Proclamation recognized that great
fraud and abuse had been committed in purchasing lands from the Indians.58
In response, the Proclamation reserved all the lands beyond the Appalachians
for the Indians and “forbade British citizens or colonies from purchasing
lands from the Indians except . . . in the name of the Crown.”59
The Proclamation attempted to stop colonial encroachment by establishing
a temporary boundary between the colonies and the tribes, and prohibited
any colonial governor from granting land within that boundary that had been
reserved to the Indians, though there was an exception for the Governors
in Canada and East and West Florida.60 The lands beyond the Appalachian
mountain chain were off limits to the colonies, as they were reserved to the
Indians under the cognizance of the Crown.61
Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1089.
Taylor, Colonies, supra note 49, 428–37. The French and Indian Wars were the last in a
longstanding conflict between the British and the French. This conflict started in Europe. For
example, the War of the League of Augsburg (1688–97), known as King William’s War in the
English colonies, pitted an anti-French alliance that included England, Sweden, Spain, Austria,
Holland, and a few German States, against Louis XIV. In terms of European dynasties, it represented the Hapsburgs against the Bourbons. This, and related conflicts, made Canada a prize
the British desperately sought. Queen Anne’s War (1702–1713) involved essentially the same
protagonists in a fight over who would succeed to the Spanish throne when Charles II died
without issue. Spain was a nominal ally of France so that once again Canada was in play but
ultimately remained in French hands. Under the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713, which ended new
hostilities between the Bourbons and the Hapsburgs, France yielded portions of Nova Scotia,
Newfoundland, and the southern shores of Hudson Bar to England. Despite these concessions,
France continued to embrace the North American continent, founding New Orleans in 1718.
Spain had a presence in Florida, leading the British to found Savannah, Georgia in 1733 as a
buffer between the Carolinas and Florida. This strategy proved successful when Georgia later
became a royal province over the opposition of Spain.
57
Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 849. “The trade was so important that France, Britain,
and America fought major wars aimed at gaining control over this trade.” Id. at 852.
58
Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 7, at 19. “Abuses included fraud in the sales of goods,
exorbitant prices for goods, use of liquor to acquire goods and land at unfairly low prices,
extortion, trading in stolen goods, gun-running, and physical invasion of Indian territory.”
Natelson, supra note 15, at 220.
59
Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 7, at 19; see Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Preconstitutional
Federal Power, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 509, 550 (2007) [hereinafter Fletcher, Preconstitutional].
60
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 548 (1832). All applications for Indian land
cessions and patents had to be forwarded to England. Francis Paul Prucha, American
Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Trade and Intercourse acts, 1790–1834, 18
(1962) [hereinafter Prucha, Policy]. Prior to the 1763 Proclamation, there was no recognized
territory dedicated solely to the Indians. Id. at 13.
61
Washburn, American Revolution, supra note 52.
55
56
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“Although the anger of the colonies was tempered by the knowledge that
the freeze was a temporary measure and not necessarily permanent, it marked
another example of the tightening noose placed by the home government
over colonial freedom of action.”62 Anyone illegally possessing Indian land
would be removed.63 Only the Crown could purchase Indian land within
a colony. British subjects could freely trade with the Indians only if they
obtained a license from their colonial governor and posted security, which
would be forfeited if they refused to follow relevant regulations.64 In addition,
between 1765 and 1769, a permanent boundary was established running from
Canada (specifically Lake Ontario) to Florida,65 “confirming in the minds of
Indians (and of many colonists) the belief that the Indian country was closed
to speculation and settlement by the increasingly aggressive colonists.”66 The
Crown thus imperialized the control of land in the colonies.
Because the Proclamation provided a “more carefully coordinated and
more tightly administered colonial administration,”67 it was resisted by the
colonists and by individuals who regarded speculation in Indian lands as their
right.68 Nevertheless, England saw such restrictions as necessary to avoid wars
precipitated by the colonists’ land claims.69
A more ambitious plan for implementing the Proclamation of 1763 was
issued by the Board of Trade one year later. The Board proposed establishing a British Department of Indian Affairs under the direction of the Crown
“so as to set aside all local interfering of particular Provinces, which has been
one great cause of the distracted state of Indian affairs in general,”70 and put
“the regulation of Indian Affairs, both commercial and political throughout
all North America, upon one general system, under the direction of officers
appointed by the Crown.”71
Id.
Adam Short & Arthur Doughty, Documents Relating to the Constitutional
History of Canada 1759–1791, at 167–68 (1907).
64
Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 849. Professor Clinton described the Proclamation
of 1763 as the “culmination of British crown experience in seeking an effective model for the
management of Euro-American/Indian relations.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1092.
He identified the key elements: centralization of the management of land cessions, diplomatic
relations and trade in London and the diminution or elimination of local colonial authority;
long-term guarantees to the Indians of their lands; and protection of Indian autonomy and
sovereignty. Id. A proclamation issued by Massachusetts Governor Gage in 1772 provided that
persons illegally on Indian land should leave immediately. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 548.
65
Prucha, Policy, supra note 60, at 19; see also Short & Doughty, supra note 63, at
119–23.
66
Washburn, American Revolution, supra note 52.
67
Washburn, Red Man’s Land, supra note 39, at 49.
68
Robert A. Williams, Jr., The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The
Discourses of Conquest 227–30 (1990).
69
Washburn, Red Man’s Land, supra note 39, at 49–50.
70
Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1093 (quoting 6 Documents Relative to the
Colonial History of the State of New York, supra note 48, at 634–41).
71
Id. Beginning in 1764, the Board of Trade began more aggressive regulation of trade
between colonies and the Indians. Trade was taken out of the hands of the colonists, all colonial
62
63
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This plan, however, was abandoned in 1768. After putting down Pontiac’s
War (1763-66) and eliminating the French threat, the British apparently
felt less pressure to spend money and resources managing the Indians. Consequently, control of Indian trade reverted to the colonies, which did very
little. With the expulsion of the French, who previously maintained colonies
stretching from the mouth of the St. Lawrence River to the mouth of the
Mississippi, the Indians who lived in that region could no longer play off the
two European powers.72 The colonies could afford to ignore the Indians and
trade abuses and land encroachments again became rampant and generated
the same unrest that had occurred prior to the French and Indian War:
Experience with commercial regulation at the colonial level (and, later,
the state level) was fundamentally unsatisfactory. . . . During the Colonial
Era, the British superintendents of Indian affairs complained bitterly about
abuses in Indian trade and about what they saw as the unwillingness of
colonial officials to correct the problems. Native leaders also frequently
complained, urging British officials to further limit trading posts to fixed
locations, to tighten trader licensing, and to invalidate land titles received
without government authorization.73
On the eve of the Revolution, separate, independent colonial management
of Indian affairs had failed again. Immediately prior to 1776, events were
moving toward complete reassertion of imperial control over the management of Indian matters. The Revolution, however, intervened and left to
the newly-independent colonies the problem of restructuring a functional
institutional machinery for regulating Indian affairs.74

Professor Clinton summarizes the colonial period as follows:
The colonial experience afforded considerable evidence of the importance of centralized coordination of Indian trade, land and diplomatic
policies. . . . There was always an underlying tension between the need for
laws regulating Indian affairs were repealed, and control was given to British superintendents
of each district. Under this new regulation all traders were required to obtain licenses from the
governor of their respective colonies and to post bonds for the observance of the regulations.
Trade was governed by prices established from time to time by appointed officials, in concert
with the traders and Indians. This plan lasted four years. Prucha, The Great Father, supra
note 25, at 26. This early use of licenses and price controls may have influenced the design of
the Indian Trader statutes, See infra notes 427, 432, 434. In 1768, “the Board of Trade formally
divided authority so that London retained control over treaty talks and over issues of land titles
outside any colony, while local colonial assemblies handled other governmental functions,
including the regulation of commerce with the Indians. Such was the division of authority
when the Revolution began.” Natelson, supra note 15, at 219.
72
Washburn, American Revolution, supra note 52. “The history of the tortuous diplomacy
between the Iroquois Confederation and their Dutch and English neighbors on the one hand
and the French in Canada on the other is matched in the south by the contest between England
and France for the loyalty and support of Cherokees, Choctaws, Chickasaws and Creeks.”
Washburn, Red Man’s Land, supra note 39, at 47–48.
73
Natelson, supra note 15, at 222–23.
74
Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1097.
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effective, coordinated, and well-run Indian policy and the profits colonists
knew could be made in Indian trade and land cessions. . . . The newlyindependent states thereafter replayed the same mistakes earlier made by
the British as they tried, during the confederation period, to separately
implement an Indian policy with ineffectual, limited coordination by the
national government. Again, the conflict between local desires for economic
profit and land and the necessity for coordination and centralization in
Indian regulation frustrated the efforts of the new nation to implement a
successful Indian policy after the Revolution.75

Professor Natelson agrees in part:
[E]ven purely local interactions [with the Indians] might have wider consequences—negative externalities. Negative externalities suggested a need
for central control. For example, during the British imperial period, the
regional effects of colonial failure to properly regulate trade argued for central trade regulation by the British government. [But, on] the other hand,
the cost of central control sometimes exceeded the cost of negative externalities. For example, remote British colonial administration was encumbered
by all sorts of practical problems, which argued for regulating trade at the
colonial level. Consequently, the most appropriate level of government to
handle a particular problem did not always appear obvious.76

B. The Revolutionary War and the Confederation
1. The Revolutionary War
The Declaration of Independence contained one unflattering reference to the
Indians: “[King George III] had excited domestic insurrections amongst us,
and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, merciless
Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions.”77 Nonetheless, the Revolutionary War
again made the “merciless savages” sought-after allies. But if the colonies
could not win over the Indians as allies, then it was critical at least to neutralize them.
On July 12, 1775, the Continental Congress declared its jurisdiction over
Indian tribes and pledged itself to secure and to preserve the peace and friendship of the Indian nations.78 A report from a committee on Indian affairs,
recognizing that there was a distinct possibility that the British would attempt
to enlist the aid of the Indians against the rebellion, recommended that meaId. at 1098.
Natelson, supra note 15, at 218–19.
77
The Declaration of Independence para. 29 (U.S. 1776). Apparently, this reference
was in response to the Indian murder of a Miss Jane McCrea. The Indians were under the command of British General Burgoyne. Washburn, American Revolution, supra note 52.
78
2 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774–1789, at 174–75 (1905). For a general discussion of the Indians during the American Revolution and its aftermath, see Wilcomb
E. Washburn, The Indian in America 146–69 (1975).
75
76
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sures be taken to foster friendship with the various tribes.79
In the early days of the war, neither the British nor the colonists enlisted
Indian support; both sides urged the Indians to remain neutral because the
“disputes were a family quarrel in which the Indians were not concerned.”80
Nonetheless, in the winter of 1774–75, George Washington recruited some
Indians.81 In the fall of 1775, the British General Gage used Washington’s
actions to bring the Indians into the war on the side of England.82
The British had an advantage in winning over the Indians. Because of longstanding hostility between the Indians and the land-hungry, expansionist
colonists, the Indians viewed the British as the lesser of two evils.83 Realizing
this, the Continental Congress countered with a plan directed at “securing
and preserving the friendship of the Indian nations”84 by establishing three
agencies (or departments) for the northern, southern, and middle tribes to
“treat with the Indians . . . to preserve peace and friendship.”85
These agencies replicated the British organization for handling Indian
affairs. The importance of these agencies is demonstrated by the appointment
of Benjamin Franklin, Patrick Henry, and James Wilson as commissioners of
Prucha, Policy, supra note 60, at 27.
Washburn, American Revolution, supra note 52.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
See Valencia-Weber, supra note 24, at 424 (“In the revolutionary and confederacy period,
the British, French, and Spanish each pursued advantages in political, economic, and military
alliances. Each exploited a strategically stated willingness to respect the tribes as political powers who had full title to their lands, in contrast to expansive states’ claims to title in Indian
lands.”).
79
80

The Continental Congress worried that the British would enter into a treaty with
the Western tribes, especially the Six Nations of Haudenosaunee and the Indians
of the Great Lakes and Ohio River Valley region, and those tribes would take up
arms against the Americans. Given the relative military weakness of the Americans
in the early years of the Revolutionary War and the fear of Indian-style guerrilla
warfare, the Continental Congress treated the situation with grave concern. The
Continental Congress had another reason to fear the Indian tribes—they had a much
better relationship with the British than the Americans, who the Indian tribes viewed
as a vicious and hungry competitor to their lands. The British Indian agents lobbied Indian tribes all along the Western frontier to fight against the Americans. The
Continental Congress had little choice but to deal with the Indian tribes, seeking
either alliances or tribal neutrality, as the piecemeal efforts of the individual colonies
failed.
Fletcher, Preconstitutional, supra note 59, at 545–46.
84
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 549 (1832).
85
Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 7, at 20 (quoting 2 Journals of the Continental
Congress 175, 183 (1775)); see also Worcester, 31 U.S. at 573–74 (M’Lean, J., concurring)
(“The Indian country was divided into three departments, and the superintendence of each
was committed to commissioners, who were authorised to hold treaties with the Indians, make
disbursements of money for their use, and to discharge various duties, designed to preserve
peace and cultivate a friendly feeling with them towards the colonies. No person was permitted
to trade with them without a license from one or more of the commissioners of the respective
departments.”).
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the middle department.86 In presenting a unified front to the Indians, the colonists’ goal was to “prevent their taking any part in the present commotions.”87
It was critical that the colonists, who lived along the frontiers of the Tribes, at
least neutralize the Indians. For example, the British presence in Canada pressured the young country to ratify its first treaty, with the Delawares,88 which
contained “all of the hallmarks of international diplomacy.”89
Not until the summer of 1776 did either side attempt to involve the Iroquois, the most powerful of the northeast tribes. The Iroquois initially resisted.
Uncertainty, however, about how the Indians might be affected by the war
caused bitter divisions within the Iroquois tribe itself.90 By 1776, four of the
six Iroquois nations joined the British (the Oneida91 and the Tuscarora would
join later).92 A delegation from the north composed of Shawnees, Delawares,
and Mohawks convinced the Cherokees to join the British.93 In the far south,
the Indians also stood with the British in a losing effort against the Spanish.
2 Journals of the Continental Congress 175, 183 (1905).
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 549.
88
Id. The treaty promised the free passage for the American troops through the Delaware
Nation and that the Delaware Nation would be the head of a state formed by the tribes
“friendly to the interest of the United States.” Id. at 550. The offer of statehood was withdrawn
once the Revolutionary War ended and the Delawares were no longer a critical ally. John R.
Wunder, “Retained by the People”: A History of American Indians and the Bill of
Rights 19 (1994); see also Clinton, Supremacy, supra note 7, at 125–26. A 1785 treaty with
the Cherokee Nation promised it “shall have the right to send a deputy of their choice . . . to
Congress.” Treaty with the Cherokee, U.S.-Cherokee Nation, art. 12, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat.
18 [hereinafter Treaty of Hopewell]. “Early on, there were persistent assumptions that Indian
tribes would compose states or send representatives to Congress. In recent times there have
been proposals for a ‘treaty federalism’ to include tribes in the governmental structure.” Ball,
Constitution, supra note 7, at 69. Professor Clinton cites two treaties with the Indians as promising “Indian statehood, or at least a delegate to Congress,” and notes that “[t]hroughout the
nineteenth century consideration was given to forming an Indian, rather than a multiracial,
state in the former Indian territory, now eastern Oklahoma.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note
22, at 1241 n.470.
89
Clinton, Supremacy, supra note 7, at 119–20. Before written treaties there were oral understandings marked by formal diplomatic ceremonies lasting several days, accompanied by the
exchange of presents, and promises of friendship. Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian
Treaties 26 (1994) [hereinafter Prucha, Treaties].
90
Washburn, American Revolution, supra note 52.
91
The Oneida were “one of the six nations of the Iroquois, the most powerful Indian Tribe
in the Northeast at the time of the American Revolution.” City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian
Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 203 (2005) (citing County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470
U.S. 226, 230 (1985)).
92
Washburn, American Revolution, supra note 52.
93
The Delaware Tribe vacillated between support for the Americans and support for the
British. The Tribe was undecided about which was the lesser evil. Some Delaware leaders
viewed the conflict as a way to gain powerful American support in order to “shake off Iroquois
domination,” whereas others abhorred a treaty. Celia Barnes, Native American Power in
the United States, 1783–1795, at 41 (2003). In 1778, a group of the Tribe, led by White
Eye, “signed a treaty of neutrality with the Americans that gave them right of passage across
Delaware land and included provision for a separate Delaware state” at the end of the war. Id.
Not all Delawares supported the treaty and White Eye was murdered while he was working
86
87
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2. Articles of Confederation
The so-called “Indian problem” dominated the new country. Benjamin Franklin, the author of the Albany Plan of 1754, which had attempted to centralize
control over the Indians, completed a first draft of the Articles of Confederation for the Continental Congress in 1776.94 The 1776 draft delegated to the
national government the sole and exclusive right of regulating trade and managing all affairs with the Indians.95 The draft provided that no colony could
engage in an offensive war with the Indians without Congressional consent,
nor could any colony purchase or encroach upon Indian lands. The draft also
called for a perpetual alliance with the formidable Confederacy. In addition,
the draft gave the Continental Congress the exclusive right to purchase land
from the Indians.
Professor Clinton describes this first draft as seeking to “nationalize the control of Indian affairs, including the regulation of trade and land cessions.”96
The second draft, by John Dickinson—who, like Franklin, also favored
national control—expressed the same theme: The United States assembled
shall have the sole and exclusive Right and Power of “[r]egulating the Trade,
and managing all Affairs with the Indians.”97
for the Americans. During this period, the Americans disappointed many Delawares because
the “frontiersmen continued to deny them supplies and the Continental Congress repeatedly
broke its word.” 4 Handbook of North American Indians 147 (1988). The Tribe later
shifted its allegiance to the British. Id.
94
Some historians claim that Franklin and other Founders were influenced in their thinking by the governmental structure of the Iroquois Confederacy. See, e.g., Brian Cook, Iroquois
Confederacy and the Influence Thesis (Dec. 11, 2000), http://www.campton.sau48.k12.nh.us/
iroqconf.htm. See also H. Con. Res. 331, 100 Cong. 2nd Sess. (1988) (“[T]he original framers
of the Constitution, including, most notably, George Washington and Benjamin Franklin, are
known to have greatly admired the concepts of the Six Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy.”);
supra note 46.
95
Mark Savage, Native Americans and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 16 Am.
Indian L. Rev. 57, 99 (1991).
Language to the effect that the national government had the right to regulate trade with the
Indians and manage all of their affairs would subsequently appear in Article IX of the Articles
of Confederation and in treaties. See infra notes 107−09 and accompanying text. This language has never been interpreted to mean that a tribe “was divested of self-government.” Ball,
Constitution, supra note 7, at 48.
Professor Fletcher notes that Indian advocates may object to a suggestion that Indian tribes
can be divested of inherent authority without tribal consent. They object to Cohen’s 1941
edition, see supra note 9, which stated that the tribes could be divested of inherent tribal sovereignty by Congress. To such advocates, this formulation smacks of a colonialist formulation.
Fletcher, Supreme Court, supra note 14, at 182. Cohen’s formulation was approved of in United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), and in later editions of the Handbook. Unsurprisingly,
advocates would prefer a rule that Indian tribes can be divested of authority only with their
consent. Id.
96
Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1099.
97
Preso, supra note 41, at 447 (emphasis added). For a more detailed history of this proposal, see Savage, supra note 95, at 81 n.97.
Professor Natelson describes Dickinson’s Indian affairs provision as in “some ways more
nationalistic than the Franklin draft and in some ways less.” Natelson, supra note 15, at 227.
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The debate over whether the Continental Congress should have the exclusive power over the Indians reflected diverse views. South Carolina, for example, argued that trade with the Indians was too lucrative to be ceded to the
new Congress.98 In contrast, other states favored national control because the
cost of fighting the Indians would outweigh the gains from trade.99 Some
argued that only the Continental Congress should have the power over the
Indians to stop conflicts among the colonies and between the colonies and the
tribes.100 Virginia sought to retain control over the “tributary tribes” within its
territory;101 Jefferson argued that some Indians were “living in a colony and
thus subject to [Virginia’s] laws.”102 Pennsylvania disagreed: “[w]e have no
right over the Indians, whether within or without the real or pretended limits
of any Colony.”103
The more cynical feared that federal politicians wanted the exclusive power
in order to exploit the Indians and to make their own fortunes in land speculation. Others opposed the centralization of power on more philosophical
grounds, as a matter of states’ rights. Debates over Franklin’s draft mirrored
the longstanding issue of whether the new national government should have
the exclusive power over Indians or whether control should be shared with
the states. At the least, it was understood that the states would not have the
exclusive power.

Unlike Franklin’s proposal, Dickinson granted Congress the exclusive power to acquire land
from the Indians only outside state boundaries. Id.
98

South Carolina governed Indian commerce in several different ways. Some regulations were directed at the identity of those carrying on that commerce. A trader had
to be licensed. He had to be of good moral character and post a bond. A potential
applicant’s name was posted publicly before applying, so anyone with objections
would have an opportunity to raise them. Traders were restricted as to whom they
could employ as their agents. The names of potential agents had to be disclosed.
Traders who violated these rules by, for instance, trading without a license, were subject to substantial penalties . . . In addition, South Carolina law specified where trade
could be carried on. A trader’s license stated where he was authorized to trade, and he
could not work elsewhere. It was illegal to bring natives into white settlements without prior permission. It was illegal for whites to travel into Indian country without
prior permission . . . . Apart from its thoroughness, the South Carolina scheme was
not unusual. Most of the provisions listed above appeared in the laws of other jurisdictions. They also appeared in treaties. In other words, this was the sort of scheme
the founding generations envisioned when it granted a federal power to ‘‘Regulate
Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.’’
Natelson, supra note 15, at 220–22. See also supra notes 41, 71.
99
Preso, supra note 41, at 447; Savage, supra note 95, at 81.
100
Savage, supra note 95, at 81–82.
101
6 Journals of the Constitutional Congress 1776, at 1077 (1906).
102
Savage, supra note 95, at 99–100.
103
6 Journals of the Continental Congress 1776, at 1078 (1776); see also Savage, supra
note 95, at 100.
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3. Article IX of the Articles of Confederation
A majority of representatives at the Continental Congress realized that peace
with the Indians required negotiations by a centralized body speaking on
behalf of all the colonists.104 After various iterations,105 Article IX of the Articles of Confederation, approved by the Continental Congress on November
15, 1777,106 set forth compromise language:
The United States, in Congress assembled, shall also have the sole and exclusive107 rights and power of . . . regulating the trade and managing all affairs
with the Indians,108 not members of any of the States, provided that the
legislative right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or violated.109

From the outset, Article IX was plagued by two gaping ambiguities. There
was no understanding as to which Indians were considered as “members” of a

104
But see Natelson, supra note 15, at 225 (“When Americans began to consider a common government other than the Crown, they had to weigh the same issues of how to divide
central and local control over Indian affairs. These were not easy questions. The Indian tribes
were (then as now) sui generis—neither wholly foreign nor wholly part of the body politic, so
foreign and domestic affairs precedents offered no obvious rule for dividing jurisdiction. There
certainly was not, as some writers have claimed, any emerging consensus in favor of central
over local control.”).
105
The full story is set forth in Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1099–1103.
106
Most of the debate over Article IX has not been preserved. “We do know that jurisdiction
over Native affairs remained a controversial point.” Natelson, supra note 15, at 228.
107
Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. IX (emphasis added).
108
In 1785 and 1786, the “treaties negotiated at Hopewell with the Cherokees, Choctaw,
and Chickasaw provided that the United States in Congress assembled, shall have the sole and
exclusive right of regulating trade with the Tribes. The treaties guaranteed the Tribes continued
occupancy of land in North and South Carolina and Georgia.” Brief of Respondent-Appellee
Indian Tribes, Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134 (1979) (No. 78-630), 1979 WL 200129, at *73 (internal quotations omitted) [hereinafter
Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes]; see also Treaty with the Cherokee, U.S.-Indian, art. IV, Nov.
28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18; Treaty with the Choctaw, U.S.-Indian, art. III, Jan. 3, 1786, 7 Stat. 21;
Treaty with the Chickasaw, U.S.-Indian, art. III, Jan. 10, 1786, 7 Stat. 24.
109
The Treaty of Hopewell (1785) with the Cherokee Nation contains virtually identical
language, granting Congress the right of “regulating the trade with the Indians, and managing
all their affairs.” Treaty of Hopewell, supra note 88. This treaty language is cited in Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 554 (1832). In Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall interpreted the
phrase “managing all their affairs” to exclude any effect on the internal affairs of the Tribe. Id.
Marshall “read it to mean that Congress has power to regulate trade with Indians, no more. It
did not mean that the tribe was divested of self-government. Tribal political existence was not
thus to be annihilated.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 48.
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state110 or what constituted the “legislative right” of a state.111 The result was
that the constraints on the power of the Continental Congress were vague and
unclear.112 These flaws would prove to be fatal and led Madison to describe
Article IX as “incomprehensible”113 and “obscure and contradictory.”114 For
the time being, however, Article IX allowed the Continental Congress to temporarily postpone the ultimate showdown on the appropriate distribution of
powers over the Indians.
The Articles of Confederation were approved on November 15, 1777 with
final ratification in March 1781.115 The ambiguities in Article IX played out
as expected, with conflicts between the states and the Continental Congress
over their respective powers and rights. The two ambiguities in Article IX
110

According to Madison,

Indian[s] not members of a State, must be meant those . . . who do not live within
the body of the Society, or whose Persons or property form no object of its laws. In
the case of Indians of this description the only restraint of Congress is imposed by the
Legislative authority of the State. If this proviso be taken in its full latitude, it must
destroy the authority of Congress altogether, since no act of Congs. within the limits
of a State can be conceived which will not in some way or another encroach on the
authority [of the] States.
James Madison, 8 The Papers of James Madison 156 (William T. Hutchinson et al. eds.
1973) (emphasis added).
Professor Clinton argues that “members” refers to Indian voting citizens, such as “the
Indians in the Massachusetts praying Indian towns,” Clinton, Supremacy, supra note 7, at 128,
or tributary tribes, such as existed in Virginia under feudal tutelage of that State, Clinton,
Dormant, supra note 22, at 1140–41. When the Articles were drafted in 1777, the boundaries
of the United States contained only the land claimed by the states so that all Indians within
the United States were within the geographical limits of a state. Id. at 1141. Professor Natelson
states that “[a]s contemporaneous dictionaries make clear, the requirement that an Indian be a
‘member’ of a state meant that he had to be integrated into the body-politic as a citizen—or at
least a taxpayer—of the state.” Natelson, supra note 15, at 229.
111
For Professor Clinton’s views, see Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1103–04. Article
II of the Articles of Confederation provided that “[e]ach state retains its sovereignty and
every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated
to the United States.” Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. II. According to Professor
Natelson, the combination of Articles II and IX was “a clear victory for the advocates of state
power. States would retain authority over ‘Member-Indians,’ those who had been completely
subject to state laws.” Natelson, supra note 15, at 230.
112
Professor Fletcher surmises that the Article “consisted of the squeezing together a combination of the nationalists’ proposed language and the antifederalists’ proposed language—without serious consideration of the impact it would have on the meaning of the final provision.”
Fletcher, Preconstitutional, supra note 59, at 548.
113
“And how the trade with Indians, though not members of a State, yet residing within its
legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by an external authority, without so far intruding on
the internal rights of legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible. This is not the only case in
which the Articles of Confederation have inconsiderately endeavored to accomplish impossibilities; to reconcile a partial sovereignty in the Union, with complete sovereignty in the States;
to subvert a mathematical axiom, by taking away a part, and letting the whole remain.” The
Federalist No. 42, at 236 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., Scott, Foresman & Co. 1898).
114
Id.
115
19 Journal of the Continental Congress 1781, at 213–14 (1912).
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were interpreted by some states as legitimizing their dealings with, and regulation of, the tribes. Georgia, North Carolina, and New York, for example,
continued to exercise jurisdiction over the Indians, and other states and their
residents continued to assert claims over Indian land.
In addition, some states entered into treaties with the Indians, thwarting
national attempts to do so. “The colonists chose treaty making to obtain
what they needed from the Native Americans who had superiority over
the Euro-Americans in population, military strength, possession of land,
critical resources, and knowledge for surviving in the environment alien to
newcomers.”116 “Less well known is the fact that colonies (and later states)
regularly exercised, or attempted to exercise, police power over those Native
Americans, tribal and non-tribal, who lived within their borders.”117
New York claimed the exclusive right to enter into a treaty with the Confederacy at the same time that the Continental Congress was attempting to
negotiate its own treaty.118 North Carolina and Georgia were constantly at
loggerheads with the Continental Congress. Georgia tried to negotiate its
own treaty with the Indians.119 The hope for a unified country neutralizing
the tribes in the Revolutionary War rapidly faded as many Indians fought
alongside the British.120
C. Post-Revolutionary War
The Treaty of Paris of 1783, which ended the Revolutionary War, contained
no reference to the Indians.121 Great Britain ceded whatever title it had to the
territory between the Atlantic Ocean and the Mississippi, including the lands

Valencia-Weber, supra note 24, at 421.
Natelson, supra note 15, at 223. “This power was in accordance with English case authority . . . .” Id.
118
New York, for example, acquired vast amounts of land, both before and after the adoption of the Constitution through treaties it independently negotiated. Gerald Gunther,
Governmental Power and New York Indian Lands—A Reassessment of a Persistent Problem of
Federal-State Relations, 8 Buffalo L. Rev. 1, 4–6 (1959).
119
1 American State Papers: Indian Affairs 16–17 (1832).
120
The Cherokees were among those who fought with the British. Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 551 (1832). For an extensive discussion of the conduct of the Indians during
the Revolutionary War, see Prucha, The Great Father, supra note 25, at 36–50 and Walter
Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, 1774–1788, at 37–91 (1933). See also Savage, supra note
95, at 100.
121
“Despite their important role and visible presence, [the Indians] had receded into the
shadows of European diplomacy. Recognition of their existence and status was easier to ignore
or deny in Europe than in America.” Washburn, American Revolution, supra note 52. Because
the Treaty of Paris did not include any provision for the Indian tribes, they therefore remained
technically at war with the colonists. Prucha, The Great Father, supra note 25, at 42–43.
Thus “[i]t seemed only natural and proper to the founders of the nation that Indian affairs be
placed under the War Department.” Id. at 42. Walter Mohr, however, claims that although the
“Indians are not mentioned in the treaty of 1783, yet they were a very influential factor in the
negotiations.” Mohr, supra note 120, at 93.
116
117
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of numerous tribes.122 In gaining this land, the new country realized it had
to make peace with many hostile tribes that had fought with the British in
order to avoid another prolonged—and unsustainable—conflict, especially
as Americans became increasingly expansionist.123 In their negotiations, the
Americans tried to convince the Indians that they were a conquered people
who had lost all their rights as a result of allying themselves with the defeated
British in the Revolutionary War.124 But “[n]either the Iroquois, nor the Indians of the Old Northwest, nor those of the South, tamely accepted colonial
assertions of sovereignty by right of conquest.”125
Some states made their own overtures to the Indians, but most realized that
the Continental Congress was the appropriate body to pursue peace. “[I]t is
just and necessary that lines of property should be ascertained and established
between the United States and [the Indians], which will be convenient to
the respective tribes, and commensurate to the public wants.”126 In 1784,
the Continental Congress appointed Commissioners to negotiate boundary
lines and conclude peace with the tribes.127 The United States entered into a
series of treaties by which “the ‘hatchet’ was ‘forever buried.’”128 One of these
122
Treaty of Paris, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 1-2, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80. The Spanish representative at the Paris negotiations argued that the lands west of the Appalachians belonged to the
“free and independent nations of Indians,” to which the British had no claim. Washburn,
American Revolution, supra note 52.
123
Arrell M. Gibson, Constitutional Experiences of the Five Civilized Tribes, 2 Am. Indian L.
Rev. 17, 20 (1974); Savage, supra note 95, at 100.
124
Savage, supra note 95, at 100; Washburn, American Revolution, supra note 52.
125
Washburn, American Revolution, supra note 52. “The United States was militarily weak
after 1783 and, although it at first treated the tribes as conquered nations, it quickly reversed
itself, developing the policy of compensating tribes for any land it took and arranging for treaties between tribes and the federal government to effect any transfers of property. The tribes
were upset at the United States’ highhanded policy after the war, which threatened the security
of the United States.” Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: the Supreme Court’s Attack on
Tribal Sovereignty, 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 641, 657 (2003).
126
Report of the Committee to Whom Were Referred Sundry Papers on Indian Affairs in the
Northern and Middle Departments, 25 Journal of the Constitutional Congress 682
(1922).
127
Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 7, at 22.
128
Id. (citing Treaty at Hopewell). The Continental Congress had two clauses dealing with
treaties. One dealt with treaties with the Indians; the other with foreign countries. Articles
of Confederation of 1781, art. IX, para. 1, 4. The U.S. Constitution gives the President the
power to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl.
2. The Constitution is silent on the nature of the treaty partner.

Treaties are the acts of sovereigns, and autonomy (self-government free from outside
control) is central to the definition of sovereignty. The good faith and good will of the
participants, and the belief of each that the other has the power to fulfill its obligations, are essential to the success of a treaty. Without such power, any agreement is
meaningless.
I The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas 462, 486 (Bruce G.
Trigger & Wilcomb E. Washburn eds., 1996).
These treaties varied quite significantly from each other, but the early ones tended to cover
land cessions, boundary matters, exchange of prisoners, mutual assistance, extradition, the
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treaties was with the Confederacy. In a conciliatory effort, the Continental
Congress determined the boundaries of Indian and non-Indian lands and
voided all purchases of Indian lands outside the boundaries of the states.
But states like Georgia challenged these actions and continued to negotiate
treaties with the Indians to purchase their lands,129 sometimes under suspect
circumstances.130
right to pass through Indian country, and relations with other sovereigns. See Early American
Indian Documents: Treaties and Law, 1607–1789 (Alan T. Vaughan ed.); Cohen’s
Handbook, supra note 7, at 26–33. Some early treaties provided for tribal representation in
Congress, see supra note 88, but such provisions were never implemented. Cohen’s Handbook,
supra, at 28. The overriding treaty objective of the United States was to obtain Indian lands.
Id. at 29. The early treaties referred to the tribes as sovereigns, possessing the right to govern
their internal affairs. The later treaties imposed federal controls over matters involving Indian
intercourse with non-Indians, and moved away from exclusive tribal authority. Id. at 32.
129
In 1786, Georgia signed the Treaty of Shoulderbone with the Creek Indians, in defiance
of the federal government’s exclusive power to deal with the Tribes. Preso, supra note 41, at
450.
130
As a general matter, treaties were sometimes entered into through bribery, fraudulent, or
questionable means or signed by persons who did not represent the whole tribe. Jay Kinney, A
Continent Lost—A Civilization Won 37, 44–45, 52, 71, 93–94 (1937). Tribal organizations were loose, sometimes to the point of anarchy, which meant that even though a chief
might agree to a treaty, others did not view it as binding. Axelrod, supra note 29, at 34. This
loose tribal government structure often led to splintered factions of “war” and “peace.” Id.
Friendly Indians were commonly selected as chiefs by federal officials and given
power and prestige over tribes that had their own methods for selecting leaders. Some
treaties purported to bind Indian tribes not present at negotiations by the signatures
of unauthorized head men who were unaware that their signatures would bind those
tribes. There are numerous accounts of threats, coercion, bribery, and outright fraud
by the negotiators for the United States.
Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 7, at 610. See also supra note 93. A further problem
was the language barrier. “The Indian treaties were written only in English, making it a certainty that semantic and interpretational problems would arise. When several Indian tribes
were involved, the government negotiators would sometimes use a language they believed to
be common to all tribes but which in fact carried different meaning to each.” Id. The U.S.
Supreme Court acknowledged these problems in Jones v. Meehan. 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899); see
also Choctaw Nation v. Okla., 397 U.S. 620, 630–31 (1970) (“The Indian Nations did not
seek out the United States and agree upon an exchange of lands in an arm’s-length transaction. Rather treaties were imposed upon them and they had no choice but to consent.”). These
problems help explain the Indian canons of construction for interpreting treaties. See infra
notes 251, 257, 532, 541, 619, 1057, 1302. Wilkinson and Volkman identify three canons for
interpreting treaties: ambiguous expressions must be resolved in favor of the Indians; treaties
must be interpreted as the Indians themselves would have understood them; treaties must be
liberally construed in favor of the Indians. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 7, at 617. The
explanation for these canons would seem to be limited to treaties; however, the courts have
extended the general approach to interpreting statutes.
Many treaties were entered into in bad faith, but not all of the violations can be blamed on
white perfidy. Many times the white treaty makers “fully expected that their side would abide
by the terms of the agreement[s],” but unfortunately neither the colonial nor (later) the federal
governments always had the means to force the compliance of those they governed. Axelrod,
supra note 29, at 34 (1993).
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Disputes between some of the southern states and certain Indian tribes
continued after the war and underscored the need for a strong national government that could impose order. Like the British before, the Continental
Congress was reduced to issuing proclamations that outlawed encroachments
on Indian land and that prohibited hostilities against the tribes, but these
were promptly ignored. Some states continued to enter into treaties, while
other states attacked the Indians. Georgia, for example, declared that any
Creek Indian found within the State would be put to death and subsequently
went to war with the Tribe in 1787; North Carolina was on the verge of war
with the Cherokees.131 Other states, like Virginia, aggressively intervened in
Indian affairs.132 Relations with the Indians were seriously deteriorating.133 By
the mid-1780s, “the resulting encroachment into Indian territory had lead
[sic] the young nation to the brink of Indian warfare on several fronts.”134
III. Birth of the Indian Commerce Clause
As the brief summary in the previous Section suggests, relations with the
Indians were chaotic and deteriorating when the Constitutional Convention
met for the first time on May 25, 1787. Besides the hostilities occurring in
the Ohio River Valley, the States of Virginia, Georgia, North Carolina, and
New York were negotiating on their own with the Confederacy.135
131
In 1785, North Carolina requested Congress to disavow the Treaty of Hopewell, which
defined the lands of the Cherokee Nation. Preso, supra note 41, at 450. Secretary of War Henry
Knox sided with the Indians. In general, Knox “insisted that the dignity, morality, and stability
of the new nation demanded respect for treaty obligations and tribal property rights.” Cohen’s
Handbook, supra note 7, at 33.

[T]he framers regarded Indian tribes as sovereign nations, albeit nations that would
soon either move West, assimilate, or become extinct . . . . In formulating federal policy toward Indian tribes in the early years of the Constitution, President Washington
and Secretary of War Knox followed the policy promulgated by the British Crown—
though not always followed by individual colonies—of dealing with Indian tribes as
sovereign nations. Their principal reason was practical: earlier attempts by individual
colonies and some states under the Articles of Confederation to assert power over
Indian tribes, especially power to seize tribal lands, had caused conflicts. According
to one historian, ‘‘[t]he country, precariously perched among the sovereign nations of
the world, could not stand the expense and strain of a long drawn-out Indian war.’’
Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope and Limitations, 132 Pa. L.
Rev. 195, 200 (1984) [hereinafter Newton, Federal Power]; see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers
Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary
Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 80-81 (2002).
132
Fletcher, Preconstitutional, supra note 59, at 552.
133
30 Journal of the Continental Congress 1786, at 372–74 (1934); 32 Journal of
the Continental Congress 365–69 (1936); 34 Journal of The Continental Congress
1786, at 365–69 (1936); 34 Journal of the Continental Congress 1787, at 182–83
(1937).
134
Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 7, at 24.
135
Even after the Constitution had been ratified, New York appointed treaty commissioners.
Natelson, supra note 15, at 223.
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The problems caused by state intrusions into the area of Indian affairs
became of paramount concern to the drafters of the Constitution. James
Madison referred to these problems in his introduction to the debates in
the Constitutional Convention when he included “treaties and war with
the Indians” in his enumeration of the violations of federal authority under
the Articles.136

Following adoption of the Constitution, “Secretary of War Henry Knox,
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, and President George Washington formulated a [new] policy of honor and goodwill toward the Indians.”137 This
policy was reflected in 1787 in the Northwest Ordinance:
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians, their
lands and property shall never be taken from them without their consent;
and in their property, right and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorised by Congress; but laws
founded in justice and humanity shall from time to time be made for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them.138

The Ordinance turned out to be more aspirational than real, as many states
ignored it, and bitter and violent confrontations occurred on the frontier.139
Knox also reported to Congress that a national solution to the problem of
dealing with the Indians was necessary to avoid war.140 He acknowledged that
the various state claims over the Indians under the Articles of Confederation
impeded a national solution.141 A committee of the Continental Congress
reported in that same year that the complete and undivided federal control of
Indian affairs was necessary. The Committee’s Report warned of possible war
between the Creeks and Georgia and that the Indians might be seeking trade
with Florida, then under Spanish domination.142 The Report blamed much of
the friction on a misunderstanding of Article IX.143

136
Lester Marston & David A. Fink, The Indian Commerce Clause: The Reports of its Death
have been Greatly Exaggerated, 16 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 205, 209 (1986). Professor
Natelson describes Madison as favoring a “very broad congressional power over Indian affairs
at the federal convention [but] when arguing for ratification he referred to the new congressional power in a way that equated it to trade regulation only.” Natelson, supra note 15, at 247.
137
Washburn, American Revolution, supra note 52.
138
32 Journals of the Continental Congress 1787, at 340–41 (2005).
139
Washburn, American Revolution, supra note 52.
140
32 Journals of the Continental Congress 1787, at 365–69 (2005). Professor
Natelson describes Knox as favoring Georgia and North Carolina ceding disputed territory to
the United States where it would be placed under congressional jurisdiction. Natelson, supra
note 15, at 234.
141
32 Journal of the Continental Congress 1787, at 366–68 (2005); Natelson, supra
note 15, at 233.
142
33 Journals of the Continental Congress 1787, at 455–463 (2005).
143
Brief of the Appellee Indian Tribes, supra note 108, at *75.

Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4

01-Pomp.indd 933

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=244384612/23/2010

11:03:26 AM

934

SECTION OF TAXATION

A. The Constitutional Convention
The defects in Article IX, which undercut the Continental Congress’s centralized control over Indian affairs, figured prominently in debates at the Constitutional Convention. The Continental Congress had exercised considerable
power over Indian affairs, provoking strong protests from states like New
York, North Carolina, and Georgia, which had large numbers of Indians
within their borders and wanted to control trade and land cessions. These
states regulated Indian affairs inconsistently with each other and at odds with
the Congress, with many of the regulations continuing pre-existing colonial
policies.
Because of opposition by some states, the Continental Congress was unable
to assert exclusive power over the tribes. The states, however, seemed to accept
the proposition that exclusive national authority was needed over the portions of the western frontier ceded to the national government. Even New
York, North Carolina, and Georgia recognized that the federal government
had the exclusive authority over peace and war with the Indians, even with
tribes living within those states. But this consensus broke down over lucrative
commercial issues such as land and trade.
According to Professor Clinton,
when the Constitutional Convention met in 1787 a majority view already
had emerged on two important constitutional principles: (1) the need to
complete centralization of control of Indian affairs in the national government and (2) the autonomous legal status of the tribes. The ambiguities in
[Article IX] had previously permitted room for state dissension from these
principles and the most affected states had vigorously dissented.144

Professor Natelson, however, offers a contrary view.
[T]he state-congressional jurisdictional conflict during the Confederation
period was very much a back-and-forth affair. There was no clear trend in
the direction of either local or central control.145 As far as the delegates to
the federal convention were concerned, there was no obvious precedent for
them to follow.146 The delegates, like others before them, would have to
grapple with the twin jurisdictional issues of (1) which levels of government

144
145

Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1147.
Professor Clinton comments:

[T]he evidence strongly suggests that most members of the Continental Congress
conceived the Indian tribes that had not completely lost their tribal autonomy during
the colonial period as separate political groups which were not subject in any way to
direct state regulation and were only subject to national authority in their relations
with the states and their citizens. In matters of self-government and police regulations
which did not affect the states or their citizens, the tribes were therefore viewed as
independent and not subject to white authority. . . .
Id. at 1146.
146
Natelson, supra note 15, at 235.
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regulated which substantive areas and (2) which level of government should
treat with which categories of Indians.147

Perhaps reflecting this lack of an “obvious precedent,” the Virginia Plan
submitted to the Convention in May 1787 was silent on the Indian issue.
The New Jersey148 and John Dickinson plans included commerce powers
but no specific mention of Indian affairs.149 Another draft, presented by
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, would have granted Congress “exclusive
power . . . of regulating the Trade of the several States as well with foreign
Nations” and “exclusive Power . . . of regulating Indian Affairs.”150 The Report
by the Committee of Detail followed the New Jersey and Dickinson plans. The
draft provided for Congress to “regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several States.”151 There was no specific Indian affairs clause.152
Id.
The New Jersey plan also incorporated earlier proposals setting forth a formula for determining representation in Congress. That formula excluded “Indians not paying taxes.” The formula was based on the rule for apportioning the money the states were expected to contribute
to the Continental Congress. 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 161,
236 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1986). The ultimate formula included in art. I, sec. 2, cl. 3 of
the Constitution for determining the number of members a state would have in the House of
Representatives, as well as for determining the levying of direct taxes, referred to “Indians not
taxed.” The contrast with slaves, who were counted as three-fifths of a person, suggests that the
Indians were not viewed as part of the new country, a view consistent with that of Chief Justice
Marshall in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), and Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Professor Clinton notes that the exclusion of “Indians not taxed”
provoked no debate, evidence that the Indians were not part of the “state polities” and not
members of any state. Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1149. The broad interpretation of
Article IX’s reference to “members of the state,” which some states used to justify their control
of Indian affairs, would seem to be inconsistent with the exclusion of “Indians not taxed”
from the formula, at least if “Indians not members of any of the states,” included “Indians not
taxed.” For a detailed history of this provision, see Savage, supra note 95, at 64–72.
Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment repeats the phase “Indians not taxed.” Professor
Clinton suggests this “clearly reflects the common contemporary legal understanding that
interim events, including the massive removal of Indian tribal members and the altered federalstate balance generated by the Civil War, had done nothing to change the political relationship
of Indian tribes and their people to the federal union as late as 1868 when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified.” Clinton, Supremacy, supra note 7, at 125. “Not taxed” is ambiguous.
Does it refer to federal taxes, state taxes, or both? Which taxes are referred to? Income? Sales?
Property? Does “not taxed” mean that the taxing jurisdiction cannot tax an Indian? What if it
can tax an Indian but voluntary chooses not to do so? The Attorney General has refused to rule
on these issues. Exclusion of ‘Indians Not Taxed’ When Apportioning Representatives, 39 Op.
Att’y Gen. 518, 519–20 (1940).
Professor Natelson criticizes those who assume “that all Indians not taxed were necessarily
outside state or federal political jurisdiction. The error lies in overlooking the fact that during
the Founding Era, representation was not nearly as congruent with political jurisdiction as it is
today.” Natelson, supra note 15, at 260.
149
Id. at 236.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Professor Natelson speculates that the failure to address the Indians “may have been an
oversight, although this seems unlikely. . . . Perhaps the committee thought Indian affairs
147
148
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In August 1787, a committee of the Continental Congress recommended
“the complete and undivided national control over” the Indians.153 The report
recited the usual litany of problems between the states and the Indians, with
Georgia and North Carolina singled out for their encroachments on the lands
of the Creeks and Cherokees. The committee cited the possibility of war by
the Creeks against Georgia; reported that the Tribes threatened to trade with
Florida, which was under Spanish control and, thus, viewed as an enemy;
and stated that Congress should be “promoting peace and free trade between
them and the Indians.”154 The report blamed the ambiguities in Article IX as
the source of these problems.155 The committee recognized legitimate grievances by the tribes and concluded:
The powers necessary [for dealing with the Indians] appear to the committee to be indivisible, and that the parties to the confederation must have
intended to give them entire [sic] to the Union, or to have given them entire
[sic] to the State; these powers before the Revolution were possessed by the
King, and exercised by him nor did they interfere with the legislative right
of the colony within its limits; this distinction which was then and may be
now taken, may perhaps serve to explain the proviso . . . The laws of the
State can have no effect upon a tribe of Indians or their lands within the
limits of the State so long as that tribe is independent, and not a member
of the State, yet the laws of the State may be executed upon debtors, criminals and other proper objects of those laws in all parts of it, and there the
Union may make stipulations with any such tribe, secure it the enjoyment
of all or parts of its lands without infringing upon the legislative rights in
question.156

The committee identified two solutions. The states could make liberal
grants of territory to the federal government for use by the Indians, or, in the
alternative, the states could
accede to Congress’s managing exclusively, all affairs with the Cherokees,
Creeks, and other independent tribes within the limits of the said States, so
that Congress in either case may have the acknowledged power of regulating trade, and making treaties with those tribes, and of preventing on their
lands, the intrusions of the white people.157

were best handled at the state level unless the federal government saw a need to act through
diplomatic channels—i.e., through the treaty power.” Id. If the latter is correct, then Congress
apparently changed its mind with the enactment of the Indian Commerce Clause.
153
Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, supra note 108, at *74 (quoting 33 Journals of the
Continental Congress, at 454).
154
Id. at *75 (quoting 33 Journals of the Continental Congress, at 456).
155
33 Journals of the Continental Congress, at 457–58.
156
Id. at 458–59; see also E. Parmalee Prentice & John G. Eagan, The Commerce Clause
of the Federal Constitution 349 (1898).
157
33 Journals of the Continental Congress, at 460. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
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On August 18, 1787, fifteen days after the committee reported, Madison
suggested that Congress be given the power “[t]o regulate affairs with the
Indians, as well within as without the limits of the United States,”158 which
apparently is the earliest version of what would become the Indian Commerce
Clause. There was no reference to this power being exclusive. Four days later,
the Committee of Detail suggested adding to the already drafted Interstate
Commerce and Foreign Commerce Clause the language “and with Indians,
within the Limits of any State, not subject to the laws thereof.”159 Again, there
was no mention of whether this power was to be exclusive.
One month after the committee report, the final language of the Indian
Commerce Clause—Congress shall have power “to regulate commerce . . .
with the Indian Tribes”—was added to the Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Clause provisions. There was little fanfare or debate.160 “With the adoption
of the Constitution, Indian relations became the exclusive province of federal
law.”161 Apparently no one made anything of the fact that the language of
158
James Madison, 1 Journal of the Federal Convention Kept by James Madison
549 (E.H. Scott ed. 1894).
159
Jonathan Elliot, Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 207
(1845); Savage, supra note 95, at 73.
160
Savage, supra note 95, at 75. Clinton attributes the lack of debate to the fact that all
Congress did was ratify the dominant view that “the national government had the sole and
exclusive right to regulate affairs with all sovereign Indian tribes.” Clinton, Dormant, supra
note 22, at 1158. “All the framers did at the Convention was ratify this dominant view, an
action that required and consumed little debate.” Id.

The debates over the ratification of the Constitution, both in the state conventions
and in the popular press, also failed to focus extensively on the Indian Commerce
Clause. These discussions, however, were not entirely unenlightening. Rather, they
reinforced the view that the Constitutional Convention, in adopting the Indian
Commerce Clause, sought to constitutionally protect from state encroachment the
exclusive power of the national government over Indian affairs and to constitutionally
protect the legal status of the Indian tribes as separate and sovereign peoples.
Id. Prucha states that the lack of debate at the Convention about the Indians “indicates, perhaps, the universal agreement that Indian affairs should be left in the hands of the federal
government.” Prucha, The Great Father, supra note 25, at 50.
161
City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 205 n.2 (2005) (citing
Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985) (citing Oneida
Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Oneida Cnty., 414 U.S. 661, 670 (1974))). But see Savage, supra note
95, at 75–76.
Professor Natelson rejects the views of certain commentators that there was “any emerging
consensus in favor of central over local control.” Natelson, supra note 15, at 225. He especially
rejects the views of Professor Clinton and Father Prucha. Id. at 225 n.168. With his characteristic graciousness, Natelson describes each author as “honest enough to admit the evidence to
the contrary, so each has to struggle mightily to preserve the claim of an emerging consensus
in favor of central over local control.” Id. Professor Natelson describes the Indian Commerce
Clause as a
power both narrower and broader than that enjoyed by the Confederation Congress.
It was narrower in that it did not purport to be exclusive, and it covered only commercial transactions with Indian tribes rather than all affairs with all Indians. It was
broader in that this commercial regulation was not subject to state obstruction, even
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Article IX referring to Congress having the sole and exclusive rights of regulating trade was not repeated in the Indian Commerce Clause.162
Four points are noteworthy, although they speak more to the scope of the
Indian Commerce Clause and less to whether it was meant to be an exclusive grant to the federal government. First, both the Committee of Detail’s
substitution language and the ultimate phrasing of the Clause were narrower
than Madison’s original proposal. The substitution language replaced “affairs
with the Indians” with the apparently narrower category of “commerce with
Indians.”163 The reference to “commerce” carried over into the final phrasing
when it infringed the state’s police power over persons within state boundaries. The
Tenth Amendment clarified that the states retained whatever was not granted. Among
the authority retained was police power over all persons within state boundaries, subject to being overridden by constitutional federal laws and treaties.
Id. at 243. Professor Natelson notes that “there appears to be no suggestion in the ratification
record that anyone thought any part of the Commerce Clause to be exclusive of concurrent
state jurisdiction.” Id. at 250.
162
Professor Natelson claims that the “convention records show clearly that in the delegates’
view the states would enjoy concurrent, although subordinate, jurisdiction with Congress over
Indian commerce.” Natelson, supra note 15, at 238–39. He does not cite any comments made
in the context of Indian commerce. Instead, he argues by inference from statements made in
other contexts. Id. at 238–41.
163
Professor Natelson has undertaken his own research and reviewed the extant literature on
the meaning of “commerce.”
Some have argued that the Founders intended commerce to encompass not only
trade but also all gainful economic activity, or even any and all intercourse whatever.
Although such an expansive meaning seems out-of-place in a listing of enumerated
powers—and, indeed, counter-intuitive generally—several recent studies have taken
it seriously enough to examine how the word was employed in the lay and legal contexts before and during the Founding Era. Those studies have found that, in the legal
and constitutional context, ‘commerce’ meant mercantile trade, and that the phrase
‘to regulate Commerce’ meant to administer the lex mercatoria (law merchant) governing purchase and sale of goods, navigation, marine insurance, commercial paper,
money, and banking. Thus, ‘commerce’ did not include manufacturing, agriculture,
hunting, fishing, other land use, property ownership, religion, education, or domestic
family life.
Id. at 214–15. Based on his research, Professor Natelson concluded that “commerce” meant
“trade” and that “regulation” meant the “legal structures by which lawmakers governed the
conduct of the merchants engaged in the Indian trade, the nature of the goods they sold,
the prices charged, and similar matters.” Id. at 215–16. Professor Natelson recognizes that a
section of the Indian Intercourse Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 137-38 (1790), addressed crimes committed in Indian country, which could not be described as a commercial regulation or Indian
intercourse. Id. at 252–53. Some have argued that this shows Congress intended an expansive
reading of commerce. Professor Natelson rejects this argument by citing Prucha, The Great
Father, supra note 25, for the proposition that the Indian intercourse laws were adopted
under the Treaty Power and not the Indian Commerce Clause. Id. at 254. Further, the Court
in United States v. Kagama, rejected the Indian Commerce Clause as the source of Congress’s
power in enacting the Major Crimes Act. 118 U.S. 375, 378–79 (1886), discussed infra notes
333−52 and accompanying text.
Professor Barnett concluded that “commerce” was a synonym for trade. Randy E. Barnett,
The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 101, 114–25 (2001). But
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of the Clause. The reference to “affairs with the Indians” was language that
had been used in Article IX of the Articles of Confederation and in numerous
treaties with the Indians.164 Presumably, affairs with the Indians subsumed
commerce.165
Second, the Interstate Commerce Clause refers to “commerce among the
states,” and the Foreign Commerce Clause refers to “commerce with foreign
nations.”166 Madison and the Committee of Detail referred to commerce
“with the Indians,” not “among the Indians” (and not commerce of the Indians), suggesting that the Indians were viewed more as foreign nations than
as states. Also, the use of “among the states” suggests the Founders were giving the national government the power to regulate commerce, for example,
see Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First
Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control over Social Issues,
85 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 14–21, 35–42 (1999), who argue for a broader meaning.
Professor Prakash argues that the meaning of “commerce” is the same in each of the three
Commerce Clauses. Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three Commerce Clauses and the Presumption of
Intrasentence Uniformity, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 1149 (1999). For a response, see Adrian Vermeule,
Three Commerce Clauses? No Problem, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 1175 (2003).
Professor Natelson’s research indicates that the term “affairs” was used to describe “interaction with the Indians of all kinds,” a “much broader category than trade or commerce.”
Natelson, supra note 15, at 217.
‘[A]ffair’ could include a commercial transaction, but it also could include a war, a
treaty, or a family picnic. Thus, the committee’s change would deny Congress competence over diplomacy, boundary adjustment, and other forms of intercourse, all
of which would be handled by treaty instead. A fortiori, the new language denied
Congress any form of police power over the tribes. Instead, Congress would receive
only a portion of a single Indian affairs power that, in the days before Independence,
the British had set aside for the colonial assemblies.
Id. at 238. There seems to be little controversy among commentators that the Indian Commerce
Clause was not meant to grant Congress power over a tribe’s internal affairs. Id. at 241.
164
See, e.g., Treaty with the Cherokee, art. IX, U.S.-Cherokee, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18;
Treaty with the Choctaw art. VIII, U.S.-Choctaw, Jan. 3, 1786, 7 Stat. 21; Treaty with the
Chickasaw art. VIII, U.S.-Chickasaw, Jan. 10, 1786, 7 Stat. 24.
165
Surprisingly, this narrowing of Madison’s original proposal has apparently had no effect
on how the U.S. Supreme Court interprets Congress’s plenary powers under the Indian
Commerce Clause. See Savage, supra note 95, at 116. Congress can “legislate for the Indian
tribes in all matters, including their form of government,” United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
313, 319 (1978); terminate the federal recognition of a tribe, Menominee Tribe of Indians v.
United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); and abrogate treaties with the tribes, United States v. Dion,
476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986). For a discussion of Justice Thurgood Marshall’s opinion in Dion, see
Tassie Hanna and Robert Laurence, Justice Thurgood Marshall and the Problem of Indian Treaty
Abrogation, 40 Ark. L. Rev. 797, 829-838 (1987).
Wheeler said that the tribes’ “incorporation within the territory of the United States, and
their acceptance of its protection, necessarily divested them of some aspects of the sovereignty
which they had previously exercised.” 435 U.S. at 323. For a penetrating critique of this socalled incorporation doctrine, see Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 34–42.
166
Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress had no control of interstate commerce.
Although the Articles reserved certain aspects of foreign commerce to Congress, there was
nothing equivalent to the Foreign Commerce Clause. Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, supra
note 108, at *79; see also Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. IX, para. 1.
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between Massachusetts and New York; the Founders did not claim to regulate
commerce between one tribe and another, any more than they claimed to
regulate commerce between England and France. Nor were they attempting
to regulate the internal affairs of the Tribes, an important distinction that
casts doubt on whether the Clause is the source of Congress’s plenary power
over the Indians.167
Third, the substitution language “within the limits of any state, not subject
to the laws thereof,” would, of course, have re-introduced the ambiguities
that had infected Article IX. That the language was dropped from the final
phrasing of the Clause was not surprising. Madison declared that Congressional regulation of “commerce with the Indian tribes is very properly unfettered from two limitations in the Articles of Confederation, which render the
provision obscure and contradictory.”168
Fourth, and perhaps most puzzling, was that the phrase “and with the
Indian Tribes” was substituted for “and with the Indians,” which was used by
both Madison and the committee of detail.169 There is apparently nothing in
writing explaining this change. One reasonable inference is that this change
made the Indian Commerce Clause conform with the Foreign Commerce
Clause, viewing the tribes, rather than the members of those tribes, as similar
to nations.170 The Court has not attached any significance to this change.171
Professor Frickey emphasizes that the “text of the Constitution lacks much of a hint of
any plenary power,” and nothing in the Constitution makes that plenary power legitimate.
Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian
Law, 110 Harv. L. Rev., 1754, 1760 (1997). Professor Clinton complains that “[i]t is a long,
twisted path indeed from the framers’ decision to give Congress the exclusive power to regulate commerce and other relations with the Indian tribes to the modern assertion of plenary
powers over them.” Robert N. Clinton, Reviewing Russel Lawrence Barsh and James Youngblood
Henderson, The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 846, 859 (1980)
(emphasis in original). Savage notes that the Founders viewed the Indians as nations and dealt
with them diplomatically. Savage, supra note 95, at 76.
The Lara majority, see infra notes 181, 184, 276, 563, suggested that the government’s
plenary power arises from “preconstitutional powers necessarily inherent in any Federal
Government.” 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004).
168
The Federalist No. 42, supra note 113, at 236; see also Savage, supra note 95, at 115.
169
Professor Natelson refers to the Indian Commerce Clause as governing “the trade carried
on between citizens and tribal Natives and those persons involved in that trade.” Natelson,
supra note 15, at 241 (emphasis added). He does not comment on the substitution of Indian
Tribes for Indians.
170
Cherokee Nation describes the tribes as “dependent, domestic nations,” not identical to
foreign nations. See infra notes 218–22, and accompanying text. Although Professor Fletcher
does not specifically address this question, his powerful article, The Original Understanding
of the Political Status of Indian Tribes, 82 St. John’s L. Rev. 153, 165–172 (2008), provides
invaluable insights.
171
See United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407, 418 (1865) (“[I]f commerce, or traffic, or
intercourse, is carried on with an Indian tribe, or with a member of such tribe, it is subject to
be regulated by Congress . . . .”) (emphasis added). According to one commentator, the word
“Tribe” in the Commerce Clause means a self-governing body and not Indians qua Indians,
William Draper Lewis, The Federal Power Over Commerce and Its Effect on State
167
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B. Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clauses
The Indian Commerce Clause seems to have received more debate than
the Interstate or Foreign Commerce Clauses. The Interstate Commerce
Clause was not the focus of much controversy either during the constitutional debates or in the ratifying conventions. “[N]early universal agreement
[existed] that the federal government should be given the power of regulating
commerce.”172 “The records disclose no constructive criticisms by the states
of the commerce clause as proposed to them.”173 Madison wrote that “few
oppose [the proposed Commerce Clause] and from which no apprehensions
are entertained.”174
The lack of opposition to the Interstate Commerce Clause is easy to appreciate. After the Revolutionary War, the states regulated and taxed interstate
commerce in a manner that gave them a competitive advantage over other
states, and they zealously guarded their powers.175 Unlike the Indian Commerce Clause, the Articles of Confederation reserved to the states–but did not
grant to the national government–the power to regulate foreign and interstate commerce. The Articles provided that “no treaty of commerce shall be
made whereby the legislative power of the respective States shall be restrained
from imposing such imposts and duties on foreigners, as their own people
are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any
species of goods or commodities whatsoever.”176 This distribution of power
proved unworkable because it allowed the states to continue their internecine
feuding through trade wars and trade barriers, including tariffs and duties.
The states were also unable to deal cohesively with foreign trade relations.
Trade with Great Britain, as well as with other countries, diminished with a
resulting shortage of foreign currency. Political leaders feared that economic
warfare would dissolve the union.177
The structure of the Articles with respect to interstate and foreign commerce stands in sharp contrast to the distribution of power over the Indians.
Subject to the two glaring ambiguities discussed above, Article IX granted the
exclusive power of regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians to the Congress. In drafting the Constitution, the starting point for the
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clauses was opposite to that of the Indian
Commerce Clause, although there was a recognition that federal control over
Action 21 (1892), but this interpretation seems inconsistent with Holliday, which had been
decided before Lewis’ book was published.
172
Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary
Comment, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 432, 443–44 (1941).
173
Felix Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause under Marshall, Taney and Waite 12
(1937).
174
James Madison, Federalist No. 45, at 259 (E.H. Scott ed., Scott, Foresman & Co.
1898).
175
Craig Ducat, Constitutional Interpretation 340 (6th ed. 1996).
176
Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. IX, para. 1.
177
Richard D. Pomp, State and Local Taxation 1-1 (6th ed. 2009).
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commerce was required, just like the recognition that federal control over the
Indians was required.178
The Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clauses had been approved before
the Convention took up the Indian Commerce Clause, and “[b]y this time,
the larger part of the discussion in the federal convention relative to commercial regulations was over, and in that which did take place later there is no
language relating even remotely to the Indian trade.”179
C. Two Schools of Interpretation
Notwithstanding the similarities in phrasing and grammatical construction
of the Interstate, Foreign, and Indian Commerce Clauses, the last has its own
unique history. The Indian Commerce Clause was separately dealt with by
the Founders, emerged at a different time at the Constitutional Convention,
and consequently was not intended to be interpreted in pari materia with the
other two provisions.180
At a minimum, all three clauses have come to be interpreted as establishing the plenary power of Congress.181 Two opposite interpretations have been
178
Charles Pinckney’s draft constitution would have provided that Congress had the exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce. See Abel, supra note 172, at 434.
179
Abel, supra note 172, at 468.
180
The Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clauses are not interpreted in pari materia. The
Court has acknowledged that the Foreign Commerce Clause requires a “more extensive constitutional inquiry” than the Interstate Commerce Clause. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979). The Interstate Commerce Clause was intended to “avoid
the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that plagued relations among the Colonies and
later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.” Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322, 325 (1979). The Indian Commerce Clause is “directed at economic, not political relations between the states.” Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, supra note 108, at *83.
The author of a seminal article on the Commerce Clause concluded that transactions with
the Indians were “so distinct and specialized a subject as to afford no basis for argument as to
the meaning of the rest of the clause.” Abel, supra note 172, at 468. “Indian trade was a special
subject with a definite content, which had been within the jurisdiction of Congress under the
Articles of Confederation” and “thus derived from a totally different branch of the Randolph
outline than did the control over foreign and interstate commerce.” Id. at 467. See also Robert
L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States than One, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1335, 1342
n.27 (“The exigencies of the time may have called for a more complete system of regulating
affairs with the Indians than of controlling commerce among the states.”).
Professor Prakash thinks the term “regulate” should be interpreted the same in each of the
three commerce clauses, Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 Cornell L. Rev.
1069, 1088 (2004) [hereinafter Prakash, Against], but that ignores the unique history of the
Indian Commerce Clause.
181
The term “plenary” or “plenary power” has several different meanings. One meaning is
“exclusive,” which some argue was the Founder’s intent with respect to the Indian Commerce
Clause. Another is “unlimited,” but not exclusive, which seems the meaning with respect to
the Interstate Commerce Clause. Still other meanings are possible. See David E. Engdahl,
State and Federal Power over Federal Property, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 283, 363–66 (1976); see also
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). Just because the United States has exclusive
power over the Indians vis-a-vis the states, does not mean it has that power over the tribes.
Nonetheless, with one exception, Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996), the U.S.
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Supreme Court has never struck down a federal statute directed at the Indians. Justice Thomas
seems willing to reexamine the plenary power doctrine, as well as the concept of tribal sovereignty. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 214–16 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also
Robert Laurence, Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over the Indian Nations:
An Essay in Reaction to Professor Williams’s Algebra, 30 Ariz. L. Rev. 413 (1988).
Professor Natelson describes
[c]ourts and commentators [as having] offered a variety of justifications for the plenary congressional power theory, all defective in various ways. One such justification
is the doctrine of inherent sovereign authority: that federal control over Indian affairs
is inherent in the nature of federal sovereignty. The idea is that the British Crown
transmitted extra-constitutional sovereign authority to the Continental Congress,
which then passed it to the Confederation Congress, which in turn conveyed it to
the federal government.
Natelson, supra note 15, at 204. Professor Natelson criticizes this proposition on the grounds
that it clashes with the Constitution’s theory of enumerated powers. Id., at 206. Professor
Natelson also describes the proposition as historically wrong.
As a matter of historical record, the British Crown did not transfer its foreign affairs
powers to the Continental Congress, but to the states. The Confederation Congress
did not receive its authority from the Continental Congress, but from the states. The
federal government did not receive its powers from the Confederation Congress, but
from the people.
Id., at 205–06. I would add that the British treated the tribes as sovereigns, which is why they
entered into treaties with them.
Professor Frickey argues that the
real problem with the supposed plenary power is not that it exists in the federal
government versus the states, but that the adjective ‘plenary’ makes it seem unlimited. In other words, the constitutional problem is not so much one of whether the
power should be attributed to Congress, whether through Article I or other legitimate
means, but instead one of what limits, if any, the Constitution or other sources of law
might place upon it.
Frickey, Domesticating, supra note 15, at 66–67. He concludes that plenary should mean “complete” and not “absolute.” Id.
Professor Milner Ball captures the tension between the sovereignty of the Indians and the
power of Congress as follows:
If an Indian nation is a nation, then its governmental powers cannot simply evanesce
and reappear in the hands of another nation’s government. Justice Stevens said the
tribes once exercised virtually unlimited power over their members. [Nat’l Farmers
Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851 (1985).] The story of
Native Americans and American law requires that we know at what point and by
what means a plenary power afterward passed from Indian nations to the United
States.
Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 21.
One commentator argues that no plenary power exists in the national government and
that many federal statutes are ultra vires and unconstitutional, “even though Congress enacted
them, the President signed them, and the Supreme Court upheld them.” Savage, supra note
95, at 82.
For the most detailed treatment of whether and to what extent Congress has plenary power,
see Newton, Federal Power, supra note 131; see also David Engdahl, State and Federal Power over
Federal Property, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 283, 363–66 (1976); Natelson, supra note 15, at 205–06.
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offered, however, about whether the Indian Commerce Clause was meant to
be exclusive rather than being shared with the states.
The “exclusive” view182 emphasizes the dissatisfaction with the ambiguities
in Article IX, the need for the new country to act in a unified manner with
the Indians, the experience of certain states in undercutting the Continental
Congress, and contemporaneous statements by the Founders.183 This view is
consistent with non-contemporaneous characterizations by the Court, which
describe Congress’s power under the Clause as plenary and exclusive.184 As one
For a systematic and thorough critique of the various theories granting Congress plenary
power, see Prakash, Against, supra note 180.
182
Professor Clinton is the intellectual leader of the school holding that the Indian Commerce
Clause vests exclusive powers in Congress vis a vis the states. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, The
Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 Conn. L. Rev. 1056 (1995). Under this exclusive view,
state taxes could not be applied to commerce with the tribes.
183
See Frickey, Domesticating, supra note 15, at 68 n.157 (citing James Madison, The
Federalist No. 42, at 268–69 (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) and Letter from President George
Washington to the Cornplanter, Half Town, and Great Tree, Chiefs and Counselors of the
Seneca Nation of Indians (Dec. 29, 1790), in 312 Writings of George Washington 179,
180 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed. 1939)). Of course, this does not reflect current law. See Frickey,
Domesticating, supra note 15, at 69 n.162.
184
See, e.g., Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 764 (1985) (“The
Constitution vests the Federal Government with exclusive authority over relations with Indian
tribes.”) (emphasis added); Lara, 541 U.S. at 200 (“the Constitution grants Congress broad
general powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers that we have consistently described
as ‘plenary and exclusive.’”) (emphasis added). Lara suggested that Congress may have preconstitutional power to deal with Indian affairs that is broader than the Indian Commerce Clause.
For a very perceptive analysis of Lara, see Fletcher, Preconstitutional, supra note 59; Bethany
Berger, U.S. v. Lara as a Story of Native Agency, 40 Tulsa L. Rev. 5 (2004).
The Supreme Court held in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida that
the Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of power from the States
to the Federal Government than does the Interstate Commerce Clause. This is clear
enough from the fact that the States still exercise some authority over interstate trade
but have been divested of virtually all authority over Indian commerce and Indian
tribes.
517 U.S. 44, 62 (1996). The results in the tax cases discussed infra are inconsistent with these
broad statements by the Court.
In Seminole, the Court invalidated a federal statute dealing with Indian affairs on Eleventh
Amendment grounds. Seminole is the first time the Court has struck down a federal statute
dealing with Indian affairs on constitutional grounds. Chief Justice Rehnquist identified the
question in Seminole as “whether Congress has acted ‘pursuant to a valid exercise of power,’”
517 U.S. at 55. Seminole could have been an opportunity for the Court to explore the Indian
Commerce Clause, which was a source of Congress’s right to have enacted the statute. The
majority opinion, however, went off in a different direction. For a penetrating critique of
Seminole, see Fletcher, Indian Problem, supra note 11, at 611–13.
Professor Jensen describes Seminole as
concluding that the federal government was obligated to act if it had reason to know
tribal government was misappropriating funds intended for members. If the interests
of a tribe and its members diverge in a particular case, however (which is certainly
conceivable), the federal government’s obligations are not so clear.
Jensen, supra note 9, at 21 n.113.
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commentator concluded, “it seems inescapable that the Framers intended the
Indian Commerce Clause to remove all doubt about the location of authority
over Indian commerce: The states were excluded.”185
The nonexclusive school186 emphasizes that unlike Article IX of the Articles
of Confederation, which stated that Congress shall have the “sole and exclusive rights and powers . . . regulating the trade and managing all affairs with
the Indians,”187 the Indian Commerce Clause (as well as Madison’s earlier
version and that of the Committee of Detail) does not explicitly confer exclusivity.188 This school emphasizes that when the Constitution wanted to grant
the federal government exclusive powers it did so by either explicitly using the
Two commentators describe the Indian Commerce Clause as “even more firmly grounded
on an historical basis than is national control of interstate or foreign commerce.” Marston
& Fink, supra note 136, at 206. They describe the purpose of the Clause at “nationaliz[ing]
political and economic relations with the Indian tribes and preempt[ing] state authority over
those relations.” Id.
185
Preso, supra note 41, at 453. Professor Natelson disputes this view, arguing that the “states
would retain concurrent, although subordinate, authority in the realms of Indian” commerce,
as well as with respect to interstate and foreign commerce. Natelson, supra note 15, at 241.
A former Deputy Solicitor General of the United States who argued many Indian law cases
believed that the
Clause, of its own force, arguably precludes State interference with white-Indian
intercourse, until and unless Congress otherwise provides. . . .[R]egulation of the
intercourse with the Indian Tribes is, by the Constitution, committed to the United
States exclusively. The State can intervene only by leave of federal authority, and it
bears the burden of showing such permission.
Claiborne, supra note 11, at 598. The views he expressed in his 1997–98 article preceded
Supreme Court opinions suggesting the contrary.
186
Professor Natelson provides the most scholarly view that the Indian Commerce Clause
was not meant to be exclusive. Natelson, supra note 15, at 212. Professor Natelson characterizes most of the academic commentary on the “original force of the Indian Commerce Clause”
as “confessedly agenda-driven” and “plagued by errors of historical method.” Id. at 212–13. If
the power to regulate commerce with the tribes is meant to be shared in some manner with the
states, then a court has to decide whether a state regulation or tax is an acceptable exercise of
that power. The inquiry invites a comparison with the approach the courts have used under the
dormant Interstate Commerce Clause. State taxes on interstate commerce are evaluated under
what is known as the four-part Complete Auto test, see supra note 20, infra notes 192, 367,
447, 690, 775, 789, 1006, 1084, 1126, 1213, 1281. If a dormant Indian Commerce Clause
challenge to a state tax were to be evaluated under that same Complete Auto test, a state is more
likely to prevail than if the Indian Commerce Clause were interpreted as granting exclusive
power to Congress.
187
Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. IX, para. 1 (emphasis added).
188
Professor Clinton does not discuss the failure to incorporate the “exclusivity” language
and many commentators ignore it as well. One exception is Professor Fletcher. Fletcher,
Preconstitutional, supra note 59, at 549–50. Professor Fletcher argues that the Founding Fathers
recognized at least two different classes of Indian tribes: those located within the boundaries of
the United States and those without. They believed (or wished) that the former would eventually assimilate or disappear into the states in which they were located (or move west or become
extinct). Id. at 559. No special constitutional provision would be necessary to deal with this
group because they would not continue to exist. Id. at 560. The “provisions in the Constitution
dealing with the internal Indian tribes are insufficient.” Id. at 562.
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word “exclusive” or prohibiting the states from legislating in that area. Advocates of this school also emphasize the custom and practice that existed prior
to the Constitution, proceedings at the convention, as well as statements by
the Founders.189
Under the “exclusive” interpretation, any state law that regulated commerce
with the tribes would be prohibited by the Indian Commerce Clause.190 The
primary issue for a court would be whether commerce was involved. Under
the non-exclusive interpretation, some, but not all, regulations would be prohibited.191 A court would have to draw a line between acceptable and unacceptable state regulations, similar to what occurs under the dormant Interstate
Commerce and Foreign Commerce Clauses.192 Resolving these contrary
interpretations is unnecessary for this Article because the Supreme Court has
been indifferent to the Indian Commerce Clause, no matter what version has
been put forth. The Court’s indifference has not been a function of whether
the Clause should be interpreted to adopt an exclusive test or not.
IV. Early U.S. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
A. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
The adoption of the Indian Commerce Clause did nothing to alter Georgia’s
longstanding hostility and aggressiveness toward the Cherokee Nation.193 The
discovery of gold on Cherokee and Creek lands fueled Georgia’s bloodlust
See, e.g., Natelson, supra note 15.
Although the Indian Commerce Clause was not intended to be interpreted in pari materia with the Interstate Commerce Clause, the “exclusive” interpretation has a parallel with an
earlier view of the Interstate Commerce Clause that the states could not “regulate those phases
of the national commerce, which, because of the need of national uniformity, demand that
their regulation, if any, be prescribed by a single authority.” S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S.
761, 767 (1945). That was not the original view of the Interstate Commerce Clause.
189
190

During the first few decades of operation under the Constitution, the validity of
state commercial regulations, if not pre-empted by Congress, was taken for granted.
When advocates of exclusive federal power began to raise their arguments during
the ante-bellum period, they were forced to accommodate this understanding by
classifying state commercial laws as ‘police power’ measures rather than commercial
regulations.
Natelson, supra note 15, at 211 n.68. Perhaps the best known early attempt at establishing the
exclusive power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce was Justice Johnson’s concurring
opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). Professor Natelson argues that “most of the
convention delegates would have disagreed with Justice Johnson, for they voted specifically to
leave substantial commercial powers, including the power to impose trade embargoes, with the
states.” Natelson, supra note 15, at 256.
191
See Natelson, supra note 15, at 256.
192
In the case of state taxation, the Court has developed a four-part test under the Interstate
Commerce Clause, see Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 274, discussed supra note 186 and
citations therein, and a six-part test under the Foreign Commerce Clause, see Japan Line Ltd.
v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. at 434 (1979), discussed supra note 180, infra notes 463,
1066, 1213.
193
See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). Milner Ball described Peck as
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and ultimately doomed the Indians.194
Georgia expropriated the land of the Cherokees and distributed it to various counties,195 and annulled all of the Tribe’s laws and ordinances in an
attempt to destroy the Indians as a political society.196 In Cherokee Nation v.
one of the cases that angered Georgians, [in which] the Court struck down their
reformist legislature’s attempt to undo its predecessor’s corrupt sale of the state’s western territories in the Yazoo land fraud. Although tribes were not directly involved,
the status of tribal title was indirectly and secondarily brought into play because the
territory included Indian country.
Milner S. Ball, John Marshall and Indian Nations in the Beginning and Now, 33 J. Marshall
L. Rev. 1183, 1184 (2000) [hereinafter Ball, John Marshall]. See also Jill Norgren, The
Cherokee Cases: Two Landmark Federal Decisions in the Fight for Sovereignty
87–92 (2004).
194
The Georgia Governor ordered a survey of the land containing gold and “called out the
state militia to protect [the] surveyors.” Ronald A. Berutti, The Cherokee Cases: The Fight to
Save The Supreme Court and the Cherokee Indians, 17 Am. Indian L. Rev. 291, 296 (1992). He
threatened civil war if the federal government interfered. Id.
The need for land on which to grow cotton also jeopardized the Indians.
When the cotton plantation system began its dynamic drive West across the gulf
plains after the War of 1812, a movement stimulated by the invention of the cotton
gin and the seemingly endless demand for cotton to feed the new mills in England
and the Northeast, the lands held by the Indians seemed an enormous obstacle.
Prucha, The Great Father, supra note 25, at 195. The growing of tobacco had the same
effect. See infra note 235.
The discovery of gold and high-quality farmland in the western United States in the
mid-19th century brought hordes of miners and settlers to Indian-occupied lands.
This time the government’s solution was to create reservations for the Indians, again
to separate them from the white invaders, often finding it necessary to coerce, cajole,
or force the tribes onto reservations. The fact that these reservation lands were typically barren and unproductive did not matter because, the government rationalized,
the Indians would occupy them only temporarily pending their assimilation into the
larger society.
Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, 16 Pub.
Land L. Rev. 1, 3 (1995). In 1875 gold was discovered in South Dakota’s Black Hills, resulting
in the invasion by the United States Army in contravention of treaty agreements, ultimately
leading to the Sioux’s attacking Custer under the leadership of Chiefs Crazy Horse and Sitting
Bull. Edward Lazarus, Black Hills White Justice: The Sioux Nation Versus the United
States, 1775 to the Present 72–88 (1991).
195
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 542 (1832). Apparently, “Cherokee land was
sold at public lottery.” Berutti, supra note 194, at 297.
196
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15 (1831). The Cherokees had proclaimed
themselves to be an independent state outside the jurisdiction of the United States. Berutti,
supra note 194, at 297. The Georgia laws “declared the Cherokee lands to be ‘Cherokee County’
within the State of Georgia, and designated this as ‘surplus’ land to be opened to Georgia
citizens for settlement by lottery. Indians were denied the right to appear in court under this
legislation, and non-Indians living within this Cherokee area were required to obtain a permit
from officials of the State of Georgia . . . [T]ribal lands were overrun by Georgians who stole
horses and cattle, ejected Indians from their homes, and seized their property. . . At Georgia’s
request, President Jackson removed federal troops from Indian land and turned all law enforcement, including tribal criminal law, over to the state.” Rennard Strickland, The Tribal Struggle
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Georgia,197 the Tribe sought from the U.S. Supreme Court an injunction to
restrain the State.198 John Marshall was Chief Justice, and this case would be
one of his three seminal and foundational decisions on Indian law: the socalled Marshall trilogy (although “trinity” might be an equally appropriate
term).199
for Indian Sovereignty: The Story of the Cherokee Cases, in Race Law Stories 37, 41–44 (Rachel
F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds. 2008).
For a discussion of how Georgia’s laws worked in practice, see Rennard Strickland & William
M. Strickland, A Tale of Two Marshalls: Reflections on Indian Law and Policy, The Cherokee
Cases, and the Cruel Irony of Supreme Court Victories, 47 Okla. L. Rev. 111, 121–22 (1994).
In the 1820’s several states passed statutes (known colloquially as ‘Indian laws’) bringing Indians within their borders under the jurisdiction of state courts. Indians were
required to pay taxes, serve in the militia, and work on state highways. They could be
sued in state courts for trespass or debt. Their tribal laws were declared to be superseded by state law, and punishments were prescribed for those attempting to enforce
tribal laws. Those statutes were predicated on the assumption that the legal status of
Indians approximated that of persons owing legal obligations to the state in which
they resided rather than that of members of independent nations.
G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change 1815–1835, at 711
(1988).
197
30 U.S. (6 Pet.) 1 (1831).
198
Id. at 1. In an earlier case, a Georgia court convicted a Cherokee of murder committed on
Cherokee land. The U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of error to review the conviction but
Georgia refused to honor the writ and hanged the Cherokee in defiance. Cohen’s Handbook,
supra note 7, at 49; Rennard Strickland, The Tribal Struggle for Indian Sovereignty: The Story
of the Cherokee Cases, in Race Law Stories 37, 44 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado
eds. 2008).
199
The other two cases were Johnson & Graham’s Lessee v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
543 (1823) [hereinafter Johnson v. M’Intosh], which preceded Cherokee Nation, and Worcester,
which shortly followed Cherokee Nation. Professor Wilkinson apparently coined the phrase
“Marshall Trinity” in Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 24.
Johnson v. M’Intosh involved a dispute between two non-Indians over title to non-Indian
land that each claimed. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 571–72. The land was a vast tract in Illinois
between the Illinois and Wabash rivers. Id. Chief Justice Marshall held that the person whose
title flowed from the United States, which purchased the land from a tribe, had better title than
the party whose title flowed from a sale from a tribe to a non-Indian. Id. at 592. No Indian or
tribe was a party to the case. Johnson v. M’Intosh has been described as the first judicial expression of a federal power and a federal responsibility over Indian land and Indian affairs. Vine
Deloria Jr. & Clifford Lytle, American Indians, American Justice 27 (1983).
For one of the best and thorough discussions of Johnson v. M’Intosh, see Lindsay G.
Robertson, Conquest by Law: How the Discovery of America Dispossessed Indigenous
Peoples of Their Lands (2005). See also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall
Trilogy, 82 N. D. L. Rev. 627, 631–39 (2006); Norgren, supra note 193, at 92–95; Philip
P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in
Federal Indian Law, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 381, 385–90 (1993) [hereinafter Frickey, Marshalling].
White, supra note 196, at 710 (“natural rights of human beings to dispose of property that
they held by virtue of possession did not apply to Indians in America.”).
A 16th century champion of Indian autonomy, Dominican priest and scholar Francisco
de Victoria contended that there was no legitimate title to Indian lands by right of discovery,
only by conquest or voluntary consent. Francisco de Victoria, De Indis et De Jure Belli
Relectiones § 2, propositions 8-16 & § 3, proposition 1 (Ernest Nys ed., John Pawley Bate
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Georgia disputed the Court’s jurisdiction and refused to appear.200
The Cherokees’ legal right to their lands was not doubted. According to
Professor Kent Newmyer, Chief Justice Marshall’s prominent biographer:
The legal right of the Cherokees to their land seemed fully secured by a
series of treaties with the federal government, the most important of which
were the Treaty of Hopewell (1785) and the Treaty of Holston (1791).201
These treaties, in addition to several federal statutes, had encouraged the
Indians to give up their native traditions in favor of American “civilization.” Under the leadership of a mixed blood elite, Georgia’s Cherokees did
just that.202 With the encouragement of the Adams administration, they
trans., Williams S. Hein & Co. 1995) (1557). See also supra note 36. Realizing that the Indians
would not understand the European Law of Nations, Victoria suggested that a civilized nation,
Spain, become the Indians’ guardian. Id. § 3, proposition 18.
Dean Getches describes the Marshall trilogy as exhibiting “a self-conscious concern with
the moral justification for a theory that allowed Europeans to extinguish Indian land title
and to curb, by their very presence, pre-existing powers of tribal self-government.” Getches,
Conquering, supra note 14, at 1579. Some “scholars question the authenticity of Marshall’s
professed agony over the morality of the doctrine and its contradictions with natural law.” Id.
at 1580 n.24. Nowhere does Marshall justify the legality or morality of the subjugation of the
Indians. He would not “enter into the controversy, whether agriculturalists, merchants, and
manufacturers, have a right, on abstract principles, to expel hunters from the territory they
possess, or to contract their limits.” Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 588. Marshall repeated
similar sentiments in Worcester, 31 U.S. at 543, treating the issue as nonjusticiable.
200
Georgia Governor Lumpkin was outraged at the impudence of summoning his State
before the Court. He described the Cherokee Nation as a “few savages residing within the territory of Georgia.” Claiborne, supra note 11, at 588. Georgia’s opposition to the Court dated
back to Chisholm v. Georgia, in which a citizen successfully sued the State for amounts owed for
goods supplied to Georgia during the Revolutionary War. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). Georgia
did not appear before the Supreme Court on the grounds that as a sovereign it could not be
sued without its consent. Instead, Georgia lobbied Congress for a change in the law to limit
the Court’s jurisdiction. Norgren, supra note 193, at 100.
Georgia ignored the decision in Chisholm, which was overturned by the Eleventh
Amendment. R. Kent Newmyer, Chief Justice John Marshall’s Last Campaign: Georgia, Jackson,
and The Cherokee Cases, 23 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 76, 78 (1999). Even though Georgia did not
appear in Cherokee Nation, Marshall nonetheless “assumed the truth of the underlying facts
and legal conclusions alleged by the Cherokee.” Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 199, at 391.
201
Georgia had protested the Treaty of Hopewell on the grounds that the “pretended treaty,
and all other proceedings that have yet transpired, are a manifest and direct attempt to violate
the retained sovereignty and legislative right of this State, and repugnant to the principles and
harmony of the Federal Union.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1115. North Carolina
similarly refused to recognize the Treaty because its interests were not represented. President
Washington did not enforce the Treaty against North Carolina, which had not yet ratified the
Constitution. By the time it did so, there were too many settlers within Cherokee territory to
make enforcement feasible. The result was that a new treaty, the 1791 Treaty of Holston, had to
be negotiated. When Tennessee complained about this new treaty, President Adams negotiated
the Treaty of Tellico. Berutti, supra note 194, at 295.
202
The Cherokees had a “‘ruling elite’ that consisted of the wealthier, English-speaking,
mixed blood members of the Nation, and who were opposed in many of their goals by other
members, although not on the goals of cultural diversity and separatism. . . . Those members
of the Cherokees that favored maintenance of ancient tribal customs and practices were condemned by the elite Cherokees as ‘aboriginal.’” White, supra note 196, at 716.
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developed domestic agriculture, a written language, and a constitution.203
Ironically, it was this very progress of Americanization, along with perennial land greed and the discovery of gold on Indian land, which prompted
Georgia to move against the Cherokees.204

1. Article III of the Constitution
The Cherokees faced what would be an insurmountable barrier to the
Court’s jurisdiction. Under Article III of the Constitution, the Court
has jurisdiction over controversies between a state and foreign states.205
Consequently, the issue was whether the “Cherokee nation [was] a foreign state in the sense in which that term is used in the constitution[.]”206
203
The Cherokees, Creeks, Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Seminoles, “collectively known as
the ‘Five Civilized Tribes,’” responded to aggression by the settlers with a strategy of “passive
defense.” Berutti, supra note 194, at 294. They strengthened their internal institutions, invited
missionaries onto their territories, centralized their governments, supported literacy programs,
created a written alphabet for the Cherokee language, published the first Indian newspaper,
developed a legal system, and entered into treaties with the United States. Id.
204
Newmyer, supra note 200, at 81. The reference to “progress of Americanization” is unclear
because land greed and gold would seem to have been enough on their own to have doomed
the Cherokees. Id.
205
The U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, . . . to Controversies . . . between a State, or
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.” U.S. Const. art III, §2, cl. 1.
206
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831). William Wirt, who represented the Cherokees along with John Sargent, sought an informal opinion from Chief Justice
Marshall on the jurisdictional issue before filing the case. Chief Justice Marshall “thought it
his duty to refrain from indicating any opinion” on the issue. White, supra note 196, at 721.
Strickland says that Wirt asked Judge Carr to probe Marshall’s views. Rennard Strickland, The
Tribal Struggle for Indian Sovereignty: The Story of the Cherokee Cases, in Race Law Stories
37, 46 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds., 2008). Putting aside his representation
of the Cherokees, Wirt personally believed—as did Marshall, Story, and Madison—that the
Indians were savages and incompatible with civilized society. “If ‘civilizing’ [the] Indians could
not solve their plight, dispossession and removal” were required. White, supra, at 722. Each felt
that the Indians’ possession of land yielded no natural rights of ownership. Id.
“Wirt was one of the most distinguished and well-known attorneys of the age . . . When
first approached, he was reluctant to take the case, but he was ultimately persuaded to represent
the Cherokee Nation by the injustices being suffered by the tribe and the influence of his old
friend Daniel Webster. The Cherokee people held Wirt in such esteem that for generations
young men were given his name.” Strickland, supra, at 43.
Wirt also argued Worcester v. Georgia, discussed infra notes 229−99.

The first major step in federal policy regarding the Indians was the removal of many
Eastern tribes to lands west of the Mississippi River to make room for non-Indian
settlement. Indians resisting removal were told that if they remained in the East they
could not expect the federal government to protect them. They were told they would
have to submit to state jurisdiction and state law because the Constitution made
no provision for separate sovereigns to exist within a state. To encourage voluntary
removal, the Indians were told that west of the Mississippi they would be forever free
from state and federal interference.
Johnson & Martinis, supra note 194, at 2–3. See also Angie Debo, A History of the Indians
of the United States 117–49 (1970).
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Chief Justice Marshall,207 writing for himself and Justice M’Lean,208 attempted
207

As Newmyer notes, The Cherokee Cases arose out of an old Georgia antipathy to the
Court and arrived in a highly-charged political atmosphere when the Chief Justice
was beset with troubles of all kinds: his wife’s death, his own old age and illness,
the threat of states’ rights ideology, the rise of Jacksonian democracy, and in-house
divisiveness among the Justices marked by their abrupt abandonment of a shared
boardinghouse life in Washington.
Ball, John Marshall, supra note 193, at 1183. Marshall was “no particular friend either to state
sovereignty or to the Jackson administration.” White, supra note 196, at 730. The case came
to the Court “in the midst of Marshall’s personal and political woes . . . Andrew Jackson was
elected President in 1828, and in his first message to Congress, he made it clear that he supported removal of the Cherokee. Congress responded with the Removal Act of 1830.” Ball,
John Marshall, supra note 193, at 1184.
As soon as the results of the 1828 election were known, Georgia extended its laws
over the Indians within the state. . . . Jackson [later] told Congress, ‘years since I
stated my belief to them that if the states chose to extend their laws over them it
would not be in the power of the federal government to prevent it.’
Michael Paul Rogin, Fathers and Children: Andrew Jackson and the Subjugation of
the American Indian 212–13 (Transaction Publishers, 1991).
208
M’Lean had recently been appointed by President Jackson and was a presidential aspirant. Norgren, supra note 193, at 100. Professor Norgren does not comment on whether the
appointment was meant to remove a political rival of Jackson’s. She describes M’Lean’s earlier
opinions as being “often guided by political aspirations.” Id. at 105.
Only six Justices heard the case. Justice Johnson concurred in a separate opinion, referring to the Indians as a “people so low in the grade of organized society” as not to be taken
seriously, Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 21 (Johnson, J., concurring), as “nothing more
than wandering hordes, held together only by ties of blood and habit, and having neither
laws or government, beyond what is required in a savage state,” id. at 27–28, as a “petty kraal
of Indians,” id. at 25, which existed in a state of “feudal dependence,” id. at 24. He used the
term “master and conqueror,” id. at 27, to describe the Tribes’ relationship with the United
States. Johnson thus rejected any concept of territorial sovereignty. Gould, Consent, supra note
6, at 820. President Jefferson had appointed Justice Johnson to break Marshall’s hold on the
Court. Johnson sought to justify his opinion with “tortured and ethnocentric legal distinctions
concerning the meaning of a state, a foreign state, and a member of the family of nations.”
Norgren, supra note 193, at 107.
Justice Baldwin concurred in an opinion describing the Treaty of Hopewell as “an indenture
of servitude.” Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 39. Both Justices Baldwin and Johnson
concluded that the Cherokees had no sovereignty at all.
Baldwin joined the Court two months before oral arguments in Cherokee Nation. “While
mental illness and an inconsistent jurisprudence limited Baldwin’s intellectual contributions in
the course of his judicial career, his opinion in Cherokee Nation was not at odds with several
of the themes in his later work, namely, concern for state power and the unwarranted extension
of Supreme Court power.” Norgren, supra note 193, at 106.
Justice Thompson dissented, joined by Justice Story. Professor Newmyer states that Chief
Justice Marshall encouraged Justices Thompson and Story to dissent, Newmyer, supra note
200, at 86, presumably to balance Justices Johnson and Baldwin. Justice Thompson wrote a
long opinion challenging the majority on both the jurisdictional and substantive issues. The
dissent argued that the Cherokees did not surrender their status as a foreign nation by being
dependent on the United States for military defense. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at
53 (Thompson J., dissenting). The Indians reserved their right to self-government and did not
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4

01-Pomp.indd 951

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=244384612/23/2010

11:03:29 AM

952

SECTION OF TAXATION

lose their sovereignty. Id. at 53.
Justice Thompson was appointed by President Monroe in 1823. “Although not always supportive of the strong national powers promoted by Justice Story, Thompson had been born in
New York State and educated at Princeton. He brought a northerner’s perspective to the question of Indian sovereignty.” Norgren, supra note 193, at 106.
Justice Duvall was not present due to the mental illness of his son. When the original decision was handed down no dissents were announced. Because only Justice M’Lean joined Chief
Justice Marshall, the opinion was a plurality opinion and, as Professor Frickey characterizes
it, “something of a middle ground, and it is relied upon today despite its lack of complete
precedential value.” Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 10 n.38. Strickland describes the
opinion as a “two, two, two split, with Marshall and McLean deciding that the Court did not
have original jurisdiction but that the Cherokees were entities with specific rights. . . . Baldwin
and Johnson decided that the Cherokee were not a state and had very few, if any, rights. Story
and Thompson, on the other hand, decided that the Cherokees were entitled to original jurisdiction as a foreign state with independent legal and political rights. In another, broader sense,
the court split might also be seen as a four to two decision, affirming Indian rights but denying
the tribe the right to present its case before the Court.” Rennard Strickland, The Tribal Struggle
for Indian Sovereignty: The Story of the Cherokee Cases, in Race Law Stories 37, 48 (Rachel F.
Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds. 2008).
Justice Story was a “Massachusetts lawyer and scholar,” who “emphasized the values of
republicanism, nationalism, and the liberalism of John Locke in his jurisprudence. His vote
against Georgia in Cherokee Nation reflected his New England roots, an unyielding commitment to the powers of the national government over those of the states, and an abiding faith in
private property rights.” Norgren, supra note 193, at 108.
Chief Justice Marshall wanted the plight of the Cherokees to be made public. He was anxious to keep the issue of Georgia’s dispossession of the Cherokees in the public domain and
help defeat President Jackson in the 1832 presidential election.
Marshall was already losing control of the Court as Jackson’s appointees split with
him on fundamental issues of constitutionalism and the relationship between the federal government and the states. He hoped a Republican president would appoint his
protégé, Justice Story, as Chief Justice to replace him, so that he could retire knowing
his federalist legacy was safe.
Robert T. Anderson, Bethany Berger, Philip P. Frickey & Sarah Krakoff, American
Indian Law 62 (2nd ed. 2010).
Curiously, given the great importance of the case and the increasing practice of filing
concurring and dissenting opinions, initially neither Justice Thompson nor Justice
Story submitted a written opinion to be published as part of the official court record.
When the spring session of the court closed a few days after the announcement of
the Cherokee Nation decision, Chief Justice Marshall decided that the unbalanced
nature of the public record would not do. Seeking to alter this and perhaps regretting
his own vote, the chief justice took the unusual step of suggesting that Thompson and
Story draft an opinion outlining their arguments in support of Cherokee claims.
Norgren, supra note 193, at 108–09.
The Court’s Reporter, Richard Peters, collaborated with Chief Justice Marshall and Justices
Story and Thompson in publishing a pamphlet, The Case of the Cherokee Nation Against the State
of Georgia, which included all of the opinions, James Kent’s paper supporting the Cherokees
on the jurisdictional issues, and the relevant treaties and statutes. White, supra note 196, at
730. Justice Story thought that the pamphlet would “do a great deal of good,” “unite the moral
sense . . . of our people,” and “sink to the very bottom of their sense of Justice.” Id.
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to resolve the unique political status of a tribe.209 Marshall observed that
“[t]he condition of the Indians in relation to the United States is perhaps
unlike that of any other two people in existence. In the general, nations not
owing a common allegiance are foreign to each other.”210 Nonetheless,
[t]he Indian territory is admitted to compose a part of the United
States. . . . They acknowledge themselves in their treaties to be under the
protection of the United States; they admit that the United States shall have
the sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with them, and managing all their affairs as they think proper . . . .211 [I]t may well be doubted
whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of
the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations.
They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent
nations.212 They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of
their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of
possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage.213 Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.214 They
look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power;
appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great
father.215
209
One commentator claims that the opinion was written in two days, Walters, supra note
11, at 127 n.4; another claims the Court issued its opinion in four days after the oral argument, White, supra note 196, at 724. According to one commentator, the politics of the time
made it impossible for Chief Justice Marshall to rule in favor of the Cherokees. Berutti, supra
note 194, at 298–99. In addition, the Cherokees’ “choice of chief counsel, former Attorney
General William Wirt,” a political enemy of President Jackson, was “suicidal to their case.”
Id. at 300. See also supra note 206. For a general discussion of the case, see Norgren, supra
note 193, at 98–111, who describes Marshall as “extricat[ing] the court from the rough seas
of politics with procedural sleight of hand,” the way he had done “decades before in Marbury
v. Madison.” Id. at 100.
210
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16. While not all that common, there are sovereigns
that are geographically located entirely within other sovereigns. Examples of these “enclaves”
include San Marino, Vatican City, and Lesotho. It is also common that countries enter into
mutual defense pacts.
211
Id. at 17.
212
Professor Clinton argues that the term “dependent” was not “a statement of political inferiority or a statement of federal supremacy, but, rather . . . an implied criticism of the political
branches of the United States government which had failed to enforce the treaty obligations of
protection when requested to do so by the Cherokee Nation.” Clinton, Supremacy, supra note
7, at 141. In contrast, the Cohen treatise states “[t]hey are denominated . . . dependent because
they are subject to federal power.” Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 7, at 1. The tenor of the
opinion supports Cohen. See also Johnson & Martinis, supra note 194, at 14 (“In international
law, the use of the dependency criterion makes sense: a domestic dependent nation could not
have its own foreign relations powers without potentially compromising the foreign affairs of
the nation upon which it is dependent.”). See also supra note 210.
213
“Likening tribes to wards in ‘a state of pupilage’ was not intended as a compliment, but
with that status comes certain expectations about the behavior of the American national government.” Jensen, supra note 9, at 22.
214
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
215
Id. Professor Jensen describes the use of the ward-guardian metaphor as “condescending.” Jensen, supra note 9, at 21. As Professor Jensen perceptively notes, concepts like ward-
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Accordingly, the Court determined, “the framers of our constitution had
not the Indian tribes in view, when they opened the courts of the union to
controversies between a state . . . and foreign states.”216
Additionally, Chief Justice Marshall made much of the construction of the
Commerce Clause. “In this clause they are as clearly contradistinguished by
a name appropriate to themselves, from foreign nations, as from the several
guardian, state of pupilage, references to the President as the great father, and the trust doctrine
in general, “could call into question the tribes’ status as sovereigns. The trust obligation need
not be interpreted in that way: one sovereign nation may have obligations to act in the best
interests of a weaker sovereign nation without diminishing the weaker nation’s sovereignty. The
tension nonetheless exists.” Jensen, supra note 9, at 22. For a devastating critique of the trust
doctrine, see Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 61–66. For a general discussion, see Stephen L.
Pevar, The Rights of Indians and Tribes 32–45 (3rd ed. 2002).
The “ward-guardian” language did not stop the government from entering into treaties with
its “wards.” Felix Cohen warned that talk of a guardian and ward relationship would legitimize
“congressional legislation that would have been unconstitutional if applied to non-Indians.”
Cohen, supra note 11, at 170. The “ward-guardian” language has been described as the “first
judicial formulation of the trust relationship between the United States and the American
Indians.” Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 7, at 613. Professor Natelson views the guardianship analogy as implying “a restricted, fiduciary power. The Founders themselves used the
fiduciary analogy to emphasize the limited nature of federal authority.” Natelson, supra note
15, at 206. That language, however, came to serve as the rationale for expansive federal legislation. See supra notes 214−15 and accompanying text; infra notes 352, 434. A resolution by the
House of Representatives states that “from the first treaty entered into with an Indian Nation,
the treaty with the Delaware Indians of September 17, 1778, the Congress has assumed a trust
responsibility and obligation to Indian tribes and their members.” H. Con. Res. 331, 100th
Cong. 2nd Sess. (1988).
216
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 18. Chief Justice Marshall made no attempt to examine any of the debate over Article III, but he did assert that
[a]t the time the constitution was framed, the idea of appealing to an American court
of justice for an assertion of right or a redress of wrong, had perhaps never entered
the mind of an Indian or of his tribe. Their appeal was to the tomahawk, or to the
government. This was well understood by the statesmen who framed the constitution
of the United States, and who might furnish some reason for omitting to enumerate
them among the parties who might sue in the courts of the union.
Id. Professor Norgren claims this statement “was nothing more than a falsification of history.
Since the middle of the seventeenth century Native Americans had been frequent litigants in
colonial courts.” Norgren, supra note 193, at 101. Professor Williams agrees. “Marshall’s argument by inference in Cherokee Nation conveniently ignored numerous well-publicized instances
where tribal Indians asserted claims in white colonial courts. As in [Johnson v. M’Intosh] the
Chief Justice felt compelled to legitimate the denial of fundamental rights to Indian tribes on
the basis of their Eurocentrically-perceived deficient and uncivilized character. Like all great
theorists and systematizers of the European legal tradition, Marshall performed a bold and
reconciling act of critical amnesia.” Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law:
The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986
Wis. L. Rev. 219, 257–58 [hereinafter Williams, Algebra].
Professor Norgren claims that Marshall “‘was willing to sacrifice the rights of the Cherokee
people’ for political motives, and that his characterization of tribes as ‘domestic dependent
nations’ instead of declaring them foreign nations was a ‘transparent ploy.’” She deplores the
result as based on “tortured and ethnocentric legal distinctions.” Norgren, supra note 193,
at 92–95.
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states composing the union.”217 The Clause “does not comprehend Indian
tribes in the general term ‘foreign nations;’ not we presume because a tribe
may not be a nation, but because it is not foreign to the United States.”218
Consequently, Chief Justice Marshall concluded the Tribe was not a foreign
nation within the meaning of Article III so that the Court lacked jurisdiction.219
2. The Oxymoronic Domestic Dependent Nation
The oxymoronic category of “domestic dependent nation”220 was Marshall’s
solution to characterizing “distinct political societies with the power of self
government and the right to make treaties that have the force of supreme
law but who, in those same treaties, were recognized as ‘dependent’ on the
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 18.
Id. at 19.
219
Professor Frickey describes the structure of the opinion, “discussing the merits first and
jurisdiction last and finding the absence of jurisdiction a convenient way to avoid a direct confrontation between the Court and a powerful institutional opponent,” as similar to Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 199, at 391 n.45.
Wilkinson and Volkman concur, comparing Cherokee Nation to Marbury v. Madison, “where
Chief Justice Marshall also held that the Court did not have jurisdiction, but established the
basic constitutional law principle of judicial review. . . . The jurisdictional ruling in Cherokee
Nation permitted Chief Justice Marshall to set forth important legal principles, while, at the
same time, rendering no affirmative order; because there was no order to enforce there was no
order to disobey.” Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 7, at 613 n.60.
220
The term encapsulates the tension that marks Indian law more generally. See Jensen, supra
note 9, at 21–27. Justice Thomas recently recognized this tension. “[T]he tribes either are or
are not separate sovereigns, and our federal Indian law cases untenably hold both positions
simultaneously.” United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 215 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Professor Natelson argues that the use of the term “nation” by members of the founding
generation
217
218

has induced some to conclude that the Founders “regarded Indian tribes as sovereign
nations, with the ability to make war, treaties, and laws for their own people.” From
this it has been inferred that American governments had no political jurisdiction over
tribes within their borders. Yet . . . colonial and state governments did exercise police
powers over Indians within their borders, including tribal Indians. . . . Referring
to tribes as “nations” was consistent with exercising political jurisdiction over them
because at the time the word “nation” did not necessarily evoke the association with
political sovereignty it evokes today. The more common meaning of “nation” followed its Latin root, natio, in referring merely to a people or ethnic group or the
inhabitants of a general territory. . . . To be sure, the contemporaneous definition of
“nation” did not exclude the possibility that some tribes were thought of as sovereign.
A member of the founding generation might well think of some tribes as sovereign
entities. But one cannot generalize from the use of the word “nation” to a conclusion
that the Founders thought all tribes were sovereign.
Natelson, supra note 15, at 259. Presumably, however, the use of the same term within the
Foreign Commerce Clause was meant to suggest political sovereignty.
Professor Norgren explains that “domestic” means that the Indian territories were located
within the exterior boundaries of the United States; dependent means that limitations were
placed on them with respect to war and foreign negotiations; and national means they were
distinctly separate peoples outside the American polity. Norgren, supra note 193, at 103.
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United States and whose trade with the United States could be regulated by
Congress.”221 Professor Krakoff captures the essence of the term by describing
Marshall as struggling to “mediate the realpolitik of the times; Indian nations
had been absorbed within the American legal framework against their will,
and there was little the Court could do but recognize their status as ‘dependent’ sovereigns, but sovereigns nonetheless.”222
Chief Justice Marshall had a more ambitious agenda, however, than merely
interpreting Article III. Marshall’s opinion could have reached the same conclusion—that the Cherokees were not a foreign nation—without any discussion of sovereignty or of the Cherokees’ status as a nation. For jurisdiction to
exist under Article III, the Tribe had to be both “foreign” and a “nation.” It
was not “foreign” regardless of its status as a “nation.” The opinion could have
been limited to that issue. That Marshall’s decision spoke in general terms
about the Indians, rather than specifically about the Cherokees, and discussed
the Indians’ sovereignty as nations, indicates an agenda well beyond that of
resolving the issue before the Court.223
In his opinion, Marshall expressed great sympathy for the Cherokees:224

Newmyer, supra note 200, at 85.
Sarah Krakoff, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York: A Regretful Postscript
to The Taxation Chapter in Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 41 Tulsa L. Rev. 5, 19
(2005). Professor Norgren characterizes Marshall as “protecting the future of the Supreme
Court by side-stepping further confrontation between the judiciary and Georgia and the
Jackson administration.” Norgren, supra note 193, at 102.
223
Professor Norgren characterizes much of the opinion as dictum and a corrupt reading of
history. Norgren, supra note 193, at 101.
224
According to Professor Newmyer,
221
222

[Marshall’s] personal views of Native Americans were conflicted. As with slavery, he
was torn between a humane concern for their rights as human beings, and a realistic
recognition of the cultural obstacles to the realization of those rights. Judging from
Virginia history, which is what Marshall did, the obstacles were formidable. Except
for a brief interlude when there was mutual respect between the colonists and Native
Americans, the story in Virginia was largely one of deception and aggression on the
part of a relentlessly advancing Anglo-civilization marked by bloody frontier warfare
in which whites and reds alike shared in the barbarities. Marshall came of age in
this hostile environment . . . Marshall grew up thinking of Indians as “savage” . . . .
When allied with Great Britain, France, and Spain, as they were at various times in
Marshall’s life, he saw them as enemies of the new nation. At the same time (especially when it became clear that ultimate victory would go to the better armed and
more numerous Americans), he saw Indians as victims in need of protection . . . .
R. Kent Newmyer, Chief Justice John Marshall’s Last Campaign: Georgia, Jackson, and the
Cherokee Cases, 23 J. of Supreme Ct. Hist., at 79 (1999). Marshall’s opinions in Cherokee
Nation and Worcester reflect this latter sentiment. Professor Frickey documents other evidence
of Chief Justice Marshall’s sympathies for the Indians, as well as those of Justice Story. Frickey,
Marshalling, supra note 199, at 405 n.107. Compare supra note 206. After the opinion in
Worcester, Justice Story wrote to George Ticknor: “The Court has done its duty. Let the nation
now do theirs.” Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics and Morality, 21
Stan. L. Rev. 500, 527 (1969).
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If the courts were permitted to indulge their sympathies, a case better calculated to excite them can scarcely be imagined. A people once numerous,
powerful, and truly independent, found by our ancestors in the quiet and
uncontrolled possession of an ample domain, gradually sinking beneath our
superior policy, our arts and our arms, have yielded their land by successive
treaties, each of which contains a solemn guarantee of the residue, until they
retain no more of their formerly extensive territory than is deemed necessary to their comfortable subsistence.225

Moreover, Marshall acknowledged that the Cherokees were a distinct political society with an “unquestioned right to lands they occupy, until that right
shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession” to the Federal Government.226
Here Marshall was addressing the merits of the controversy; and, indeed,
he appeared to settle it decisively. Having spoken on the merits of the case,
he went on to proclaim that he was not speaking on the merits of the case.
He could not do so, he said, because the Court had no authority to hear
the case under the original jurisdiction, since the Cherokees were neither a
state . . . nor a foreign state.227

Marshall concluded
[i]f it be true that the Cherokee nation have rights, this is not the tribunal
in which those rights are to be asserted. If it be true that wrongs have been
inflicted, and that still greater are to be apprehended, this is not the tribunal
which can redress the past or prevent the future.228
225
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 15. “To admit personal prejudice in favor of one of
the litigants in the case was unusual to say the least. To say that the Cherokees claimed under
‘successive treaties, each of which contains a solemn guarantee’ was even more remarkable.”
Newmyer, supra note 200, at 84.

Chief Justice Marshall resisted the political and moral pleas of the Cherokees because
he believed that the Constitution would not allow the Court to accept jurisdiction. The best he would do for the Cherokee Nation . . . was to suggest through his
opinion . . . that the Cherokee claims had merit and that the Court might rule differently in a future case.
Burke, supra note 224, at 530–31.
226
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
227
Newmyer, supra note 200, at 84 (emphasis in original). Professor Newmyer views the “ad
hoc nature of the whole opinion [as suggesting] that the Chief Justice was slipping, that age
and sickness had taken their toll. That impression was strengthened by the fact that he was
unable to unite the Court behind him.” Id. at 85. Similar comments would apply to Worcester,
decided just one year later.
228
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20.
In this statement one can barely recognize the voice of the assertive jurist long reviled
by states’ rights partisans, the famed John Marshall, whose court had previously not
shied from upholding the national powers of the United States in the cases Martin
v. Hunter’s Lessee, McCulloch v. Maryland, and Dartmouth College v. Woodward.
Perhaps Marshall pulled back in Cherokee Nation because Indian rights were at issue
rather than his beloved contract clause or the national bank. Perhaps the climate of
Jacksonian politics overwhelmed the usually feisty chief justice. Perhaps Marshall
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B. Worcester v. Georgia
The third case in Chief Justice Marshall’s famous trilogy was Worcester v. Georgia.229 Georgia required those entering Cherokee land to obtain a State license
and swear a loyalty oath to Georgia.230 In Worcester, two federally licensed
missionaries—Worcester and Butler—were U.S. citizens who, acting under
the federal Trade and Intercourse Acts, were on Cherokee land without a
Georgia license.231 Worcester and Butler were imprisoned for violating Georgia law. Other missionaries were also convicted but accepted a pardon from
felt that Indian removal would occur quickly and that the Court would be foolish
to invite further confrontation with members of Congress intent on limiting federal
judicial authority. . . . The final two paragraphs of the opinion in particular offer clear
evidence of Marshall’s mental exhaustion and abandonment of the Indian cause.
Norgren, supra note 193, at 104–05.
“The Chief Justice’s prophecy has proved correct. The Court has typically failed to protect
tribal rights, and greater wrongs have been inflicted. But his prophecy was insufficient. His prescience could scarcely have revealed to him that the wrongs would continue into the twentyfirst century and that the Court would not only not redress or prevent them but would become
their principle [sic] contemporary source.” Ball, John Marshall, supra note 193, at 1195.
229
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Professor Frickey characterizes Worcester as “one of the most
important components of federal Indian law.” Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of
Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 Yale L.J.
1, 10 (1999). Professor Gould describes the trilogy as delineating
the nature and extent of the doctrine of inherent sovereignty. Tribes are domestic
dependent nations whose right to occupy their lands is subject to the “ultimate
domain” of the federal government; they may not form treaties with foreign nations,
but may govern their affairs without interference from the states, except when limited
by treaties or by the acts of Congress. Implicit in the Marshall trilogy is that sovereignty exists over territory.
Gould, Consent, supra note 6, at 817.
Professor Wilkinson states that “of all the United States Supreme Court cases handed down
between 1789 and the end of the Civil War . . . only three of those cases were cited more often
by modern courts during the 1970s than Worcester v. Georgia.” Charles Wilkinson, Perspectives
on Water and Energy in the American West and in Indian Country, 26 S.D. L. Rev. 393, 402
(1981). Professor Wilkinson must be disappointed by the Court’s opinions after he wrote those
comments. See Fletcher, infra note 244.
230
A leading casebook suggests that Georgia prohibited non-Indians from going into Indian
country without a license and swearing loyalty to the State in order to eliminate non-Indian
influences on the Cherokees. Anderson, Berger, Frickey & Krakoff, supra note 208, at 62.
More generally, the Georgia laws have been attributed to “lust for gold, the need for large tracts
of land to grow cotton, or the need to cut through Cherokee territory for a route from the
Atlantic to the Tennessee River. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy,
82 N. D. L. Rev. 627, 643 n.84 (2006).
231
“Worcester was a white missionary, the nephew of the founder of the powerful American
Board of Commissioners for the Foreign Missions, and the eighth generation in an unbroken
line of Congregational ministers [who] abandoned the pleasant life of a Vermont minister to
teach the gospel and civilization to the Cherokees.” Burke, supra note 224, at 519. “In Samuel
Worcester, the Cherokees could have found neither a better plaintiff nor a more loyal spokesperson. He was as articulate as he was determined, and the press took to his cause, which came
to symbolize the power of a giant state oppressing an individual standing on moral principle
in defense of the wronged.” Rennard Strickland, The Tribal Struggle for Indian Sovereignty:
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the Georgia Governor; Worcester and Butler refused and were sentenced to
four years of hard labor.232 They appealed their convictions in order to challenge the constitutionality of the State’s law.233 Unlike Cherokee Nation, no
issue of jurisdiction was presented because the plaintiffs were U.S. citizens. As
in Cherokee Nation, Georgia refused to participate in the case.234
Part of the background of the case involved an 1802 compact between the
United States and Georgia (the Georgia Compact) that had obligated the
federal government to extinguish Indian title within Georgia in exchange for
that State’s ceding a large area of land to the United States (parts of which
would become Alabama and Mississippi).235 In 1816, Andrew Jackson, as
The Story of the Cherokee Cases, in Race Law Stories 37, 50 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W.
Carbado eds. 2008).
232
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 521, 597. The Georgia trial court initially released Worcester
because as a missionary he could dispense federal funds and thus be considered a federal agent.
William F. Swindler, Politics as Law: The Cherokee Cases, 3 Am. Indian L. Rev. 7, 15 (1975).
He was also the postmaster of New Echota, the Cherokee capital. Id. To make sure Georgia
could apply its laws to Worcester, President Jackson made it clear Worcester was not a federal
agent and also fired him as postmaster. Id.
233
Clifford M. Lytle, The Supreme Court, Tribal Sovereignty, and Continuing Problems of State
Encroachment into Indian Country, 8 Am. Indian L. Rev. 65, 70 (1980). Worcester and Butler
argued that the Superior Court of Gwinnett County, the trial court that released them, was
“the highest court in [the state] in which a decision could be had in [such a] suit.” Worcester, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) at 532. “[T]he clerk of the county court responded to their writ of error, although
the judge never signed it.” White, supra note 196, at 731. Hence, a record was created in
the case and although Georgia never appeared before the U.S. Supreme Court, the case was
docketed for the 1832 Term. Id. For background on the events leading up to Worcester, see the
sources cited in Walters, supra note 11, at 129 n.17.
234
Once again, the Cherokees hired Sargent and Wirt, see discussion supra notes 206, 209.
Wirt may not have been the best choice of counsel because he was running against President
Jackson in the 1832 presidential election. Swindler, supra note 232, at 9. “Surely Jackson was
not going to execute in Wirt’s favor any Supreme Court mandate which could prove harmful
to Jackson’s administration.” Berutti, supra note 194, at 304. Wirt’s “concluding argument
was so moving that Chief Justice Marshall shed tears, something he had not done since the
Dartmouth College case. Rennard Strickland, The Tribal Struggle for Indian Sovereignty: The
Story of the Cherokee Cases, in Race Law Stories 37, 51 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W.
Carbado eds. 2008).
235
Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 7, at 46 & n.274. The Compact “assumed that only
the federal government could acquire land held by Indians, but it did not apply to Indian
reserves and allotments, which in practice were ‘sold’ by Indians to whites as rapidly as white
settlers demanded them.” White, supra note 196, at 715. One commentator describes the
1802 Compact as taking a “large step toward making Removal a national policy.” Berutti, supra
note 194, at 293. The origins of the policy of removing the Indians west of the Mississippi
reflect the pressures of an increased population after the Revolutionary War. Also, cotton,
one of the young country’s major crops, exhausted the soil so that new farmland was always
needed, supra note 194. The cultivation of tobacco was also land-intensive, supra note 42.
No doubt contempt for the Indians also played a role. Leading politicians of that era thought
nothing of writing that “‘civilized and uncivilized people cannot live in the same territory or
even in the same neighborhood.’” Berutti, supra, at 293. (citing Roy H. Pearce, Savagism
& Civilization: A Study of the Indian and the American Mind 68 (Johns Hopkins
University Press 1965)). A familiar theme was that the Indians were non-Christian savages.
Id. at 298. One of the earliest versions of this theme was expressed by the infamous preacher
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Commissioner for the United States, negotiated a treaty that provided for
the Tribe’s voluntary removal from their land within Georgia in exchange for
land in the West and compensation. Because removal was voluntary and few
Cherokees were willing to move, the treaty failed to satisfy Georgia.236
The case came before the Court at a time when the Federal Government
and the states were hoping to move the eastern tribes to areas west of the Mississippi, to free up their lands for settlement.237 At the time,
[t]he nation [had] long avoided facing Indian relations as a legal, political,
or moral problem. The ambivalent Indian policy of the federal government,
the irresistible push of white settlers, and the official ‘willingness’ of the
tribes to sell their lands long hid the conflict between the theory and pracJohn Cotton, who fashioned a Biblical argument justifying the dispossession of the Indians.
John Cotton, God’s Promise to His Plantation 4–5 (Reiner Smolinski ed. 2007) (1630),
available at http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/etas/22/.
The Louisiana Purchase in 1803 was partially motivated by the need to move the Indians
westward. Berutti, supra, at 293. After the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, federal policymakers “began to debate the tactics of inducing Indians east of the Mississippi to exchange their
remaining ancestral lands for a permanent territory in the West.” Getches, Cases and
Materials, supra note 25, at 94. Removal would “allow the white man to claim the land so
that the black man could work it for him.” Berutti, supra note 194, at 293. Father Prucha attributes to President Jefferson the idea of moving the Indians from the East to the newly acquired
lands. See Williams, Barbarism, supra note 7, at 256.
236
Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 7, at 46; Prucha, Treaties, supra note 89, at 42,
64, 88; see Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 583 (M’Lean, J., concurring). The Cherokees were
influenced by federal Indian agents and missionaries—sometimes one and the same—who
impressed upon them the benefits of farming. By 1827, the Cherokees adopted a constitution,
had essentially abandoned hunting, refused to emigrate or sell their lands, and declared themselves to be an independent nation. See discussion supra note 203. President Jackson refused
to help them in their struggle with Georgia, taking the position that they could not establish
an independent nation within that State, and the United States would not interfere with the
internal laws of a state. Jackson’s position was that the Indians had either to emigrate or to
comply with the Georgia statute, which was a version of the “Indian laws.” White, supra note
196, at 715. Professor Milner Ball suggests that Christian missionaries were hired as federal
agents. Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 4. Presumably, this was done to convert the Indians
to Christianity.
237
See supra note 235. Worcester was no ordinary case.
The Court approached the case . . . as though caught in the clutches of fate and
irresistible events. . . . The Governor, legislators, and judges of Georgia had publicly
dared the Supreme Court to interfere; and the President . . . who had encouraged—or
at lest winked at—this outrage, now seemed prepared to stand by and watch the State
defy the Constitution, laws, and treaties.
Burke, supra note 224, at 500. Writing in 1826, James Madison stated that “[n]ext to the case
of the black race within our bosom, that of the red on our borders is the problem most baffling
to the policy of the country.” Letter from James Madison to Thomas L. McKenney (Feb. 10,
1826), in Annie Heloise Abel, 1 The History of Events Resulting in Indian Consolidation West
of the Mississippi, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1906,
at 255 (1908). The contrast between the term “within our bosom” for the black race with
“on our borders” for the Indians is telling. It helps explain the difference in the constitutional
distinction between Indians and slaves for purposes of Congressional representation. See supra
note 148.
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tice of our Indian relations . . . Written treaties that spoke of Indian nations,
Indian boundaries, and Indian political rights remained on file, while time
and the lack of records concealed the bribery, threats, and force that so often
preceded their signing.238

In 1829, President Jackson announced that he was recommending legislation to set aside federal lands west of the Mississippi for emigrating Indians.
Those Indians who chose not to emigrate could retain allotted land, but would
be subject to state laws. The Cherokees responded by petitioning Congress
to vindicate their rights. “Southern congressmen overwhelmingly supported
[Jackson’s removal bill and] Northern representatives generally opposed it.”239
Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, adversaries of Jackson, kept the issue before
the public. When the bill was passed in 1830,240 opponents of the Jackson
administration, including Webster, recommended that the Cherokees litigate.241
1. Extra- and Pre-Constitutional Discussion of Sovereignty (Dicta)
In Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall wrote the opinion he wished he could
have written in Cherokee Nation242 and read it to a hushed audience in a barely
audible voice.243 Professor Newmyer describes Cherokee Nation as a “bridge
Burke, supra note 224, at 501.
White, supra note 196, at 715–16.
240
For a critical review of the Removal policy, see generally Helen Jackson, A Century of
Dishonor (Univ. of Okla. Press 1995). A Georgia Congressman no doubt captured the mood
of the southern states when he argued in defense of the 1830 Removal Act:
238
239

The practice of buying Indian lands is nothing more than the substitute of humanity and benevolence, and has been resorted to in preference to the sword, as the best
means for agricultural and civilized communities entering into the enjoyment of their
natural and just right to the benefits of the earth, evidently designed by Him who
formed it for purposes more useful than Indian hunting grounds.
Williams, Barbarism, supra note 7, at 244 (emphasis in original). The removal of the Indians to
the west had been debated “as the final solution to the ‘Indian problem’ since Jefferson’s 1803
Louisiana Purchase.” Id. See supra note 235. “Even so-called ‘friends of the Indians’ argued that
tribalism’s incompatibility with the values and norms of white civilization left removal as the
only means to save the Indian from destruction.” Id. at 245.
241
After denying the Cherokee standing in Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 1, Chief
Justice Marshall privately informed Wirt that he was sympathetic to the Indians’ cause, and
believed that Georgia lacked jurisdiction over them. Chief Justice Marshall encouraged Wirt to
bring a case that the Court could hear. 1 The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of
the Americas, supra note 128, at 525–26. Wirt, who argued Cherokee Nation, was co-counsel
for the plaintiffs with Sergeant. Justice Story described Wirt’s oral argument as “uncommonly
eloquent, forcible, and finished.” White, supra note 196, at 731. See also supra notes 206,
209.
242
Worcester gave the Cherokee “one last chance for survival, Marshall one last opportunity
to answer his states’ rights critics, and the American people a chance to depose ‘King Andrew.’”
Newmyer, supra note 200, at 86.
243
Newmyer, supra note 200, at 87. Justices Duvall (who was absent in Cherokee Nation),
Story, and Thompson joined Chief Justice Marshall. Justice M’Lean concurred, seeking to
“distinguish himself from the apparent limits the opinion of the Court placed on a state’s
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to Worcester . . . . The link . . . was Marshall’s ‘domestic dependent nation’
concept.”244
After dispensing with a series of procedural issues establishing the jurisdiction of the Court,245 Chief Justice Marshall embarked on a lengthy review of
the history of the British, the colonies, and the United States with the Indians
power to regulate the affairs of Indians within its borders.” White, supra note 196, at 732. In
dicta, Justice M’Lean stated that he would allow a state to exercise power if the Indians had
become assimilated or if they became incapable of self-government because of a reduction in
their numbers. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 594.
If a tribe of Indians shall become so degraded or reduced in numbers, as to lose
the power of self-government, the protection of the local law, of necessity, must be
extended over them . . . The exercise of the power of self-government by the Indians,
within a state, is undoubtedly contemplated to be temporary.
Id. at 593. He also stated that “[a]t no time has the sovereignty of the country been recognized
as existing in the Indians, but they have always been admitted to possess many of the attributes
of sovereignty. All the rights which belong to self government have been recognized as vested
in them.” Id. at 580. In an opinion Justice M’Lean subsequently wrote as a circuit judge, he
upheld Ohio’s assertion of jurisdiction over the Wyandott Reservation by applying state law
and not the federal Nonintercourse Act to a non-Indian who stole a horse from an assimilated
Indian. United States v. Cisna, 25 F. Cas. 422 (C.C.D. Ohio 1835) (No. 14,795). One of the
determinative factors was that the reservation was surrounded by a “dense” white population
that had “daily intercourse” with the Indians. Id. at 424.
Justice Baldwin dissented in Worcester on the grounds that the writ of error was defective.
See supra note 233. On the merits, however, he would have sided with Georgia for the reasons
he expressed in Cherokee Nation. See supra note 208. In Cherokee Nation, Justice Baldwin
described the United States’ relationship with the Indians as one in which the United States
had “the right of soil, sovereignty and jurisdiction.” 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 40. “He therefore
thought the territory clause was relevant to Indian law. Baldwin believed Indian country was
United States territory. He never said exactly how it became so, except by his interpretation of
treaties.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 48.
“Justice Baldwin’s dissent essentially tracked his concurrence in Cherokee Nation. Justice
Johnson was absent because of ill health.” White, supra note 196, at 732. Strickland states that
Johnson would have otherwise dissented. Rennard Strickland, The Tribal Struggle for Indian
Sovereignty: The Story of the Cherokee Cases, in Race Law Stories 37, 52 (Rachel F. Moran &
Devon W. Carbado eds. 2008).
244
Newmyer, supra note 200, at 86. Worcester, however, does not use the phrase “domestic dependent nation.” See 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Indeed, a Lexis search for the term
“domestic dependent nation” turns up only eight references in U.S. Supreme Court opinions.
Professor Fletcher thinks that Marshall replaced the term “domestic dependent nations” with
“distinct, independent political communities.” Fletcher, Indian Problem, supra note 11, at 595.
That term appears five times in Supreme Court opinions, including Worcester. More generally,
in the “last few decades, the Court almost never cites Worcester for any proposition other than
the undisputed tenet that tribes retain some sovereignty. The Court has long ago departed from
the platonic notion that state law has no force in Indian Country.” Id.
The U.S. Supreme Court has described Worcester as one of Chief Justice Marshall’s “most
courageous and eloquent opinions.” Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959). One of the
reasons the opinion was courageous was that it “reaffirmed the sovereign and autonomous
status of the Cherokee Nation as a domestic dependent nation at the very time the federal government and the states were seeking to remove eastern tribes to land west of the Mississippi.”
Clinton, supra note 14, at 848. The opinion was a thumb in Jackson’s eye.
245
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 536–51.
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generally, and the Cherokees in particular, to determine whether Georgia was
acting extra-territorially by asserting jurisdiction over the Tribe.246 “America,
separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct people,
divided into separate nations, independent of each other and of the rest of
the world, having institutions of their own, and governing themselves by
their own laws.”247 Marshall emphasized that the British treated the Indians
with respect, as self-governing communities able to enter into treaties. “[O]ur
history furnishes no example . . . of any attempt on the part of the crown to
interfere with the internal affairs of the Indians.”248 At the time of the Revolutionary War, Britain considered the Indians “as nations capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war; of governing themselves,”249 and during
and after the war the United States adopted the same attitude.250
Marshall laid the groundwork for what would become an important Indian
canon of construction251 by describing the Cherokee chiefs who signed the
1785 Treaty of Hopewell252 as “not very critical judges of the language, from
the fact that every one makes his mark; no chief was capable of signing his
name. It is probable the treaty was interpreted to them.”253 “The language
used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their prejudice.
If words be made use of which are susceptible of a more extended meaning
than their plain import, as connected with the tenor of the treaty, they should
be considered as used only in the latter sense.”254
Accordingly, Marshall interpreted the Treaty liberally in favor of the Indians.255 “Chief Justice Marshall appeared to view the Indian treaty narrowly

Id. at 536–41, 542–51.
Id. at 542–43.
248
Id. at 547.
249
Id. at 548.
250
Id. at 548, 552. Dean Getches notes that Marshall “went out of his way to describe tribal
sovereignty in ringing, unmistakable terms: ‘national character,’ ‘right of self-government,’
‘nations capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war,’ ‘distinct, independent political
communities,’ ‘Indian nations,’ ‘political existence,’ and ‘pre-existing power of the nation to
govern itself.’” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1577. As I argue in the text, despite the
importance of these references generally, I view them as dicta.
251
The Indian canons of construction are intended to encourage interpretations of statutes and treaties that favor Indian rights. See Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical
Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 Calif. L. Rev. 1137, 1141 (1990)
[hereinafter Frickey, Congressional Intent]. Professor Jensen thinks the court is less enthusiastic
about the Indian canons outside of the treaty context. Jensen, supra note 9, at 93–94. For an
explanation of why the canons might be limited to just treaties, see supra note 130 and the
references therein. See generally Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 7, at 119–28.
252
Other treaties were mentioned in passing. In addition to the Treaty of Hopewell, Chief
Justice Marshall analyzed a treaty with the Delawares, Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 549–50,
and the Treaty of Holston, id. at 555–56.
253
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 551. See also supra note 130.
254
Id. at 582.
255
See Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 199, at 401.
246
247
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as a contract of adhesion256—an agreement in which the negotiation process
had not been one of arm’s-length bargaining between equal adversaries and
in which the more powerful party bore full responsibility for all contractual
drafting.”257 Marshall thus concluded that the Cherokees did not surrender
their sovereignty but remained a nation, albeit one receiving the protection
of a more powerful country.258 “This relation was that of a nation claiming
and receiving the protection of one more powerful: not that of individuals
abandoning their national character, and submitting as subjects to the laws
of a master.”259
Marshall went on to interpret a second treaty with the Cherokees, the 1791
Treaty of Holston, concluding that “[t]his treaty, thus explicitly recognizing the national character of the Cherokees, and their right of self government; thus guarantying their lands; assuming the duty of protection, and of
course pledging the faith of the United States for that protection; has been
frequently renewed, and is now in full force.”260 Under that treaty, the Chero256
Professor Frickey raises some serious problems with “embracing this contract-of-adhesion theory.” Id. at 406. But see Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 7, at 617–18. Indians
apparently viewed the treaties as more than contracts—as enduring commitments to brotherly
care. Valencia-Weber, supra note 24, at 423 (citing Robert A. Williams, Jr., Linking Arms
Together: American Indian Treaty Visions of Law and Peace, 1600–1800, at 98–123
(1997) [hereinafter Williams, Linking Arms]). Treaty provisions on “[l]and transactions
were to bind, not separate, the parties, and thus form multi-cultural unity.” Id. at 423 (citing
Williams, Linking Arms, supra, at 115–23).
257
Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 199, at 401. This justification for a generous construction of treaties in favor of the Indians would not apply to the interpretation of federal or state
statutes. Professor Jensen, however, suggests that the canons can be viewed as one way for the
national government to satisfy its obligation to act as a guardian to the tribal wards. Jensen,
supra note 9, at 29. Dean Getches defends applying the canons to the interpretation of federal
statutes on the grounds such laws “were not founded on a relationship of mutuality. Rather,
they have arisen in a context of enormous federal power over Indians.” Getches, Conquering,
supra note 14, at 1584. Many other groups, however, could probably make a similar argument.
In Choctaw Nation v. United States, the Court said it would interpret a treaty as “unlettered
people” understood it, and “as justice and reason demand in all cases where power is exerted by
the strong over those to whom they owe care and protection.” 119 U.S. 1, 28 (1886); see also
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 196 (1999) (“[W]e interpret Indian treaties to give effect to the terms as the Indians themselves would have understood
them.”); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985) (“[C]anons are
rooted in the unique trust relationship between the United States and the Indians.”); Carpenter
v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930) (“Doubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the
weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection
and good faith.”).
258
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 555.
259
Id. Marshall had an extended discussion of Article IX of the Treaty of Hopewell, which
provided that “the sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with the Indians, and managing all their affairs, as they think proper.” Id. at 553 (emphasis in original). He rejected interpreting the phrase “managing all their affairs” as indicating that the Cherokees surrendered
their self-government. Id. at 553–54.
260
Id. at 556. “Marshall understood the treaty transaction to be a ceding of rights by the
tribe, not a granting of rights by the United States, with the key question being what the
Indians thought they were giving up.” Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 10 n.43. In
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kees declared that they were under the protection of the United States. “This
relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one
more powerful: not that of individuals abandoning their national character,
and submitting as subjects to the laws of a master.”261
Marshall then turned to various Congressional Acts to regulate trade with
the Indians, describing them as considering “the several Indian nations as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their
authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guarantied by the United States.”262
He characterized the treaties and laws as “contemplat[ing] the Indian territory as completely separated from that of the states; and provid[ing] that all
intercourse with them shall be carried on exclusively by the government of
the union.”263
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent
political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power . . . . The very term “nation,”
so generally applied to them, means “a people distinct from others.” The
constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made,
to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous
treaties with the Indian nations . . . .264

The Cherokee Nation “is a distinct community occupying its own territory,
with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have
no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter.”265
Noteworthy was the absence throughout the opinion of the term “domestic dependent nation.”266 That term might have been necessary in order to
finesse the issue of jurisdiction in Cherokee Nation, but in Worcester, Marshall
could let his true views control. The tribes might not be “foreign” nations but
Marshall had no doubts whatsoever that they were nations. Georgia could no
more legislate for the Indians than it could for South Carolina or Canada.
As powerful and eloquent as Chief Justice Marshall was in establishing the
sovereignty of the Cherokee and treating them as a nation,267 this discussion,
general, “treaties were viewed as solemn agreements between cooperative sovereigns under
which the tribe, not the federal government, granted rights, which as in derogation of their
own sovereignty should be narrowly construed.” Id. at 12.
261
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 555.
262
Id. at 557.
263
Id.
264
Id. at 559.
265
Id. at 561. William Walters cites this language as support for the proposition that “inherent tribal sovereignty bars the intrusion of state law into tribal territory.” Walters, supra note
11, at 134.
266
See supra note 170 and the references therein.
267
Two other cases in the 1880s further the view that the tribes were sovereigns located
within the United States. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (tribal police powers
were not federal power created by and springing from the Constitution but preexisted the
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which dominates the opinion both in eloquence and in length,268 was arguably dicta.269 The Cherokee nation might be a distinct community occupying
Constitution and are not subject to the Fifth or Fourteen Amendments); Ex parte Crow Dog,
109 U.S. 556 (1883) (federal court lacked jurisdiction to try an Indian for the murder of
another member of his tribe on the reservation). The Court refused to construe ambiguous
language in a treaty as indicating tribal consent to federal criminal jurisdiction. Shortly after
the decision, Crow Dog was overturned in 1885 by the Federal Major Crimes Act, codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1153, granting the Federal Government jurisdiction over seven serious crimes
when committed in Indian country by an Indian against either non-Indians or Indians. The
constitutionality of the Act was upheld in United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), discussed, infra notes 333–53, and accompanying text. Talton was overruled in part by the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303, which applied to the tribes various provisions of the Bill of Rights, such as the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures,
protection against double jeopardy, a right against self-incrimination, due process protections,
equal protection, and a right to a jury trial in criminal cases. Professor Wilkinson describes
the Worcester-Crow Dog-Talton cases as “calling for largely autonomous tribal governments
subject to an overriding federal authority but essentially free of state control.” Wilkinson,
supra note 7, at 24. In United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), the Court held because
the Indians were sovereigns, a person could be tried in both tribal and federal courts without
violating double jeopardy. For a general discussion of criminal jurisdiction in Indian country,
see Canby, supra note 3, at 169–204; Stephen L. Pevar, The Rights of Indians and Tribes
142–66 (3rd ed. 2002).
Professor Gould issues a cautionary warning:
Crow Dog continues to be lauded as one of the most important decisions upholding
tribal rights of self-determination. Yet by stressing cultural differences between tribal
Indians and non-Indians, the decision invited other Courts to hold that tribal powers
extend to tribal members only. The decision also prompted Congress to legislate in
matters that previously had been left to tribal self-governance.
Gould, Consent, supra note 6, at 827.
Professor Natelson warns that just because “members of the founding generation often
spoke of the tribes as ‘nations,’” Natelson, supra note 15, at 259, does not mean that the
states had no “political jurisdiction over tribes within their borders.” Id. “[C]olonial and state
governments did exercise police powers over Indians within their borders, including tribal
Indians.” Id. (emphasis in original). But Professor Natelson issues a caveat. “To be sure, the
contemporaneous definition of ‘nation’ did not exclude the possibility that some tribes were
thought of as sovereign. A member of the founding generation might well think of some tribes
as sovereign entities. But one cannot generalize from the use of the word ‘nation’ to a conclusion that the Founders thought all tribes were sovereign.” Id. (emphasis in original). See also
supra note 220.
268
Out of a twenty-eight page opinion, (31 U.S. 536-563), Marshall devoted over seventy
percent to a history of the Indians, over twenty percent to procedural and jurisdictional issues,
and less than fifteen percent to constitutional issues (as opposed to pre- and extra-constitutional issues). Professor White describes this allocation as making “Marshall’s familiar point
that attention to history and to the principles embodied in that history not only clarified constitutional analysis, it went a long way toward disposing of the issues to be analyzed.” White,
supra note 196, at 733.
269
Many commentators would disagree with this conclusion. Professor Frickey states that
Marshall “had to rebuff arguments that the tribe had lost its sovereignty, either through the
legally operative effects of discovery and conquest or by ceding it in a treaty, and had therefore
become legally indistinct from other residents of Georgia.” Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 199,
at 394 (citing Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 542–48). The pages in the opinion that Professor
Frickey cites, 542–48, however, do not support what he assumed to be Georgia’s argument.
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its own territory in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, so that the
judgment of that State’s courts is a “nullity,” but could the Supreme Court
reverse it?270 If the Cherokees’ only complaint about Georgia law was its “extraGeorgia did not appear in the Supreme Court and thus did not file any brief. It is possible
that Chief Justice Marshall’s discussion of sovereignty was responding to Justice Johnson, who
argued in Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20–31, that the Cherokees had no sovereignty.
Johnson was ill and did not take part in Worcester. White, supra note 196, at 732.
See also Walters, supra note 11, at 136 (“[T]he Georgia law was void because it infringed
upon the inherent sovereignty of the Cherokee nation.”). Walters implicitly agrees that the
discussion of sovereignty would be dicta if the Indian Commerce Clause were the ground for
the opinion. He rejects this ground because he cannot accept that Marshall would have spent
so much time on dicta. Walters claims that federal law had incorporated the concept of tribal
sovereignty and that “when Georgia infringed upon the rights of the Cherokees to govern
themselves, the state also violated the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.”
Id. at 140. Walters does not explain, however, how federal law incorporated the concept of
tribal sovereignty. His views are also inconsistent with Justice Marshall stating that the sovereignty argument would not have provided a constitutionally-recognized claim that could
be redressed. As Marshall stated, if the Cherokees’ only complaint about Georgia law was its
“extra-territorial operation, the objection, though complete, so far as respected mere right,
would give this court no power over the subject.” 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
Walters also overlooks that “[t]raveling far beyond the question presented in a case was
typical of Marshall, was contemporaneously criticized, and, as a method of adjudication, is
excused today largely because scholars have on the whole sympathized with Marshall’s perceived ends.” Lindsay G. Robertson, Conquest by Law: How the Discovery of America
Dispossessed Indigenous Peoples of Their Lands xi (2005).
Just because the sovereignty discussion was dicta does not mean Marshall was wrong in
addressing it or that it was unimportant or irrelevant to the development of Indian law.
Marshall was addressing a larger audience with a larger issue and making a political argument
rather than a legal one. I think it would have been better to have spent more time developing
the holding of the case, especially the Indian Commerce Clause argument. But many tribal
rights and powers flow from the pre- and extra-constitutional sovereignty argument into which
Marshall breathed life. “Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law . . . is the principle
that those powers which are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated
powers granted by express acts of Congress . . . .” Felix S. Cohen, Federal Indian Law 122
(1942), repeated in Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 7, at 122.
According to Professor Gould, this statement “usually attributed to Cohen, first appeared
in an opinion of Solicitor Nathan R. Margold, Powers of Indian Tribes, 1 Op. Solic. Gen.
445, 447 (1934).” Gould, Consent, supra note 6, at 816 n.33. “Fundamental to the doctrine of
inherent sovereignty is the principle that tribal powers arise outside the Constitution. Unless
ceded by treaty or limited by the Congress, these powers secure for tribes the essential rights
of separate sovereigns.” Gould, Consent, supra note 6, at 816. But the “doctrine of inherent
sovereignty has been unequal to the task of protecting tribal power because it has no textual
support within the Constitution.” Gould, Tough Love, supra note 11, at 675. I share this view
and think supporters of the Indians would have been better off had Marshall emphasized the
constitutional aspects of Worcester in addition to the pre- and extra-constitutional sovereignty
discussion.
Professor Frickey, however, describes Worcester and Talton, see supra note 267, infra note
336, as the “conceptual high-water mark of tribal sovereignty in federal Indian law” that remain
“formidable precedents antagonistic to modern judicial efforts to undercut tribal authority.”
Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 11. “Formidable” overstates their precedential value,
at least in the cases discussed in this Article.
270
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
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territorial operation, the objection, though complete, so far as respected mere
right, would give this court no power over the subject.”271 In a sense, Marshall
just admitted that what he previously wrote was dicta.272
2. The Judiciary Act of 1789
Marshall did not elaborate on why the Court would have “no power over the
subject,” but presumably he was referring to the controversial Section 25 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provided Supreme Court review of “a final
judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of law or equity of a State
in which a decision in the suit could be had . . . where is drawn in question
the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the
ground of their being repugnant273 to the constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States, and the decision is in favour of such their validity.”
Apparently, Marshall felt that he had to base his decision on narrower
grounds than the grandiose and sweeping pre- and extra-constitutional concept of Indian sovereignty, especially in a case involving penal laws.274 It wasn’t
enough that the laws of Georgia violated the sovereignty of the Cherokees—
which they did—and that such laws would no more apply to the Tribe than
to Canada, he had to show that “the acts of Georgia are repugnant to the
constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.”275 This he did with an
economy of language totally inconsistent with the eloquence of his earlier
discussion of sovereignty:276
271
Id. Although “[t]he Cherokees constituted a distinct, sovereign nation that retained its
‘natural rights’ to self-government, despite the fact that it lay within the geographical boundaries of the United States and the State of Georgia . . . [N]o federal issue is raised; in other words,
the substantive conclusion does not provide the Court with jurisdictional authority.” Walters,
supra note 11, at 140. This statement seems inconsistent with Walters’ views discussed supra
note 269.
272
Not all commentators agree. For example, Professor Dewi I. Ball states “[t]he ruling in
Worcester held that the states had no jurisdiction in the reservations and only Congress had
the power to remove attributes of tribal sovereignty. The tribe had authority over the reservation and all people in the reservation.” Dewi I. Ball, Williams v. Lee (1959)—50 Years Later:
A Re-Assessment of One of the Most Important Cases in the Modern Era of Federal Indian Law,
n.45 (unpublished paper, on file with the author). That view, however, while perhaps sufficient
to make the Georgia judgment a nullity, would give the Court “no power over the subject.”
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
273
Dean Getches states that “repugnant” was a term that in the early days meant “preemption.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1591 n.73.
274
See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 567–69 (M’Lean, J., concurring).
275
Id. at 561.
276
See supra note 268. Walters thinks that Marshall based his decision on the ground that
“native tribes enjoy a federally recognized right to govern themselves, a right, moreover, which
was absolutely incompatible with the assertion of state authority over federally recognized
tribal territory.” Walters, supra note 11, at 141. Walters understands that this interpretation
raises two questions.

Does tribal sovereignty bar[] the intrusion of federal as well as state jurisdiction
into Indian country? To turn this question around, does federal power to legislate
within tribal territory derive solely from particular treaty relationships with particular
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[T]he acts of Georgia are repugnant to the constitution, laws, and treaties
of the United States.
They interfere forcibly with the relations established between the United
States and the Cherokee nation, the regulation of which, according to the
settled principles of our constitution, are committed exclusively to the government of the union . . . They are in direct hostility with treaties . . . .277

These brief, compact statements suggest three independent grounds for
holding that Georgia’s laws were unconstitutional that would satisfy the Judiciary Act: they violated treaties with the Cherokees, they violated the Indian
Commerce Clause, and they violated federal statutes. None of these reasons
depended on the sovereignty of the Indians.
3. The Holding: Violation of the Indian Commerce Clause
Georgia “interfere[d] forcibly with relations established between the United
States and the Cherokee nation, the regulation of which, according to the
settled principles of our constitution, are committed exclusively to the government of the union.”278 “The whole intercourse between the United States
and [the Cherokee Nation], is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the
tribes . . . ? And what is the tribal right of self-government guaranteed by federal common law or whether it rises to constitutional status. Otherwise asked, does Congress
itself, in Marshall’s views, have the power to alter the terms of the federal recognition
of the Cherokees’ sovereignty? Could Congress overrule Worcester v. Georgia?
Id. at 141 n.66.
If the opinion is not grounded on specific provisions in the Constitution or on federal
statutes, but rather on the pre- and extra-constitutional sovereignty of the Indians, then the
Court would be applying federal common law. Speaking generally about Indian law and not
specifically about Worcester, Professor Pommersheim describes the Court as engaging in federal
common law because where Congress has been silent and one would “normally presuppose an
unimpaired tribal sovereignty—the Court now recognizes a judicial plenary power to parse the
limits of tribal court authority based on federal common law.” Frank Pommersheim, Tribal
Courts and the Federal Judiciary: Opportunities and Challenges for a Constitutional Democracy,
58 Mont. L. Rev. 313, 328 (1997). Federal common law might be enough to justify characterizing the Georgia court’s judgment as a nullity, 31 U.S. at 561, but not enough to satisfy the
requirements of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
If Marshall had not been concerned about the Judiciary Act of 1789, the opinion could have
stopped at the point where he described the Georgia law as a “nullity.” The opinion could then
have been defended on the structure of the Constitution and the original understanding of the
Founders. That approach could describe the Court’s opinion in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999). See also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004) (“Moreover, ‘at least during the
first century of American’s national existence . . . Indian affairs were more an aspect of military
and foreign policy than a subject of domestic or municipal law.’ [citing Cohen’s Handbook
208 (1982 edition)]. Insofar as that is so, Congress’s legislative authority would rest in part, not
upon ‘affirmative grants of the Constitution,’ but upon the Constitution’s adoption of preconstitutional powers necessarily inherent in any Federal Government, namely, powers that this
Court has described as ‘necessary concomitants of nationality.’ United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315–22.”).
277
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
278
Id. (emphasis added).
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government of the United States.”279 Presumably, this exclusive commitment
referred to the Indian Commerce Clause,280 although at this point in the
opinion Marshall did not refer explicitly to that Clause.281
Earlier in the opinion, however, Marshall had explained that:
Id.
Professor Clinton describes Marshall in Worcester as “correctly reflect[ing] the decision
of the framers of the Constitution to vest sole and exclusive power of managing the bilateral
relations with the Indians . . . .” Robert N. Clinton, Reviewing Russel Lawrence Barsh and James
Youngblood Henderson, The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 846,
858 (1980). Professor Natelson acknowledges that Worcester “might have had some probative
value of the original understanding if Marshall (a leading ratifier himself ) had discussed what
that understanding was. But he did not. The decision tells us nothing about what the ratifiers understood forty-three years earlier.” Natelson, supra note 15, at 260–61. It is not clear,
however, why Marshall, a “leading ratifier,” should not be viewed in Worcester as expressing the
“original understanding.”
William Walters asks whether
279
280

Marshall based his ultimate conclusion upon the ground of exclusive federal authority. Marshall maintained that the federal government enjoyed exclusive authority
to deal with Indian tribes. He did not, however, strike down the Georgia law that
supported Worcester’s convictions by reasoning from the premise that the state had
attempted to exercise a power reserved to the federal government. Although this path
to Worcester’s result lay open for Marshall, he passed it by in favor of one that traversed a different ground, that is, that the Georgia law was void because it infringed
upon the inherent sovereignty of the Cherokee nation.
Walters, supra note 11, at 135–36. Walters’s argument is consistent with the amount of time
Marshall spent discussing the sovereignty issue, supra note 268, but is inconsistent with
Marshall’s express desire to source the decision on the Constitution to avoid any challenge
under the Judiciary Act. That desire was understandable given such a politically explosive holding in the case and one that involved a state’s criminal laws. The opinion reads as if Marshall
was exhausted by the time he turned his attention to the constitutional issues, consistent with
Professor Newmyer’s description of Marshall’s health as “slipping, [and] that age and sickness
had taken their toll.” Newmyer, supra note 227, at 85.
281
Professor Natelson says that Marshall had
no need to investigate the constitutional question: the Court’s holding was mandated
by two treaties governing the case, treaties Marshall recited at length . . . Only at one
point did he seem to indicate that the exclusive power of Congress arose from the
Constitution alone; and unsupported by citation or argument.
Natelson, supra note 15, at 260–61 (citing Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561 (the Georgia
statutes “interfere forcibly with the relations established between the United States and the
Cherokee nation, the regulation of which, according to the settled principles of our constitution, are committed exclusively to the government of the union”)). Professor Natelson
acknowledges that Justice M’Lean’s concurring opinion “is clearer.” Id. at 261 n.425. To be
sure, Marshall could have written a tighter opinion, with more citations, but for the reasons
suggested in the text, I do not view the statements Professor Natelson referred to as dictum.
Marston and Fink state that read “in the broadest possible sense, Worcester stands for an
automatic and absolute exclusion of state law in Indian country, based on Congress’s plenary
control over Indian ‘commerce.’” Lester J. Marston & David A. Fink, The Indian Commerce
Clause: The Reports of its Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 16 Golden Gate U. L. Rev.
205, 210 (1986). Presumably, they are referring to the Indian Commerce Clause. They do not
address why “commerce” existed. See infra note 284.
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The ambiguous phrases [of Article IX of the Articles of Confederation] were
so construed by the states of North Carolina and Georgia as to annul the
power itself. . . . The correct exposition of this article is rendered unnecessary by the adoption of our existing constitution. That instrument confers
on congress the powers of war and peace; of making treaties, and of regulating commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and
with the Indian tribes. These powers comprehend all that is required for the
regulation of our intercourse with the Indians.282 They are not limited by any
restrictions on their free actions. The shackles imposed on this power, in
the confederation, are discarded. . . . [T]he whole power of regulating the
intercourse with [the Indians] was vested in the United States.283

In his concurring opinion, Justice M’Lean endorsed the Indian Commerce
Clause as the source of exclusive power over the Indians: “By the constitution,
the regulation of commerce among the Indian tribes is given to congress. This
power must be considered as exclusively vested in congress . . . .”284
282
Walters relies on this language to support his view that Marshall “never hinted of any
federal police power applicable to Indian territories, except that specifically provided for in
Indian treaties.” Walters, supra note 11, at 138.
283
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559–60 (emphasis added). “Marshall’s Worcester reading of
Congress’s power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes is the same as his Gibbons reading of Congress’s power to regulate commerce among the states and with foreign nations. The
power belongs wholly to Congress. In relation to its object, the power is unlimited. However,
it cannot be extended beyond the specified relationship. It has no force with respect to affairs
internal to the foreign nations, state, or tribe. This reading of the Indian commerce clause
is consistent with Marshall’s general view of the relation of the federal government to the
separate, distinct Indian nations.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 48. In Gibbons, Marshall
asserted without explanation that commerce with foreign nations means “every species of commercial intercourse,” 22 U.S. 1, 193, and that if “this be the admitted meaning of the word, in
its application to foreign nations, it must carry the same meaning throughout the sentence.” 22
U.S. 1, 194. See supra note 163. For Professor Natelson’s views on the meaning of “commerce”
at the time of the Constitution, see supra note 163.
More important than whether the meaning of commerce is the same for all three clauses
is whether the power to regulate commerce should be viewed the same. The unique history
surrounding the drafting of the Indian Commerce Clause suggests that whether Congress’s
power under that Clause should be viewed as exclusive or shared with the states is independent
of how that power is interpreted under the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clauses. The
Court has held that the Foreign Commerce Clause is not interpreted in pari materia with
the Interstate Commerce Clause. See supra note 180. The Indian Commerce Clause is not
intended to be interpreted in pari materia with either the Foreign Commerce Clause or the
Interstate Commerce Clause.
According to Professor Frickey, Marshall’s quotation of the Commerce Clause “defined the
sovereign status of tribes.” Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 199, at 394. I do not see the link
between the Indian Commerce Clause and the sovereignty issue for the reasons I argue in the
text.
284
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 580 (emphasis added). But M’Lean also issued a cautionary
warning that tracked his concurrence in Cherokee Nation.

If a tribe of Indians shall become so degraded or reduced in numbers as to lose
the power of self-government, the protection of the local law, of necessity, must be
extended over them. The point as which this exercise of power by a State would be
proper, need not now be considered: if indeed it be a judicial question.
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The Indian Commerce Clause speaks only to regulating commerce with
the Indian tribes; there was no doubt that the Cherokees were a tribe.285 Marshall understood that the Clause delegated to Congress the exclusive power to
regulate commerce with Indian tribes. Hence, Georgia had no power to seize
Cherokee lands, annul their laws, or control access to their territory. Marshall
had no doubts that the Indian Commerce Clause provided an automatic and
absolute exclusion of Georgia law in Indian country286 (a proposition slowly
whittled away by subsequent cases). The degree and nature of the Tribe’s sovereignty was simply not relevant under the Indian Commerce Clause.287
4. The Holding: Violation of the Treaties288
As part of his sovereignty discussion, Marshall analyzed numerous provisions
of the treaties between the Cherokees and the national government. Georgia’s
actions violated many of these provisions. Georgia’s laws violated provisions
that “mark[ed] out the boundary that separates the Cherokee country from
Id. at 593 (M’Lean, J., concurring). Commenting on Justice M’Lean’s warning, Dean Getches
noted the “Court, however, declined to decide it was a judicial function to readjust the sovereign status of tribes.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1586.
Neither Marshall nor M’Lean explained why “commerce” existed within the meaning of
the Clause in the case of missionaries who might not have been engaged in commerce, at
least if that term is narrowly interpreted. But there is nothing in the case elaborating on what
they did. The Georgia law affected the ability of all persons, including those clearly engaged
in commerce (given any reasonable interpretation of the term), to enter the Cherokee Nation
without a license. In Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), see discussion infra notes 333−352 and
accompanying text, decided 54 years later, the United States argued that commerce meant
“intercourse,” a term that presumably would have covered the missionaries. Professor Natelson
rejects this meaning of commerce. See supra note 163.
285
See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
286
For a general discussion of the term “Indian Country,” see Cohen’s Handbook, supra
note 7, at 182–99; Jensen, supra note 9, at 9–13.
287
Walters claims that Marshall did not decide the case on the basis of the Indian Commerce
Clause but on the ground that the Georgia law “was void because it infringed upon the inherent sovereignty of the Cherokee nation.” Walters, supra note 11, at 136. But Marshall clearly
worried that relying on that pre- and extra-constitutional ground would not satisfy the requirements of the Judiciary Act of 1789 so that Walters’s reading, shared by other commentators,
cannot be correct.
The Court has held that nothing should turn on whether the commerce is with a tribe or an
individual Indian. See supra note 171. If the latter is covered by the Clause, then a fortiori the
degree and nature of a tribe’s sovereignty is irrelevant.
If the interpretation in the text is rejected, the question then becomes why Marshall did not
rely on the Indian Commerce Clause.
288
Walters argues that because the Constitution declares treaties to be the supreme law
of the land, and the treaties embody a conception of tribal sovereignty, that conception has
been incorporated into the Constitution. “When the people of the United States adopted
the Constitution with its provision that prior treaties are the law of the land, the principle of
tribal sovereignty received recognition in the supreme law of the land.” Walters, supra note 11,
at 142 n.17. But neither tribes nor treaties are fungible. So even accepting Walters’s formulation arguendo, what “conception” of sovereignty should be viewed as being embodied by the
Constitution? And nothing in the Constitution requires that treaties be entered into only with
“sovereigns,” nor is there any definition of what constitutes a “sovereign.”
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Georgia;289 guarant[ied] to them all the land within their boundary; solemnly
pledge[d] the faith of the United States to restrain their citizens from trespassing on it; and recognize[d] the pre-existing power of the nation to govern
itself.”290
Again, these violations were independent of the sovereignty issue. As long
as the treaties were valid, and that issue was not before the Court,291 Georgia’s
laws had to be struck down. A determination of whether the treaty was violated was independent of the sovereignty issue.292
5. The Holding: Violation of Federal Statutes
Finally, although not a major part of his opinion, Chief Justice Marshall held
that the Georgia statute violated laws of the United States.293 Presumably,
these laws referred to the Congressional acts to regulate trade and intercourse
with the Indians, which he mentioned at various places earlier in the opinion.294 Once again, the issue of sovereignty was irrelevant; these laws would
289
An amicus brief by the State of Washington on behalf of Montana in Moe v. Confederated
Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976), see discussion infra notes 654−739 and accompanying text, described the treaties with the Cherokees as denying Georgia any jurisdiction
over the Tribe.

In a very real and express sense, the Cherokee lands were not a part of the State of
Georgia . . . . The purpose of the Georgia Act declared unconstitutional was to add
Cherokee territory to the boundaries of the State of Georgia . . . . it is not so much
that the principles of [Worcester] have been changed by subsequent cases. Rather,
what has been changed are the rights guaranteed to the Indians by federal legislation of which treaties are only a part. It is equally interesting to note that even in
these early cases the court was not unaware of the problems that might result when
the Indian reservation communities became intermingled with lands and communities over which the Indians had no jurisdiction. In fact, the treaties which set apart
lands for the Indians at a place distant to the white man’s settlements were in specific
response to these problems.
Brief of the State of Washington as Amicus Curiae for Montana, 1975 WL 173494 at *8–9.
290
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561–62.
291
Even today, when the sovereignty doctrine has been greatly eroded, the treaties with
the Indians remain valid. The issue today is over how a treaty should be interpreted, see e.g.,
Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 7, which presupposes the validity of the treaties.
292
In his concurring opinion, Justice M’Lean rejected the proposition that for a treaty to be
valid each party had to possess the same attributes of sovereignty. The only requisite according
to M’Lean was that each of the contracting parties must possess the right of self-government
and the power to perform the provisions of the treaty. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 581
(M’Lean, J., concurring).
For a discussion of with whom the Senate can enter into treaties, see Laurence H. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law 646 (3rd ed. 2000).
293
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
294
Id. at 556, 562, 576. The 1802 Act was the first permanent trade and intercourse statute.
It was preceded by four temporary acts. The Cherokees had argued that Georgia violated an
1802 “act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes.” Id. at 540. In his concurring opinion, Justice M’Lean was more specific: “[Georgia’s laws] are repugnant to the . . . law
of 1802.” Id. at 578 (M’Lean, J., concurring).
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preempt the Georgia statutes regardless of the sovereignty of the Indians.295
Tribal sovereignty was no doubt the “heart of Marshall’s decision,”296 but by
itself that would not suffice to give the Court jurisdiction as Marshall explicitly stated.
The Court reversed and annulled the verdict and conviction of Worcester and Butler. After winning the case, Worcester and Butler were caught
up in politics and procedural infirmities and were not immediately released.
When it became obvious the Cherokees did not have the support of President
Jackson,297 and had been deserted by many of their earlier allies, Worcester and Butler ultimately accepted a pardon from the Georgia Governor in
1833.298
295
Presumably, Professor Gould would reject my analysis of the holding of Worcester. “Bold
as it was, Justice Marshall’s view that Georgia had no authority to impose its laws within the
territory of the Cherokees was what now would be regarded as federal common law, interstitial rather than constitutional.” Gould, Tough Love, supra note 11, at 675–76. “[B]ecause the
doctrine of inherent sovereignty lacks constitutional underpinnings, it has consistently failed
the tribes whenever it has been advanced as a basis for asserting power over nonmembers.” Id.
at 676. Gould, however, does not cite Kerr-McGee, Colville, or Merrion, which upheld as an
inherent aspect of sovereignty tribal taxes imposed on activity occurring on tribal land, which
would seem to contradict his statement, although Atkinson Trading, see infra notes 331, 592,
759, 762, 880, 1075, cuts back on this power. I do agree with Professor Gould, however, that
a decision based on sovereignty would constitute federal common law, but that is exactly why
I think Marshall did not rest the decision on those grounds. His fear was that federal common
law would not have satisfied the Judiciary Act of 1789. Consequently, Marshall grounded the
decision more firmly (if only half-heartedly) on the Constitution and relied on the Indian
Commerce Clause, treaties, and statutes.
Sovereignty might not be the holding in Worcester but I disagree with McSloy, who suggests
that it would be malpractice to cite the inherent sovereignty doctrine as grounds for bringing
suit. Steven Paul McSloy, The “Miner’s Canary”: A Bird’s Eye View of American Indian Law and
its Future, 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 733, 738 (2003), cited in Gould, Tough Love, supra note 11,
at 677 n.45.
296
Walters, supra note 11, at 140.
297
“Indian policy under Jackson was distinguished by a refusal on the part of the federal government to regard the Indian tribes as sovereign nations, by deference to states who attempted
to compel Indians to conform to their laws, and by constant pressure on the Indians to emigrate.” White, supra note 196, at 711.
298
Burke, supra note 224, at 530; Strickland & Strickland, supra note 196, at 115–16. There
is some confusion among commentators over what happened after the decision. The Court did
not issue an enforcement order to Georgia and may have even lacked a procedural mechanism
for doing so, although one commentator states that the Court purposely did not follow its
normal procedure of preparing a mandate requiring federal marshals to effectuate the decision. Berutti, supra note 194, at 305. Professor Norgren writes that the Supreme Court issued
a mandate to the Georgia Superior Court to release Butler and Worcester and the Supreme
Court’s term ended before a writ of execution could be issued. Nothing could be done until
the next term of the Court in the fall. There was a question of whether Georgia had to issue
a written refusal to execute the Court’s mandate before the Court could act. Norgren, supra
note 193, at 122–23.
Even if there were a procedural mechanism for issuing an order, many Georgia officials
announced that they disagreed that the State had no jurisdiction over the Cherokees. “The
Court rose before the return of the messenger who bore the requisite documentation of
Georgia’s refusal of obedience. The Court had been concerned about what it regarded as defi-
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ciencies in the Judiciary Act of 1789. The Act foreclosed possible avenues of enforcement
available to the Court.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 58. Those deficiencies were cured by
changes made in 1833. Burke, supra note 224, at 531.
A potential crisis was avoided when Georgia Governor Lumpkin pardoned the missionaries in order not to embarrass President Jackson, see Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 7, at 50;
Swindler, supra note 232, at 17, although other commentators fail to mention this. “Due to
a glitch in federal statute law governing the appeals process, the Court’s formal reversal order
to the [relevant Georgia court] was never issued. Technically, Georgia did not have to defy the
Court, and Jackson did not have to take a public stand on the matter.” Newmyer, supra note
200, at 90. Strickland & Strickland, supra note 196, at 114 (citing Burke, supra note 224, at
526), claim that the Court “could not have issued a writ of habeas corpus until its 1833 term;
and since ‘the Georgia court never puts its refusal in writing, it is arguable that the Supreme
Court could not have awarded execution’ even in its next term.”
White tells a more involved story. Had Worcester and Butler asked the Justices to certify
Georgia’s refusal to release them, President Jackson would have had the constitutional obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. Georgia might
have then declared the federal statutes and treaties null and void and other southern states
might have rallied to its case. Secession and civil war were a possibility. But if Worcester and
Butler were to ask the Georgia governor for a pardon, which it was understood he would have
granted, they would be acknowledging that Georgia could regulate Indian affairs within their
borders. That acknowledgment would have been as dangerous to the Union, the Cherokees
argued, as would the enforcement of the Court’s mandate by Jackson. (The famous statement
attributed to President Jackson in response to Worcester, “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it,” turns out to be apocryphal, Newmyer, supra note 200, at 90,
but certainly consistent with Jackson’s views, which is why it has had such currency.) After
first resolving to press their appeal, Butler and Worcester changed their minds, accepted a
pardon, and were released from prison. White, supra note 196, at 738. See also 4 Albert J.
Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall 539–52 (1980); 1 Charles Warren, The Supreme
Court in United States History, ch. 19 (1926); H. von Holst, The Constitutional
and Political History of the United States 448–58 (1889).
When Andrew Jackson beat Henry Clay in the 1832 presidential election, the federal government continued the policy of dispossessing the Indians under the 1830 removal legislation. The Cherokees made the political judgment in the face of physical threats, beatings, and
coercion, that they would be better off moving west rather than resisting Georgia’s continued
incursions without having the support of the federal government. Strickland & Strickland,
supra note 196, at 117–25.
The Creeks, Choctaws, and the Cherokees were all forced into signing such treaties,
in which the federal government provided them with lands west of the Mississippi.
While the treaties gave “civilized” Indians the option of remaining on allotted land,
federal policy contributed to the speedy resale of allotments to white settlers and
speculators. Even though most Indians preferred not to emigrate, the federal government assumed that they would, and failed to scrutinize “sales” in which the Indians
were severely disadvantaged.
White, supra note 196, at 736–37.
A minority faction of the Cherokees signed in 1835 the Treaty of New Echota (denounced
by the majority as “the false treaty”), surrendered their land in Georgia for five million dollars
and land in Indian Territory, which would later become Oklahoma, and embarked on the
infamous “trail of tears.” Strickland & Strickland, supra note 196, at 123. “[S]ixteen thousand
Cherokees were driven at gunpoint from their homeland in Georgia . . . and more than four
thousand . . . died enroute.” Id. at 111. Even worse, when they arrived at the Promised Land,
other tribes were already in possession. “From the Cherokee’s point of view, Marshall’s opinion for the Court, like the treaties they were now constitutionally entitled to negotiate, was
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Worcester was a seminal case, widely cited more for its dicta about the preand extra-constitutional sovereignty of the Indians than for the importance
of the Indian Commerce Clause.299 The focus on sovereignty was understandable. Marshall was probably responding to the common and demeaning perception that the conflict between Georgia and the Cherokees was “a contest
between the savage and the civilized, between expansion and stagnation,
between progress and decay. . . . The idea of the Indian as a savage and as
an obstacle to civilization was almost totally pervasive during this period.”300
President Jackson understood and exploited these sentiments, which even
Marshall’s eloquence could not offset. On a more legal and less political level,
Marshall was likely responding to the Johnson and Baldwin concurrences in
Cherokee Nation that denied the sovereignty of the Indians.301 In any event, as
the discussion below illustrates, the Indians would have been better off if the
Court’s emphasis on the Indian Commerce Clause were better appreciated.
With the advent of the Civil War, Indian policy no longer held full sway.
worth no more than the paper it was written on.” Newmyer, supra note 200, at 90. President
Jackson justified his inaction in defense of the Cherokees as saving them from being murdered.
Other states also ignored the teachings of Worcester. See, e.g., State v. Foreman, 16 Tenn. 256
(1835). See also Anderson, Berger, Frickey, & Krakoff, supra note 208, at 74–77; Grant
Foreman, Indian Removal: The Emigration of the Five Civilized Tribes (1932); Amy
H. Sturgis, The Trail of Tears and Indian Removal (2007); The Cherokee Removal: A
Brief History with Documents (Theda Perdue and Michael Green eds. 2005); Cherokee
Removal: Before and After (William L. Anderson ed. 1991). Strickland captures the
dilemma of the Cherokees. “If the tribe signed the removal treaty, they would surrender their
homelands and the graves of their beloved ancestors; if the tribe refused to sign, they would
be driven at bayonet point away from their homelands and the graves of their beloved ancestors. The choice was no choice.” Rennard Strickland, The Tribal Struggle for Indian Sovereignty:
The Story of the Cherokee Cases, in Race Law Stories 37, 55 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W.
Carbado eds. 2008).
The initial reaction to Worcester was quite different. “News of [the decision] was greeted with
euphoria among the Cherokees in Georgia and their friends in Washington.” Strickland &
Strickland, supra note 196, at 112. “Reverend Lyman Beecher, father of Henry Ward Beecher,
is reported to have jumped in the air, clapped his hands, and shouted ‘God be praised.’” Id.
In a letter to his wife, Justice Story proclaimed: “Thanks be to God, the Court can wash
their hands clean of the inequity of oppressing the Indians and disregarding their rights.”
Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Young Blood Henderson, The Road: Indian Tribes
and Political Liberty 60 (1980).
In 1992, then-Governor Zell Miller of Georgia pardoned Worcester and Butler. See Tom
Watson, 160 Years Later, Georgia Apologizes for Cherokee, Pardon Helps Heal, USA Today, Nov.
25, 1992, at A2. Of course, Worcester and Butler had previously accepted a pardon, see supra,
so the need for a second one is unclear.
299
Beveridge comments that Marshall’s discussion of the sovereignty of the Indians “is the
most extended and exhaustive historical analysis Marshall ever made in any judicial utterance,
except that on the law of treason during the trial of Aaron Burr.” Beveridge, supra note 298,
at 549.
300
Strickland & Strickland, supra note 196, at 118.
301
Baldwin dissented in Worcester, relying on his opinion in Cherokee Nation. See supra note
208. Baldwin’s views are “historically as well as juridically unsubstantiated; they have much
in common with the position on plenary power taken by today’s Court in National Farmers
Union.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 49.
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Both sides in the War seized Indian lands that were strategically located. The
West was marked by increased hostility toward the Indians, reinforced by the
passage of the Homestead Act of 1862. In that same year, Congress authorized the President to abrogate all treaties with tribes that were fighting with
the South.302
Massacres of the Indians and other abuses and atrocities led Congress,
shortly before the end of the Civil War, to authorize an inquiry into the treatment of tribes by military and civil authorities. The country was exhausted
from the War and wanted to put the Indian problem behind it. Consequently,
numerous treaties were signed during and shortly after the Civil War that figure in some cases below.303 In 1871, Congress outlawed future treaties with
the tribes.304
The first cases challenging state taxing power over Indians arose during this
post Civil War period. Dean Nell Newton, an icon in the field of Indian law,
summarizes this time period as follows:
In the years preceding the Civil War, especially during the 1830’s to the
1850’s, Congress had sought to remove the Eastern Indian tribes West
of the Mississippi, but as settlers began opening up the West, continued
removal305 began to be viewed as impossible. After the Civil War and the
pacification of the last tribes of the plains, a movement began to assimilate
Indians into American culture, by force if necessary. A policy of treating
Indian tribes as separate nations with power over their own people on their
own land was seen as antithetical to this new policy. . . . Indian law became
more a matter of domestic law, with Indians regarded as subjects to be governed, rather than foreign nationals.306
302
Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 7, at 69. For a general discussion of the Indians and the
Civil War, see Annie Heloise Abel, The Indians in the Civil War, 15 The American Historical
Review 281 (1910); Laurence M. Hauptman, Between Two Fires: American Indians in
the Civil War (1955); Arrell Morgan Gibson, Native Americans and the Civil War, 9 American
Indian Quarterly 385 (1985); Annie Heloise Able, The American Indian in the Civil
War 1862-1865 (1992); David A. Nichols, Lincoln and the Indians: Civil War Policy
and Politics (1978); Edmund Danziger, Indians and Bureaucrats: Administering the
Reservation Policy During the Civil War (1996).
303
See, e.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) (1883 treaty); McClanahan
v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (1868 treaty); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S.
217 (1959) (1868 treaty).
304
25 U.S.C. § 71. See supra note 6.
305

The idea of removing the Eastern Indians to the trans-Mississippi territories had been
considered by presidents as a solution to the so-called ‘Indian problem’ since the
formation of the Republic. However, not until the 1830s did Andrew Jackson, a
fervent believer in state sovereignty, set federal Indian policy steadfastly on a course
of removing tribes to federal territory west of any states.
Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 17.
306
Newton, Federal Power, supra note 131, at 205–06. The Government’s policy of removing Indians and relocating them to reservations was criticized by the Indian reform movement
starting in the 1870s. See Americanizing the American Indians 1–10 (Francis Paul Prucha
ed. 1973). The Lake Mohonk Conferences of Friends of the Indian were annual conferences
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C. The Kansas Indians and The New York Indians
Despite this new policy that Dean Newton describes, the Court’s early cases
striking down a state tax were consistent with Worcester’s pre- and extraconstitutional sovereignty discussion. The two earliest prominent tax cases
decided right after the end of the Civil War were The Kansas Indians,307 and
The New York Indians,308 companion cases decided in 1867. The former consolidated three cases,309 and prohibited Kansas from taxing land belonging to
a tribe, and land held in severalty by individual Indians under patents issued
to them pursuant to certain treaties. The property tax was a major source of
state revenue at this time,310 underscoring the significance of these cases.
1. The Teaching of Worcester
The Court left no doubt about how it viewed the sovereignty of the Indians.
Consistent with the teachings of Worcester, the Kansas Indians were described
as a “people distinct from others, capable of making treaties, separated from
the jurisdiction of Kansas.”311 As “long as the United States recognizes [the
Tribe’s] national character they are under the protection of the treaties and
the laws of Congress, and their property is withdrawn from the operation of
state laws.”312 “There can be no divided authority” between federal and state
governments over Indian affairs.313 State law does not apply until there is “a
voluntary abandonment of their tribal organization.”314 The Tribes “enjoy the
privilege of total immunity from [s]tate taxation.”315
By accepting statehood, Kansas ceded control over the Indians to the federal government.316 As long as the Tribe is “preserved intact, and recognized
of Indian sympathizers, which typically did not include Indians. Ironically, these sympathizers
tended not to value Indian civilization. Id. at 1. Their agenda emphasized allotment, education, and granting Indians citizenship. Id. at 6–7.
307
Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737 (1867).
308
New York Indians, 72 U.S. 761 (1867).
309
Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. at 751–57 (Shawnee), 757–59 (Weas), 759–61 (Miamis).
310
See Richard Ely, Taxation in American States and Cities 172 (1888).
311
Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. at 755.
312
Id. at 757.
313
Id. at 755. This might be an oblique reference to the Indian Commerce Clause, although
that provision was not cited in the opinion.
314
Id. at 757.
315
Id. at 756. According to Professor Milner Ball, the “modern revision of that statement
takes its origin from the Williams v. Lee statement that, ‘absent governing Acts of Congress, the
question has always been whether state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to
make their own laws and be ruled by them.’” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 101; Williams
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), discussed infra notes 376–424 and accompanying text. I am not
sure why Professor Ball thinks Williams v. Lee is the “modern revision” of that statement. The
statement that the Tribes enjoy the privilege of total immunity from state taxation, and the
caveat that state law applies until there is a “voluntary abandonment of their tribal organization” is far more protective of tribal interests than the holding in Williams v. Lee that a state
can legislate up to the point where it infringes on the right of reservation Indians to make their
own laws and be ruled by them (absent prohibition by Congress).
316
Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. at 756.
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by the . . . government as existing, then they are a ‘people distinct from others,’ . . . separated from the jurisdiction of [the State], and to be governed
exclusively by the government of the Union.”317 While the Indian Commerce
Clause was not explicitly cited, presumably it was the source of Congress’s
exclusive authority.318
2. The Application of a Treaty
In the companion case of New York Indians,319 the Court also held in favor
of the Indians, essentially on the basis of a treaty. The state property tax was
characterized as “an unwarrantable interference, inconsistent with the original
title of the Indians, and offensive to their tribal relations.”320 “Until the Indians have sold their lands, and removed from them in pursuance of the treaty
stipulations,321 they are to be regarded as still in their ancient possessions,
and are in under their original rights, and entitled to the undisturbed enjoyment of them.”322 Neither case involved a discussion of the Indian Commerce
Clause, perhaps because it was problematic whether “commerce” existed.
D. Utah & Northern Railway v. Fisher
Another post-Civil War tax case of significance is Utah & Northern Railway
v. Fisher323 (decided five months before Kagama, discussed infra). In a brief
1885 opinion, the Court upheld a property tax levied by the Territory of
Idaho on an easement owned by the railroad that ran through a reservation.
The Indians sold land to the United States for $6,000 with the understanding that such land would be used by the railroad as a right of way and roadbed, and for depots, stations, and other structures.324 After taking title to the
land, the United States granted a right of way to the railroad for the same

Id. at 755 (emphasis added).
The Indian Commerce Clause would also seem to be the source for the Court’s statement
that “there can be no divided authority between federal and state governments over Indian
affairs.” Id. at 755. Preso is more definitive. “The Court also reaffirmed the Indian Commerce
Clause as an independent bar to state authority . . .” Preso, supra note 41, at 456–57 n.87.
Professor Clinton also agrees. “While the Indian Commerce Clause was not explicitly cited,
[the] result is quite consistent with the dormant Indian Commerce Clause.” Clinton, Dormant,
supra note 22, at 1175. In general, Professor Clinton will treat a case whose holding is consistent with the dormant Indian Commerce Clause as if that case actually involved that Clause. I
am less willing to characterize those cases in that manner.
319
New York Indians, 72 U.S. 761 (1867).
320
Id. at 771.
321
That exact situation would occur in Utah & Northern Railway v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28
(1885), infra notes 323−32 and accompanying text.
322
New York Indians, 72 U.S. at 770.
323
116 U.S. 28 (1885). The defendant, the tax assessor and tax-collector of the county, made
no appearance. The tax was levied under the laws of the Territory for territorial and county
purposes. Id. at 28–29.
324
Id. at 32.
317
318
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$6,000.325
The railroad argued that because the land was located on the reservation, it
was geographically outside the Territory of Idaho and thus outside the Territory’s taxing jurisdiction. The railroad wanted to cloak itself with the property
tax exemption the Indians had for their own land under The Kansas Indians
and The New York Indians. Under this view, the case could have been framed
as whether the Territory could tax privately-owned property located within
an Indian reservation.326
1. The Railroad’s Property Was “Withdrawn” from the Reservation
Part of the opinion takes this tack. The “land upon which the railroad and
other property of the [railroad] are situated was, so far as necessary for the
construction and working of the road, and the construction and use of buildings connected therewith, withdrawn from the reservation.”
“The road and property thereupon became subject to the laws of the Territory relating to railroads, as if the reservation had never existed.”327 In a
sense, that part of the opinion can be read as saying that personal or real
property owned by a non-Indian on a reservation can be taxed by a territory

325
Id. The opinion states that “[b]y an act of Congress confirmatory of the agreement the
same right of way was relinquished by the United States to the company . . .” Id. (emphasis
added). The reference to the “same right of way” is confusing, suggesting that the Indians conveyed only a right of way to the government. That suggestion is contradicted, however, by the
opinion also stating that the Indians “surrender[ed] . . . their title to so much of the reservation
as might be necessary for the legitimate and practical uses of the road.” Id. (emphasis added).
That language comes from the Congressional Act implementing the conveyance, Act of July
3, 1882, ch. 268, 22 Stat. 148. The caption of that Act also refers to a sale by the Indians. “An
act to accept and ratify an agreement with the Shoshone and Bannock Indians for the sale of a
portion of their reservation in Idaho Territory required for the use of the Utah and Northern
Railroad, and to make the necessary appropriation for carrying out the same.” Id. (emphasis
added). It seems clear that the Indians sold a fee interest in their land. As the Act indicates, the
Indians understood that the land would be used as a right of way by the railroad.
The Act provided that “the right of way over the land relinquished by said agreement
to the United States for the construction of said Utah and Northern Railroad, and the use
of the several parcels of land so relinquished intended to be used for depots, stations, sidings, and so forth, for said railroad, are hereby granted to said Utah and Northern Railroad
Company . . . ,” suggesting that title to the land remained in the government. Id. (emphasis
added).
Professor Taylor seems to disagree with this reading. He refers to a “right of way granted by
the Tribe to the railroad.” Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 855. He also claims that the
governing statute “failed to state whether the underlying fee interest was held by the United
States as trustee for the Tribe or whether the United States acquired and retained full fee title.”
Id. at 855–56.
326
That question was answered in the affirmative in Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898), see
discussion infra notes 354−75 and accompanying text.
327
Utah & Northern 116 U.S. at 32. Tit. 18, sec. 1151, now defines rights-of-way running
through a reservation as constituting “Indian Country.”

Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4

01-Pomp.indd 980

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=244384612/23/2010

11:03:33 AM

INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE AND STATE TAXATION

981

(or state).328 Had that been the whole opinion it would have been limited in
its application.
2. “Just Rights” of the Indians Are Not Impaired
But the plaintiff argued the case more broadly, interpreting a treaty between
the Indians and the federal government as prohibiting the tax because the
“reservation is excluded from the general jurisdiction of the Territory.”329 The
Court responded by holding that
[t]he authority of the territory may rightfully extend to all matters not
interfering with [the treaty]. It has, therefore, been held that process of its
courts may run into an Indian reservation of this kind, where the subjectmatter or controversy is otherwise within their cognizance. If the plaintiff
lawfully constructed and now operates a railroad through the reservation, it
is not perceived that any just rights of the Indians under the treaty can be
impaired by taxing the road and property used in operating it.330

Under the facts of this case, this conclusion was hardly surprising because
the Indians sold the land to the Federal Government with the understanding
that a right of way would be granted to the railroad. No rights of the Indians
would be impaired in this voluntary transaction. The case did not involve a
state’s power to tax Indians or sanction the exercise of jurisdiction over the
Indians themselves, who were not a party to the case. Unfortunately, the case
has led to much confusion and has been cited adversely to the Indians.331
328
It is unclear from the opinion whether the Territory was attempting to tax the land owned
by the Federal Government. That tax would have been invalid under McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. 316 (1819). The opinion states that the tax “was levied under the laws of the Territory
upon the railroad, its depots, and other property within the reservation . . . .” Utah & Northern,
116 U.S. at 29 (emphasis added). If “other property” means other property owned by the railroad, the tax would not have been imposed on the federal government.
329
Utah & Northern, 116 U.S. at 31.
330
Id. at 31–32. This language is suggestive of the Williams v. Lee formulation in 1959:
“absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action
infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.”
358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). See supra note 315.
331
The first case to cite Utah & Northern was Thomas v. Gay 169 U.S. 264 (1898), see
discussion infra notes 354−75 and accompanying text. That case upheld the state taxation of
privately-owned cattle grazing on a reservation under leases with the Indians. Without any discussion, the cattle were implicitly analogized to the railroad in Utah & Northern, disregarding
the distinction that the railroad was using property that was “withdrawn” from the reservation
and that the railroad had no business relation with the Indians, whereas the cattle were on
reservation land, and the lessees were operating under leases with the Indians.
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980),
involving a state sales tax on the purchaser of cigarettes on a reservation, Justice Rehnquist
cited inter alia Utah & Northern for the proposition that “the traditional cases clearly did not
find that Indian sovereign immunity was contravened by subjecting tribes to the burdens
inherent in state taxation of the reservation activities of non-Indians.” Id. at 182 (Rehnquist,
J., concurring in part, concurring in the result in part, dissenting in part). Rehnquist did not
cite any specific page in Utah & Northern for support. His reliance on Utah & Northern was
misplaced, however, because the railroad was not conducting its business on the reservation or
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with the Indians. Furthermore, the economic incidence of the tax did not fall on the Indians,
with whom the railroad apparently had no dealing, unless it is assumed that the possibility of a
tax after the sale somehow affected the price at which the Indians sold the land to the government. This latter point of tax capitalization cannot be determined because the case is silent on
how the $6,000 price for the land sold to the Government was agreed upon or why the government would grant a right of way over that land for the same price that is paid for the land
in fee. See infra note 331. Rehnquist would have been on stronger grounds had the railroad
sold cigarettes to non-Indians on land that it owned that was located within the boundaries
of a reservation.
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141–42 (1980), see discussion infra
notes 916−84 and accompanying text, miscited Utah & Northern for the proposition that
“[l]ong ago the Court departed from Mr. Chief Justice Marshall’s view that ‘the laws of [a
State] can have no force’ within reservation boundaries.” This description failed to mention
that Utah & Northern’s property was privately-owned and “withdrawn” from the reservation.
McClanahan v. Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 168 (1973), see discussion infra notes 519−91 and
accompanying text, improperly offered Utah & Northern as an example of a state exercising
sovereignty over non-Indians who undertook activity on Indian reservations, again ignoring
the private status of the railroad’s property and the fact that it was “withdrawn” from the
reservation.
Most recently, Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361–62 (2001), endorsed the description of
Utah & Northern in the controversial 1958 edition of the Cohen treatise, see discussion supra
note 11, that: “an Indian reservation is considered part of the territory of the State.” Federal
Indian Law (U.S. Dep’t. of Interior) 510, and n.1 (1958). Contrary to this description, Utah
& Northern held that privately-owned property was withdrawn from (i.e., not part of ) the
reservation. The issue was not whether the reservation was part of the Territory of Idaho.
For one of the more penetrating discussions of Hicks, which held that a tribal court lacks
jurisdiction to adjudicate a tribal member’s civil claims against state officials who were executing a search warrant on trust lands for alleged off-reservation crimes, see Gould, Tough Love,
supra note 11, at 671; Singer, supra note 125, at 642 (“Hicks changed fundamental norms in
the field of federal Indian law in a manner that flew in the face of both established precedent
and existing federal policy.”).
Professor Singer views Hicks as one example of why over
the last twenty years, the Supreme Court has led a massive assault on tribal sovereignty. Although it has acted to affirm expansive tribal powers over tribal members, it
has substantially curtailed tribal power over nonmembers, including both non-Indians and Indians who are not tribal members. At the same time the Court has stripped
tribes of governmental powers that had previously held in Indian country, it has
increased the powers of state governments in Indian country. This transfer of power
from tribes to states has occurred without congressional authorization or executive
approval; indeed, it contradicts both congressional and executive policy which, in
recent years, has strongly supported the revitalization of tribal governments.
Id. at 643.
In commenting on Atkinson and Hicks, Professors Duthu and Suagee described the Court
as making
abundantly clear that the key animating principle of its Indian law jurisprudence is solicitous protection of the interests of nontribal members; the Court
shows no concern whatsoever for adherence to this nation’s historic promises
to secure and protect the territorial and political integrity of tribal systems of
self-government . . . [T]hese decisions continue a trend of increasing judicial activism
in federal Indian law wherein the Court, and not Congress, assumes the lead role
[under the Indian Commerce Clause] . . . [T]hese decisions serve to highlight a real,
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Most significantly, despite what the Court would later claim,332 the case
had nothing to do with Indian Commerce Clause.
E. United States v. Kagama
The above cases involved state taxing statutes. The most prominent non-tax
case of this period addressing the Indian Commerce Clause involved an 1886
challenge to a federal statute. In United States v. Kagama,333 the Court upheld
the power of Congress to adopt the Major Crimes Act.334 The Act, passed in
1885, set forth seven crimes,335 which if committed in Indian country would
constitute federal offenses, even if committed by one Indian against another,
which were the facts in Kagama.336 The Act was significant because it projected federal law into matters involving solely Indians.
and quite profound, abdication by the United States Congress of its trust responsibilities to Indian tribes . . . . Congress has largely stood by as the Supreme Court has
literally rewritten the law relating to the scope of inherent tribal sovereignty.
N. Bruce Duthu & Dean B. Suagee, Supreme Court Strikes Two More Blows Against Tribal SelfDetermination, 16 Nat. Resources & Env’t. 118–19 (2001).
332
See infra note 366 and accompanying text.
333
118 U.S. 375 (1886).
334
18 U.S.C. § 1153. In Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945), the Court held that the Major
Crimes Act preempted a state statute. “[T]he policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Nation’s history.” Id. at 789. For a general discussion
of criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, see Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over
Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 503 (1976) [hereinafter Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction].
335
Murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with the intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny.
Kagama, 118 U.S. at 376.
336
Id. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), held that tribes had no
jurisdiction over non-Indians for crimes committed on reservations. It was unclear whether
the critical distinction was between Indians and non-Indians, or Tribal members and nonmembers. Relying on Oliphant, Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), held that the tribes lacked
inherent sovereign power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians and nonIndians, but had the power to exclude persons deemed undesirable. The distinction between
member Indians and non-member Indians was also endorsed by the Court in Colville. See 447
U.S. at 134; Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 7, at 237–43.
Professor Gould characterized Duro as inconsistent with United States v. Mazurie, 419
U.S. 544 (1975), where the Court stated that tribes possess the attributes of territorial sovereigns over members and nonmembers. Gould, Consent, supra note 6, at 837. Duro was
modified by Congress, which amended the Indian Civil Rights Act to establish the “inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction
over all Indians.” Public Law No. 101-511, Sec. 8077, 104 Stat. 1856, 1892–93. In general,
see Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 7, at 237–43. In Mazurie, the Court cited the Indian
Commerce Clause and the doctrine of trust responsibility to hold that Congress could regulate
liquor sales in Indian country.
Oliphant is a Rehnquist opinion that has been widely criticized for using “mostly fragments
of historical evidence,” citing irrelevant federal statutes, relying on “contradictory opinions
of executive branch officers, congressional reports on tangentially related legislation, and an
1878 decision by a maverick district judge. What is most remarkable, though, is not the thin
historical record on which the Court relied; rather, it is the fact that conjectures about the past
were used to justify a legal principle fixing the limits of tribal sovereignty. Nowhere does the
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1. Inapplicability of the Indian Commerce Clause
The plaintiffs were two Klamath Indians, one indicted for murder of another
Klamath Indian on a California reservation, and the other for aiding and abetting in that murder.337 A central question in the case was whether the Indian
Commerce Clause authorized Congress to enact the Major Crimes Act. The
Court held that it did not, but nonetheless found other, extra-constitutional
grounds for upholding the statute.338
With respect to the Indian Commerce Clause, the Court conceded that:
[I]t would be a very strained construction of this clause, that a system of
criminal laws for Indians living peaceably in their reservations, which left
out the entire code of trade and intercourse laws justly enacted under that
provision, and established punishments for the common-law crimes of
murder, manslaughter, arson, burglary, larceny, and the like, without any

Court explain why popular assumptions about tribes’ criminal jurisdiction should override the
foundation principles’ guarantee that Indian autonomy will be curbed only at the direction
of Congress.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1597. Barsh also challenged Rehnquist’s
use of history. Russel Barsh, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting
of the Snark, 63 Minn. L. Rev. 609, 610 (1978) (“carelessness with history, logic, precedent,
and statutory construction”). Cf. Professor Norgren’s criticism of Chief Justice Marshall’s use
of history in Cherokee Nation, supra note 216.
Professor Williams applies the work of Albert Memmi, who analyzed racism, in criticizing
Justice Rehnquist’s reasoning. Williams, Barbarism, supra note 7, at 261–65; see also Williams,
Algebra, supra note 216, at 267–74; Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 7, at 226–28; Johnson &
Martinis, supra note 194, at 11–14.
Oliphant is cited by many as a watershed case in which the Supreme Court started down
the path of eviscerating the pre- and extra-constitutional sovereignty doctrine. See, e.g., Peter
C. Maxfield, Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe: The Whole is Greater than the Sum of the Parts,
19 J. Contemp. L. 391, 396 (1993). But Williams v. Lee started the Court down that path
even earlier. See 358 U.S. 217 (1959), discussed infra notes 376−424 and accompanying text.
Professor Gould describes the Oliphant Court as assuming “virtually independent power to
limit inherent sovereignty . . . the Court declared that tribes have been implicitly divested of
inherent power to prosecute non-Indians, because criminal jurisdiction is inconsistent with
their status.” Gould, Consent, supra note 6, at 813. Gould describes Oliphant and Talton v.
Mayes as illustrating that “when contests have pitted a tribe against an individual, unless the
individual was a member of the tribe, the tribe has almost always failed.” Gould, Tough Love,
supra note 11, at 674.
Professor Frickey argues that Oliphant was a “horrible test case for affirming tribal sovereignty in the modern context.” Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 36. Only 50 tribal
members lived on the reservation compared with nearly 3,000 non-Indians. Id. at 36–37. Bad
facts make for bad law and I would consider Moe and Colville in that same vein.
337
Kagama, 118 U.S. at 376.
338
Lower court cases had relied on the Indian Commerce Clause for upholding criminal
jurisdiction in other circumstances. United States v. Cisna, 25 F. Cas. 422 (C.C. Ohio 1835).
But see United States v. Bailey, 24 F. Cas. 937 (C.C. Tenn. 1834). Kagama recognized that the
Constitution “is almost silent in regard to the relations of the government which was established by it to the numerous tribes of Indians within its borders.” 118 U.S. at 378.
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reference to their relation to any kind of commerce, was authorized by the
grant of power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes.339

2. The Indians are Wards of the Nation
Despite this concession, and without any textual basis for its analysis, the
Court announced that the Act was within the powers of Congress.340 In doing
so, the Court excluded the possibility that sovereign tribes could regulate
inter-Indian crimes: “The soil and the people within these limits are under the
political control of the Government of the United States, or the States of the
Union. There exist within the broad domain of sovereignty but these two.”341
In addition, the Court noted:
These Indian tribes are the wards342 of the nation. They are communities
dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food.
Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States,
and receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the
people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies.
From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of
dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which
it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the
power. . . .
The power of the general government over these remnants of a race once
powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. It must
339
Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378–79. Professor Natelson describes Kagama as “reject[ing] the
Indian Commerce Clause as a source of plenary congressional authority.” Natelson, supra note
15, at 210. While the Court rejected the application of the Indian Commerce Clause to the
facts in Kagama, no inference should be drawn about its general applicability.
Professor Clinton describes Kagama as reiterating “the original understanding of the constitutional relationship between the federal government and the states in the area of Indian
affairs, although the Court relied less on the Indian Commerce Clause as the source of that
relationship than it had in prior cases.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1176. I find the
reference to “relying less” to be a somewhat generous description: the Kagama Court rejected
the Indian Commerce Clause outright. I would also disagree with the extent to which earlier
cases that did not mention the Indian Commerce Clause could be said to have relied on that
Clause.
Professor Clinton is surprised that the Court did not rely on the Indian Commerce Clause
because “at least one Circuit Court previously had sustained the constitutionality of another
criminal jurisdictional statue for Indian country by directly relying on the Indian Commerce
Clause.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1177 n.348. Professor Milner Ball thinks the
Indian Commerce Clause “might uphold a code of trade but not a code of law wholly unrelated to trade.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 51.
340
“It is not at all clear that there is a legitimate basis for attributing such power to Congress.
The Marshall Court certainly thought the tribes were separate and distinct.” Ball, Constitution,
supra note 7, at 51.
341
Kagama, 118 U.S. at 379 (emphasis added). This statement obviously ignores the third
possibility, that the Tribes are sovereigns.
342
“[I]t is only too easy . . . to dismiss the possibility that wards are bearers of sovereign,
independent, national integrity.” Ball, John Marshall, supra note 193, at 1188.
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exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because
the theatre of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United
States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its
law on all the tribes.343

3. Nontextual and Nonconstitutional Trusteeship
The Court has been roundly criticized for basing its decision on this “nontextual and nonconstitutional trusteeship authority, rather than relying, as had
past cases, on the Indian Commerce Clause.”344 Kagama is blatantly inconsistent with Worcester,345 where Chief Justice Marshall characterized British
relations with the Indians (which carried over to the new government) as
“never intrud[ing] into the interior of their affairs, or interfer[ing] with their
self government.”346
In dicta, the Court distorted the essence of Cherokee Nation. The Court
described Cherokee Nation as holding “that the Cherokees were not a State
or nation within the meaning of the constitution, so as to be able to maintain the suit.”347 But Chief Justice Marshall never held that the Chero343
Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383–85. Professor Prakash explores but then rejects the possibility
that the opinion was based on the Territory–Property Clause of the Constitution. Prakash,
Against, supra note 180, at 1078 n.54.
344
Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1180. Professor Clinton did not list the prior cases
in which the Court has supposedly relied on the Indian Commerce Clause. His list would have
been a good deal longer than mine because he would include cases whose result was consistent
with the Indian Commerce Clause even if the Court had never cited that Clause. For example,
he would probably include United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881), which sustained
Colorado’s prosecution of a non-Indian for the murder of another non-Indian on a reservation within the State. “While McBratney never directly mentioned the Indian Commerce
clause, the implication was clear that state jurisdiction and sovereignty extended into Indian
country located within a state where the matter was regulated, taxed, or adjudicated by the
state and involved no Indian interests directly or indirectly.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note
22, at 1181–82. See his characterization of Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), id. at 1186,
1191−93, 1196, 1203, 1227, 1235, 1245. I am not as confident that the Court would have
applied the Indian Commerce Clause in McBratney if Indian interests had been involved.
345
Professor Frickey, however, suggests that the decision “indicates that Congress has power
over Indian affairs based more on inherent notions of centralized national power in a colonial
government than on a strict interpretation of the congressional powers enumerated in the
Constitution. It is, to that extent, an extension of the Marshall trilogy.” Frickey, Domesticating,
supra note 15, at 59.
346
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 547 (1832). But see Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, where
the Court declared that the “[p]lenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has
been exercised by Congress from the beginning,” 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903), a statement that
Clinton describes as “demonstrably historically false.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at
1179 n.351. Professor Milner Ball describes Lone Wolf as giving “Congress greater power than
any conferred by the Constitution.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7 at 54.
347
Kagama, 118 U.S. at 379. The Court argued that if the tribes were foreign nations they
would have been encompassed by the Foreign Commerce Clause; alternatively, that clause
would have referred to “foreign and Indian nations.” Id. Presumably this discussion was irrelevant. If the Indian Commerce Clause did not apply because there was no relation between a
criminal code and “commerce,” that same reasoning would apply under the Foreign Commerce
Clause.
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kees were not a nation, only that they were not a foreign nation: “[T]he
constitution . . . does not comprehend Indian tribes in the general term ‘foreign
nations;’ not we presume because a tribe may not be a nation, but because it
is not foreign to the United States.”348 Rather astonishingly, Kagama ignored
Marshall’s oxymoronic creation: “domestic dependent nation.” The holding
in Kagama denies the Indians the very sovereignty that Cherokee Nation and
Worcester sought to emphasize.
The Court’s rejection of the Indian Commerce Clause is understandable,
especially in 1886.349 After all, murder, one of the crimes covered, does not
have any inevitable relationship to commerce, and the Act did not link the
crimes to any aspect of commerce.350 Even if the concept of “commerce” were
to be broadened, which would occur in subsequent cases interpreting the
Interstate Commerce Clause, intra-tribal crimes on a reservation might still
not be covered.

348
349

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 19 (1831).
Professor Laurence explains that

[i]t is not surprising that in 1886 the Court took a narrow view of the limits of
the Indian commerce clause, for the same was true under the interstate commerce
clause. In fact, the Court began to broaden its view of the Indian commerce clause
well before the same development of the interstate commerce clause. For example, in
United States v. Sandoval, the Court upheld a criminal statute with respect to liquor
traffic with specific reference to the Indian commerce clause.
Robert Laurence, The Indian Commerce Clause, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 203, 225 (1981) [hereinafter
Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause]. As suggested above, there is no reason to assume that the
Indian Commerce Clause is to be interpreted in pari materia with the Interstate Commerce
Clause, although this comment carries less weight when the issue is the interpretation of “commerce.” See supra notes 163, 180, 283.
350
The United States argued that the Indian Commerce Clause provided the authority for
the statute. Relying on Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 190 (1824), the Government argued that
commerce meant “intercourse.”
Ever since the adoption of the Constitution in 1789 Congress has exercised the power
of regulating the intercourse with Indians, and of enacting criminal laws with regard
to the conduct of Indians and the conduct of white men having intercourse with
Indians in the Indian country and the reservations within the States.
Brief for the United States, at 6. The Government also argued that the “policy of such legislation is a question of legislative discretion, and not of judicial cognizance.” Id. at 20. For a
discussion of the meaning of “commerce” at the time the Constitution was adopted, see supra
note 163.
Although subsequent (non-Indian) cases came to interpret Congress’s powers under the
Interstate Commerce Clause very broadly, the Court issued a shot across the bow in United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Lopez held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which
outlawed guns within 1,000 feet of a school, was invalid because it did not regulate an activity
arising out of, or connected with, a commercial transaction that substantially affected interstate commerce, and consequently was beyond Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.
Id. This holding is consistent with Kagama.
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4. Holding is Unsupported by the History of Relations with the Indians
The pre-constitutional history of relations with the Indians does not justify
Congress’s power to have enacted the Major Crimes Act. Prior to the Constitution, and even for a period after its adoption, the colonies, the states, and
the national government did not project their laws into Indian country, at
least in areas not involving land or trade. And as Marshall noted in Worcester:
[O]ur history furnishes no example, from the first settlement of our country, of any attempt on the part of the crown to interfere with the internal
affairs of the Indians, farther than to keep out the agents of foreign powers,
who, as traders or otherwise, might seduce them into foreign alliances. The
king purchased their lands when they were willing to sell, at a price they
were willing to take; but never coerced a surrender of them. He also purchased their alliance and dependence by subsidies; but never intruded into
the interior of their affairs, or interfered with their self government, so far as
respected themselves only.351

Kagama ignored this history and the tribes’ status as domestic dependent
nations352 by announcing that the Indians were weak, helpless, and dimin31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 547.
Professor Wilkinson views Kagama as consistent with McBratney, 104 U.S. at 621, and
Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 553. Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 24. McBratney involved a murder by a
non-Indian of a non-Indian on Indian country. The Court upheld state court jurisdiction notwithstanding the federal General Crimes Act indicated that federal jurisdiction was applicable.
The Court did not refer to the Indian Commerce Clause presumably because no commerce
with the Indians existed. Other than this being a “white on white” crime, McBratney was hard
to reconcile with Worcester. Dean Getches feels that Worcester and McBratney are distinguishable “only if one assumes that the murder of one white by another in McBratney was of no
concern to the tribe on whose reservation it took place. As such, the crime fell outside the
ambit of ‘Indian affairs,’ the field in which Congress was legislating when it passed the federal
murder statute.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1587.
New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 500 (1946), describes McBratney as applying
only to “crimes between whites and whites which do not affect Indians.”
In its amicus brief in McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n, 471 U.S. 195 (1985) discussed
infra notes 519−91 and accompanying text, the Government described McBratney as a “narrow exception[] to Worcester concerning matters not directly affecting the Indians who reside
on the reservation. No decision of this Court authorizes state regulation or taxation of Indians
on reservations, in the absence of congressional authorization.” Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae McClanahan v. Arizona, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (No. 71-834), 1972 WL
136317, at *6.
Lone Wolf allowed Congress to unilaterally revoke an Indian treaty and upheld a federal sale
of tribal land that was invalid under the treaty. A treaty cannot “materially limit and qualify
the controlling authority of Congress in respect to the care and protection of the Indians.”
Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 564. Congress has “power over the property of the Indians, by reason
of its exercise of guardianship over their interests, and . . . such authority might be implied,
even though opposed to the strict letter of a treaty with the Indians.” Id. at 565. Lone Wolf also
declared that Congress’s plenary authority over the tribes was a political question, not subject
to control by the courts. Id. at 568. That view was rejected in United States v. Sioux Nation,
448 U.S. 371, 413 (1980) (the political question doctrine “has long since been discredited
351
352
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ished in numbers.353
F. Thomas v. Gay
Thomas v. Gay354 was the earliest case (1898) in which the Court upheld a
state tax on non-Indians doing business with a tribe on a reservation. The
case involved a personal property tax levied by the Territory of Oklahoma
on cattle owned by non-Indians grazing on the reservation under leases with
the Indians.355 A federal statute356 authorized the leases but was silent on the
matter of state taxation.357
The taxpayers-lessees argued that state taxation of the cattle under leases
authorized by Congress violated the “rights of the Indians and [was] an invasion of the jurisdiction and control of the United States over them and their
lands.”358
in takings cases, and was expressly laid to rest in Delaware Tribal Business Committee”) and
Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977) (Congress’s plenary
power does “not mean that all federal legislation concerning Indians is . . . immune from
judicial scrutiny.”). Lone Wolf relied in part on Kagama with respect to the helplessness of the
Indians. 118 U.S. at 566.
Professor Wilkinson describes the Kagama-McBratney-Lone Wolf cases as “implicitly
conceptualiz[ing] tribes as lost societies without power, as minions of the federal government. Since the tribes were presumptively unable to wield an acceptable level of governmental
authority, the Court looked to federal or state authority to fill the void.” Wilkinson, supra,
at 24. The “tribes were fading entities moving toward extinction.” Id. at 27; see also Ball,
Constitution, supra note 7, at 53; Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 265 (1901) (“The
North American Indians do not and never have constituted ‘nations’ . . . . In short, the word
‘nation’ as applied to the uncivilized Indians is so much of a misnomer as to be little more than
a compliment.”); Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 653 (1890) (“The proposition that the Cherokee Nation is a sovereign in the sense that the United States is sovereign,
or in the sense that the several states are sovereign . . . finds no support.”).
353
At one point in the opinion, however, the Court states that the Indians “were, and always
have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal
relations; not as states, not as nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but
as a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus
far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided.”
118 U.S. at 381–82. But that description no longer applied because “after an experience of
a hundred years of the treaty-making system of government, Congress has determined upon
a new departure—to govern them by acts of Congress.” Id. at 382. The opinion studiously
avoids any reference to “domestic dependent nation,” or “independent political community,”
see supra notes 220, 244, and accompanying text.
“After the Civil War, the treaty system had come under attack by Christian reformers, whose
opinion of Indians was identical to that expressed by Justice Miller in Kagama. Indians were
said to be wards, not treaty partners.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 52.
354
169 U.S. 264 (1898).
355
The tax was not limited to grazing or to reservation land. “[W]hen any cattle are kept or
grazed, or any other personal property is situated in any unorganized country, district or reservation of this territory, such property shall be subject to taxation in the organized county to
which said country, district or reservation is attached for judicial purposes . . . .” Id. at 272.
356
Id. at 273.
357
Id. at 272–73.
358
Id. at 273.
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1. Misstatement of Utah & Northern Railway
In response, the Court cited Utah & Northern for the proposition that “property of railway companies traversing Indian reservation are subject to taxation by the States and Territories in which such reservations are located.”359
Apparently, the railway property was analogized to the cattle and there the
analysis ended. The property of the railway could be taxed and therefore the
cattle could be taxed. Both were privately owned and the Court viewed both
as being on the reservation. Not discussed was that the railroad had no ongoing business relationship with the Indians and was using property that was
“withdrawn” from the reservation. By contrast, the owners of the cattle were
using reservation land under leases with the Indians.
Moreover, while it is conceivable that a Territorial property tax imposed in
Utah & Northern might have been passed backward to the Indians through a
reduction in the price of the land, the Indians sold the land to the Government
under conditions that hardly suggested the possibility of tax capitalization,360
whereas the taxpayer-lessees were arguing more plausibly in Thomas that a tax
on the cattle would affect the value of the Indian-owned land. Today, the taxpayers would have had a gaggle of economists with computer printouts and
sophisticated models, but no empirical evidence was offered in 1898.
2. Indians’ Property Rights Not Seriously Affected
In what would take on greater importance in later cases, especially for Justice
Rehnquist361 in Colville, infra, the Court rejected the argument that the IndiId.
One curious aspect, for example, was that the Indians sold the land in fee to the
Government for $6,000 and the Government granted less than a fee interest (a right of way)
for the same amount, reinforcing the strong suspicion that no free market existed that was setting the price of the land. See supra note 331.
361
Justice Rehnquist has been described as having “nothing but contempt for Indian cases.”
Bob Woodward & Scott Armstrong, The Brethren 412 (1979). Dean Getches offers a
more nuanced view.
359
360

Although some attribute [Rehnquist’s active role in Indian cases] to his relatively
junior status and a fabled unpopularity of Indian cases among the Court’s members,
the degree of vigor with which he has asserted his views in Indian law belies a perfunctory or obligatory exercise. His spirited opinions arguing for an historical review
of facts to guide construction of Indian statutes have been especially significant.
Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1632–33. Dean Getches also observed that “[i]n a
spate of cases beginning about the time Rehnquist became Chief Justice in 1986, the Court
veered away from the foundations of Indian law.” David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The
Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of State’s Rights, Color Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 Minn.
L. Rev. 267, 273–74 (2001); see also David J. Bloch, Colonizing the Last Frontier, 29 Am.
Indian L. Rev. 1, 1 (2004) (“Since 1978, and especially after Rehnquist became its Chief
Justice, the Court has diminished the inherent powers tribes possessed as domestic dependent
nations and transferred them to the states at the federal government’s expense but without
its consent, indeed to the contrary of congressional and executive policy favoring tribal selfdetermination.”).
Professor Frickey has described the Rehnquist Court as
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ans’ property rights were seriously affected by the Oklahoma tax. The lessees
argued “that the money contracted to be paid for the privilege of grazing is
paid to the Indians as a tribe, and is used and expended by them for their own
purposes, and that if, by reason of this taxation, the conditions existing at the
time the leases were executed were changed, or could be changed by the legislature of Oklahoma at its pleasure, the value of the lands for such purposes
would fluctuate or be destroyed altogether according to such conditions.”362
In classic ipse dixit logic, the Court simply stated “it is obvious that a tax put
upon the cattle of the lessees is too remote and indirect to be deemed a tax
upon the lands or privileges of the Indians,”363 thus dispensing with an othdeflat[ing] the Indian law canon. The primary reason is that this Court is hardly
interested in generous construction of federal statutes and other provisions to promote the lot of disadvantaged peoples . . . [T]his problem is aggravated by the fact
that the tribes’ usual opponents in Rehnquist Court cases have been the states, and
that, for the current Court, federalism is a public-law value of extreme importance.
Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 199, at 424–25 n.180.
Two other commentators described Chief Justice Rehnquist as taking “the position that the
states should be the linchpins of the republic. It follows that he sees Indian tribes, with their
sovereignty and separateness from state governments, as violating his preference for state government.” Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases,
16 Pub. Land L. Rev. 1, 2 (1995). “Whatever the subject, Rehnquist manages to construe the
law to limit or impair the governing powers and jurisdiction of Indian tribes. This is in direct
conflict with a basic canon of Indian law.” Id. at 18. Writing in 1995, Johnson and Martinis
concluded that in “the seventy-nine Supreme Court opinions involving Indian claims in which
Rehnquist has taken part since his appointment to the Court in 1972, he has rarely cast a vote
in favor of Indian interests.” Id. at 24.
[H]e believes that state regulations and taxes should apply on reservations, especially
to non-Indians, unless federal legislation can be found expressing an opposite intent.
This position reverses a long-standing rule of construction in Indian cases—that state
law does not apply on a reservation unless Congress clearly expresses that intent.
Id. at 25.
Writing in 1983, one commentator describes Rehnquist as moving “during the course of
the past decade from a centrist position and frequent author of the Court’s unanimous or
majority opinions in Indian cases through 1978, to become the Court’s most consistent and
vigorous dissenter.” Robert S. Pelcyger, Justices and Indians: Back to Basics, 62 Or. L. Rev. 29,
30 (1983).
Professor Fletcher notes that the practice of federal Indian law is in serious normative
decline “and most likely began to degenerate around the time of the ascension of Chief Justice
Rehnquist in 1986 and the concomitant trend toward reducing the Supreme Court’s docket.”
Fletcher, Indian Problem, supra note 11, at 580. “While as Chief Justice, he did not write the
lead opinions in many Indian law decisions, the doctrinal origins of these cases can be traced
back to the damage done by then-Justice Rehnquist in the 1970s and early 1980s to foundational principles of federal Indian law.” Id. at 591.
362
Thomas, 169 U.S. at 273.
363
Id. The cases the Court cited as upholding state taxes alleged to have interfered with interstate commerce, id. at 273–74, exhibited similar ipse dixit logic. The lessees also cited Pollock v.
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), holding that a tax on rents was substantially a
tax on the lands so that a tax on cattle should also be viewed as a forbidden tax on Indian land.
The Court dismissed this argument as “fanciful,” with the formal and meaningless response
that the tax was on cattle and not on rent. Thomas, 669 U.S. at 274. Presumably, a tax on the
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erwise empirical question. The Court ignored the fact that cattle were being
removed from the Territory apparently to avoid the tax.364
3. Indian Commerce Clause
The taxpayers also argued that the tax violated the Indian Commerce Clause.
The tax interfered with, or imposed a servitude upon lawful commercial intercourse with the Indians, “over which Congress has absolute control, and in
the exercise of which control it has enacted the statute authorizing the leasing
by the Indians of their unoccupied lands for grazing purposes.”365 Astonishingly, the Court claimed that this issue had been decided in favor of the state
in Utah & Northern,366 notwithstanding that the railroad in that case had not
even raised an Indian Commerce Clause argument and the opinion makes
rents having the same economic effects as a tax on cattle would have been struck down by the
Court.
364
Thomas, 169 U.S. at 264.
Professor Taylor, with his usual insight, suggests that Thomas and other cases during this
time period were decided
during the early part of the allotment process when federal Indian policy sought
to eliminate tribes as political entities and to hasten the assimilation of Native
Americans. Given this context, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court paid little
or no attention to the possible ill effects of their decisions on the tribes. Instead, the
members of the Court probably viewed territorial taxation as an important part of a
broad federal policy of closing the frontier, establishing new states, and finishing the
process of manifest destiny. Given the flawed reasoning and obvious lack of impartiality, [Thomas, Utah & Northern, Phoenix Railroad, and Wagoner v. Evans] should be
viewed as unworthy of any precedential value.
Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 858–59. He also analyzes other issue in Thomas, which I
do not address in this Article. See id. at 857–58.
Allotment sometimes led to the disestablishment of a tribe. See, e.g., DeCoteau v. Dist.
Cnty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 427–28 (1975). Sometimes allotment led to a contraction of the size
of a reservation. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 333 (1998).
For a general discussion of the allotment policy, see Frederick E. Hoxie, A Final Promise:
The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880-1920 (1984); John W. Ragsdale, Jr., The
Movement to Assimilate the American Indians: A Jurisprudential Study, 57 UMKC L. Rev. 399,
399-400; John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Indian Reservations and the Preservation of Tribal Culture:
Beyond Wardship to Stewardship, 59 UMKC L. Rev. 503, 510–13 (1991); Judith V. Royster,
The Legacy of Allotment, 27 Ariz. St. L. J. 1 (1995); Singer, supra note 125, at 649 (“At the
time of the allotment acts, Congress intended eventually, but not immediately, to destroy
tribal government, and it provided that tribal land that ended up in non-Indian hands would
become subject to state law.”).
In an amicus brief filed in Ramah Navajo School Board v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico,
458 U.S. 832 (1982), discussed infra notes 985−1057 and accompanying text, the Government
warned that Thomas should not be extended, describing the decision as “[written] at a time
when Indian reservations were destined for extinction, and condoning only a tax on nonIndian cattle located on leased land within a reservation, with no subsequent tribal involvement.” Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd.,
Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of N.M., 458 U.S. 832 (1982) (No. 80-2162), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 1162, at *7 [hereinafter Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae].
365
Thomas, 169 U.S. at 274.
366
Id. at 275.
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no reference, even in passing, to that Clause. Perhaps realizing that Utah
& Northern was a frail response to the Indian Commerce Clause argument,
the Court retreated into the kind of formal, rather than pragmatic, analysis
that marked its approach to the Interstate Commerce Clause at this time
but later abandoned.367 The challenged taxes “were not imposed on the business of grazing, or on the rents received by the Indians, but on the cattle as
property of the lessees.”368 Repeating its earlier exercise in ipse dixit reasoning,
the Court concluded that the tax on the cattle was “too remote and indirect
to be deemed a tax or burden on interstate commerce,369 so is it too remote
and indirect to be regarded as an interference with the legislative power of
Congress.”370 Two frail reeds do not make a convincing argument.
4. Taxation of Nonresidents
Finally, the case dealt with a theme that would recur in later opinions. The
taxpayers, nonresidents of the Territory, argued that they did not benefit from
the Oklahoma taxes and that as nonresidents they were not represented in the
Oklahoma Legislature. The Court properly rejected this argument:
Undoubtedly there are general principles familiar to our systems of state
and Federal [G]overnment, that the people who pay taxes imposed by laws
are entitled to have a voice in the election of those who pass the laws, and
that taxes must be assessed and collected for public purposes, and that the
duty or obligation to pay taxes by the individual is founded in his participation in the benefits arising from their expenditure. But these principles,
as practically administered, do not mean that no person, man, woman, or
child, resident or non-resident, shall be taxed, unless he was represented by
some one for whom he had actually voted, nor do they mean that no man’s
property can be taxed unless some benefit to him personally can be pointed
out.371

The Court might have noted that the property tax was nondiscriminatory
and applied equally to residents and nonresidents. Consequently, although
nonresidents could not vote in Oklahoma elections, their interests were protected indirectly by residents. As residents pursued their own self-interests
in making sure that the rate and application of the tax was reasonable, they
367
This formal approach was judicially interred in Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 274, although
many earlier cases had foreshadowed its demise. See Thomas, 169 U.S. at 287.
368
Thomas, 169 U.S. at 275.
369
Although the Court referred to interstate commerce, the plaintiffs actually argued that
the Oklahoma tax violated the Indian Commerce Clause and not the Interstate Commerce
Clause.
370
Thomas, 169 U.S. at 275. This assertion might have been belied by the record. The syllabus of the case states that “[b]efore these taxes became delinquent, plaintiffs in error began
to remove or attempted to remove their respective property from the territory” although the
opinion is silent on this fact. Id. at 267. Presumably, the cattle were taken somewhere else for
grazing, free of the Oklahoma tax (an early example of capital moving in response to a tax).
Id.
371
Id. at 276–77.
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were safeguarding the interests of the nonresidents. The Court might have
also noted that Congress could always intervene to remedy egregious situations.372
The Court correctly disposed of the taxpayers’ final argument that they did
not benefit from the use of the tax proceeds:
[I]t cannot be maintained that those plaintiffs whose cattle are within the
protection of the laws of Oklahoma receive no benefit from the expenditures
in [the] County. Certainly they have some advantage in the improvement of
the roads within that county, when they journey to and from the towns and
settlements in the organized county. They are interested in the prevalence
of law and order in the communities adjacent to their property, and in the
provision made for the care of the poor and insane . . . [T]hey have a right
to send their children to the schools in the organized county.373
It is no objection to a tax that the party required to pay it derives no benefit from the particular burden; e.g. a tax for school purposes levied upon
a manufacturing corporation. But, in truth, benefits always flow from the
appropriation of public moneys to such purposes, which corporations in
common with national persons receive in the additional security to their
property and profits.374

Thomas is rich in themes that will reappear in subsequent cases.375 Future
cases will cite it for the proposition that a state can tax economic transactions
between Indians and non-Indians on a reservation, although it is hard to
imagine that Chief Justice Marshall would have allowed Georgia to tax property leased by Worcester and Butler from the Cherokees. The Thomas Court
had a chance to apply both the pre- and extra-constitutional sovereignty doctrine and the Indian Commerce Clause to turn the reservation into a tax-free
enterprise zone—but did not—and thus started the Indians down another
trail that continues today.
V. Modern Jurisprudence
A. Williams v. Lee
In the 20th century, the Supreme Court was fairly quiescent on matters of
Indian sovereignty until Williams v. Lee,376 a non-tax case. The issue involved
372
For a discussion of the taxation of nonresidents, see infra notes 1121−29 and accompanying text.
373
Thomas, 169 U.S. at 278.
374
Id. at 280.
375
The case did not raise the intergovernmental tax immunity argument, which would later
be used to strike down state taxes on the reservation, before eventually being abandoned.
During its heyday, the doctrine was used to strike down an Oklahoma severance tax on a nonIndian lessee of Indian coal. Choctaw, Okla. & Gulf R.R. v. Harrison, 235 U.S. 292 (1914).
376
358 U.S. 217 (1959). Professor Frickey describes the case as the first “in a contemporary
context in which non-Indians were involved.” Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 28–29.
According to Frickey, Williams v. Lee was a wonderful test case. The Navajo Reservation was
not generally subjected to allotment and retained its Indian character. It had tribal courts to
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a non-Indian, Williams, selling goods at a general store on the Navajo reservation377 under a license required by the Indian Trader statutes.378 The trader
sued a Navajo Indian and his wife in the Arizona State courts to collect for
goods sold on credit at the store.379
deal with suits by outsiders. And the vendor had no reasonable expectation of immunity from
tribal regulation. Id. at 30.
377
Unlike other reservations, there were few non-Indians living with the Navajos. Allotments,
see infra note 675 and the references cited therein, were not made on the Navajo reservation.
378
25 U.S.C. § 262 provides that “[a]ny person desiring to trade with the Indians on any
Indian reservation shall, upon establishing the fact, to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, that he is a proper person to engage in such trade, be permitted to do so under
such rules and regulations as the Commissioner of Indian Affairs may prescribe for the protection of Indians.” See Warren Trading Post v. Arizona, 380 U.S. 685, infra notes 425–68 and
accompanying text; Cent. Mach. Corp. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160, infra notes
469−518 and accompanying text.
379
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. at 217–18. Sales on credit were common given the widespread
poverty that existed among the Navajos. 25 C.F.R. 140.23, a regulation promulgated under
the Indian Trader statutes, provided that “[a] trader may extend credit to Indians, but such
credit will be at the trader’s own risk.” The Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae argued
that the case should be resolved on the basis of that regulation and not on the broader issue
that the Arizona courts have no jurisdiction over tribal Indians with respect to any cause of
action arising within the Navajo Reservation. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (No. 39), 1958 WL 91611, at *1. In their petition for
certiorari, the Lees relied on that regulation but subsequently abandoned this argument in
their brief before the Court, Id. at *3. Their reason for doing so was that an earlier version of
the regulation read “[c]redit to Indians will be at the trader’s own risk, as no assistance will be
given by Government officials in the collection of debts against Indians.” Petitioners’ Reply
Brief, Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (No. 39), 1958 WL 91609, at *2. The reference
to “no assistance by Government officials” was deleted “at the request of an association of
Indian traders,” arguing that “Government Indian agents should at least use moral suasion to
persuade Indians to meet their obligations.” Id. The Lees thought this history of the regulation,
which they learned of only after filing their petition for certiorari, made their earlier argument
untenable. Id. at *3.
The Government disagreed with the Lees’ reading of the regulation and argued that it operated to “deprive the state courts of jurisdiction over such a claim.” Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae, supra, at *4. The court below thought the regulation went to the merits
and not the jurisdictional issue. Id. Rather amazingly, Petitioners’ Reply Brief describes the
government’s reading of the regulation as “walking out on the quicksand of a construction
so untenable that we abandoned it because we could not in all conscience urge it upon the
Court.” Petitioners’ Reply Brief, supra, at *3–4. Presumably, the Lees wanted to win the case
on the broader jurisdictional issue and not on the narrower issue of how to interpret the
regulation. “Our purpose, of course, is to win this case. But we are simply unable to read into
the language of this regulation thus derived the meaning that the Solicitor General professes
to find therein. We are aware, of course, that it is generally sound judicial administration to
decide cases narrowly, and that it is specifically the duty of this Court to avoid constitutional
adjudication whenever litigation can be disposed of on non-constitutional grounds. But we do
not believe that the basic jurisdictional question involved in the present case can be avoided by
now inventing a tortured construction of the regulation.” Id. at *4. For the reasons discussed in
the text, the Indians might have been better off with a narrower decision based on the regulation. But hindsight is always cheap.
According to Professor Berger, the Solicitor General’s lack of emphasis on the inherent
sovereignty of the Indians was not surprising.
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1. The Infringement Test
Justice Black,380 writing for a unanimous court, held that Arizona lacked
A few months before, the Office of the Solicitor of the Interior Department had
issued the 1958 revision of the [Cohen] Handbook of Federal Indian Law. Where
Cohen’s chapter on state jurisdiction had opened by declaring that “state laws have
no force within the territory of an Indian tribe in matters affecting Indians,” the new
opening statement was that “[f ]ederal power has been interposed so that State laws
generally have had little force within the territory of an Indian tribe in matters affecting Indians.” The Handbook forthrightly admitted that the shift in federal policy
was behind this diluted language: “Present Federal policy calls for the termination of
Federal supervision of affairs of Indian tribes desiring such termination, to the extent
practicable and as soon as termination is feasible. Any discussion of the scope of State
power over Indian affairs must take that policy, and measures taken to effectuate it,
into consideration.” [citing Department of Interior, Handbook of Federal Indian
Law 501, 502 (1958)]
The 1958 Handbook nevertheless had proclaimed that “State law does not apply to
Indian affairs except so far as, and to the extent that, the United States gives or has
given its consent.” [citing id. at 501]. The Solicitor General’s brief in the Supreme
Court did not admit to even this much. The Solicitor rejected [the Indian’s argument]
declaring that “We do not agree that reservation Indians are beyond the reach of all
state law until Congress specifically provides otherwise.” [citing Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae, 1958 WL 91611, at *5] . . . [The government ultimately
argued on behalf of the Indians] but only on the narrowest of grounds.
Bethany Berger, Williams v. Lee and the Debate Over Indian Inequality, 109 Mich. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2010). Apparently, Justice Frankfurter and Chief Justice Earl Warren were sympathetic to this argument. Dewi I. Ball, supra note 272.
Justice Frankfurter is reported to have described Williams v. Lee as an indirect reaffirmation
of Brown v. Board of Education. Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 29 n.140. Professor
Gould describes the case as involving “only a minor civil matter initiated in state court by a
non-Indian.” Gould, Consent, supra note 6, at 839. As my Indian friends remind me, these
“minor” cases go to the heart of their sovereignty and probably reflected the litigating judgment call described above to abandon a narrow argument based on the regulation, for the
broader jurisdictional argument.
380
Louis F. Claiborne, a former Deputy Solicitor General of the United States who argued
many Indian law cases before the Court, described the Court as having very little interest
in Indian cases, and noted that for many years opinions were assigned to Justices Black or
Douglas, “both sympathetic to the Indian cause.” Claiborne, supra note 11, at 585. He cites
the large number of unanimous landmark cases as evidence of the Court’s lack of interest,
which has generally benefited the tribes. Id. at 586–87. More recently, however, the Court’s
Indian opinions have become fractured. What is puzzling is why the Court granted certiorari
in so many Indian cases if it was truly uninterested in them and viewed them as “peewee” cases.
See infra note 560.
Professor Fletcher, writing in 2007, notes that the Court has heard an average of two Indian
cases per year since 1953 and occasionally as many as five cases in a single term. Fletcher, supra
note 361, at 579. Professor Fletcher makes a persuasive and eloquent case that
the Court identifies an important constitutional concern embedded in a run-of-the
mill Indian law certiorari petition, grants certiorari, and then applies its decision
making discretion to decide the “important” constitutional concern. Once that portion of the Indian law case is decided, the Court decides any remaining federal Indian
law questions in order to reach a result consistent with its decision on the important
constitutional concern. From the view of a national decision maker such as a Supreme
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subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.381 The Court started its
analysis by referring to Worcester as holding that “[t]he Cherokee Nation . . . is
a distinct community, occupying its own territory in which the laws of Georgia had no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but
with the assent of the Cherokees themselves.”382 Justice Black noted, however,
that Worcester has been
modified . . . in cases where essential tribal relations were not involved383
and where the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized, but the basic
Court Justice, there is much more to a simple Indian law case than a dispute between
Indians, Indian tribes, and the non-Indian individuals, governments, and entities
that oppose them. There are questions of equal protection, due process, federalism,
jurisdiction, congressional and executive power, and more. Indian law disputes often
are mere vessels for the Court to tackle larger questions; often these questions have
little to do with federal Indian law. And, since Indian law is not as grounded in the
Constitution as the other questions, it is more malleable; prone to inconsistencies
and unpredictability.
Id. at 580.
He notes that the Indians are winning fewer of these cases than previously and that a
“great victory for Indian Country in the twenty-first century consists of convincing
the Court not to grant certiorari.” Id. at 591.
Id. at 590 (emphasis in original). With Rehnquist and O’Connor having been replaced by
Roberts and Alito, “the personal interest in Indian law of those departed ‘Westerners’ would
seem to portend a further decline in Indian law certiorari grants.” Id. at 605.
381
See also Fisher v. Dist. Ct., 424 U.S. 382 (1976); Kennerly v. Dist. Cnty. Ct., 400 U.S.
423 (1971) (invalidating tribal legislation that authorized state civil court jurisdiction because
the tribe had not followed the correct procedures). Professor Berger notes that at oral argument,
Norman Littell, who represented the Indians, could not quite answer the question whether the
state lacked subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction over the Indians. He ultimately
asked the Court to resolve this question in chambers. Berger, supra note 379. The Lees argued
that the transaction occurred on the reservation between an Indian and a licensed Indian
trader pursuant to federal law. “This is a subject-matter expressly and exclusively delegated to
Congress by the Constitution itself, and accordingly it cannot be made the subject of litigation
in state courts as long as [the Indian trader statute] remains in force.” Brief for the Petitioners,
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (No. 39), 1958 WL 91612, at *21.
For a discussion of the possible effect of President Truman’s veto of the Navajo Rehabilitation
Bill on the Supreme Court’s decision, see Dewi I. Ball, supra note 272 and Berger, supra note
379.
382
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. at 219. Williams’s brief challenged the very notion of Indian
sovereignty. The brief claimed that Worcester was irrelevant because unlike the Cherokee
Nation, when the “Navajos became part of the United States there was no such thing as a
Navajo Tribe in the political sense.” Brief for the Respondents, Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217
(1959) (No. 39), 1958 WL 91610 at *7. “The political entity known as the Navajo Tribe was
an artificial creature of the federal government, not a recognized nation as was the Cherokee.”
Id. at *8. “The Cherokee nation was recognized as a political sovereign by Great Britain. The
United States succeeded to this position.” Id. By contrast, “the United States succeeded to the
position of Mexico regarding the Navajos” and the “[p]olitical sovereignty of the Navajos was
recognized by no one, because in fact, there was no sovereign.” Brief for the Respondents,
supra, at *7.
383
In support of this proposition, Justice Black cited cases: sanctioning suits by Indians
against outsiders in state courts; allowing state jurisdiction over white-on-white crime; and
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policy of Worcester has remained384. . . . Essentially, absent governing Acts of
Congress,385 the question has always been whether the state action infringed
on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them.386 Cf. Utah & Northern . . . .
Congress has also acted consistently upon the assumption that the States
have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation.387

2. Defects in the Opinion
Allowing the case to be brought in the Arizona courts “would undermine
the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would
infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves.”388 Black’s formulation, which would inform some of the Court’s subsequent analysis until
providing exclusive tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians on Indians, or by
Indians on non-Indians. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. at 219–20. Professor Milner Ball states that
none of the cases cited by Justice Black supported the proposition for which they were cited.
Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 76 n.371. Professor Barsh agrees, arguing that the states had
no power to act extraterritorially. Barsh, Omen, supra note 15, at 5. Barsh criticizes Black for
invoking 19th century decisions such as Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896), which
“actually relied on federal delegations of power to states under defunct laws.” Id. at 5 (emphasis
in original). In fairness to Black, there is only one, fairly irrelevant reference to Draper. Barsh
agrees with Professor Milner Ball that Black’s citations were “inaccurate, inapplicable, or misconstrued.” Id. at 6.
384
Black contradicted Chief Justice Marshall’s lengthy discussion in Worcester about why
the Indians had not given up their sovereignty through their treaties with the United States,
see supra note 261 and accompanying text, by asserting that “[t]hrough conquest and treaties
they were induced to give up complete independence and the right to go to war in exchange
for federal protection, aid, and grants of land.” 358 U.S. at 218. Professor Milner Ball pointedly notes that Black “did not say how or when tribes were conquered or in which treaties they
surrendered their sovereignty.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 73. Professor Ball might have
added, “which tribes?” Professor Barsh describes the Court as seeking “to synthesize the shifting and inconstant tide of Indian law, giving shape to the first general principle of tribal jurisdiction and powers to emerge since John Marshall’s time.” Barsh, Omen, supra note 15, at 4.
385
Congress rarely authorizes state taxation. For one example, however, see Indian Oil
Leasing Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 158, 43 Stat. 244 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 398 (2001)).
386
According to Professor Barsh, Black’s statement “was his own invention, albeit more or
less consistent with the results of prior federal decisions. It had never before appeared as the
rule of a case. In fact, Black himself had stated the opposite rule in dictum twelve years earlier
in New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin.” Barsh, Omen, supra note 15, at 6 (emphasis in original).
Black never identified the constitutional basis for his formulation. Obviously, the reference to
“absent acts of Congress” is a reference to the Supremacy Clause, but that would not explain
the reference to the “infringement” language.
387
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. at 219–20.
388
Id. at 223. Justice Black never explained the connection between self-government and
the lack of access to Arizona courts. Professor Frickey suggests that “self-government includes
having one’s own courts apply one’s own rules of decision to disputes arising within one’s own
territory.” Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 30. Professor Laurence is more skeptical,
describing the Court as “glibly” reaching its conclusion and noting “there was no discussion of
exactly what it is about the exercise of jurisdiction over a debt arising on the reservation that
is so intrusive into reservation affairs.” Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at
242.
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superseded by a balancing approach, suffers from three critical defects.
First, the only case Justice Black cites for the proposition that “absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action
infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled
by them” is Utah & Northern Railway,389 which he cites with a “cf.” That
case, however, involved a railroad challenging a property tax imposed by the
Territory of Idaho on property that was “withdrawn” from the reservation.
No Indians were parties to the case or had any economic interest in the outcome.
To be sure, the railroad argued that treaties between the Indians and the
federal government prohibited the tax390 and the Court, without any real
analysis (the defendant made no appearance391 but did file two briefs), stated
that “[t]he authority of the Territory may rightfully extend to all matters not
interfering with [the treaty].”392 The Court announced that it did not “perceive[] that any just rights of the Indians under the treaty can be impaired by
taxing the road and property.”393 No lengthy analysis was needed because the
Indians sold the land to the United States with the understanding that the
government would grant a right of way to the railroad. Obviously, the Court
had no reason to discuss “essential tribal relations,” or whether the rights of
Indians were jeopardized because the Indians were a willing participant in the
transaction.394 Because of the subsequent importance that will be attached to
the italicized language in the excerpt from Williams v. Lee above, the citation
to an irrelevant case, Utah & Northern is especially troubling. Irrelevancy is
not cured by using a “cf.”
Second, there is a schizophrenic quality to the opinion in Williams v. Lee
(perhaps the price paid for unanimity).395 It posits a state’s power to act, short
of infringing the right of Indians to make their own laws. Yet this power cannot be reconciled with Justice Black’s statement that “Congress has also acted
389
For a discussion of Utah & Northern, 116 U.S. 28 (1885), see supra notes 323−32 and
accompanying text. Professor Milner Ball describes Black’s formulation of the state infringement language as “his own.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 79 n.378. Professor Ball speculates that Justice Black might have been misled by Cohen’s Indian law treatise. Id.
390
There was no discussion of why the railroad had standing to assert the benefits of a treaty
the Indians entered into with the government, an issue that would have been relevant if the
Court were to have struck down the tax on the basis of that treaty.
391
Id., at 28.
392
Id. at 31.
393
Id. at 32.
394
For the reasons discussed in the text, the language in Utah & Northern that the “authority
of the Territory [of Idaho] may rightfully extend to all matters not interfering with [Indian]
protection,” 116 U.S. at 31, which although similar to Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. at 217, has
nothing to do with the jurisdictional issue in the latter.
395
Commenting more generally, Professor Laurence describes federal Indian law as schizophrenic. Robert Laurence, Don’t Think of a Hippopotamus: An Essay on First-Year Contracts,
Earthquake Prediction, Gun Control in Baghdad, The Indian Civil Rights Act, The Clean Water
Act, and Justice Thomas’s Separate Opinions in United States v. Lara, 40 Tulsa L. Rev. 137, 148
(2004).
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consistently upon the assumption that the States have no power to regulate the
affairs of Indians on a reservation.”396
Third, Black never identified the constitutional basis for his “infringement”
test. The “absent governing Acts of Congress” is obviously a reference to the
Supremacy Clause, but that would not explain the “right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them,” which seems sourced in
the pre- and extra-constitutional sovereignty of the Indians397 or the Indian
Commerce Clause.
If Black did not turn Worcester and the Indian Commerce Clause quite on
their heads, he nonetheless significantly distorted them.398 Under Worcester,
the states could not regulate or legislate over the Indians without Congressional permission.399 Under Williams v. Lee, permission would now no longer
be needed; if Congress has not prohibited the state action, the constraint on
358 U.S. at 220 (emphasis added).
A few years later in McClanahan, the Court will state that the “trend has been away from
the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on
federal preemption.” McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
398
Professor Dewi I. Ball described the position of the Arizona Superior Court in Williams
that state courts had civil authority on the reservation unless Congress restricted that power
as “turning the Indian sovereignty doctrine on its head.” Dewi I. Ball, supra note 272, at 76.
Ball also noted that Chief Justice Earl Warren was particularly concerned about prohibiting
entirely state jurisdiction on the reservation. Id. Perhaps the schizophrenic nature of the opinion reflects the price paid to get the Chief Justice to join the majority.
Professor Milner Ball correctly notes that the “Court could have followed Worcester. All
it needed to do was point out that states have no jurisdiction in Indian country. That would
have been a simple, obvious, correct resolution of the controversy . . . .” Ball, Constitution,
supra note 7, at 72. “Worcester has been stood on its head, and Black’s unstated, contradictory assumption about the presence of states in Indian country has become a first principle of
constitutional Indian law. . . . Since Williams, the creative potential of Worcester for federalism
has been replaced by a Court-administered federalism that assaults tribal government.” Id. at
76. I have offered in the text three narrower and less dramatic ways Black could have ruled for
the Indians.
Commenting in general and not specifically on Williams v. Lee, Professor Clinton notes that
the assumption that “states possess inherent power over non-Indian activities in Indian country
which will be found to be preempted only if the federal government, through statute, regulation, or otherwise, has so occupied the field as to prevent state exercise of that inherent power,”
turns “the original understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause on its head and takes federal
Indian law back to the confederation period when states continued to assert claims of inherent
sovereignty in Indian country.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1218.
399
Claiborne suggests that the:
396
397

[L]imitations and weaknesses of the traditional “pre-emption” and “infringement”
tests, have led me back to the old idea of residual tribal sovereignty. The obvious
advantages of this approach are: (1) that, as Wheeler stressed, to determine what powers remain, one does not look to see what Congress granted, but simply what has
been taken, all else surviving; (2) that “sovereignty,” as opposed to self-government,
necessarily implies some authority over a territory; and (3), that the same principle
usually—although not always—decides both whether tribal authority exists and
whether State authority is precluded.
Claiborne, supra note 11, at 595 (emphasis in original).
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a legislature will be the Court’s evaluation of the degree of infringement.400 In
one fell swoop, Black transferred power to both the states and the courts that
would decide when an “infringement” occurred.401
Post Williams v. Lee cases can now ask whether the challenged state action
infringes on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be
ruled by them. This is an amorphous, subjective test402 and one (with the
benefit of hindsight) that has not favored the tribes.403 Unfortunately for the
Indians, the “infringement” language has not been broadly interpreted404 and
has devolved into a malleable balancing test,405 even though nothing in Williams v. Lee suggests such a test. Indeed, nothing in the case suggests that the
interests of a state should be taken into account at all.406 But in McClanahan,
discussed below, Justice Thurgood Marshall will describe Williams v. Lee as
400
Some commentators would disagree with the characterization in the text. “Williams [v.
Lee] was greeted as a watershed by advocates of the doctrine of inherent sovereignty. Not
only did the Court implicitly acknowledge the inherent rights of tribes as being largely coextensive with their territory, it stated explicitly that the fact the plaintiff was non-Indian was
immaterial.” Gould, Consent, supra note 6, at 823; see Frickey, supra note 15, at 30; see also
Dewi I. Ball, supra note 272 (“There is no question, the Williams [v. Lee] opinion revitalized
the Indian sovereignty doctrine and the court’s reliance on the territorial sovereignty of the
tribes.”); Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1589 (“In its bellwether Williams [v. Lee] decision, the Court vindicated tribal sovereignty in a modern context.”). Williams v. Lee opened
“the modern era of federal Indian law.” Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 1.
401
This transfer of power, which will come to haunt the Indians, makes it difficult to applaud
the case as vindicating “tribal sovereignty in a modern context—a debt collection case brought
by a non-Indian merchant against tribal members.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at
1589. “[S]tates could play a role in the Indian country that Worcester said was extraterritorial to them. The Court had put itself in position to encourage and sanction state forays into
Indian country.” Ball, John Marshall, supra note 193, at 1187.
Professor Frickey is kinder to Black. “Black blended the decisions of the Marshall Court and
the institutional sensitivity of the traditional constructs with the path of subsequent federal
Indian law.” Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 29.
402
“The most noteworthy thing about the infringement test is how little guidance it gives to
courts trying to apply it.” Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 242.
403
In no tax case has the infringement argument prevailed, no matter how devastating the
effect of a state tax might be on a tribe’s economy.
404
Writing around 1998, Claiborne expressed skepticism about the usefulness of the
Williams v. Lee test:

The so-called ‘infringement’ test is equally vulnerable. The very term ‘self-government’
suggests tribal authority only over members. Indeed, there is language in Wheeler
suggesting as much. So understood, it is very difficult to argue that regulating or
taxing non-Indians who are merely buying from or selling to Indians is an aspect of
self-government, or that State regulation and taxation of such non-Indian activities
infringes ‘the right of the Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.’ It is
even more difficult to rely on the right of self-government to explain tribal regulation
of land use by non-Indian residents of a Reservation who have no dealings with the
Indians.
Claiborne, supra note 11, at 594 (emphasis in original).
405
See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 457–58 (1995).
406
Judge Canby suggests that “[i]n theory, at least, [the Williams v. Lee test] precludes state
interference with tribal self-government no matter how important the state’s interest may be.
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summarizing a line of cases illustrating that “notions of Indian sovereignty
have been adjusted to take account of the State’s legitimate interests in regulating the affairs of non-Indians.”407 This language invited a balancing approach
in future cases, an invitation which the Court has found irresistible.408
3. An Alternative Opinion
What is puzzling is why Justice Black even framed the question the way he
did. He endorsed the principle that “the States have no power to regulate the
affairs of Indians on a reservation.”409 Although he cited nothing in support of
this statement, it is consistent with the Indian Commerce Clause410 and with
It still clearly precludes the exercise of state adjudicatory jurisdiction over reservation-based
claims against tribal members.” Canby, supra note 3, at 287.
407
411 U.S. 164, 171. McClanahan is discussed infra notes 519–591 and accompanying
text.
408
While the final score is not in, the Indians would appear to have paid dearly for the
balancing test. Professor Gould reminds us that Williams v. Lee involved “only a minor civil
matter initiated in state court by a non-Indian.” L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal
Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 810, 839 (1996). Of course, no one can
predict the damage that might have come from a decision against the Lees.
409
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1954).
410
The text assumes that Justice Black was using “affairs” as synonymous with “commerce.”
The case involved a commercial transaction so that “commerce” was involved. For a discussion
of the meaning of “commerce” and “affairs” see supra note 163.
Professor Clinton describes Williams v. Lee as “[p]erhaps the broadest statement of a dormant commerce clause test before the doctrine came under attack during the 1970s.” Clinton,
Dormant, supra note 22, at 1184. “[C]areful analysis of the [Williams v. Lee] opinion indicates
that [Black] offered a dormant Indian Commerce Clause analysis, albeit without directly citing
the Indian Commerce Clause, which temporarily fell into disuse by the Court after Kagama.”
Id. at 1185–86. “[T]he facts of [Williams v. Lee], which involved a non-Indian federally licensed
trader, fairly indicated that the Court thought the scope of its infringement test was coextensive with the scope of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine announced in Worcester.” Id. at
1186–87. “Since dormant Commerce Clause analyses primarily operate ‘absent governing Acts
of Congress,’ the Williams infringement test, while not clearly announced and labeled as an
Indian Commerce Clause test, is best understood in this light.” Id. at 1186. Professor Clinton
concludes “[t]he broad claim of an exclusive federal authority in Indian affairs asserted in
Worcester had been transformed into the infringement test of Williams v. Lee.” Id. at 1186.
The holding in Williams v. Lee is consistent with the results of a dormant commerce clause
analysis, which will usually be true whenever the Court rules against the state. Nonetheless,
careful analysis or not, it is hard to see how Black was offering a dormant Indian Commerce
Clause analysis. First, Black never mentioned that Clause by name. There was a fleeting reference to it by citation, and that occurred in an irrelevant footnote. 358 U.S. at 219 n.4. The
Clause was hardly informing Black’s thinking. Second, the Indian Commerce Clause would
prohibit state legislation adversely impacting on commerce, without any inquiry into whether
that infringed on the right of Indians to make their own law and be ruled by them. Professor
Clinton recognizes this latter point. “If, as argued above, the Williams v. Lee test is to be seen
as the modern incarnation of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, the acceptance of the
notion that states ‘could protect [their] interests’ in Indian country was fundamentally inconsistent with the doctrine.” Clinton, supra, at 1196. Third, in none of the history of the Clause
that Professor Clinton so painstakingly assembles is there anything suggestive of the Williams
v. Lee formulation. Fourth, if the Indian Commerce Clause were viewed as granting Congress
the exclusive powers over Indian affairs, which is Professor Clinton’s view, why would the
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Worcester. But if the States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on
a reservation, why does it matter whether or not such regulation infringes on
the rights of Indians to make their own laws?411
One can only imagine what Chief Justice John Marshall would have thought
of states being able to project their laws onto the reservation provided they do
not violate a court-made, open-ended “infringement” test. Worcester did not
evaluate whether Georgia’s laws infringed on the Cherokees’ right to make
their own laws and be ruled by them (although given their draconian reach

Court even reach the infringement test? If Arizona violated the Indian Commerce Clause by
asserting jurisdiction over a commercial transaction occurring on the reservation, the question would not be phrased as whether the State’s action infringed on the right of the Indians.
The action by the State must be legitimate before it can be evaluated as an “infringement.” If
the state action violates the Indian Commerce Clause, it is unconstitutional ab initio without
reaching the infringement test. If the states have no power to regulate the commercial affairs
of Indians on a reservation absent permission from Congress, which did not exist in Williams
v. Lee (Arizona turned down Congress’s invitation under Public Law 280 to assert jurisdiction
over the reservation), an Indian Commerce Clause analysis would have ended there.
If the Indian Commerce Clause is interpreted more like the Interstate Commerce Clause,
the “infringement” language still cannot be justified. The Interstate Commerce Clause has
been interpreted to adopt a balancing test, yet nothing in the infringement formulation suggests a role for balancing the interests of a state. The balancing test had yet to emerge at the
time of Williams v. Lee.
Professor Laurence, however, also thinks Williams involved the Indian Commerce Clause.
“Once it is recognized that the Williams [v. Lee] test is whether a state has acted ‘within its
province’, and therefore a dormant commerce clause inquiry, one may look to the more substantial body of law under the interstate commerce clause for analytical guidance.” Laurence,
Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 243.
For the reasons suggested above, I would reject this characterization. Writing in 1981,
Professor Laurence thought that
the Indians’ right “to make their own laws and be ruled by them” probably should
be seen as tipping the scale towards invalidity of the state regulation. In other words,
the dormant Indian commerce clause presumes the invalidity of state regulation of
reservation activity, and the burden is on the state to justify the intrusion into Indian
activity.
Id. at 243–44. The post-1981 cases have rejected this suggestion.
411
See supra note 410; Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 74.
Justice Black apparently thought that Worcester did not control because it had been narrowed, and he was unwilling (or unable) to reinstitute Chief Justice Marshall’s more absolutist
teachings. But cf. Anderson, supra note 208, at 398:
[A]lthough the Court acknowledged that the holding in Worcester had been diluted
by McBratney, which provides that the state has exclusive jurisdiction if a non-Indian
victimizes another non-Indian in Indian country, it nonetheless treated Worcester as
the most important precedent in federal Indian law. It tried to make sense of Worcester
in the modern era by developing a test: the state may not assert authority in Indian
country if that would infringe on the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be governed by them.
As subsequent cases illustrate, the modern era has left very little of the teachings of Worcester
(or of the Indian Commerce Clause’s constraint on state taxation).
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the Court did not need to make such a determination).412 “States could [now]
play a role in Indian country that Worcester said was extraterritorial to them.
The Court had put itself in position to encourage and sanction state forays
into Indian country.”413
In fairness to Black, he was writing during the termination era and Indian
law scholars and Indian sympathizers feared for the worst. As a leading casebook states, “one might have expected the Court to authorize state court
jurisdiction. Indeed, lower court decisions in the first half of the twentieth
century typically ratified state power in Indian country, reasoning either
that tribal sovereignty was a dated notion or that express federal action was
required to oust state jurisdiction.”414 If that is the frame of reference, the
opinion is a relief because things could have been far worse—a classical glass
half full rather than half empty opinion. And perhaps it was too late in the
day to rehabilitate Worcester, especially if a unanimous opinion was the goal.
But even assuming those constraints, Black could have relied on three narrower grounds in rejecting Arizona’s jurisdiction, any of which would have
avoided the infringement language.
First, the 1868 treaty415 establishing part of the Navajo reservation as
“set[ting] apart” for “their permanent home” a portion of what had been their
native country, and provided that no one, except United States Government
personnel, was to enter the reserved area. Implicit in these treaty terms, as it
was in the treaties with the Cherokees involved in Worcester v. Georgia, was
the understanding that the internal affairs of the Indians remained exclusively
within the jurisdiction of whatever tribal government existed.416
412
The text suggests a third possible defect in Justice Black’s formulation. The statement that
the “question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them,” cannot be taken seriously if the word
“always” is to be taken seriously. Chief Justice Marshall never analyzed whether Georgia’s law
infringed on the right of the Cherokees to make their own laws and instead provided a bright
line test that prohibited Georgia from projecting its laws onto Indian country. Nothing in the
opinion suggests that Chief Justice Marshall would have upheld less sweeping Georgia laws.
The same Chief Justice Marshall, who repelled Georgia’s attempt to project its laws onto the
Cherokees, would likely have denied jurisdiction to Georgia under facts similar to Williams
v. Lee.
413
Ball, John Marshall, supra note 193, at 1187.
414
Anderson, supra note 208, at 396.
415
Professor Berger describes the treaty as “sacred to the Navajo people; its signing marked
the release of the tribe from their confinement at Fort Sumter in Bosque Redondo, New
Mexico, and the guarantee that they would never again be forced from their homeland.”
Bethany Berger, Williams v. Lee and the Debate Over Indian Inequality, 109 Mich. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2010).
416
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221–22 (1959) (emphasis added). The Court also stated
that “when Congress has wished the States to exercise [jurisdiction] it has expressly granted
them the jurisdiction which Worcester v. Georgia had denied.” Id. at 221. Professor Milner
Ball challenges Congress’s power to delegate jurisdiction to the states. “Worcester said Indian
country was extraterritorial to the states. Black does not explain how this bar is overcome.”
Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 73.
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Justice Black referred to this treaty but it is unclear whether he intended it
as an independent ground for the decision.
It is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation
and the transaction with an Indian took place there. The cases in this Court
have consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over their
reservations. Congress recognized this authority in the Navajos in the Treaty
of 1868, and has done so ever since. If this power is to be taken away from
them, it is for Congress to do it.417

The Treaty left no room for a state official to “enter the reserved area.”
Applying the favorable Indian canons of construction, the sale of the goods
on the reservation would qualify as an “internal affair” of the Navajos. Given
this reading, the treaty did not entertain Black’s formulation that a state could
legislate up to the point where its actions infringe on the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. The language of the
Treaty itself could be read to deny Arizona jurisdiction.
A second ground for the opinion could have been Arizona’s refusal to
assume jurisdiction over the reservation pursuant to P. L. 280,418 “if the State
Legislature or the people vote affirmatively to accept such responsibility.”419
Arizona had not done this, presumably because it would then have had the
cost of running the schools on the reservation and providing police protection and the like. Arizona wanted it both ways: civil jurisdiction without the
attendant costs.420
A final ground for a decision could have been the Indian Commerce
Clause, which the Court never discussed.421 The opinion makes only a passWilliams v. Lee, 358 U.S. at 223.
Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 590 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1151, 1162, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1360 (2006)). Public Law 280 was an example of
“when Congress has wished the States to exercise this power [of jurisdiction] it has expressly
granted them the jurisdiction which Worcester v. Georgia had denied.” Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. at 221. Professor Clinton views the Williams v. Lee holding as resting in part on P. L. 280.
Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1185.
419
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. at 222.
420
“To date, Arizona has not accepted jurisdiction, possibly because the people of the State
anticipate that the burdens accompanying such power might be considerable.” Id. at 222–23.
The Arizona Enabling Act contains a disclaimer of jurisdiction over Indian lands. Sec. 20, 36
Stat. 569, which is replicated in the Arizona constitution, Ariz. Const. art. XX, § 4. The
Court would later hold that P. L. 280 jurisdiction did not extend to state taxes. See Bryan v.
Itasca Cnty., Minnesota, 426 U.S. 373, 379–80 (1976). Professor Frickey agrees that P. L.
280 “raised a negative inference about congressional intent to allow state courts to exercise
jurisdiction.” Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 33. But a “negative inference concerning
state power is not nearly as probative of the extent of tribal sovereignty as direct congressional
authorization of tribal authority, of course.” Id. Given how little the Williams v. Lee formulation has mattered in tax cases, supporters of the Indians probably would have been happier had
Black relied more heavily on the negative inference.
421
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134
(1980), infra notes 740–915 and accompanying text, the Tribes’ Brief described Williams v.
Lee as holding “that while the broadest reaches of [Worcester] have been qualified by subse417
418
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ing reference to the Indian Commerce Clause in an irrelevant footnote and
only by citation. “The Federal Government’s power over Indians is derived
from Art. I, Sec. 8, cl.3, of the . . . Constitution . . . and from the necessity
of giving uniform protection to a dependent people [citing Kagama with no
page reference].”422
The Court thus had three grounds for rejecting Arizona’s jurisdiction: the
1868 treaty, Arizona’s refusal to assume jurisdiction under P. L. 280, and the
Indian Commerce Clause. Any of these approaches, alone or in combination, would have avoided the infringement language without further eroding
the pre- and extra-constitutional sovereignty doctrine. Perhaps Black rejected
these more narrow approaches in favor of what he saw as a broader and more
far-reaching protection for the Indians. If so, he would be disappointed by
subsequent events—Williams v. Lee would turn out to offer none of that protection.423 “The tribe won Williams v. Lee, but the statement of the standard by
quent cases, the negative implications of the Indian Commerce Clause are still intact, at least
when ‘essential tribal relations’ are involved.” Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, supra note 108,
at *15. The reference to “essential tribal relations” might have been an attempt in the context
of litigation to put the best spin on the precedent, but nothing in the history of the Indian
Commerce Clause suggests this qualification. The Tribes also argued that Williams v. Lee “preserved the preemptive effect of the Commerce Clause as interpreted in Worcester, at least in
cases where self-government was involved.” Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes at 141, Washington
v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 44 U.S. 134 (1980) (No. 78-630) 1979
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1818, at *141. Presumably the Brief was referring to the Indian
Commerce Clause and not the Interstate Commerce Clause. For my responses to the argument that Williams v. Lee was a Dormant Indian Commerce Clause case, see supra note 410.
422
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. at 220 n.4. Professor Barsh describes the last part of the quoted
language as a “condescending nineteenth-century theory the Court need not have endorsed.”
Barsh, Omen, supra note 15, at 60 n.37.
The footnote’s reference to Kagama, 118 U.S. at 375, is puzzling given Black’s sympathies
for the Indians. Why would he cite one of the most demeaning cases for a proposition that
was not even critical to the case? What function the footnote was serving is unclear because the
case did not involve a challenge to the power of the federal government. And of course Kagama
rejected the Indian Commerce Clause as the source of Congressional power for enacting the
Major Crimes Act. In addition, if the essence of Kagama is that the Indians must be protected
from the states, why does Congress have the power to grant civil jurisdiction to the states? See
Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 73.
Marston and Fink describe Williams v. Lee as based on the
so-called Indian sovereignty doctrine, which limits state authority over Indians
and their land by virtue of the quasi-sovereign status of Indian tribes. Under this
approach, state laws are generally not applicable in Indian country unless Congress,
in the exercise of its plenary power under the Indian commerce clause, expressly
provides that state law will apply.
Marston & Fink, supra note 136, at 211. The holding in Williams v. Lee, however, seems
opposite of their description. Congress does not have to expressly provide that state law applies;
state law applies unless it infringes on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be ruled by them.
423
The Court has subsequently rejected the infringement argument in all of the subsequent
tax cases discussed in this Article.
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which this victory was achieved was to prove inimical to tribal protection.”424
The Court would henceforth be the arbiter of what state action infringed
upon the Indians’ right of self-government. Worcester had been displaced. In
the hands of an ally like Justice Black, the threat to Indian sovereignty was
minimal, but other justices would soon prove to be less protective.
B. Preemption and the Indian Trader Cases
1. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission
The modern era of Supreme Court Indian-state tax jurisprudence begins in
1965 with Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission.425 The Court
confronted the issue of whether Arizona could levy its generally applicable,
non-discriminatory, 2% tax on the “gross proceeds of sales, or gross income”
of a retail trading business on the Navajo Indian reservation.426 The retailer
was licensed under the Indian Trader statutes.427
Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 72.
380 U.S. 685 (1965). The Trading Post was located at Kayenta on the Navajo Reservation
on lands leased from the Tribe. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz.
State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965) (No. 115), at 5.
Professor Taylor adds a useful context:
424
425

By 1796, the federal government entered the Indian trade directly and authorized
the establishment of federally owned and operated trading posts. The purpose of this
strategy was twofold. First, Congress believed that it could reduce friction on the
boundaries between Indian and non-Indian territories if federal traders charged fair
prices and extended reasonable credit. Second, the extension of credit created debts
that could later be extinguished through land cessions negotiated in treaties. It was
fairly obvious to Congress and to the Washington administration that this methodology for securing territorial concessions might be cheaper than direct payment or
military action. Indeed, the method was successful and ended a few decades later
only when private Indian traders prevailed upon Congress to discontinue the system.
Private traders felt that the federal traders were unfair competition and effectively
prevented them from making a fair return on their investments.
Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 851–52.
426
Arizona imposed the tax on “every person engaging or continuing within this state in the
business of selling any tangible personal property at retail.” Warren Trading Post Co., 380 at
686 n.1 (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Sec. 42-1312 (1956) (repealed 1988)). The tax functions as a
retail sales tax and is known as a vendor-based sales tax. Walter Hellerstein, Michael McIntyre
& Richard D. Pomp, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Taxation after Jefferson Lines, 51 Tax
Law Rev. 47, 92–93 (1995). The Court incorrectly described the taxpayer as “claim[ing] that
as applied to its income from trading with reservation Indians on the reservation the state tax
was invalid.” Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 686 (emphasis added).
Arizona imposed its tax on the vendor but the analysis should be the same even had the tax
been imposed on the consumer, which is the way many sales taxes are structured. Had the tax
been imposed on the consumer, an Indian purchaser might have also been protected under
McClanahan, supra notes 519–91 and accompanying text. See also Moe, infra notes 654–739
and accompanying text; Colville, infra notes 740–915 and accompanying text.
427
Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 685–86. The Supreme Court opinion is silent on
whether the trading post was owned by Indians. Presumably, this issue was irrelevant to the
holding. The Indian Trader statutes make it irrelevant whether the vendor is an Indian or nonTax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4

01-Pomp.indd 1007

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=244384612/23/2010

11:03:36 AM

1008

SECTION OF TAXATION

Until 1956, the Arizona tax, adopted in 1935, was never applied to licensed
Indian traders.428 In 1956, the Arizona Tax Commission adopted a regulation
providing that any person operating a trading post on the Indian reservation
was “subject to the tax levied upon retail sales” and that such tax shall be paid
“on gross proceeds of sales made to Indians residing on the reservation as well
as off the reservation.”429
Of special significance for this Article, Warren Trading argued that the tax
violated the Indian Commerce Clause.430 It also charged that the tax was
inconsistent with the Indian Trader statutes. These challenges were limited
to sales made on the reservation to reservation Indians.431 Warren Trading
was not challenging the taxation of sales to non-Indians, presumably because
this latter group was insignificant and as a litigating matter, not worth the
risk of diverting the Court’s focus. In addition, such a position would have
Indian. The relevant inquiry is whether the purchaser is an Indian. See infra notes 730–31,
781–87 and accompanying text.
According to my colleague, Professor Berger, “the licensed traders were among the very few
non-Indians living in Navajo country (the others being [Bureau of Indian Affairs] employees
and missionaries). The Navajos were dependent on the traders for the purchase of their necessities and for the sale of their wools, rugs and jewelry. The traders were also intermediaries
between largely illiterate communities having no mailing addresses and government agencies
and distant relatives. In addition, they also functioned as financial intermediaries, cashing
checks from railroad employers and pension boards. Navajos purchased many goods on credit
and sold their products to the traders for credit. The traders performed a necessary service
and were proud of their contributions, but their monopoly power also led to abuse as they
sometimes took advantage of the Navajos. In 1948, the Navajo Council started leasing trading
posts for a share of gross sales and limiting the mark-ups that traders could impose on goods.”
Berger, supra note 379.
Although the Commissioner of Indian Affairs had power under the Indian Trader statutes
to set prices on the reservation, I can find no record of his ever having done so.
428
Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant (July
1964) at 3. The Arizona tax was levied upon Warren Trading’s retail sales starting on November
1, 1956. After Arizona reversed itself and started levying the tax, California and New Mexico
followed suit. Brief of Appellant at 15, Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n.,
380 U.S. 685 (1965) (No. 115).
429
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S.
685 (1965) (No. 115), at 5.
430
Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 686. Warren Trading sought a declaratory judgment
that the assessment was unconstitutional. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 429 at 2.
The Superior Court for Maricopa County granted summary judgment in favor of the Tax
Commission and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed. Id. The State Supreme Court held
that State laws apply to the extent they do not conflict with federal Indian laws. Id. In Central
Machinery, 448 U.S. at 160, infra notes 469–518 and accompanying text, which also involved
the same Indian Trader statutes discussed in Warren Trading, the United States Government,
as amicus curiae, argued that the Indian Commerce Clause of its own force preempted the
Arizona tax. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 1979 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1414,
at *12. See infra notes 517–18 and accompanying text.
431
Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 686 n.1. The Court did not define “reservation
Indians,” but presumably it meant Navajos living on the reservation. For a discussion, see
Pirtle, et al., supra note 19, at 48–52.
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been inconsistent with the language of the statutes, which deals with sales to
Indians and not non-Indians.
a. Interference with the Federal Regulatory Scheme
Justice Black, writing for a unanimous Court, emphasized the long history
behind the Indian Trader statutes, which originated in 1790.432 These statutes
provided the Commissioner of Indian Affairs with the sole power and authority to appoint traders to the Indian tribes and to specify the kind and quantity
of goods and prices at which such goods could be sold to the Indians.433 Pursuant to these statutes, the Commissioner promulgated comprehensive and
detailed regulations
prescribing in the most minute fashion who may qualify to be a trader and
how he shall be licensed; penalties for acting as a trader without a license;
conditions under which government employees may trade with Indians;
articles that cannot be sold to Indians; and conduct forbidden on a licensed
trader’s premises.434
432
Act of July 22, 1790, entitled “An Act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian
tribes,” and the subsequent laws based on it, established key elements of the federal government’s Indian policy: the regulation of trade with the Indians; prohibition of purchases of
Indian lands, punishing non-Indians committing crimes and trespasses against the Indians,
limiting trade to persons licensed by the government and complying with federal regulations.
Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 7, at 37–38. “With that Act, the legislators gave a practical and contemporaneous construction to the constitutional clause granting to Congress ‘the
power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes.’” Id. at 37. Control of Indian affairs, originally in the War Department, was transferred to the Interior Department in 1849. Professor
Ansson reports that the Act prohibited the sale of land by any Indians within the United States
to any person or state, except when done through a treaty under federal authority. Richard J.
Ansson, Jr., State Taxation of Non-Indians Whom Do Business With Indian Tribes: Why Several
Recent Ninth Circuit Holdings Reemphasize The Need For Indian Tribes To Enter Into Taxation
Compacts With Their Respective State, 78 Or. L. Rev. 501, 505 (1999). The current embodiment of the Indian Trader statutes, 25 U.S.C. § 261 et seq., empowers the President to: forbid
the introduction of goods into the territory of a tribe, to revoke and refuse licenses to trade
with a tribe, establish penalties for trading without a license, and forbid traders to hire white
persons as clerks unless licensed to do so. For the regulations under the Indian Trader statutes,
see 25 CFR § 251.9 et seq. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3113, forbidding introduction of liquor into
Indian country and providing for revocation of the license of a trader violating this prohibition.
433
Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 689. Section 261 provides that the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs shall have the sole power to make such rules and regulations as he may deem just
and proper specifying the prices at which goods are sold to the Indians. 25 U.S.C. § 261.
434
Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 689. Professor Taylor describes the Indian Trader
statutes as paternalistic and resented by many Indians and their supporters as reflecting the

guardian/ward relationship [which] places the federal government in the role of protector and the tribal members in a subordinated position requiring protection. By
contrast, an analysis that includes considerations of tribal sovereignty places needed
emphasis on the simple fact that a tribe is a government within the federal system and
that its governmental integrity is worthy of consideration and encouragement.
Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 862.
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Justice Black concluded:
These apparently all-inclusive regulations and the statutes authorizing them
would seem in themselves sufficient to show that Congress has taken the
business of Indian trading on reservations so fully in hand that no room
remains for state laws imposing additional burdens upon traders. In fact,
the Solicitor’s Office of the Department of the Interior in 1940 and again in
1943 interpreted these statutes to bar States from taxing federally licensed
traders on their sales to reservation Indians on a reservation. We think those
rulings were correct.435

Justice Black’s opinion reads like a straightforward preemption analysis.436
435

380 U.S. at 690. In 57 I.D. 124 at 125, the Department of the Interior ruled that

[t]he regulation of trade with Indian tribes is one of the powers expressly delegated to
Congress by section 8 of Article I of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. art.
I § 8. Congress has exercised this power in statutes restricting trade with the Indians
and giving exclusive authority to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to regulate such
trade and the prices at which goods shall be sold to the Indians . . . Where Congress
has exercised its authority it is axiomatic that the field is closed to State action.
Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant (July 1964),
supra note 428, at 6. According to the Government, until the Arizona courts ruled differently,
the position of the Department of the Interior was universally respected. Id. In Warren Trading,
there was no evidence the Commissioner had regulated prices on the reservation.
436
Under a traditional preemption analysis (developed outside the context of Indian law),
a court examines the statutory language, its purposes, and the legislative history to determine
congressional intent. State law is preempted if it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941). In general, a state tax is presumptively legitimate. The Court has warned,
however, that concepts of preemption developed in other contexts do not automatically apply
in Indian cases. See infra notes 936, 991 and accompanying text. That would be especially
true of the presumption that a state tax is legitimate. For a general discussion, see Stephen M.
Feldman, Preemption and the Dormant Commerce Clause: Implications for Federal Indian Law,
64 Or. L. Rev. 667, 678–87 (1986).
Writing generally, and not in the context of Indian tax cases, Professor Tribe has described
the Court as dividing its preemption analysis into three categories: express preemption, where
Congress has indicated that state regulations were precluded; implicit preemption, where
Congress has by implication precluded a certain kind of state regulation; and conflict preemption, where Congress did not necessarily focus on preemption of state regulations at all,
but where the particular state law conflicts directly with federal law. Tribe, supra note 292, at
1176–77. Warren Trading could be described as either conflict or implicit preemption.
Despite the tone and structure of the Warren Trading analysis, the Court initially did not
view itself as engaging in a preemption analysis. Just eight years after the decision, the Court
described Warren Trading as
no doubt, influenced by the federal licensing requirements, [but] the reasoning . . .
cannot be so restricted. The Court invalidated Arizona’s tax in part because “Congress
has, since the creation of the Navajo Reservation nearly a century ago, left the Indians
on it largely free to run the reservation and its affairs without state control, a policy
which has automatically relieved Arizona of all burdens for carrying on those same
responsibilities.”
McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 171 n.6 (1973), discussed infra notes
519–91 and accompanying text. This broader approach seems to emphasize the sovereignty
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The comprehensive, all-inclusive, detailed regulations occupied the field437
and preempted the State tax.438 Congress had “undertaken to regulate reservation trading in such a comprehensive way that there is no room for the States
to legislate on the subject.”439
Justice Black, however, never explained why the Arizona tax, which was tantamount to a nondiscriminatory sales tax,440 would interfere with the federal
statutory scheme.441 Justice Black implicitly defined the “field” to encompass
prices on the reservation, which Congress had provided the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs with the sole power and authority “to specify.”442 The sales tax
would interfere with this power and authority by affecting prices, and thus
was preempted.443
of the Indians and the illegitimacy of Arizona’s claim for revenue because it provided nothing
for which it could exact a quid pro quo. The existence of any Indian Trader statutes would be
irrelevant under this view, so no preemption argument would apply. But the lack of state services could have been viewed by the Court in a preemption analysis as a reason why Congress
occupied the field.
By 1980, however, the Court began citing Warren Trading as an example of when a state law
“may be pre-empted by federal law,” White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136,
142 (1980), and held that “[o]ur decision today is based on the preemptive effect of the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme, which, like that in [Warren Trading], leaves no room for the
additional burdens sought to be imposed by state law.” 448 U.S. at 151 n.15 (emphasis added).
See also infra note 955 and accompanying text.
Professor Jensen refers to Warren Trading as “the first great Indian law preemption case,”
Jensen, supra note 9, at 69. He does not comment on Black’s failure to use that term, or on the
comments in McClanahan, supra.
437
“[F]ield pre-emption may be understood as a species of conflict pre-emption: a state law
that falls within a pre-empted field conflicts with Congress’s intent (either express or plainly
implied) to exclude state regulation.” English v. General Electric, 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990);
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). But compare Tribe, supra note 436.
438
Professor Milner S. Ball views Justice Black as adopting the preemption theory he had
suggested in Williams v. Lee. Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 101. Why Williams v. Lee
should be read as suggesting a preemption theory is unclear. The Court did not rely on any
federal statute to preempt State jurisdiction.
439
Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 692 n.18.
440
See Hellerstein, McIntyre & Pomp, supra note 426, at 92–93.
441
Justice Black did not address one of the key arguments relied on by the Arizona courts
below. The Arizona Superior Court, citing Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898), discussed
supra notes 354–75 and accompanying text, saw no difference between a state being able to
tax “stock in trade devoted to sale to Indians . . . and taxing the privilege of selling such stock,
insofar as the rules against non-interference with governmental functions are concerned.” Brief
of Petitioner-Appellant at 8, Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, (1965) (No. 115)
(describing the reasoning of the Arizona Superior Court, which was affirmed by the Arizona
Supreme Court). The dissenting opinion by the Arizona Supreme Court would have struck the
tax under the Indian Commerce Clause. Id.
442
Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 688–89.
443
The Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant stated
the issue as whether “the State’s attempt to tax Indian traders selling to Indians on the reservation is invalid because Congress has occupied the field by adoption of a comprehensive system
of statutes regulating such commerce.” Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae,
supra note 428, at 4. The government also raised the fear that if the tax were upheld other
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The Commissioner, however, had never exercised that power.444 The interference was more of a theoretical possibility than a real one—an interference
with the possible exercise of this power in the future. Another Justice might
have argued that the Commissioner’s unexercised delegation of power meant
that there was no “plan” for the sales tax to disturb, but Justice Black was one
of the Indians’ protectors on the Court.445 And as a practical matter, if the tax
were to be preempted should the Commissioner engage in price controls in
the future, the Court might as well clear the way now, rather than waiting for
the Commissioner to actually act.
The Court’s analysis was independent of the economic effects of the sales
tax (or its preemption). It was enough for Justice Black that the Arizona tax
“would put financial burdens on [the vendor] or the Indians with whom it
deals in addition to those Congress or the tribes have prescribed, and could
thereby disturb and disarrange the statutory plan Congress set up in order to
protect Indians against prices deemed unfair or unreasonable by the Indian
Commissioner.”446
b. Inapplicability of the Indian Commerce Clause
Black’s approach made it unnecessary to deal with Warren Trading’s Indian
Commerce Clause argument or the similar argument made by the government
as amicus curiae.447 Even if no Indian Commerce Clause existed (assuming
states would follow, which would have a “material effect upon the economic status of the tribes
which has long been a matter of great federal concern.” Id. at 8.
444
The lack of any serious control over Indian traders led to a class action suit requesting
that the Secretary of the Interior promulgate regulations governing the traders. Rockbridge v.
Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that the district court had jurisdiction to hear
the case). The suit alleged that the trading posts had monopolies that allowed the vendors to
charge unduly high prices for inferior products, and to charge any rate of interest.
445
Professor Jensen views the case as “clearly the product of a Court much more tribalfriendly than the current one.” Jensen, supra note 9, at 70 n.412.
446
Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 691.
447
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 429, at 8–10. Warren Trading argued, inter alia,
that just the way a state cannot tax interstate commerce, it cannot tax commerce with Indians.
The former proposition, however, was overruled in Complete Auto v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274
(1977), which sets forth the constitutional conditions under which a state can tax interstate
commerce. Even before Complete Auto, however, the doctrine that a state could not tax interstate commerce had been whittled away and reduced to formalistic distinctions. See id. Warren
Trading also cited United States v. Holliday, supra note 171, for the proposition that the phrase
“Commerce with the Indian Tribes” includes commerce with individual members of those
tribes.
The United States in its amicus brief made a similar Indian Commerce Clause argument.
“[I]t is beyond question that the Constitution forbids a State from imposing a tax upon
the privilege or right to engage in interstate commerce. Since the Commerce Clause grants
Congress the same authority over commerce with the Indian tribes as over commerce among
the several States . . . it similarly prohibits a State from taxing the right to engage in commerce with those tribes.” Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellant (July 1964), supra note 428, at 4, Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n,
380 U.S. 685 (1965) (No. 115). The United States cited Spector Motor Service v. O’Connor,
340 U.S. 602 (1951), for the proposition that the Constitution “delegated to the United States
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other constitutional authority permitted Congress to adopt the Indian Trader
statutes),448 the Court’s preemption analysis would have remained unchanged
because it was based on the Supremacy Clause.449 In other words, the preemption analysis would have been dispositive even if there were no Indian
Commerce Clause.
On the other hand, if no Indian Trader statutes existed, the Court would
have had to confront the Indian Commerce Clause argument. The argument
would then have been that the Clause, on its own, prohibited any state regulation or tax from applying to on-reservation commercial transactions.450
In addition to the Indian Commerce Clause, two other possible arguments
would have been that the tax violated Worcester’s pre- and extra-constitutional

the exclusive power to tax the privilege to engage in interstate commerce.” Id. The Arizona tax
was a “transaction privilege tax,” levied on the vendor and not the purchaser, which facilitated
an argument based on Spector. Spector, however, was subsequently overruled by Complete Auto,
supra.
The United States also argued that “even if the Commerce Clause were not an exclusive
delegation of power in this area, Arizona’s attempt to tax Indian traders selling to reservation
Indians would be invalid because Congress has occupied this field and left no room for the
action taken by the State.” Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Appellant (July 1964), supra note 428, at 4. Warren Trading made a similar argument. Brief
for Appellant, supra note 400, at 10–11. Black’s opinion is consistent with this part of the
Government’s Memorandum and Warren Trading’s brief.
The Papago Tribe in its amicus brief argued that the Indian Commerce Clause preempted
the Arizona sales tax in the first instance so that the issue of the Indian Trader statutes should
be irrelevant. Brief of the Papago Tribe as Amicus Curiae at 2, Warren Trading Post Co. v.
Arizona Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965) (No. 115). Analytically, this is a fundamental
point that Black does not address. (The Papago Tribe is now known as the Tohono O’odham
Nation. See infra note 453.)
448
The Indian Commerce Clause is presumably the source of Congress’s power to pass the
Indian Trader statutes.
449
Professor Clinton argues that there “is no federal supremacy clause for Indian tribes and
that any federal legislative activity that might affect Indian tribes or their lands requires their
formal consent, through treaty or analogous procedure.” Clinton, Supremacy, supra note 7, at
118.
450
Professor Taylor cites Warren Trading for the proposition that “[s]tates, in contrast [to
Congress] have virtually no power over Indian affairs unless Congress grants it to them.” 380
U.S. at 687 n.3. Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 862. The footnote relied on by Taylor
reads “[c]ertain state laws have been permitted to apply to activities on Indian reservations,
where those laws are specifically authorized by acts of Congress, or where they clearly do not
interfere with federal policies concerning the reservations.” 380 U.S. at 687 n.3 (citing inter alia
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898), Utah & N. Ry.
Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885)) (emphasis added). Whether “states have virtually no power
over Indian affairs unless Congress grants it to them” depends on how a Court interprets the
italicized language, supra. Also, the structure of a preemption argument is that a state has the
power it is exercising unless prohibited by federal law, which is contrary to Professor Taylor’s
reading.
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sovereignty doctrine,451 or that it failed the Williams v. Lee test452 (which
Black also authored). Because of the Indian Trader statutes, however, the case
lent itself to a straightforward preemption type of analysis and the Commerce Clause, Worcester/sovereignty, and Williams v. Lee arguments would
await another day.453
c. Arizona’s Right of Taxation
Justice Black never had to answer the fundamental question of whether Arizona had the right to levy a sales tax in the first instance. Whether Black
intended it or not, the implicit structure of his argument was that Arizona
had the right to levy a sales tax unless Congress prohibited it. That approach
could be read as consistent with Williams v. Lee on the assumption that a state
sales tax would not infringe on the right of the Navajos to make their own
laws and be ruled by them. If Black did not mean to endorse this proposition,
however, it would have been more cautious and agnostic if he had explicitly
issued the classic caveat that “assuming for the sake of argument,” that Arizona had the right to levy a sales tax, it would nonetheless conflict with the
Indian Trader statutes. That caveat would preserve the possibility that if there
were no Indian Trader statutes, the Indian Commerce Clause would have to
be confronted.

451
Justice Black cited Worcester essentially for the proposition that the federal government
permitted the Indians largely to govern themselves free from state interference and had exercised a sweeping and dominant control over persons who wished to trade with Indians. Warren
Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 687–88. Worcester was cited more in support of the preemption
argument than in establishing the sovereignty of the Indians as an independent ground for the
Court’s holding.
452
A Williams v. Lee argument would have proceeded along the lines that the Arizona sales
tax made it less likely that the Tribe could impose its own sales tax in the future, but if it did,
less revenue would be raised than if the State had no sales tax. This reduction in tribal revenue
would have secondary and tertiary effects on governance. See infra note 453.
453
The United States filed a brief as amicus curiae in support of Warren Trading in July
1964. Memorandum for the United States, supra note 428. In December 1964, the United
States filed a second memorandum, arguing that Williams v. Lee provided an additional and
sufficient ground for ruling in favor of Warren Trading. Memorandum for the United States,
Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (Dec. 1964)(No. 115).
“Indian self-government cannot be a meaningful enterprise if the power of the tribe to tax
transactions with Indians on the reservation is drained by duplicate State taxation of the very
same transactions.” Id. at 3. See supra note 452.
Although the Navajos had no sales tax, the Papago Tribe had enacted a 3% privilege tax on
the gross receipts from sales made on its reservation. See Brief of the Papago, supra note 447,
at 1. The government’s reference to “duplicate taxation” might have been a reference to the
Papago tax.
In reviewing a draft of this Article, Professor Fletcher alerted me that the Tribe is now
known as the Tohono O’odham Nation. According to the Tribe’s home page, the name change
occurred in 1986. http://www.tonation-nsn.gov/great_seal.aspx. Papago means “bean people,”
http://www.accessgenealogy.com/native/tribes/pima/papagoindianhist.htm, and is apparently
derogatory.
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d. Lack of State Services
Justice Black made an additional argument in Warren Trading that could be
read as reinforcing the preemption analysis, but one that also had a due process flavor (although he did not cite that clause), suggesting Arizona could
not impose the tax at all. He emphasized that the federal government—
and not Arizona—provided roads, education, and other services needed by
the Indians.454 “[S]ince federal legislation has left the State with no duties
or responsibilities respecting the reservation Indians, we cannot believe that
Congress intended to leave to the State the privilege of levying this tax.”455 In
short, Arizona provided nothing on the reservation for which it could ask a
tax in return.456
On one hand, under a preemption analysis Congress could be viewed as
taking the lack of services into account when it passed the Indian Trader
statutes, making it clear that a state did not have the right to impose a sales
tax in the first instance. On the other hand, the way Justice Black phrased
the issue is consistent with a Due Process Clause analysis,457 which would be
independent of a preemption argument458 (or an Indian Commerce Clause
argument). As Justice Frankfurter formulated the test (albeit not in a case
involving the Indians):

454
Justice Black described the Navajo Reservation as being set apart as a “permanent home”
for the Navajos in a treaty made with the “Navajo nation or tribe of Indians” on June 1,
1868. Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 686. Notwithstanding the minor role this reference
played, Justice Marshall in McClanahan described Warren Trading as “this Court [interpreting] the Navajo treaty to preclude extension of state law—including state tax law—to Indians
on the Navajo Reservation.” McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 175
(1973).
455
Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 691. By contrast, in Oklahoma Tax Commission v.
United States, 319 U.S. 598 (1943), upholding a state estate tax on restricted Indian personal
property, Justice Black stressed that “Oklahoma supplies for [the Indians] and their children
schools, roads, courts, police protection, and all the other benefits of an ordered society.” Id. at
608–09. He also found little effective tribal government. Id. at 603.
456
In its amicus brief, the Papago tribe made a similar argument. See Brief of the Papago
Tribe as Amicus Curiae, supra note 447, at 10.
457
Justice Black never cited the Due Process Clause, which makes it hard to characterize
that Clause as an independent ground for the holding in Warren Trading. In White Mountain,
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist in dissent, suggested that if a state
provided no services to a taxpayer, the Due Process Clause might prohibit the levying of a
tax. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 158 (1980) discussed infra note
874.
One commentator reports that Stewart made an extemporaneous comment during a visit
to Boalt Law School to the effect that any case the Court decides in Indian law is stillborn and
has no precedential value. Robert S. Pelcyger, Justices and Indians: Back to Basics, 62 Or. L.
Rev. 29, 31 (1983).
458
In Central Machinery, discussed infra note 481–493 and accompanying text, Justice
Stewart in dissent assumed that Black’s argument was a second independent ground for the
decision. See Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160, 168 (1980) (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
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A state is free to pursue its own fiscal policies, unembarrassed by the
Constitution, if by the practical operation of a tax the state has exerted its
power in relation to opportunities which it has given, to protection which
it has afforded, to benefits which it has conferred by the fact of being an
orderly, civilized society.459
That test is whether property was taken without due process of law, or, if
paraphrase we must, whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears
fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state.
The simple but controlling question is whether the state has given anything
for which it can ask return.460

Arizona provided no opportunities, protection, or benefits to the reservation. “Congress has, since the creation of the Navajo Reservation nearly a
century ago, left the Indians on it largely free to run the reservation and its
affairs without state control, a policy which has automatically relieved Arizona of all burdens for carrying on those same responsibilities.”461 Arizona
provided nothing for which it could exact a tax as a quid pro quo and Justice
Black might have viewed the State’s attempt to raise money from activities on
the reservation as illegitimate and unjustified, an argument that would apply
regardless of the existence of the Indian Trader statutes.
The inherent weakness with this type of argument is the amorphous nature
of government-provided benefits, opportunities, and protections. Arizona
provided services that inured, at least indirectly, to the Navajos. Both Warren
Trading and the Indians were the joint beneficiaries of the State’s roads that
connected to the reservation, which facilitated the delivery of inventory to
the retailer for sale to its Indian customers.462 Arizona also provided police
and fire protection to persons and property traveling on those roads. More
fundamentally, the Court has come to require very little of a state under the
Due Process Clause. Police and fire protection, the benefit of a trained work
force, and the advantages of a civilized society will suffice.463 Nonetheless, as
Justice Black’s comments suggest, the equities were on the side of the Indians
because Arizona provided them with no direct services.

Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
Id.
461
Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 690.
462
The state-maintained roads would also facilitate access to the reservation by potential
non-Indian customers. The issue before the Court, however, was limited to the taxation of sales
made to Indians. Apparently the federal government provided the roads on the reservation
and not the State. Id. One often cited state benefit is the provision of a judicial system, which
facilitates commercial activities. But as Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), held, Arizona
courts would have no jurisdiction over suits arising from sales by Warren Trading to reservation
Indians, at least if the State had not assumed civil jurisdiction under P. L. 280. See supra note
418–20 and accompanying text.
463
Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 445 (1979).
459
460
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e. Tribal Sales Taxes and Double Taxation
In Warren Trading, the Navajos did not have their own tribal sales tax, although
the Arizona Papago Tribe did.464 Warren Trading argued that the combined
imposition of the Papago tax and the Arizona tax would “discourage qualified
persons from being traders on the Papago Reservation, or discourage commerce among the Papagos, or necessitate the repeal of the Papago tax to lessen
the commercial burden.”465 The holding in Warren Trading would ensure that
no double taxation would result should a tribe impose its own sales tax on
reservation sales to Indians. Only a state tax would be prohibited. As will be
seen, however, Warren Trading has no bearing on the double taxation that
would result from sales to non-Indians466 (or even from sales to Indians who
are not members of the tribe imposing the tax).467 Consequently, for these
purchasers the Court will allow the simultaneous imposition of tribal and
state sales taxes (with no credit or other relief to mitigate the double taxation),
despite the devastating effect this might have on a tribal economy.468

464
See supra notes 447, 453. One of the oldest tribal taxes was imposed by the Muscogee
Indians in 1857. Sharon O’Brien, American Indian Tribal Governments 232 (1989).
That tax appears to be a personal property tax, levied on all goods offered for sale, at the rate
of one percent.
465
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 429, at 15. This point would also be the basis of
a Williams v. Lee argument. See supra notes 376–424 and accompanying text.
This argument assumes that a tribal tax would not be inconsistent with the Indian Trader
statutes. Black’s opinion, however, although limited to the Arizona sales tax, could be read
as suggesting that a tribal sales tax would also be precluded by the Indian Trader statutes. If
Congress intended that the Commissioner should have the freedom to control prices on the
reservation, then a tribal tax, just as much as a state tax, could disturb and disarrange the statutory plan Congress had set up in order to protect the Indians against prices deemed unfair or
unreasonable. In other words, the Indian Trader statutes would protect Indian purchasers from
the actions of their tribe, as well as those of the State.
The Indian Trader statutes, however, allow the governing body of an Indian reservation
[to] assess from a trader such fees, etc. as it may deem appropriate.” Warren Trading Post Co.,
380 U.S. at 689. Black also stated in referring to the Arizona tax that

[t]his state tax on gross income would put financial burdens on appellant or the
Indians with whom it deals in addition to those . . . the tribes have prescribed, and
could thereby disturb and disarrange the statutory plan Congress set up in order to
protect Indians against prices deemed unfair or unreasonable by the Indian.
Id. (emphasis added). Together, these references would seem to support a tribal sales tax.
466
Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 482 (1976), discussed
infra notes 654–739 and accompanying text.
467
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
155–56 (1980), discussed infra notes 740−915 and accompanying text.
468
But see infra notes 890–93, 909–10, 1315–17, 1349–55 and accompanying text.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4

01-Pomp.indd 1017

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=244384612/23/2010

11:03:38 AM

1018

SECTION OF TAXATION

2. Central Machinery v. Arizona State Tax Commission
Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission,469 authored by Justice
Marshall,470 involved the same Arizona sales tax and Indian Trader statutes at
issue in Warren Trading. Despite losing Warren Trading, Arizona now sought
to tax the on-reservation sale of eleven farm tractors to the Gila River Tribe
by an off-reservation corporation.471
Warren Trading had already held that the Indian Trader statutes preempted
the Arizona sales tax. The issue in Central Machinery was whether its fact pattern fell within the statute. If it did, the sales tax would be preempted under
Warren Trading.
a. Differences with Warren Trading
Two differences with Warren Trading were that: (1) the vendor in Central
Machinery did not have a permanent place of business on the reservation;
and (2) it was not licensed to engage in trade with Indians on the reservation
under the Indian Trader statutes.472 The Arizona Supreme Court found these
differences sufficient to uphold the tax.473 Justice Marshall, by contrast, found
them irrelevant and applied Warren Trading to strike down the Arizona sales
tax.
The Court was properly untroubled that Central Machinery had not
obtained a license under the Indian Trader statutes and had no permanent
place of business on the reservation. The statute and the regulations required
Central Machinery to obtain a license. The statute made it a crime for “[any]
person . . . to introduce goods, or to trade without a license” in Indian coun-

Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980).
Dean Getches describes Marshall as “something of a specialist in Indian law, and his colleagues seemed glad for his leadership, content to let him perform an unpopular duty.” Getches,
Conquering, supra note 14, at 1653. Dean Getches describes Justices Marshall, Brennan, and
Blackmun as generally “loyal to the tradition of respecting tribal rights and sovereignty as
subject only to congressional modification. Justice Marshall and Brennan wrote a disproportionately large number of the key Indian decisions of the modern era, including about a third
of all Indian decisions between 1973 and 1983. Justice Blackmun usually joined with Marshall
and Brennan on sovereignty-related cases.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1630–31.
See generally Robert Laurence, Thurgood Marshall’s Indian Law Opinions, 27 How. L. J. 3, 61
(1984) [hereinafter Laurence, Thurgood Marshall]; Rebecca Tsosie, Separate Sovereigns, Civil
Rights, and the Sacred Text: The Legacy of Justice Thurgood Marshall’s Indian Law Jurisprudence,
26 Ariz. St. L. J. 495 (1994).
471
Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 161. The sale was made to Gila River Farms, an enterprise of the Gila River Indian Tribe. The vendor paid the tax to Arizona under protest. It was
stipulated that Central Machinery would pay any refund to Gila River Farms. Id. at 162 n.2.
The Court cited Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. at 157 n.13, for the proposition that
it is irrelevant whether a sale was made to a tribal enterprise rather than to a tribe. Central
Machinery, 448 U.S. at 164 n.3.
472
Id. at 161.
473
Id. at 164.
469
470
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try474 and a regulation provided for the licensing of “itinerant peddlers.”475
Furthermore, the purpose of the statute—to prevent fraud on the Indians476—would be easily circumvented if a vendor could eliminate the protections intended by the Indian Trader statutes simply by not obtaining a
license,477 or by not having a permanent place of business on the reservation.478 In addition, a vendor that failed either condition should not be able
to capitalize on that fact to bring itself outside the purview and regulatory
regime of the statute.479
Justice Marshall had no problem concluding that the sale of the tractors
occurred on the reservation because that was the place where: the sale was
solicited, the contract was executed, and delivery and payment were made.480
Id. at 165 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added). In the early days of the country, itinerant peddlers were the rule
rather than the exception. Persons licensed to trade with the Indians would often bring goods
onto the reservation, exchange them for furs, and leave. Prucha, Policy, supra note 60, at
66–71, 85.
476
H.R. Rep. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1834), stated that the purpose of the
Indian Trader statutes was to prevent the Indians from being defrauded. Central Machinery,
448 U.S. at 163. Despite this purpose of the statute and the language of the Indian Trader
statutes, Professor Taylor argues that a state personal income tax should also be preempted,
the same as a sales tax. His argument is based more on policy considerations than on statutory
construction. Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 891–94.
477
Curiously, the sale of tractors was approved by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, notwithstanding the lack of a license. Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 165 n.4. Professor Taylor states
that the Court “acknowledged that no federal law enforcement officials seemed to care that
such transactions were commonplace,” Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 864. In support of
that proposition, Professor Taylor cites Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 165 “[i]t is the existence
of the Indian Trader statutes, then, and not their administration, that pre-empts the field of
transactions with Indians occurring on reservations,” which does not provide the support for
which it is cited. See Taylor, supra, at 864 n. 174.
The Bureau also approved the tribal budget, which allocated money for the sale. Central
Machinery, 448 U.S. at 165 n.4. Apparently the Bureau either thought no license was required
or was indifferent about whether one was. The Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
states without any citation that “in practice no ‘license’ is issued for a single transaction.” Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n 1979 U.S.
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1414, at *7. Justice Marshall acknowledged that the Bureau had approved
the contract of sale and tribal budget but did not respond to the argument that that approval
could be read as de facto approval of the Arizona sales tax.
478
Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 165.
479
On the other hand, a vendor might wish to be covered by the statute in order to have a
sale exempted from a state sales tax under Warren Trading. In any event, the statute should not
be elective based on the desires of the vendor.
480
Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 161, 165. In Warren Trading, the sale obviously took place
on the reservation and the Court never even mentioned this issue.
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is not overly concerned with where a sale takes
place. Nonetheless, the UCC defines a sale as the “passing of title from the seller to the buyer
for a price.” UCC Sec. 2-106. “Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the
time and place at which the seller completes performance with reference to the delivery of the
goods.” UCC Sec. 2-401(2). Consequently, if title passes on the reservation, the UCC would
support an argument that a sale occurred there.
474
475
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In essence, Marshall applied the holding in Warren Trading to anyone selling
on a reservation, whether or not licensed, and whether or not the sale was
a one-time event. Justice Marshall had no need under the facts of Central
Machinery to define what constitutes a sale on the reservation.
b. Stewart’s Dissent
i. Marshall Misapplied Warren Trading. Justice Stewart dissented,
joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Justice Stewart agreed that
Warren Trading stated the correct principles but disagreed about their application. “The question . . . is not whether the appellant may be required to have
a license, but . . . whether the state tax ‘runs afoul of any congressional enactments’ dealing with the affairs of reservation Indians . . .”481 Before answering
this question, Stewart articulated the two grounds of Warren Trading. First,
the Arizona tax in Warren Trading could disturb and disarrange the statutory
plan Congress had set up in order to protect the Indians against prices deemed
unfair or unreasonable. Second, Arizona had no responsibility for servicing
the reservation and thus no right to levy a tax.482 Justice Stewart then concluded that neither of these conditions was satisfied in Central Machinery.
ii. The Sale Was Isolated and Occasional. Stewart emphasized the isolated nature of the sale of tractors and contrasted it with the continuous trading that existed in Warren Trading. In the latter case, “the financial burdens
of state taxation would have impaired the Commissioner’s ability to prescribe
‘the kind and quantity of goods and the prices at which such goods shall be
sold to the Indians,’ 25 U.S.C. Sec. 261, and might have threatened the very
existence of the resident trader’s enterprise, on which the tribe depended for
its essential commerce.”483 Because the sale of the tractors was an isolated
transaction, it posed no risk of “jeopardiz[ing] those federal and tribal interests involved in the thorough regulation of on-reservation merchants trading
continuously with the Indians—the situation dealt with in Warren Trading
Post.”484 Moreover, the “reasonableness of the terms of sale may be guaranteed, as they were in this case, by the Commissioner’s review of them.”485
Stewart’s description of Warren Trading is a tad hyperbolic486 because the
Commissioner had never exercised his power to set prices either before or
after that case. Moreover, nothing in that case suggested that if the Arizona
tax were upheld, the existence of the trading post would be threatened, thus
jeopardizing the Navajos.
Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 167 (Stewart, J. dissenting).
Id. at 168. Justice Stewart implicitly assumed that Justice Black’s discussion of Arizona
not having the right to tax because it provided no services was a second independent ground
for the decision and not part of the preemption argument. See supra note 458 and accompanying text.
483
Central Machinery, 448 at 169.
484
Id.
485
Id. (emphasis added).
486
Ironically, Justice Stewart accused Marshall of being hyperbolic when he concluded that
there was “no room” for the Arizona sales tax. Id.
481
482
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Justice Stewart’s emphasis on the “occasional” or “isolated” nature of the
transaction was both inconsistent with the regulatory scheme and with the
goal of the statute. First, nothing in the statute required that a trader be
engaged in a continuous course of selling. To the contrary, the regulations
issued under the statute specifically anticipated the existence of “itinerant
peddlers” and required them to obtain a license.487 The regulations did not
define an “itinerant peddler” but presumably encompassed persons without
a permanent place of business, the very sort who were likely to make isolated
or occasional sales on the reservation.
Second, given that the goal of the statute was to protect the Indians from
being defrauded, it should be irrelevant whether a transaction was occasional,
isolated, or continuous. Indeed, the likelihood of fraud might be even higher
in the case of an isolated sale where the vendor might not care about any
ongoing business relationship.
Finally, the relevance of an “isolated” sale is not apparent. A one-time sale
might be so significant in dollar amount that it dwarfs whatever else might
occur on the reservation during the rest of the year. To take an extreme example, suppose there was a one-time sale of an airplane for $25 million. That
this might be a one-time, isolated sale would be irrelevant in terms of the
potential for fraud.
Even assuming less extreme facts, transactions in subsequent years might
show that an earlier transaction was not isolated. If in subsequent years, for
example, Central Machinery sold other farming equipment to the Tribe, the
earlier sale of the tractors, with the benefit of hindsight, would not appear to
be “isolated.”488
For Justice Stewart, the question of a license was irrelevant. Indeed, Justice
Stewart could have viewed the Bureau of Indian Affairs as having granted a
de facto license to Central Machinery without that characterization changing
his analysis. His view was that not all sales on the reservation, even by traders licensed under the statute, fell within Warren Trading. That a vendor was
licensed did not automatically mean that the Arizona sales tax was invalid
if the sale was an isolated transaction. Warren Trading had no application
to Central Machinery because the transaction was isolated and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs had approved the sales price, including the tax. In
contrast, for Justice Marshall it was enough that the sale “took place” on the
reservation.
iii. Arizona Provided No Services. With respect to the second rationale of Warren Trading—that Arizona had no responsibility for servicing the
reservation and thus no right to levy a tax—Justice Stewart emphasized that
Central Machinery did business throughout Arizona and derived substantial
benefits from State services provided at the taxpayer’s expense. “Thus, quite
Bureau of Indian Affairs Rules on Financial Activities, 25 C.F.R. § 140.9(b)(2010).
At the time the tax consequences of the earlier sale were being litigated, the events in the
subsequent years might not have yet occurred. Even if they had, whether those events could be
introduced in the litigation over the earlier years would depend on a state’s rules of evidence.
487
488
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unlike the circumstances in Warren Trading, the State in this case has not
been relieved of all duties or responsibilities respecting the business it would
tax.”489 He scolded the majority for not following the “settled teaching of
the Court’s [Indian law] decisions . . . that every relevant state interest is
to be given weight,”490 and that “limits inherent in the principles of federal
preemption . . . [require] a careful inquiry into pertinent federal, tribal, and
state interests, without which a rational accommodation of those interests is
not possible.”491 While subsequent cases will require this type of inquiry,492
describing that approach as “settled teaching” at this point in time as part of
a preemption analysis was a bit of a stretch.
These statements, however, were irrelevant to the second rationale of Warren Trading. To be sure, Warren Trading’s only business was on the reservation whereas Central Machinery’s business was based off the reservation.
The relevant question, however, was not whether Arizona was relieved of
all duties and responsibilities respecting Central Machinery, “the business it
would tax,”493 but rather was it relieved of duties and responsibilities on the
reservation. Justice Stewart never answered that question. Furthermore, it was
inconsistent for him to have stressed the isolated nature of the sale, while
simultaneously stressing the State’s “legitimate governmental interest in raising revenues.” If the sale was isolated, then little weight should be given to the
State’s inability to tax it. More generally, a state will typically have an interest
in raising revenue from a tax. If too much weight is placed on this interest,
the analysis will be unfairly biased in favor of a state.
Finally, Justice Stewart did not explain why Arizona’s revenue interests
would not be properly protected by its ability to tax Central Machinery’s offreservation sales under its sales tax, or to tax its profits from those sales under
the State’s corporate income tax. At stake was only the sales tax on an isolated
transaction.

Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 170 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id. at 170 (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, 157 (1980), discussed infra notes 740–915 and accompanying text; White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980), discussed infra notes 916–84
and accompanying text; McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), discussed infra notes 519–91 and accompanying text).
491
Id.
492
See, e.g., Dep’t of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61, 73 (1994) (“If
the balance of federal, state, and tribal interests favors the State, and federal law is not to the
contrary, the State may impose its levy [Colville] and may place on a tribe or tribal members
‘minimal burdens’ in collecting the toll.”); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S.
450, 459 (1995). For an insightful discussion of Milhelm Attea, see Sarah Krakoff, Undoing
Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 Am. U. L. Rev.
1177, 1239–40 (2001). In Stewart’s defense, he was probably relying on language in White
Mountain, a companion case to Central Machinery, infra notes 967–68, and accompanying
text.
493
Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 170 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
489
490
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c. Powell’s Dissent
Justice Powell, writing only for himself in dissent, argued that recent cases
undermined the notion that the Indian Trader statutes preempted all state
regulation (apparently a reference to the Arizona sales tax).494 The two cases
he cited, however, Moe495 and Colville,496 dealt, inter alia, with sales to nonIndians, who are not covered by the Indian Trader statutes.497
i. The BIA Approved the Sale. Powell also echoed Justice Stewart’s
argument that because the Bureau of Indian affairs approved all aspects of
the sale, and that the contract price included costs attributable to the Arizona
sales tax, “there is no danger that ordinary state business taxes upon the seller
will impair the Bureau’s ability to prevent fraudulent or excessive pricing. To
hold the seller immune from state taxes otherwise due upon a single transaction with the Indians gives the non-Indian seller a windfall or the Indian
buyer an unwarranted advantage over all others who deal with the seller.”498
ii. Was the Commissioner Aware He Was Approving the Arizona Sales
Tax? What is clear is that Central Machinery added the amount of the tax
to the price of the tractors499 and that unlike Warren Trading, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs reviewed the contract price.500 What is unclear from
all of the opinions, however, was whether the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
was even aware that the contract price he approved included the Arizona
sales tax. If he were indeed unaware, then it would be reasonable to apply
Warren Trading to preempt the Arizona tax. This would preserve his ability to impose price controls in the future.501 But if the Commissioner were
aware that he was approving the sales tax, the tax could hardly be described as
“disturb[ing] and disarrang[ing] the statutory plan Congress set up in order
to protect Indians against prices deemed unfair or unreasonable by the Indian
Commissioner.”502
494
Id. at 172 (Powell, J., dissenting). He also drew a distinction between the scope of the regulations that apply to those making continuous sales on the reservation, like Warren Trading,
and those making a single sale, like Central Machinery. Id. at 171–72. He distinguished Warren
Trading as dealing with the former and not the latter.
495
Moe v. Confederate Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976). See infra notes
654–739 and accompanying text.
496
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
See infra notes 740–915 and accompanying text.
497
See infra notes 725, 786.
498
Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 173 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
499
Id. at 162.
500
Id. at 169. Justice Powell in dissent stated that “[s]ince a seller not licensed to trade
with the Indians must secure specific federal approval for each isolated transaction, there is
no danger that ordinary state business taxes upon the seller will impair the Bureau’s ability to
prevent fraudulent or excessive pricing.” Id. at 173. The “approval” is apparently a reference
to 25 U.S.C. §§ 262, 264 (2009), see Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 171, which refers to the
approval needed to trade with the Indians, but does not require that the Bureau approve the
price of any specific or particular transaction.
501
See discussion supra notes 440–45.
502
Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685, 691 (1965).
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Justice Marshall asserted that the Bureau approved the contract of sale
and the tribal budget, which allocated money for the purchase,503 but never
opined on whether the tax was explicitly stated. Justice Stewart stated that
“the reasonableness of the terms of sale may be guaranteed . . . by the Commissioner’s review of them.”504 What Justice Stewart never says, however,
is whether the tax was explicitly stated so that the Commissioner could be
viewed as having actually approved it. Justice Powell noted that the contract
price was approved by the Bureau and included the tax,505 but again did not
discuss whether it was separately stated. Rather surprisingly, an issue critical
to the dissent was never addressed.
The Commissioner was an executive branch employee. No one in the dissent addressed how the actions of the executive branch could overrule the
intent of the legislative branch. In other words, assuming arguendo that Congress intended that no state sales tax be imposed on the sale of any goods to
the Indians under the facts of Central Machinery, the executive branch could
not act in a way inconsistent with that intent without raising a separation of
powers issue. Under this view, whether the executive branch approved the
Arizona sales tax or not would be irrelevant.
d. Implications of the Decision
The decision in Central Machinery has two secondary effects. First, the opinion eliminates the double taxation that otherwise would result should a tribe
levy its own sales tax on the same transaction that a state seeks to tax.
Second, off-reservation vendors might now be encouraged to enter the reservation to “solicit and execute the contract of sale and to receive payment,”506
in order to sell without the sales tax, circumstances that Justice Stewart suggested “are certain to characterize all sales to reservation Indians after today’s
decision.”507 Although Justice Stewart offered this observation as a criticism
of the majority, it is not clear why, if this were to occur, it should be criticized
rather than lauded. True, the State will lose sales taxes, assuming that the
transaction would have otherwise occurred off-reservation. But if the result of
the decision is that the range of on-reservation goods and services increased,
perhaps exerting downward pressure on prices, the Indians should benefit.
While it is hard to imagine a Walmart or Lowe’s changing their business
model in order to sell tax-free on the reservation, a vendor of goods of especial
interest to the Indians might.508
Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 165 n.4.
Id. at 169 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
505
Id. at 173 (Powell, J., dissenting).
506
Id. at 170 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
507
Id.
508
On the downside, the possibility exists that a transaction having no nexus with the reservation might be manipulated or “papered over” to justify a vendor’s failure to collect a sales
tax. Professor Laurence, however, is skeptical that this tax avoidance would occur. “No attorney
would be quite so quick to give a client such advice, for to do so probably will remove jurisdiction over disputes over the contract from the state court.” Laurence, Thurgood Marshall,
503
504
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Most importantly, however, the combination of Warren Trading and Central Machinery, makes it clear that the Indian Trader statutes apply to all sales
on a reservation, whether continuous or isolated, and whether the vendor is
licensed or unlicensed. Because of the sweeping holding of these cases (especially of Central Machinery, which would seem to swallow Warren Trading)
and the rise of remote vendors (e.g., those selling over the Internet, through
mail order catalogs, cable television, and 800 telephone calls), the issue of
whether a sale takes place on- or off-reservation becomes critical.509
The place of sale was not at issue in Warren Trading. That case involved a
sale made at a store located on the reservation to an Indian. Presumably, all
the relevant elements of the sale occurred on the reservation: solicitation,
execution of the contract, passage of title, passage of risk, delivery, and payment. The sale could not have taken place anywhere else.
Had all the elements of a sale occurred off the reservation, by contrast,
the Indian Trader statutes would not have applied. For example, if an Indian
purchased a good in downtown Phoenix, paid at the store, took possession
there, and subsequently brought the item back to her home on the reservation, the Indian Trader statutes would be inapplicable.510 This off-reservation
sale, and Warren Trading’s on-reservation sale, represent the polar points on a
continuum between which numerous permutations are possible.
In effect, Justice Marshall viewed Central Machinery as falling closer to the
“on-reservation” end of the continuum. “Appellant’s salesman solicited the
supra note 470, at 61. Two caveat are in order. First, the state may have jurisdiction, perhaps
under Public Law 280. See supra notes 418–20 and accompanying text. Second, a seller that
had received payment by cash or credit card might not care about this issue because it would
have no need to sue the purchaser. On the other hand, a seller might care about jurisdiction
over potential suits involving a warranty that it issued or alleged defects in the merchandise.
For a discussion of whether Williams v. Lee prevents Indian plaintiffs from suing in the state
courts, see Carole E. Goldberg, Rebecca Tsosie, Kevin K. Washburn, Elizabeth Rodke
Washburn, American Indian Law: Native Nations and the Federal System 651 (6th
ed. 2010).
509
Warren Trading and Central Machinery will strike down a sales tax only if it would otherwise be applicable. A remote vendor must have nexus with the reservation (or with the state in
which the reservation was located) in order to be required to collect that state’s sales or use tax.
Under Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), that requirement has two components:
due process nexus and commerce clause nexus. If either does not exist, a vendor would not
have to collect any sales (or use) tax in the first place, regardless of Warren Trading and Central
Machinery. For a discussion of Quill, see infra notes 710–74. Even if a vendor does not collect
the sales or use tax, the purchaser is still nonetheless obligated to pay any applicable use tax. See
Richard D. Pomp, State and Local Sales Taxation, ch.6 (6th ed. 2009).
510
The sale at the Phoenix store would not be covered by the statute’s precondition that
a person “introduce goods, or to trade” without a license “in the Indian country, or on any
Indian reservation.” 25 U.S.C. § 264 (2006). The Phoenix vendor would not be “introducing
goods” on the reservation and not trading in Indian country or on any reservation. Professor
Taylor claims that the opinion itself suggests that if a transaction occurred off-reservation, the
Arizona sales tax would have then applied. He cites Central Machinery in support of that assertion. 448 U.S. at 164 n.3. I do not find support in that citation for his proposition. Taylor,
Framework, supra note 23, at 900.
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sale of these tractors on the reservation, the contract was made there, and payment for and delivery of the tractors also took place there.”511 “The contract of
sale . . . was executed on the . . . [r]eservation, and delivery and payment were
effected there.”512 Because no element of the sale apparently occurred at the
vendor’s off-reservation location,513 Justice Marshall had no trouble concluding that the Indian Trader statutes applied.
e. Defining a Sale
The opinion thus had no need to provide guidance about what constituted a
reservation sale. Transactions with remote vendors, however, raise that very
question.514 Ambiguity abounds on such basic issues such as where a contract
is executed or where a payment is made (or even where delivery occurs in
the case of downloaded intangible property). In a world of remote vendors
and electronic commerce, situsing a sale can be more difficult than it was in
either Warren Trading or Central Machinery, especially if intangible property
is involved.
Whatever rules are developed should further the goal of the statute, which
the Court stated was to protect the Indians from fraud.515 Internet web sites,
mail order catalogs, off-reservation stores and the like that do not cater exclusively, or even primarily, to the Indians do not raise the potential for fraud
with which the statute is concerned. In contrast, activities specifically directed
at the Indians, such as solicitation on the reservation, raise exactly that possibility. This difference suggests that in determining where a sale takes place
great weight should be given to the nature of the solicitation.
Consider, for example, a catalog of goods marketed only to Indians.
Assume the catalog is not distributed generally but is limited to Indian reservations. Consistent with the goal of the Indian Trader statutes, which is to
prevent fraud, a good ordered from such a catalog should be considered to be
an on-reservation sale without pondering the niceties of where the contract
was executed, where a credit card payment occurred, or where delivery took
place. In other words, while the statute requires some connection with the
reservation, the concept of where a sale takes place should be elastic enough
to encompass situations that fall within the goal of protecting the Indians
against fraud without any searing inquiry into the elements of a contract.516
Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 161.
Id. at 164.
513
Professor Taylor claims that “tribal representatives visited the off-reservation business
location of the trader to view the farm machinery,” citing 448 U.S. 160, 161 in support of that
statement. Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 899. I cannot find that support.
514
See infra note 516 and accompanying text.
515
Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 163.
516
Professor Taylor also recognizes the difficulty of situsing a sale but would resolve the issue
by determining the place of destination. Professor Taylor argues that “the focus [should] be
on the purchaser and the location of the use of the property. Central Machinery’s requirement
of an on-reservation transaction could be satisfied if the purchaser is the Tribe or one of its
members and if the property purchased is used wholly or primarily on the reservation.” Taylor,
511
512
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The majority’s reference to place of execution, payment, and delivery should
be viewed as merely descriptive and suggestive rather than prescriptive. That
is, as a sufficient condition for finding an on-reservation sale but not a necessary one.
f. The Solicitor General and the Indian Commerce Clause
The parties understandably argued the case in the context of Warren Trading.
The Solicitor General, appearing amicus curiae on behalf of the taxpayer, did
so as well.517 The Solicitor General also made an eloquent appeal to the Indian
Commerce Clause:
No more than the Foreign Commerce Clause, the Indian Commerce Clause
is not the exact counterpart of the Interstate Commerce Clause. Indeed,
its purpose is, in many respects, very different. From the start, the Indian
Commerce Clause was understood to authorize complete and absolute federal
regulation of white-Indian relations of a kind and degree then unthinkable—
and even now not entirely familiar—in respect of non-Indian commerce
Framework, supra note 23, at 900. I agree that this approach “would simplify things considerably and dispense with a case-by-case analysis of every transaction” and the various facts involving its completion. Id. In many cases our two approaches would reach similar conclusions.
My problem is that the focus on the purchaser, who must be an Indian for the statute to be
triggered in the first instance, and the location of the use of the property have less to do with
furthering the goal of the statute than does focusing on the nature of the solicitation. Professor
Taylor’s formulation would also appear to reach goods bought off-reservation but delivered
onto the reservation.
The problem of situsing a transaction is even more difficult in the case of a service, as statetax lawyers well appreciate. The Indian Trader statutes, drafted in an earlier era when manufacturing and mercantile activities dominated economic activity, covers “goods,” 25 U.S.C. §§
263–64 (2009), and merchandise, § 264, but not services. Moreover, the statute’s references
to “trader,” “trade” or “trading,” §§ 262–64, anticipate the provision of a good or merchandise
but not a service. Other provisions refer to horses, liquor, weapons, instruments of husbandry,
articles of clothing, skins and furs, and cooking utensils, all examples of tangible personal
property and reflecting the nature of the economy when the statutes were drafted. See Brief of
the State of New Mexico, Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982)
(No. 80-2162), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1165, at *51–52 [hereinafter Brief of the State
of New Mexico]; see also United States ex rel. Keith v. Sioux Nation Shopping Ctr., 488 F.
Supp. 496 (D.S.D. 1980); Palm Springs Spa, Inc. v. Cnty. of Riverside, 95 Cal. Rptr. 879
(Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
Professor Taylor argues that “the statute itself, which, although it refers to goods, is broad
enough to extend to the sale of services.” Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 902. Because the
possibility of fraud is not limited to the sale of goods and can arise in the case of services, I agree
with Professor Taylor about the need to cover that case; however, I am less sanguine that the
statutory language is malleable or elastic enough to cover services despite the strong policy reasons for doing so. Accord Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (No. 78-1177), 1979 U.S. S.
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1279, at *16 n.9. (“References to ‘goods’ in [the Indian Trader statutes] and
the commonly accepted meaning of the term ‘trader,’ make it clear that sales of services are not
governed by these provisions.”). But see Laguna Indus. v. New Mexico Taxation & Revenue
Dep’t., 845 P.2d 167 (1992), aff’d, 855 P.2d 127 (1993).
517
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n,
448 U.S. 160 (1980) (No. 78-1604), 1979 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1414, at *5.
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between the States . . . [The Indian Commerce Clause] reserved to the
national government exclusive authority—absent delegation—to regulate
intercourse with the Indian tribes, so long as they maintained their separate
organization within their own territory . . . We must remember that those
who wrote the Indian Commerce Clause spoke of Indian ‘nations,’ with
whom it was appropriate to execute treaties . . . But, as it happens, the
specific history of the Indian Commerce Clause itself confirms its purpose
to nationalize white-Indian relations and wholly to exclude State authority to
regulate that intercourse.
Before the Constitution, there had been much vying between the States
and the national Congress over authority to deal with the Indian tribes. The
matter was ambiguously compromised in the Articles of Confederation,
which, in Article IX, granted Congress “the sole and exclusive right and
power of . . . regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians,”
but then exempted Indians who were “members of any of the States” and
purported to preserve “the legislative right of any State within its own limits.” As Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 42, that was an “endeavour
to accomplish impossibilities.” He construed the new Indian Commerce
Clause as resolving the dilemma by giving the national government exclusive authority over intercourse with the Indian tribes, whether within the
States or elsewhere. Ibid. Although it was not always followed in practice,
Madison’s view, not surprisingly, has generally been accepted as sound constitutional doctrine.
Indeed, during the ensuing century, this Court expressly asserted that “there
can be no divided authority” between federal and State governments in
Indian affairs. [The Kansas Indians]. And, after rehearing the history of the
Indian Commerce Clause as intentionally altering the scheme of the Articles
of Confederation the Court concluded that “Congress now has the exclusive
and absolute power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes.” [United
States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey]. See, also, [United States v. Holliday].
Nor do we appreciate that the Court has retreated from that principle in
more recent times.518
518
Id. at *13–17 (emphasis added). The author of that brief was apparently Claiborne, see
supra note 11, who also authored The Trend of Supreme Court Decisions in Indian Cases, supra
note 11. Freed of the constraints of a brief, he elaborated in that article on his views of the
Indian Commerce Clause:

The Constitution expressly recognizes the separateness of Indian Tribes, as quasisovereign political entities. As Chief Justice Marshall noted long ago, the Supremacy
Clause impliedly recognizes Indian Tribes as distinct political communities by
effectively ratifying and continuing in force “treaties heretofore made,” almost all
which . . . would be appropriate. So, also, the Commerce Clause, in speaking of
“commerce with the Indian tribes” as something different from “commerce between
the States,” necessarily separates the Indian Tribes from the States. And, finally, the
exclusion of “Indians not taxed” from the population on the basis of which a State’s
Representatives are apportioned, makes it clear that Indians maintaining tribal
relations, even though within the boundaries of a State, are separate and exempt
from State jurisdiction. Significantly, this provision was repeated in the Fourteenth
Amendment, ratified in 1868. . . . Taken together, I believe it fair to say that these
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With Warren Trading as precedent, it was easy enough for the Court to
ignore these arguments. The opinion makes no mention of the Solicitor General’s argument and never refers to the Indian Commerce Clause.
C. The Distinction Between On- and Off-Reservation Activities
1. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission
Eight years after Warren Trading, the Indians won what would prove to be a
costly victory in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission; costly because
the Court gratuitously relegated Worcester to that of a “backdrop.”519 The issue
was whether Arizona could levy its nondiscriminatory, personal income tax520
provisions reflect a constitutional understanding, agreed to by the original States for
themselves and all future States to be admitted on an equal (and no more advantageous) footing, that the Indian Tribes and their remaining territory were separate
sovereignties, off limits to State intervention . . . I also believe there is a constitutional
basis for the special rule—not accounted for by recognition that Indian Tribes are
“sovereign” within their Reservations—to the effect that, in some circumstances at
least, non-Indians trading with Indians in Indian country are exempted from regulation and taxation by their State. This requires a finding that Tribes are under the
special protection of the United States. I believe such a rule can be derived from the
Indian Commerce Clause. That Clause, of its own force, arguably precludes State
interference with white–Indian intercourse, until and unless Congress otherwise provides. . . . To be sure, this is not obvious on the face of the constitutional text. But it
is familiar history that the Indian Commerce Clause was intended to eliminate the
divided authority between the Nation and the States which was apparently condoned
by the Articles of Confederation in respect of white–Indian relations. This is reflected
in the debates of the Constitutional Convention and in The Federalist; more important, it has been noted by the Court in Worcester, and as late in 1876 in Forty–Three
Gallons of Whiskey. The upshot is that regulation of the intercourse with the Indian
Tribes is, by the Constitution, committed to the United States exclusively. The State
can intervene only by leave of federal authority, and it bears the burden of showing
such permission. In short, instead of looking for preemptive legislation (as in Warren
Trading Post), we should be noting the absence of statutes delegating authority to the
State.
Claiborne, supra note 11, at 597–98.
519
McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
520
Arizona provided that a tax be “levied, collected, and paid for each taxable year upon the
entire net income . . . of every resident of this state.” Id. at 166 n.3. McClanahan conceded
she was a resident within the meaning of the statute. Id. Because of this concession, the Court
was not “called upon to determine whether a reservation is a part of the corpus of a surrounding state, but only whether a reservation that is admitted to be part of a state may nevertheless
enjoy exceptions to that state’s plenary power.” Barsh, Omen, supra note 15, at 14. While this is
a good lawyer-like distinction, today the consensus is that a reservation is part of a state.
Justice Marshall described the case as requiring the Court to “reconcile the plenary power
of the States over residents within their borders with the semi-autonomous status of Indians
living on tribal reservations.” McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 165. Coming from a friend of the
Indians, this phrasing of the issue is odd and troubling. Why would Marshall make such a
broad and sweeping concession that was unnecessary to the analysis? Literally, the concession
was dictum, but symbolically it was a damaging proposition.
Professor Barsh interprets this phrasing as “implying that tribal sovereignty is an exception
to a presumption in favor of state power.” Barsh, Omen, supra note 15, at 13.
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on income earned by a Navajo who lived and worked on the reservation.521
McClanahan522 had $16.20 withheld from her salary and, in a case of first
impression,523 filed for a refund.524

521
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 166. Professor Wilkinson notes that McClanahan was not
a tribal employee. Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 60. That point would be relevant under the
old intergovernmental immunity doctrine, which immunized federal employees and instrumentalities from state taxation (as well as immunizing state employees from federal taxation).
Tribes and tribal employees were analogized to federal instrumentalities and federal employees
and immunized from state taxation. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 167. As a non-tribal employee,
McClanahan would not have been encompassed by that doctrine. See id. at 169–70. But by the
time of the case, the intergovernmental immunity doctrine had been abandoned. The Court
had long held that states could levy an income tax on federal employees and that the federal
government could levy its income tax on state employees. Id. at 167. The more important
point is that the inapplicability of the intergovernmental immunity doctrine does not mean
that a state has the power in the first place to tax an Indian on a reservation. Whether a state has
the power to tax is independent of whether an Indian might have once had a right (no longer
applicable) to be exempted from that tax.
The “freedom from state jurisdiction was a function of the nature of Indian nations and
Indian country. It did not arise from a notion that tribes are federal instrumentalities.” Ball,
Constitution, supra note 7, at 69.
522
Professor Taylor describes McClanahan as a “secretary,” Taylor, Framework, supra note 23,
at 862, but the opinion is silent on her occupation. In a phone conversation with the author,
Ms. McClanahan described her position as a teller with the First Navajo National Bank, now
part of Wells Fargo. There were other Navajos also protesting their state income taxes. As an
aside to those whose ancestors had their names changed upon entering the United States, many
Navajos were given “American” names, which is how a 100% full-blooded Navajo ended up
with the name “McClanahan.”
523
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 165.
524
McClanahan brought the suit in the Arizona courts, just like any other taxpayer seeking a
refund. The State claimed she owed a further $11.84 in tax. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n,
484 P.2d 221, 222 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971).
Arizona had not accepted civil jurisdiction over the reservation under Public Law 280.
The government as amicus curiae argued that Arizona wanted it both ways: it did not accept
Congress’s invitation to assume jurisdiction over the Navajo reservation but nonetheless
wanted to tax income earned on the reservation by a Navajo. Brief of the United States as
Amicus Curiae, McClanahan, 411 U.S. 164 (No. 71-834), 1972 WL 136317, at *3–4 [hereinafter Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, McClanahan]. A similar argument was made
in Williams v. Lee, supra notes 419–20 and accompanying text.
McClanahan reserved the question of whether a grant to a state of civil jurisdiction over
causes of action between Indians, or to which Indians are parties, was a congressional grant
of power to tax reservation Indians. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 178 n.18. That question was
negatively answered in Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373 (1976), which struck down a personal property tax on a mobile home owned by a tribal member. The Court held that a grant
of civil jurisdiction to Minnesota under Public Law 280 did not allow that State to levy a tax
on personal property located on a reservation. For an astute discussion of Public Law 280, see
Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians,
22 UCLA L. Rev. 535 (1975). See also Jensen, supra note 9, at 67–68; Canby, supra note 3,
at 258–85.
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a. Interpreting the 1868 Treaty
Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing again for a unanimous Court,525 held that
an 1868 treaty between the United States and the Navajo Nation prohibited
the Arizona tax.526 The treaty provided, in relevant part,
that a prescribed reservation would be set aside “for the use and occupation
of the Navajo tribe of Indians” and that “no persons except those herein so
authorized to do, and except such officers, soldiers, agents, and employees
of the government,527 or of the Indians, as may be authorized to enter upon
Indian reservations in discharge of duties imposed by law, or the orders of
the President, shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in,
the territory described in this article.”528

The treaty dealt with the right of entry onto the reservation, and Marshall acknowledged, as he had to, that the language did not deal with state
taxes at all.529 Nor was Arizona attempting to enter the reservation in violation of the treaty.530 But Justice Marshall refused to read the treaty as a
525
Claiborne has expressed surprise that McClanahan was a unanimous decision. Claiborne,
supra note 11, at 586. He attributes the unanimity to the “relatively low priority of Indian cases
in the Supreme Court.” Id. Another possibility is that unanimity was “purchased” by Marshall
at the cost of watering down Worcester.
526
Marshall described McClanahan as involving a “narrow” question. McClanahan, 411
U.S. at 168. Marshall noted that Arizona was not attempting to tax non-Indians on the reservation or Indians off the reservation. Id. at 167–68. In Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes, discussed infra notes 654–739 and accompanying text, the Court upheld a state tax
on non-Indians purchasing cigarettes on the reservation. In Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Indian Reservation, discussed infra notes 740–915 and accompanying text, the Court extended
Moe to non-member Indians. In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation, discussed
infra notes 1359–72 and accompanying text, the Court upheld the Oklahoma income tax on
Indians working on a reservation but living off-reservation.
Marshall incorrectly described Utah & Northern Railroad Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28, 29
(1885), as involving the “exertions of state sovereignty over non-Indians who undertake activities on Indian reservations.” McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 168. The property that was being taxed
in Utah & Northern, however, was “withdrawn” from the reservation. See supra notes 323–32
and accompanying text.
527
Few non-Indians (soldiers, agents, or government employees) lived on the reservations
when the treaty was negotiated. One implication is that little thought was given by either
Congress or the courts in the early to mid-19th century about the power and rights the Indians
might have over non-Indians on the reservation. See Gould, Consent, supra note 6, at 818.
The Treaty of Hopewell, for example, anticipated that non-Indians would leave the Cherokee
lands. Id.
528
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 174. The State conceded that it could exercise neither civil nor
criminal jurisdiction over the reservation. For Justice Marshall, that “would seem to dispose of
the case.” Id. at 179. But of course it did not. Had the State won, and if McClanahan refused
to pay what she owed in excess of what was withheld, see supra note 524 and accompanying
text, Arizona would have had a judgment against her that the State could then have asked the
Navajo courts to enforce.
529
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 174.
530
The treaty allowed “employes [sic] of the government” to enter the reservation. Id. Arizona
was not a state at the time that the treaty was signed, so presumably the “government” was a
reference to the United States.
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contract between parties dealing at arm’s length with equal bargaining positions.531 He summoned one of the so-called Indian canons of construction
with its roots in Worcester532 (unintentionally demonstrating how malleable
the canon was): “doubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak
and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its
protection and good faith.”533 When combined “with the tradition of Indian
independence . . . it cannot be doubted that the reservation of certain lands
for the exclusive use and occupancy of the Navajos and the exclusion of nonNavajos from the prescribed area was meant to establish the lands as within
the exclusive sovereignty of the Navajos under general federal supervision.”534
Id.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 555 (1832). The canons have been applied
to interpreting treaties, statutes, executive orders, regulations, and the like when the meaning
of a provision is unclear. The canons implement two broad propositions: that Indian rights are
to be construed broadly and that restrictions on those rights are to be construed narrowly. See
Jensen, supra note 9, at 29; Erik M. Jensen, Chickasaw Nation: Interpreting a Broken Statute,
97 Tax Notes 1195 (Dec. 2, 2002); Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 12, 58, 73
(“[A]lthough Congress had the authority to destroy Indian rights, the assumption was that
Congress would not do so lightly, and thus canons of interpretation protecting tribal interests were applied to statutory as well as treaty interpretation.”); Frickey, Domesticating, supra
note 15, at 73 (“Unfortunately, however, the current Court has badly depreciated the canons,
reducing them from clear statement requirements to be considered at the outset of the interpretive analysis to mere tiebreakers that apply only if the court would otherwise flip a coin. No
such tie ever emerges in its analysis of these disputes because the current Court venerates state
sovereignty and has little respect for tribal independence. Consequently, the canons have lost
most of their influence.”); Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 58 (“The canons of interpretation that once seemed to influence strongly, if not control, outcomes in federal Indian law
cases have lost their force in the context of significant nonmember interests.”).
Professor Jensen argues that Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001), treated
the canons “as little more than rules of convenience.” Jensen, supra note 9, at 31. For a general
discussion of the canons, see Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 7, at 119–28; Lauren Natasha
Soll, The Only Good Indian Reservation Is a Diminished Reservation? The New and Diluted
Canons of Construction in Indian Law, 41 Fed. Bus. News & J. 544 (1994); Wilkinson &
Volkman, supra note 7, at 617–20; supra note 130 and the references therein.
533
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 174 (emphasis added) (quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S.
363, 367 (1930)). Despite Marshall’s language, Professor Frickey criticizes using the canon to
protect disadvantaged minorities: “[T]he Indian law canon is essentially structural and institutional and was not established to promote equality or to combat political powerlessness.
Much more important, the Court has committed the same error, and its error threatens to
destroy much of the force of the Indian law canon.” Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 199, at
425. Bryan v. Itasca County characterizes McClanahan as establishing a rule against finding that
“ambiguous statutes abolish by implication Indian tax immunities.” 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976)
(emphasis added). The use of the term “immunity” suggests that Marshall first determined that
Arizona had no power to tax McClanahan and then determined that the treaty did not grant
Arizona that power. But that was not the structure of the opinion.
534
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 174–75. Justice Marshall then noted that “[i]t is thus unsurprising that this Court has interpreted the Navajo treaty to preclude extension of state law—
including state tax law—to Indians on the Navajo Reservation. Id. at 175 (citing Warren
Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 269
(1959)). Warren Trading, however, relied on the federal Indian Trader statutes and not on the
treaty, and Williams allowed Arizona to take actions provided it did not infringe on the right of
531
532
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Justice Marshall never identified what constituted the “doubtful expression.”
Justice Marshall was equally unconvincing when he described Congress as
consistently acting on the assumption that Arizona lacked jurisdiction over
Navajos living on the reservation.535 His support was twofold. First, when
Arizona entered the Union, it disclaimed, inter alia, all right and title to lands
lying within its boundaries owned or held by any Indian or tribe.536 Marshall,
however, does not justify the leap between disclaiming title in land and the
State’s inability to tax income earned on the reservation.537
b. Interpreting the Arizona Enabling Act
Second, and also unconvincing, Justice Marshall cited the Arizona Enabling
Act, which provided, inter alia, that “nothing . . . shall preclude [Arizona]
from taxing . . . any lands and other property outside of an Indian reservation
owned or held by an Indian.”538 He was unperturbed by the lack of any reference to the taxation of income:
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. Neither case supported Marshall.
Whether McClanahan should be read as limited to only Navajos living on the reservation
or would apply to members of other tribes also living on the reservation was subsequently
addressed in Colville in the context of cigarette taxes. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); see infra notes 781–87 and accompanying text.
The Colville Court held that the state could not tax the sale of cigarettes to members of the
tribe on whose reservations the sale took place, but could tax the sale to non-tribal members.
Colville, however, involved what the Court viewed as a tax avoidance situation involving a tribe
trying to market a tax exemption. Id. The question is whether the distinction between tribal
and non-tribal members will be limited to tax avoidance situations or is intended by the Court
to apply more generally.
Professor Taylor argues forcefully that in the case of income taxes, no distinction should
exist between Indians who are tribal members and Indians who are not. Scott A. Taylor, The
Unending Onslaught on Tribal Sovereignty: State Income Taxation of Non-Member Indians, 91
Marq. L. Rev. 917, 959 (2008) [hereinafter Taylor, Onslaught]. Arizona, for example, should
not be able to tax McClanahan even if she was a non-tribal member. Id. He makes a strong
case on policy and normative grounds. He also reads McClanahan as supporting that reading,
claiming that “when Justice Marshall concluded that state power to tax did not extend to
on-reservation activities of ‘reservation Indians,’ he clearly meant Indians who were members
of the tribe and also those Indians who were members of other tribes.” Id. at 958. Even if
Marshall “clearly” meant non-tribal members, which seems doubtful, this would be dictum.
535
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 175.
536
“Even after the rapid westward movement of the frontier made the policy of physically separating tribes from the states impossible, the federal government sought to protect
the Indians’ autonomy by denying newly admitted states jurisdiction over the tribes within
state boundaries.” Robert N. Clinton, Reviewing Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood
Henderson, The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 846, 846 (1980).
537
If McClanahan were receiving rental income from reservation land, she could argue that
an income tax on that rent should be viewed as a tax on the source of that income, the land,
and that a tax on reservation land would be inconsistent with Arizona having disclaimed all
right to reservation land. See supra note 536 and accompanying text. However strained that
argument might be, McClanahan was earning income from the provision of her services and
not from the ownership of land.
538
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 176. Similar provisions are found in the enabling acts of many
western states, as well as in state constitutions.
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It is true, of course, that exemptions from tax laws should, as a general
rule, be clearly expressed.539 But we have in the past construed language far
more ambiguous than this as providing a tax exemption for Indians . . . and
we see no reason to give this language an especially crabbed or restrictive
meaning.540

How Marshall took a statute that implicitly exempted land on the reservation and interpreted it as granting an exemption from an income tax is
a remarkable act of legerdemain.541 This non sequitur cannot be explained
away simply because other ambiguous language might have been generously
construed.542 There was simply no ambiguity in the Enabling Act in the first
539
The Enabling Act did not refer to any “exemption,” but presumably Marshall is treating
the land on the reservation as exempt. Technically, land would be “exempted” only from a tax
that it would otherwise be subject to. For example, no one would say that land in New Mexico
is “exempted” from an Arizona property tax because Arizona would have no jurisdiction in the
first place over land in New Mexico.
If the reservation land is immune from state taxation under the Indian Commerce Clause,
for example, or because of the pre- and extra-constitutional sovereignty doctrine, the reference
to “exemptions” would be irrelevant.
540
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 176.
541
Marshall might just as well have argued that the treaty reference to “property” includes
cash or other consideration, and thus covered McClanahan’s salary.
Professor Jensen argues that where doubt arises as to congressional intent, doubt should
favor the Tribes:

[I]n the taxation context, the application of the canons should mean that the imposition of federal or state taxes on persons or transactions within Indian country—taxes
that might harm a tribe’s economic position even if the taxes are nominally imposed
on nontribal parties—ought to be disfavored (and limitations on tribal taxing power
similarly ought to be disfavored). Because of its plenary power over Indian affairs,
Congress can impose, or permit states to impose, taxes that have unhappy consequences for tribes—and it can limit tribal taxing power—but, if Congress is going
to do any of those things, its intentions should be clear. If the intentions are not
clear—if, that is, there is legitimate doubt about what Congress intended—the canons point toward resolving that doubt in favor of the affected tribes.
Jensen, supra note 9, at 30.
That position, which would be strengthened by an appeal to the Indian Commerce Clause
rather than a canon, would have been a more satisfying way of dealing with McClanahan than
the tortured analysis by Marshall and would have better served the long-term interests of the
Indians.
542
Justice Marshall also relied on the Buck Act, 4 U.S.C. § 105 et seq. (2009). Section
106(a) grants to the states general authority to impose an income tax on residents of federal
areas, but section 109 provides that nothing in section 106 shall be deemed to authorize the
levy or collection of any tax on or from any Indian not otherwise taxed. He recognized that
this language did not make it clear whether the reference to “any Indian not otherwise taxed”
covered reservation Indians earning their income on the reservation, and held that the Buck
Act could not be read as an affirmative grant of immunity to reservation Indians. McClanahan,
411 U.S. at 176–77. Certainly the Buck Act could be read as merely preserving the status
quo with respect to state taxation of the Indians at the time the Act was enacted. Nonetheless,
Justice Marshall found that “Congress’s intent to maintain the tax-exempt status of reservation Indians is especially clear in light of the Buck Act.” Id. at 176. Ironically, Marshall found
clarity in the Buck Act’s ambiguity and ambiguity in the Navajo Treaty and Arizona Enabling
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place.543
c. Mischaracterizing the Sales Tax as an Income Tax
Justice Marshall apparently thought that the line between taxes on land and
those on income had already been blurred in Warren Trading: “Indeed, it is
somewhat surprising that the State adheres to this distinction in light of our
decision in Warren Trading wherein we invalidated an income tax which Arizona had attempted to impose within the Navajo Reservation.”544
The first problem with this statement was that Warren Trading involved a
sales tax and not a personal income tax, which was the type of tax imposed on
McClanahan. Indeed, it would have been very difficult to have argued that an
Arizona personal income tax on the owners of the Warren Trading Post was
inconsistent with the Indian Trader statutes covering the sale of goods, or that
a personal income tax could somehow “disturb and disarrange the statutory
plan Congress set up in order to protect Indians against prices deemed unfair
or unreasonable by the Indian Commissioner.”545 Justice Marshall’s confusion
probably arose because the Arizona sales tax in Warren Trading was levied
on the “gross proceeds of sales, or gross income.”546 To those not schooled in
state taxation, the reference to gross income might have suggested an income
tax.547
The second problem with this statement is that Warren Trading struck
down the Arizona sales tax on the basis of the Indian Trader statutes. Those
statutes had no application in McClanahan, which did not involve a vendor
selling property to the Indians.
Marshall rejected the difference between a tax on land and a tax on income
on jurisdictional grounds:
Act. One senses that Marshall was driven more by results than by logic in McClanahan. In
Warren Trading, the Court held that the Buck Act did not apply to Indian reservations. Warren
Trading, 380 U.S. 685, 692 n.18 (1965).
543
Commenting not specifically on McClanahan, Claiborne, supra note 11, notes generally
that the Court has stretched its interpretations of treaties and statutes involving taxation of
Indians:
The Court has stretched provisions of treaties and statutes to the breaking point to
find federal pre-emption of State intervention. Even with respect to State taxation of
Reservation Indians, it is very difficult to point to any provision of federal law that
does more than exempt tribal land. And, certainly, we can find nothing expressly
foreclosing State regulation or taxation of non-Indians on a Reservation, even when
their activities immediately affect the Indian community. I suspect that this statutory
pre-emption approach will yield nothing more. To press it any further would expose
the pretense too starkly.
Claiborne, supra note 11, at 594.
544
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 180–81 (emphasis added).
545
Warren Trading, 380 U.S. at 691.
546
Id. at 685. See also supra note 426 and accompanying text. Justice White made the same
error in the companion case of Mescalero. See infra note 626 and accompanying text.
547
After all, “gross income” is a term defined in section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code.
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However relevant the land–income distinction may be in other contexts,
it is plainly irrelevant when, as here, the tax is resisted because the State is
totally lacking in jurisdiction over both the people and the lands it seeks to
tax. In such a situation, the State has no more jurisdiction to reach income
generated on reservation lands than to tax the land itself.548

But the jurisdictional issue was controlled by the language of the treaty, which
arguably drew exactly the distinction Arizona suggested.
In Marshall’s defense, it might be observed that in 1868, when the treaty
was signed, the predominant state tax was the property tax, not the income
tax.549 The property tax, consequently, would be the logical focus of the Treaty
and the Enabling Act. Each of these enactments, moreover, could be read as
adopting a Worcester-sovereignty argument that prohibited any injection of
Arizona law onto the reservation.
d. Further Erosion of Worcester
When Marshall turned to Worcester, however, his discussion would prove
anathema to the Indians.550 Although his discussion was dicta because the
holding relied on the 1868 Treaty and the Arizona Enabling Act, it would
nonetheless take on great significance coming from one of the Indians’ strongest allies,551 writing for a unanimous Court.552
Justice Marshall referred to the “Indian sovereignty doctrine”553 of
Worcester as “undergo[ing] considerable evolution in response to changed
circumstances.”554 “[N]otions of Indian sovereignty have been adjusted to
take account of the State’s legitimate interests in regulating the affairs of nonIndians.”555
548
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 181. Speaking generally about Marshall’s statutory interpretation in McClanahan, Professor Laurence writes that “McClanahan forthrightly reached long to
find a tax immunity.” Laurence, Thurgood Marshall, supra note 470, at 84.
549
See Ely, supra note 310.
550
See, e.g., Justice Rehnquist’s opinions in Colville, discussed infra notes 740–915 and
accompanying text, Central Machinery, discussed infra notes 469–518 and accompanying text,
and Ramah, discussed infra notes 985−1057 and accompanying text.
551
This is not the first time that the Indian cause might have been undercut by their friends.
See Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 44–46.
552
It is also possible, of course, that Justice Marshall’s discussion of Worcester was the price
Marshall had to pay for unanimity.
553
Professor Clinton feels that Marshall left “entirely unclear” “which doctrine(s) [he]
thought were involved in the ‘the Indian sovereignty doctrine.’” Clinton, Dormant, supra note
22, at 1192. I think it is clear, however, that Marshall was referring to the pre- and extra-constitutional sovereignty doctrine. Nonetheless, Professor Clinton concludes that “[c]areful analysis
of the McClanahan opinion, however, demonstrates that the Indian sovereignty doctrine reference in McClanahan may have been the dormant Indian Commerce Clause.” Id. at 1193.
While the result in McClanahan, which struck down the personal income tax, is consistent
with the Indian Commerce Clause, assuming “commerce” existed, Marshall made it clear that
he was not relying on that clause. See infra notes 573–77 and accompanying text.
554
McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973).
555
Id.
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[T]he trend556 has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty
as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-emption557
. . . . The modern cases thus tend to avoid reliance on platonic notions of
Indian sovereignty558 and to look instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which define the limits of state power559 . . . . The Indian sovereignty
556
As usual, Professor Laurence cuts to the chase. “A ‘trend’? Perhaps, more accurately, Justice
Marshall is the ‘trend-setter.’” Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 23.
557
According to one commentator critical of this statement, “[t]he laws have not changed,
but the fashion or trend apparently has.” Minnis, supra note 7, at 299 n.59.
“The authority Marshall offers for this critical departure from inherent Indian sovereignty
is the companion Mescalero opinion. The relevant passage in Mescalero is the one that cites
McClanahan for its authority. It is a tight little closed loop.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at
103. See infra note 601.
558
With his trademark wit, Professor Jensen writes that this “was not intended to flatter
Plato.” Jensen, supra note 9, at 25 n.134. Jensen describes Marshall as disparagingly referring
to platonic notions of sovereignty, but nonetheless describes the case as a “great victory for
preemption.” Id. at 73 n.438.
Professor Barsh warns that if “there are no general ‘platonic’ notions of tribal sovereignty,
but merely the applicable treaties and statutes, the way is opened for distinguishing the status
of each of some two hundred tribes. The legal costs and uncertainties necessarily resulting from
the adoption of that rule necessarily chill reservation development.” Barsh, Omen, supra note
15, at 21. Perhaps this is why McClanahan has come to be broadly interpreted, and freed from
its roots in an Arizona Treaty and Enabling Act.
Faulting Justice Marshall’s “platonic” language is perhaps unfair when McClanahan herself conceded that Worcester’s “broad territorial notion of Indian tribal jurisdiction” had been
modified. Brief for Appellant, McClanahan, 411 U.S. 164 (No. 71-834), 1972 WL 136308,
at *10.
559
Marshall cited Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962), and the 1958 edition of Cohen’s treatise in support for the statement in the text. Kake would seem to be irrelevant as precedent. The 1958 edition was characterized as “propagandistic” by Professor Milner
Ball, and it provided a simple but incorrect test for the validity of state taxes on Indians:

[T]hey will be disallowed if they “substantially impede or burden the functioning of
the Federal Government.” No need to worry about tribal self-government. Perhaps
[the 1958 edition] was the inspiration for transforming the sovereignty of Indian
nations into a “platonic notion.” Perhaps, too, it inspired judicial termination of the
tribes. Williams, Mescalero, and McClanahan recycle the Bureau’s propaganda and
offer it as modern law.
Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 103. But Marshall also cited favorably the 1958 edition for
another proposition:
State laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation
except where Congress has expressly provided that State laws shall apply. It follows
that Indians and Indian property on an Indian reservation are not subject to State
taxation except by virtue of express authority conferred upon the State by act of
Congress.
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 170–71 (citing U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Federal Indian Law
845 (1958)). Interestingly, Marshall does not cite that edition using Cohen’s name but instead
cites it as “U.S. Dept. of the Interior.” If Marshall truly believed the quoted language, however,
the whole tenor of the opinion would have been different. The treaty and enabling act would
have been examined to see whether they granted taxing authority, not whether they prohibited
the tax.
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doctrine is relevant, then, not because it provides a definitive resolution of
the issues in this suit, but because it provides a backdrop560 against which
the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read. It must always
be remembered that the various Indian tribes were once independent and
sovereign nations, and that their claim to sovereignty long predates that of
our own Government. Indians today are American citizens.561 They have
the right to vote, to use state courts, and they receive some state services.562
560
Professor Jensen suggests that if “nothing else, the backdrop of sovereignty has historically
meant that state power is presumed not to apply to tribal members in Indian country.” Jensen,
supra note 9, at 74.
Professor Laurence views McClanahan as a clear statement that a different approach to
supremacy questions from what occurs outside Indian cases is appropriate and that the sovereignty of the tribe justifies that result. Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349,
at 239.
561
The Citizenship Act of 1924 provides that all “non-citizen Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States” are declared to be citizens of the United States. 43 Stat.
253. As citizens, Indians are entitled to vote in federal elections. Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d
833 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976). Prior to the Act, Indians could become
citizens only through naturalization, although some became citizens under treaties or specific
statutes. “Indians had to be made citizens so that the great experiment in coercive civilization could continue without possible legal impediments. Citizenship was conferred to benefit
the government, not the tribes.” Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, The
Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty 96 (1980), cited in Ball, Constitution, supra
note 7, at 11 n.39. The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868, provided that “all persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
The Indians were not covered by the amendment because they were viewed as owing their
allegiance to their tribes and not to the United States. Tiger v. W. Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286
(1911); Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884). See Walter Berns, Taking the Constitution
Seriously 35–36 (1987).
Some Indians do not accept that they can be made citizens of the United States. Ball,
Constitution, supra note 7, at 11. Some Indians, such as the traditional Hopi and Iroquois,
reject U.S. citizenship in favor of their own Indian citizenship under tribal sovereignty. Facts
About Native Americans, Homahota Consulting, http://www.homahotaconsulting.com/
faqs.html. The Iroquois issue their own passports. When the United Kingdom refused to recognize these passports, the Iroquois national lacrosse team could not play in the 2010 world
championship. Iroquois Nationals Lacrosse, http://iroquoisnationals.org/.
562
During oral argument at the Arizona Court of Appeals, counsel for McClanahan conceded that Arizona spent money on education and welfare within the Navajo reservation.
See Brief for Appellee, McClanahan, 411 U.S. 164 (No. 71-834), 1972 WL 136309, at *34.
Counsel also acknowledged that reservation Indians had the right to vote in Arizona, the
right to serve on a jury, and a “practically guaranteed representation in the Arizona House of
Representatives.” Id. at *36. The State’s brief asked whether the Indians should “receive all the
benefits of state citizenship, but none of the burdens of such citizenship . . . ?” Id. at *37–38.
The reality is more complicated, however, than that suggested by the State’s brief. Congress
has not authorized taxation of income earned by an Indian working on a reservation but has
authorized state taxation of reservation activities in certain other, albeit limited, circumstances.
See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 398, 398c (2010) (state can tax production of Indian-owned reservation
minerals but the tax cannot become a lien against the property). The large amount of federal
expenditures on the reservation has multiplier effects that inure to the benefit of a state; similarly, with respect to tribal expenditures. McClanahan’s brief asserted that 80% of the State’s
share of categorical aid was paid by the federal government and that general assistance was fur-
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But it is nonetheless still true, as it was in the last century, that “the relation
of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States . . . [is] an
anomalous one and of a complex character . . . . They were, and always have
been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved
their tribal relations; not as States, not as nations, not as possessed of the full
attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the
laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided.”563

This language in McClanahan, which further narrowed Worcester, “was
viewed by a good many as signaling the demise of tribal sovereignty, now a
‘platonic notion’ and a ‘backdrop.’ . . . McClanahan seemed to suggest that in
the future tribal powers would be defined in the first instance by Congress,
not by original sovereignty.”564 “[T]he decision announced that the doctrine
of inherent sovereignty would henceforth serve more as an ideal than as a rule
of law.”565
Because McClanahan involved an Indian living and working on the reservation, why did Worcester not provide a “definitive resolution”? Chief Justice
John Marshall, who declared that the “power to tax is the power to destroy,”566
would probably have struck down a Georgia tax on the income of Worcester
and Butler; a tax on the income of a Cherokee would have been an a fortiori
nished by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and by the Navajos. Also, the BIA provided most
of the support for its boarding schools and for vocational education. The majority of support
for public schools on the reservation came from federal sources; other support came from local
taxation of real property interests located on the reservation. All roads were federally financed,
as was the development of water supplies and sanitation systems. The Tribe maintained its own
police force. In short, most government services on the reservation were provided by either the
federal government or the Tribe. Reply Brief for Appellant, McClanahan, 411 U.S. 164 (No.
71-834), 1972 WL 136313, at *13–14.
563
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172–73 (emphasis added). More recently, Justice Thomas
described federal Indian policy as “schizophrenic.” United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219
(2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Professor Frickey points out the irony in the “involuntary displacement of indigenous
peoples from their lands and their political subjugation by a self-proclaimed superior
sovereignty . . . in a country that began by declaring itself independent of colonial status and
that soon adopted a Constitution that has served as a model for restraining the abuse of public
power.” Frickey, Domesticating, supra note 15, at 33.
564
Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 60. On a more positive and sanguine note, Professor Getches
describes McClanahan as “perhaps the definitive modern-era case,” Getches, Conquering, supra
note 14, at 1590, and views it as supporting a “movement toward revitalization of tribal governments,” id. at 1593.
In its amicus brief, the United States argued that “Congress has consistently acted on the
assumption that in the absence of its express authorization the States have no power to regulate
or tax Indians on a reservation.” Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, McClanahan,
supra note 524, at *4.
565
Gould, Consent, supra note 6, at 825.
566
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819) (“That the power to tax
involves the power to destroy . . . .”). But see Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277
U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The power to tax is not the power to destroy
while this Court sits.”) (overruled in part).
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case. And although Worcester dealt with criminal jurisdiction, Justice Thurgood Marshall recognized that “the rationale of the case plainly extended to
state taxation within the reservation.”567
Justice Thurgood Marshall did not try to distinguish the tax cases from
the nontax cases that he cited as illustrating a narrowing of the Worcester
doctrine. The tax cases he cited involved: Indians who left the reservation,
becoming assimilated into the general community;568 Indians conducting
activities off-reservation;569 and non-Indians conducting activities on Indian
reservations.570 None supported his assertion that the sovereignty doctrine
did not provide “a definitive resolution of the issues [in McClanahan],”571 at
least for tax issues, and none came close to involving a state tax on income
earned exclusively on the reservation by an Indian residing there. But even the
nontax cases Marshall cited did not support his point.572
e. Inapplicability of the Indian Commerce Clause
Justice Marshall also failed to emphasize the Indian Commerce Clause holding in Worcester.573 Marshall’s emphasis on Worcester’s extra-constitutional
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 169.
Id. at 171 (citing Okla. Tax Comm’n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598 (1943)).
569
Id. at 172 (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973), for the proposition that the “trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state
jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-emption.”).
570
Id. at 168 (citing Utah & N. R.R. Co., 116 U.S. 28 (1885), discussed supra notes 323–32
and accompanying text, and Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1878), discussed supra notes
354–75 and accompanying text).
571
Id. at 172.
572
See Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 103.
573
Nonetheless, Professor Laurence states, with no page citation to the opinion, that Marshall
identified the Indian Commerce Clause as one of the “legal theories available to account for
the barrier that exists to the exercise of state jurisdiction on the reservation.” Robert Laurence,
Thurgood Marshall’s Indian Law Opinions, 27 Howard L. J. 3, 22 (1984).
McClanahan made an Indian Commerce Clause argument, see Reply Brief for Appellant,
McClanahan, supra note 562, at *9–10, which apparently had no more of an impact on Marshall
than did the Solicitor General’s argument in Central Machinery. See supra notes 517–18 and
accompanying text. One potential obstacle in applying the Indian Commerce Clause to strike
down the Arizona tax was that McClanahan lived and worked on the reservation and earned
all her income there, so that “commerce with the Indian tribes,” might not have existed, at least
under a narrow interpretation of what constitutes “commerce.” That problem was avoided by
relying on the Treaty as prohibiting the Arizona tax.
For Indian Commerce Clause purposes, it should be irrelevant that the case involved an
individual and not a tribe. True, the Indian Commerce Clause refers to “Tribes” and not
“Indians.” An earlier draft of this provision did refer to “Indians” but was later changed to
“Tribes.” See supra notes 169–71 and accompanying text. No explanation was given for the
substitution and the Court has never relied on this history to distinguish “Indians” from
“Tribes.” To the contrary, the Court seems to have rejected the difference in terminology as
having any significance. See supra note 171.
As in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), discussed supra notes 421–22 and accompanying text, the Indian Commerce Clause is referred to in McClanahan only once in an irrelevant
footnote, and not by name but rather by citation, for the proposition that the “source of federal
567
568
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sovereignty discussion is understandable because it dominates that opinion,
but if he were going to gratuitously entertain erosions of that doctrine, why
not at least undo some of that damage by emphasizing the importance of the
Indian Commerce Clause?
The answer may lie in a footnote, in which Justice Marshall explained that
“in almost all cases federal treaties and statutes define the boundaries of federal and state jurisdiction.”574 Although he made that statement to explain
why it is unnecessary to reach the more abstract “platonic” question of Indian
sovereignty, it would also explain why the Indian Commerce Clause had no
major role to play in his thinking.575
Put differently, the Indian Commerce Clause would have its greatest role
to play if no federal treaties or statutes applied, for then the question would
be starkly presented whether a state statute was excluded by the Clause.576
authority over Indian matters . . . is now generally recognized [to derive] from federal responsibility for regulating commerce with Indian tribes and for treaty making.” McClanahan, 411
U.S. at 172 n.7 (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). That footnote in turn referred to a footnote in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. at 219 n.4, which cited the Indian Commerce Clause and
Kagama. The Williams footnote cited Kagama for the proposition that the federal government’s
power is also derived “from the necessity of giving uniform protection to a dependent people.”
Williams, 358 U.S. at 217 n.4 (citing United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886)).
A short time later in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982), see infra text
accompanying notes 1058–1130, Justice Marshall replaced the reference to “treaty making”
in the McClanahan footnote: “when Congress acts with respect to the Indian tribes, it generally does so pursuant to its authority under the Indian Commerce Clause, or by virtue of its
superior position over the tribes.” 455 U.S. at 155 n.21 (emphasis added). He does not identify
the source of Congress’s “superior position,” but presumably it would not involve any constitutional provision and seems to refer to Kagama. Presumably Marshall dropped the reference to
treaty making because it no longer occurs, and hadn’t occurred since 1871, see supra note 304
and accompanying text. He could not identify the Indian Commerce Clause as the “exclusive”
source of federal authority without overruling Kagama.
Professor Wilkinson thinks that Marshall’s McClanahan footnote rejected the proposition
that the Indian Commerce Clause precludes all state authority on the reservation. Wilkinson,
supra note 7, at 60 n.34. That seems to be a safe conclusion because nothing in Marshall’s
opinion suggests that the Indian Commerce Clause precludes any state authority—let alone
all state authority.
Professor Milner Ball claims that the “broadest modern reading of the Commerce Clause
does not support congressional power to take away all aspects of Indian national sovereignty.”
Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 50.
Professor Clinton views the McClanahan footnote as “nominally repudiat[ing] the extraconstitutional source of power it created in the notion of trusteeship by announcing that all
federal power in Indian affairs is derived from the Indian Commerce Clause and the power to
make treaties.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1165 n.324. He does not address the new
phrasing in Merrion.
574
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172 n.8. Professor Laurence states that the footnote’s assertion
“is just not true.” Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 249.
575
Professor Laurence, however, included McClanahan as a case dealing with the Dormant
Commerce Clause. Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 247.
576
Under those circumstances, the Williams v. Lee doctrine would also apply because there
would be no congressional acts on point. Hence, the Court would need to decide if the state
action infringed on the Indians’ right to self-government.
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Justice Marshall made passing reference to this possibility, but he did so in
the context of his sovereignty argument and not in the context of the Indian
Commerce Clause. If no treaty or legislation applied, the issue of “residual
Indian sovereignty” would have to be reached, but he dismissed this situation
as “something of a moot question . . . of little more than theoretical importance, however, since in almost all cases federal treaties and statutes define the
boundaries of federal and state jurisdiction.”577 That sentence would read the
same if “the Indian Commerce Clause” (or Williams v. Lee) were substituted
for “residual Indian sovereignty.”
Given Marshall’s generous application of the pro-Indian canon of construction, which would interpret many statutes as covering taxes notwithstanding
that their language did not refer to them, as was true in McClanahan, it is
easy to appreciate his view that “residual sovereignty” (or Williams v. Lee or
the Indian Commerce Clause) would have no role to play.578 But certainly
the entire waterfront of taxation could hardly be expected to be covered by
treaties and statutes, no matter how generously interpreted.
Without examining all of the existing treaties and statutes and the panoply
of state taxes that could be imposed on the myriad ways of earning income
or doing business on a reservation, Justice Marshall’s use of the term “moot”
seems unwarranted at best and certainly unduly optimistic. If no treaty or
statute applied (or even existed), the implications of the Indian Commerce
Clause issue would have to be confronted.
f. Inapplicability of Williams v. Lee
Arizona’s principal argument was that its personal income tax did not violate
the Williams v. Lee doctrine because it was taxing individual Indians and not
the Tribe. Consequently, the tax could not infringe on Indian rights of selfgovernment.579 Marshall did not challenge the premise that Arizona had the
right to tax in the first place. Instead, he suggested that the tax might have an
577
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172 n.8. To the extent this statement is true, it greatly narrows
the Williams v. Lee doctrine. The reality is that in McClanahan there was no explicit federal
statute either authorizing the state income tax at issue or exempting the Indians from such a
tax.

Significantly, Justice Marshall wrote no opinions in which this inquiry beyond
supremacy needed to be addressed. This is, in part, of course, because he applies
supremacy analysis so vigorously on behalf of the tribes. It may also be because he
thinks there is little to such inquiry. [The footnote] suggests so, rather explicitly.
Laurence, Thurgood Marshall, supra note 470, at 81.
578
Professor Laurence, writing in 1984, concluded that when “a state seeks to exercise jurisdiction on the reservation, Justice Marshall’s eggs are in the supremacy clause basket. A third
of his opinions deal with that situation. All prohibit the activity; all are decided on preemption
grounds; all suggest the supremacy clause will always answer the question.” Laurence, Thurgood
Marshall, supra note 470, at 80. Professor Laurence recognizes that the “Court as a whole is not
as consistent as Justice Marshall.” Id. (citing Colville and Moe).
579
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 179.
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impact on tribal self-determination.580 But instead of expanding on this point
and breathing some life into the infringement test,581 Justice Marshall viewed
the Williams v. Lee infringement test as inapplicable because that doctrine
“dealt principally with situations involving non-Indians.”582 In these situations,
both the tribe and the State could fairly claim an interest in asserting their
respective jurisdictions. The Williams test was designed to resolve this conflict by providing that the State could protect its interest up to the point
where tribal self-government would be affected. The problem posed by this
case is completely different. Since [McClanahan] is an Indian and since her
income is derived wholly from reservation sources, her activity is totally
within the sphere which the relevant treaty and statutes leave for the Federal
Government and for the Indians themselves.583

Presumably, Marshall did not mean that Williams v. Lee was inapplicable
when only Indians are involved, but rather that under the facts of the case the
tax conflicted with the 1868 Treaty and the Enabling Act.584 Williams v. Lee
applies only “absent governing Acts of Congress,”585 and such acts existed in
the form of the Treaty and the Enabling Act. Considering Justice Marshall’s
view that federal statutes and treaties will in almost all cases preempt state

580
“In fact, we are far from convinced that when a State imposes taxes upon reservation
members without their consent, its action can be reconciled with tribal self-determination.”
Id. at 179.
581
Dean Getches notes that “Arizona and other states had been perverting the Court’s cryptic statement in [Williams v. Lee] . . . to presume that states could exercise jurisdiction on the
reservation absent evidence of a direct clash with tribal government.” Getches, Conquering,
supra note 14, at 1590. This “perversion,” however, is exactly what Justice Black’s formulation
in Williams invited.
582
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 164. Professor Jensen criticizes this statement as inaccurate and
counterintuitive. Jensen, supra note 9, at 62 n.365. The plaintiff in Williams v. Lee was a nonIndian, but there is no reason to think that doctrine would be inapplicable if only Indians were
involved. The opinion does not discuss the identity of McClanahan’s employer. Marshall must
have assumed the employer was an Indian. McClanahan’s employer was a bank, presumably a
legal entity. See supra note 522.
The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the test was not “whether the income tax infringes
on [McClanahan’s] rights as an individual . . . but whether such a tax infringes on the rights of
the [tribe] to be self-governing.” McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 164.
583
Id. at 179–80.
584
Professor Clinton suggests that Marshall might have confused the discredited intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine with the dormant Indian Commerce Clause. Clinton,
Dormant, supra note 22, at 1194, but there is no evidence of that.
585
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 180 n.21.

Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4

01-Pomp.indd 1043

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=244384612/23/2010

11:03:41 AM

1044

SECTION OF TAXATION

taxes,586 there would seem to be little room left for applying the Williams v.
Lee doctrine.587
g. An Alternative Approach
What is puzzling is that Marshall could have written the same opinion without undercutting Worcester. Indeed, he essentially viewed the case as involving
a “narrow issue,”588 controlled by the Treaty and Enabling Act: “We hold that
by imposing the tax in question on this appellant, the State has interfered
with matters which the relevant treaty and statutes leave to the exclusive province of the Federal Government and the Indians themselves.”589 To be sure,
his reading of the Treaty and Enabling Act was unconvincing and he appealed
to Worcester for assistance, but reducing Worcester to a “backdrop” did not
add weight to his already strained interpretation. In short, the Indians would
come to pay a high price for a holding that could have been reached with far
less damage.
The structure of the opinion is inconsistent with Marshall’s professed
belief that state laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on reservations except where Congress has expressly provided otherwise.590 If he really
believed that, of course, he would have examined the Treaty and Enabling
Act to see if Congress expressly provided for the Arizona income tax rather
than examining them to see if they exempted the Indians. His search for an
exemption in the Treaty and Enabling Act is more consistent with his description of the case as reconciling the “plenary power of the States over residents
within their borders with the semi-autonomous status of Indians living on
tribal reservations.”591
Like Williams v. Lee, there is a schizophrenic quality to the opinion. Like
Williams v. Lee, the opinion could have been written more narrowly, and with
less damage to the long-term interests of the Indians. Both were unanimous
opinions and perhaps the lack of consistency in each reflected the need to
bring along otherwise dissenting Justices.

Id. at 176–78.
In dicta, Marshall responded to Arizona’s argument that the Williams v. Lee doctrine
was inapplicable because the state was taxing an Indian and not a tribe or land on the reservation. According to the State, Williams v. Lee applies only to tribes. Rejecting this distinction,
Marshall emphasized that tribes are composed of individual Indians, so that the “question has
always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their
own laws and be ruled by them.” Id. at 181 (emphasis added) (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S.
217, 220 (1959)). “In this case, appellant’s rights as a reservation Indian were violated when
the state collected a tax from her which it had no jurisdiction to impose.” Id.
588
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 168.
589
Id. at 165.
590
Id. at 171. His treatment of Arizona’s refusal to assume jurisdiction under Public Law 280
as evidence of it lacking taxing jurisdiction is consistent with this view. Id. at 177–78.
591
Id. at 165 (emphasis added); see also supra notes 580–81 and accompanying text.
586
587
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2. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones
Justice Marshall’s emphasis on McClanahan’s living and working on the reservation592 explains the difference in result between McClanahan and its companion case, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones.593 The latter dealt with the Sierra
Blanca Ski Enterprises, owned and operated by the Mescalero Tribe on land
adjacent to its reservation in New Mexico and leased from the United States

592
A tribal member living on the reservation but earning his or her income off-reservation is
probably subject to a state income tax under Mescalero. See infra notes 648–52 and accompanying text. Although Jensen states that “it is not clear whether an enrolled member of a tribe who
earns income within a reservation but lives outside it may have his income taxed by the state,”
Jensen, supra note 9, at 66, Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995),
discussed infra notes 1359–72, upheld a state tax under those circumstances.
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993), the Court applied
McClanahan to Indians who lived in “Indian country,” which includes formal and informal
reservations, dependent Indian communities, and Indian allotments, whether restricted or
held in trust by the United States. Id. at 123; see also Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band
Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 511 (1991) (“[T]he test for determining whether
land is Indian country does not turn upon whether that land is denominated ‘trust land’ or
‘reservation.’ Rather, we ask whether the area has been ‘validly set apart for the use of the
Indians as such, under the superintendence of the Government.’”).
For federal criminal jurisdiction, Congress has defined Indian country statutorily:

[It encompasses](a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any
patent, and including rights-of-way running through the reservation; (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the
original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without
the limits of a state; and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not
been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2010).
The treatment of rights-of-way running through the reservation as Indian country would
seem inconsistent with Utah & Northern where the right-of-way was treated as “withdrawn”
from the reservation. See supra notes 323–32 and accompanying text. Indian country is not
dependent on the existence of a tribe. The definition “generally applies to questions of civil
jurisdiction.” Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998). (A
footnote in DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975), had previously stated that section 1151 “generally applies as well to questions of civil jurisdiction.”) In
Venetie, the Court emphasized that the three categories set forth in section 1151 concern land
that is “validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such, under the superintendence of the
Government.” 522 U.S. at 529. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 653 n.5 (2001),
warned that the definition in section 1151 does not address a tribe’s sovereignty over nonmembers on non-Indian fee land. For stylistic convenience, I use the term “reservation” throughout
this Article rather than the broader and more accurate term, “Indian country.”
Apparently the first use of the term “Indian country” was the Royal Proclamation of 1763,
discussed supra note 60 and accompanying text. See Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 89.
593
411 U.S. 145 (1973). “When the Mescalero analysis is placed alongside McClanahan,
the conclusion must be that federal regulation is construed broadly and state law is presumed
invalid with respect to on-reservation activity, while the opposite is true of off-reservation
activity.” Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 239.
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Forest Service.594 The case involved the New Mexico gross receipts tax and
use tax. Despite the Court’s references to the gross receipts tax at places in the
opinion as an income tax,595 that tax is equivalent to a sales tax.596 The Court
allowed New Mexico to tax the gross receipts generated by sales of tangible
personal property and services at the resort (ski rentals, lift tickets, food, or
beverages) but barred the use tax on tangible personal property purchased
outside of New Mexico and brought into the State to construct two ski lifts.
Justice White wrote for a six-person majority,597 breaking the unanimity that
had accompanied Williams, Warren Trading, and McClanahan.
a. Revisiting McClanahan
In the court below, the Mescalero Tribe argued that its 1883 treaty with
the United States vested exclusive jurisdiction “over the tribe” in the federal government,598 basing this argument in part on the Indian Commerce
Clause.599 Justice White, however, rejected
the broad assertion that the Federal Government has exclusive jurisdiction over the Tribe for all purposes and that the State is therefore prohibited from enforcing its revenue laws against any tribal enterprise “whether
the enterprise is located on or off tribal land.” Generalizations on this
subject have become particularly treacherous. The conceptual clarity600
of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall’s view in Worcester has given way to more
594
The resort was developed under the auspices of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
(IRA), using funds lent by the federal government. Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 146.
595
Id. at 157, 160, 162–63.
596
Hellerstein, McIntyre & Pomp, supra note 426, at 90–92.
597
Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 146, 159. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Marshall, Blackmun,
Powell, and Rehnquist joined Justice White. Justice Douglas dissented in part joined by Justices
Brennan and Stewart.
598
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 489 P.2d 666, 668 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971).
599
In its brief before the Supreme Court, the Tribe argued that New Mexico had no authority to tax the Tribe because the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over it. The Tribe
based this argument in part on the Indian Commerce Clause. Brief of the Mescalero Apache
Tribe, Mescalero, 411 U.S. 145 (No. 71-738), 1971 WL 134307, at *14–16 [hereinafter Brief
of the Mescalero Apache Tribe, Mescalero]. Arguing by analogy to Congress’s preemption of
state control of liquor sales to Indians regardless of whether the sale occurred off-reservation,
the Tribe asserted that the power to regulate commerce with the tribes extends to the entire
nation and not just Indian country. Id. at *15. “Whether the enterprise is located on or off
tribal land is not the criteria to determine if the state may tax the Tribe. The relevant factors
are whether the enterprise is under federal control and regulation and is meeting the goals of
federal Indian policy.” Id. at *16.
600
Professor Clinton writes:

If this dicta were limited to cases involving Indian commerce occurring outside of
Indian country, of the type involved in Mescalero Apache Tribe, the suggestion of a
limit on or erosion of “the conceptual clarity” of Worcester, perhaps, may have been
logically consistent with earlier cases. The extension of the Justice White’s comments,
however, to the assumption of the existence of state authority over Indian commerce
occurring on reservations is very peculiar in light of the cases that he cites.
Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1198.
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individualized treatment of particular treaties and specific federal statutes,
including statehood enabling legislation, as they, taken together, affect
the respective rights of States, Indians, and the Federal Government. See
McClanahan601 . . . The upshot has been the repeated statements of this
Court to the effect that, even on reservations, state laws may be applied
unless such application would interfere with reservation self-government
or would impair a right granted or reserved by federal law602 [Williams v.
Lee].603 Even so, in the special area of state taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it, there has been no satisfactory
authority for taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian income from activities
carried on within the boundaries of the reservation, and McClanahan lays to
rest any doubt in this respect by holding that such taxation is not permissible absent congressional consent.604
601
Worcester involved both treaties and statutes. See supra notes 288–96 and accompanying
text. Contrary to White’s assertion, Chief Justice Marshall himself engaged in an “individualized treatment of particular treaties and specific federal statutes,” although the analysis in that
part of Worcester was overshadowed by the tone and number of pages spent on the pre- and
extra-constitutional sovereignty issue. See supra notes 268–69 and accompanying text.
White’s citation of McClanahan for the proposition that the “conceptual clarity of Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall’s view in Worcester has given way to more individualized treatment of
particular treaties and specific federal statutes” illustrates the damage done by Justice Thurgood
Marshall’s unwarranted concession in McClanahan.
Justice White’s citation of McClanahan for the proposition that Worcester had been eroded,
Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 148 (citing McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172
(1973)), was mirrored in McClanahan by Justice Marshall’s citation of Mescalero in support
of the same proposition: “Finally, the trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian
sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-emption [citing
Mescalero],” McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172 (citing Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 148), a quite remarkable example of circular citations. Accord Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 103. See supra note
557.
602
This statement is criticized by Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1198–99.
603
Justice White cited Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962), in addition to
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). Kake undercut Worcester by stating that “a reservation
was in many cases a part of the surrounding State or Territory, and subject to its jurisdiction
except as forbidden by federal law.” Kake, 369 U.S. at 72. Kake has been strongly criticized. See
Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 102 (citing Monroe E. Price & Robert N. Clinton, Law
and the American Indian 439 (2d ed. 1983)). In Kake, no reservation even existed, making it irrelevant as precedent for White’s statement. Professor Milner Ball feels that Mescalero
“constitutes a major revision of Worcester and the Kansas Indians,” id., but I think Williams v.
Lee deserves the blame as well.
In its brief, the Tribe argued that the “action of the state interferes with the tribe’s right
to self-government. The tribe is seeking stability through economic development of its land
resources on and near the reservation. Such development means continuity of tribal integrity and customs while assuring the tribal sovereignty.” Brief of the Mescalero Apache Tribe,
Mescalero, supra note 599, at *12. The brief asserted that Williams v. Lee “not only holds that
the state law may not be applied where it interferes with a tribe’s right to self-government, but
also lays down a very narrow area in which tribal relationships were considered not to be jeopardized by action.” Id. at *12–13. The latter point is an overly generous reading of the case.
604
Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 147–48 (emphasis added). With respect to taxation of activities
on a reservation, Justice White might have better served, not by citing McClanahan, a case the
Court described as involving a “narrow question,” 411 U.S. at 168, but rather by resurrect-
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White cited only “McClanahan” with no page reference for his dictum that
“in the special area of state taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction or other
federal statutes permitting it, there has been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried on within
the boundaries of the reservation . . . .”605
The problem with relying on McClanahan as support for this broad proposition is the emphasis of that case on the 1868 Treaty with the Navajos and on
the Arizona Enabling Act, and the Court’s statement that it was dealing with
a “narrow question.”606 If McClanahan actually held that such taxation is not
permissible absent congressional consent, there would have been no need to
have analyzed the treaty and Enabling Act to determine if they prohibited the
tax. Instead, the focus would have been on whether they permitted taxation
that was otherwise prohibited. Worcester would have been better precedent
for Justice White’s broad proposition, except that Marshall had gratuitously
eviscerated it in McClanahan.
Presumably, Justice White’s citation to McClanahan, without a specific
page reference, was to that case’s discussion of the sovereignty doctrine “with
its concomitant jurisdictional limit on the reach of state law.”607 That doctrine, however, was ultimately denigrated to the status of a “backdrop,”608 a
thumb on the scale of justice. The Indian Commerce Clause might have been
better support; Justice Marshall, however, had not developed that theme in
the companion case of McClanahan.
Apart from the lack of clarity about the basis for Justice White’s assertion, he also does not explain why the immunity from taxation is limited to
a tax on land and a tax on income. What about severance taxes, sales taxes,
fuel taxes, franchise taxes, hotel occupancy taxes, and the like? If either the
pre- and extra-constitutional sovereignty doctrine of Worcester or the Indian
Commerce Clause is the underpinning for his pronouncement, no distinction should be made by type of tax. In addition, for a tribe seeking to encourage non-Indian investment, Justice White’s tax-free zone is of little value.
Investors want the assurance of knowing their income, as well as that of their
Indian investors, will be free of state taxation, an assurance that could be
ing Worcester and re-emphasizing The New York Indians, The Kansas Indians, and the Indian
Commerce Clause. See also California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202,
215 n.17 (1987) (“We have repeatedly addressed the issue of state taxation of tribes and tribal
members and the state, federal, and tribal interests which it implicates. We have recognized
that the federal tradition of Indian immunity from state taxation is very strong and that the
state interest in taxation is correspondingly weak. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to rebalance
these interests in every case.”).
605
Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 148 (emphasis added).
606
McClanahan. 411 U.S. at 168. The McClanahan Court held “that by imposing the tax in
question on this appellant, the State has interfered with matters which the relevant treaty and
statutes leave to the exclusive province of the Federal Government and the Indians themselves.”
Id. at 165.
607
Id. at 171.
608
Id. at 172.
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provided by an invigorated Indian Commerce Clause but not by White’s
framework.
Justice White does not explain why state taxation is a “special area.” “Special” because of a lack of state services on the reservation? “Special” in the
sense of not being controlled by any precedent? “Special” because taxation is
an inherent aspect of sovereignty? “Special” in that tax revenue is the lifeblood
and key to a tribe’s independence and weaning itself from the federal trough?
“Special” because of the “encompassing” federal statutes and treaties?609 “Special” because of Worcester or the pre- and extra-constitutional sovereignty of
the Indians? “Special” because of McCulloch v. Maryland?610
b. Inapplicability of McClanahan to Off-Reservation Activities
Mescalero involved off-reservation activities. Unlike on-reservation activities,
“[a]bsent express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held subject to nondiscriminatory state
law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State.”611 None of the cases
Justice White cited for this principle,612 however, dealt with taxes, but he
saw no reason to treat taxes differently: “That principle is as relevant to a
State’s tax laws as it is to state criminal laws,”613 an odd assertion given that he
had earlier referred to the “special area of taxation.” Apparently, that “specialness” was limited to on-reservation activities, without any explanation about
why taxes are not “special” when off-reservation activities are involved. White
never considered whether the Indian Commerce Clause might have a special
role to play in the case of taxation.614
c. The New Mexico Enabling Act
Justice White cited the New Mexico Enabling Act as support for the difference in taxation of on- and off-reservation activities. The Enabling Act
provided that “nothing herein . . . shall preclude the said State from taxing,
See Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 249.
See supra notes 228, 328, 566; infra note 1154.
611
Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 148–49.
612
See id. at 149 (citing Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968);
Organized Vill. of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75–76 (1962); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S.
681, 683 (1942); Shaw v. Gibson–Zahniser Oil Corp., 276 U.S. 575 (1928); Ward v. Race
Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896)).
613
Id.
614
None of the cases he cited, see Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 148–49, discussed the Indian
Commerce Clause:
609
610

Why is the result different when the sovereign tribe leaves the reservation? Mescalero
is not as clear as McClanahan on this point. Part of the reason is stare decisis, but
most of the Court’s discussion is of the intergovernmental-immunity doctrine, a nonIndian concept in current disfavor. In short, it appears that off-the-reservation Indian
governments are treated like other governments.
Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 239–40.
I would put it a tad differently: off the reservation Indians are treated like non-Indians.
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as other lands and other property are taxed, any lands and other property outside of an Indian reservation owned or held by any Indian615 . . . [and] shall
be exempt . . . to such extent as Congress has prescribed . . . .”616 Although
the Enabling Act referred to only taxes on land or other property, such as a
property tax, which was the dominant state tax at that time,617 the Court
asserted with no discussion or explanation that “[i]t is thus clear that . . .
New Mexico retained the right to tax, unless Congress forbade it, all Indian
land and Indian activities located or occurring”618 off reservation. The “it is
thus clear” was anything but clear: with no discussion or support, the Court
simply expanded the Treaty’s reference to “lands and other property” to all
“activities,” which included the activities at the ski enterprise.
This broad reading of the Enabling Act’s limited reference to the taxation of
land and property would seem inconsistent with the favorable Indian canon
of construction applied in McClanahan.619 That is, even if Justice White
found the Enabling Act’s reference to taxing land or other property ambiguous enough to include the New Mexico gross receipts tax—a tax levied on the
sale of property rather than on the ownership of property—that ambiguity
should have been resolved in favor of the Tribe pursuant to the canon of construction laid down in McClanahan (with its roots in Worcester).

615
The Court ignored arguments made by the Tribe and its amicus that the reference to
“Indians” does not encompass “Indian tribes.” See, e.g., Brief of Montana Inter-Tribal Policy
Board as Amicus, Mescalero, 411 U.S. 145 (No. 71-738), 1972 WL 136293, at *12. This
argument was not frivolous because other parts of the Enabling Act referred to Indian tribes,
suggesting that the reference to Indians rather than Indian tribes was intentional and not
inadvertent. In other contexts the distinction would be irrelevant, including under the Indian
Commerce Clause.
616
Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 149. The New Mexico Constitution contains an identical provision. N.M. Const. art. XXI, § 2.
617
See Ely, supra note 310.
618
Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 149–50 (emphasis added).
619
Whether the Indian canons of construction have any ongoing vitality is problematic.

Moreover, the canon that assumes Congress intends its statutes to benefit the tribes is
offset by the canon that warns us against interpreting federal statutes as providing tax
exemptions unless those exemptions are clearly expressed. Nor can one say that the
pro-Indian canon is inevitably stronger—particularly where the interpretation of a
congressional statute rather than an Indian treaty is at issue. This Court’s earlier cases
are too individualized, involving too many different kinds of legal circumstances, to
warrant any such assessment about the two canons’ relative strength
Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 95 (2001). See also Erik M. Jensen, Chickasaw
Nation: Interpreting a Broken Statute, 97 Tax Notes 1195 (Dec. 2, 2002); United States v.
Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 47–50 (1985); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472
U.S. 237, 255–57 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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d. Section 465 of the IRA
Equally surprising was the Court’s interpretation of section 465 of the Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA)620:
[A]ny lands or rights acquired pursuant to any provision of the Act shall
be taken in the name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or

620
The IRA, also known as the Wheeler Act, drafted by Felix Cohen and John Collier
(then Commissioner of Indian Affairs), supra notes 11 and 29, was a response to the Meriam
Report, which documented the failures of the allotment policies and the horrible living conditions of the Indians. The report was also highly critical of the federal bureaucrats in charge of
Indian policy and administration. The IRA attempted to promote tribal independence and
cultural pride by: providing for tribal constitutions; encouraging tribal enterprises through
federal loans; providing for the acquisition of land or rights in land for the use of tribes; and
exempting such lands from state taxation. The IRA rejected the prior allotment policy and
attempted to turn the governance of Indian country back to the tribes. “The reforms of the
[IRA] and related policies allowed the beginnings of a revival of tribalism. Tribal councils and
courts reorganized or began operating formally for the first time.” Wilkinson, supra note 7,
at 21. For background on the IRA, see Bradley B. Furber, Two Promises, Two Propositions: The
Wheeler–Howard Act as a Reconciliation of the Indian Law Civil War, 14 Seattle U. L. Rev.
211 (1991).
Dean Washburn notes that although Felix Cohen is perhaps best known for his Handbook
of Federal Indian Law, see supra note 11, “his most stubborn legacy was his work in helping
draft the IRA constitutions that continue to govern many tribes today. It is because of these
constitutions that Cohen remains a highly controversial figure in federal Indian law. For while
the Handbook has been revised, many tribal constitutions have been stubbornly resistant to
change.” Kevin K. Washburn, Book Review, Felix Cohen, Anti-Semitism and American Indian
Law, 33 Am. Indian L. Rev. 583, 592 (2009). For a discussion of tribal governments and
tribal constitutions, see Canby, supra note 3, at 65–75. Without even mentioning Cohen’s
role, Professor Williams describes the IRA as permitting

tribes to adopt Anglo-style constitutions and by-laws in a mimetic effort toward civilized ‘self-government.’ In virtually every case, of course, these ‘self-governing’ articles
of government were drafted by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the Department of
Interior, which in turn coerced the tribes into adopting Anglicized structures of government.
Williams, Algebra, supra note 216, at 276–77. But see supra note 94.
For a more nuanced view, see Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 22:
Traditional governance came naturally in reasonably tight-knit, cohesive societies.
Evolution into more elaborate forms of government would have occurred most
smoothly on reservations composed solely of tribal Indians and tribal land. When the
reservations were opened, true traditional governments were essentially doomed in
most tribes, and the authority of any form of tribal rule was undermined. With the
land base slashed back once again and with strange new faces within most reservations, tribal councils and courts went dormant.
“When Congress enacted the [IRA], it stopped the allotment process. But it did nothing
to reverse the conquest, or to provide guidance to the Court for the post allotment era. It
might have helped tribes consolidate or reacquire lands, or even have paid reparations.” Gould,
Consent, supra note 6, at 844. President Theodore Roosevelt referred to the allotment policy
as “a mighty pulverizing engine to break up the tribal mass.” 35 Cong. Rec. S90 (1901); see
generally, Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 7, at 1039–57.
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individual Indian for which the land is acquired, and such lands or rights
shall be exempt from State and local taxation.621

Putting aside whether a reference to the taxation of land should be interpreted to cover a sales or a use tax,622 there was a threshold question of whether
this statute even applied to the ski resort, which was built on land leased from
the United States Forest Service for a term of 30 years. The land was not
acquired for the Tribe, and was not held in trust for the Tribe as required
under the Act.
Justice White was unfazed by these statutory obstacles, although he
acknowledged that the ski resort was “not technically ‘acquired’ ‘in trust for
the Indian tribe.’”623 Without any discussion about why the Act required that
land be acquired and held in trust for the Tribe, or about the differences in
rights and obligations between a landlord and lessee compared with a trustee
and beneficiary, or whether the statute would have been satisfied if the federal
land were placed into a trust for the benefit of the Tribe and why that was not
done, Justice White merely announced that section 465 applied:
[A]s the Solicitor General has pointed out, “it would have been meaningless
for the United States, which already had title to the forest, to convey title
to itself for the use of the Tribe.”624 We think the lease arrangement here in
question was sufficient to bring the Tribe’s interest in the land within the
immunity accorded by s. 465.625

621
Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 155 (quoting 25 U.S.C. Sec. 465). The exemption of the land
from state and local taxation reflected an abundance of caution because a state (or its subdivision) would not be able to levy an ad valorem tax on the value of the property owned by the
federal government. See, e.g., United States v. Allegheny Cnty., 322 U.S. 174, 192 (1944).
622
Justice White’s interpretation of the Enabling Act’s reference to the taxation of land,
which he extended to include “activities,” see supra notes 538–91 and accompanying text,
indicates a willingness to broadly interpret that statute.
623
Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 156 n.11 (emphasis added).
624
Professor Barsh asks whether “any lease of federal land to a tribe [is] therefore automatically trust land, even if the Secretary of the Interior never processes it in accordance with the
applicable statute?” Barsh, Omen, supra note 15, at 18.
625
Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 156 n.11. The Government’s brief argued that taxing the land
“would unjustifiably create a windfall to the [s]tate and deprive the [t]ribe of the immunity it
clearly would have had if non-federal (previously taxable) land had been made available to it.
Surely Congress intended no such anomalous result.” Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, Mescalero, 411 U.S. 145 (No. 71-738), 1972 WL 137541, at *14. It is unclear what
the government’s reference to “taxing the land” refers to. Certainly a state could not impose
an ad valorem property tax on land owned by the federal government, whether it was leased or
held in trust. The issue in this part of the opinion did not involve the taxation of the land, but
whether the statute applied.
The Court also rejected the broad claim that the IRA rendered a ski resort a federal instrumentality that was constitutionally immune from state taxation. Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 150–55.
Professor Barsh claims that the “federal instrumentality idea is hostile to tribal self-government
because it limits lawful tribal activities to those that serve federal objectives.” Barsh, Omen,
supra note 15, at 17. In any event, the instrumentality doctrine has been abandoned.
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Having overcome that threshold statutory requirement and having concluded that the Act applied, White then mischaracterized the New Mexico
sales tax as an income tax,626 which he concluded the IRA did not forbid:
[i]t is true that a statutory tax exemption for “lands” may, in light of its context and purposes, be construed to support an exemption for taxation on
income derived from the land. But, absent clear statutory guidance, courts
ordinarily will not imply tax exemptions627 and will not exempt off-reservation income from tax simply because the land from which it is derived, or
its other source, is itself exempt from tax.628

This rule of construction, while true outside of Indian tax cases, flies in the
face of Justice Marshall’s Indian canon of construction in McClanahan and
his generous interpretation of the 1868 Treaty and the Arizona Enabling Act.
The most sensible way of reconciling these two inconsistent doctrines is to
view Mescalero’s statement as applying only to off-reservation situations. Certainly if state tax laws are not applicable on a reservation except where Congress has expressly provided, which was Justice White’s view, albeit dictum,
why should the Indians have the burden of showing that a tax exemption
exists? An exemption is relevant only if a tax would otherwise apply; if state
tax laws do not apply, that should be the end of the inquiry.
Justice White’s mischaracterization of the New Mexico sales tax as an
income tax, troubling for what it suggests about the Court’s understanding
of state taxes, was nonetheless harmless error. Under the Court’s approach,
the statute would no more forbid sales taxes than income taxes. Likewise, his
willingness to characterize a statutory requirement that the land be held in
trust as a “technicality” was also harmless error because in the end it did not
matter for this issue whether section 465 of the IRA even applied. That section did not cover sales or (income) taxes even if the statutory preconditions
were satisfied, but it would become relevant for the use tax.
The Court reached a different—and surprising—conclusion when it turned
to the use tax on tangible personal property bought outside New Mexico and
brought into the State. At issue was personalty installed in the construction
of the ski lifts and permanently attached to the realty.629 The Court opined
that these permanent improvements would be exempt from a property tax
under section 465; in a leap of logic, White concluded that the same immu626
Justice Black made the same error in Warren Trading, mischaracterizing the Arizona sales
tax as an income tax. See Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685, 686
(1965). Justice Marshall then perpetuated this error in McClanahan. McClanahan v. State Tax
Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 180–81 (1973).
627
For criticism of this rule, see Erwin N. Griswold, Note, An Argument Against the Doctrine
that Deductions Should Be Narrowly Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 Harv. L.
Rev. 1142 (1943).
628
Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 155–56. Nor did the legislative history of section 465 support an
exemption. Id. at 157. But see Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956) (striking down federal
income tax on the sale of timber as inconsistent with the General Allotment Act of 1887).
629
Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 158 (citing Stipulation of Facts).
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nity should extend to the use tax on the property.630 The “use of permanent
improvements upon land is so intimately connected with use of the land itself
that an explicit provision relieving the latter of state tax burdens must be construed to encompass an exemption for the former.”631
e. The Illogic of the Opinion
As state tax lawyers will appreciate, White’s logic is inconsistent with the
structure and administration of the sales and use tax.632 Sales taxes and use
taxes distinguish between tangible personal property, which is almost always
taxable, and real property, which is almost always exempt.633 In the case of
tangible personal property, this determination is made at the time of purchase. The future use of the property does not typically determine its taxable
status; otherwise, the administration of the tax would be nigh impossible. A
consumer might buy mortar, sheetrock, bricks, or shingles at Lowe’s or Home
Depot, all of which will likely become permanently attached to, or incorporated into, realty. States would typically treat the purchases as taxable tangible
property and not as exempt real property.634
The use tax is a backstop to the sales tax. The rationale is that if an item
were taxable if purchased in-state, it should be subject to the use tax if purchased out-of-state and brought into the state. Otherwise, consumers would
have an incentive to purchase goods out-of-state to the detriment of local
vendors and to the state fisc. Conversely, if an item were exempt if purchased
in-state, it should be exempt from the use tax if purchased out-of-state to
avoid discriminating against interstate commerce.635 The Court’s opinion
turns the rationale of a use tax upside down by exempting tangible personal
property purchased outside New Mexico that would have been taxable if purchased inside the State.636 The Court provided the Tribe with an incentive to
purchase items outside the State, unless the exemption was to be extended
Id.
Id.
632
It was also inconsistent, as Justice White recognized, with the Court’s intergovernmental
immunity cases, which held that use taxes were not to be viewed as property taxes. See, e.g.,
United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 474 (1958).
633
See generally Pomp, supra note 177, at 6-33 to 6-34.
634
A common rule is that a contractor would pay sales tax on the purchase of the personal
property but would not be required to charge its customer sales tax. The theory is that the
contractor passes the sales tax through to the customer. Minn. Dep’t of Revenue, Sales
Tax Fact Sheet No. 128 (July 2010); see generally John F. Due & John L. Mikesell, Sales
Taxation 98–100 (1983).
635
See Pomp, supra note 177, at 9-1.
636
A credit is provided against the use tax for any sales taxes (or use taxes) paid to other states
on the purchase in order to avoid discriminating against interstate commerce. An exemption
for goods purchased out-of-state that would have been taxable if purchased in-state would be
constitutional because interstate commerce can be favored over intrastate commerce. A state
legislature, however, is unlikely to put its own merchants at a disadvantage by encouraging
out-of-state purchases so that such exemptions are rare.
630
631
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to items purchased in New Mexico for attachment to realty, contrary to the
rationale of the use tax.
f. Geographical Restrictions on the Indian Commerce Clause
Justice White made no mention of the Indian Commerce Clause,637
although it figured prominently in the Tribe’s brief. Textually, the Clause is
not geographically constrained. It does not refer to commerce occurring in
Indian country or on reservations but rather “Commerce . . . with the Indian
Tribes.” At the time of the Constitution, the majority of Indians lived in
enclaves and presumably no thought was given to their having commercial
enterprises or activities elsewhere. If commercial dealings with the Tribe are
under the exclusive control of the federal government pursuant to the Indian
Commerce Clause, the location of this activity should not matter.
On the other hand, some geographical limitations seem to be consistent
with the clause. It is hard to imagine, for example, that the Indian Commerce
Clause would immunize a purchase made by the Tribe on a shopping trip
to Santa Fe. Would purchases made by the Mescalero in Phoenix for the ski
resort be exempt from New Mexico’s Uniform Commercial Code or other
commercial statutes?638 Nonetheless, the ski resort was adjacent to the reservation and was a commercial enterprise that had the imprimatur of Congress,
which could be used to distinguish it from these other, more extreme situations.639
Picking up on this theme, Justice Douglas,640 concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justices Brennan641 and Stewart, attempted to
637
Nonetheless, Professor Laurence views Mescalero as dealing with the dormant Indian
Commerce Clause. Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 247.
638
See Natelson, supra note 15, at 212. Professor Natelson raises the argument that if the
Indian Commerce Clause granted Congress the exclusive powers of regulation, then “Indians
visiting New York City would not have to obey the Big Apple’s traffic laws. In the face of such
difficulties, the Supreme Court has acknowledged exclusivity in some cases, but rejected it
in others. The border between the two domains has been less a border than a smudge.” Id.
Natelson’s examples show that taking the “exclusivity” argument seriously can produce uncomfortable, if not odd, results. But his examples also show that we have not taken the exclusivity
language seriously, not necessarily that the exclusivity interpretation is wrong. Nevertheless,
perhaps a territorial limitation has to be read into the exclusivity argument; although that limitation is not obvious from the language of the Clause, it is consistent with the “separateness” of
the Indians at the time of the Constitution and the Ratifying Conventions.
639
“McClanahan reduced the state’s province to practically nothing in Indian-Indian reservation activities, Mescalero expands the province to practically everything in off-reservation
activities.” Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 248.
640
According to Dean Getches, “Douglas favored Indians only when their interests overlapped with other, higher concerns of his such as civil rights. He sharply curbed Indian rights,
going against established doctrine, when he feared that tribal sovereignty would clash with
his preference for wildlife conservation.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1632 n.284.
Claiborne describes Douglas’s bias in favor of the Indians as tempered by his conservationist
instincts. Claiborne, supra note 11, at 585.
641
Justice Brennan has been described as “generally supportive of Native American rights.”
Dewi I. Ball, supra note 272.
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breathe some life into the Indian Commerce Clause and free it of any territorial limitations:
The power of Congress granted by [the Indian Commerce Clause] is an
exceedingly broad one. In the liquor cases,642 the Court held that it reached
acts even off Indian reservations in areas normally subject to the police
power of the States. The power gained breadth by reason of historic experiences that induced Congress to treat Indians as wards of the Nation.643

“The powers of Congress ‘over Indian affairs are as wide as State powers
over non-Indians. . . . One illustration of its extent is shown by the liquor
cases already cited. . . . There is no magic in the word ‘reservation.’”644 Douglas’s unarticulated premise was that if Congress can regulate off-reservation
activities under the Indian Commerce Clause, then a state cannot regulate
such activities. Hence, New Mexico could not tax the Mescalero on its offreservation ski enterprise.645
The dissent also argued that the statute’s reference that “any lands or rights
acquired pursuant to the IRA should be exempt from state taxation” covered
the New Mexico sales tax, which Douglas also misdescribed as an income tax:
“There is no more convincing way to tax ‘rights’ in land than to impose an
income tax on the gross or net income from those rights.”646 “If [the statute]
be thought to be ambiguous, we should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the
tribe.”647 The dissent did not identify the nature of the ambiguity.
Mescalero holds that tribes and Indians receive no special tax treatment of
their off-reservation activities unless Congress dictates otherwise.648 This doctrine advances two economic objectives, neither of which favors the Indians
or rises to a constitutional imperative. First, it furthers competitive equity in
that off-reservation Indian- or tribally-owned enterprises are treated the same
642
Congress has provided a comprehensive scheme of regulating liquor within Indian country. This regulation dates back to colonial times. Current law has its roots in an 1834 statute
and makes it a crime to sell, give away, introduce, or attempt to introduce intoxicating beverages within Indian country. “Indian country” is broadly defined. For a general discussion, see
Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 7, at 889–92. Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478 (1914).
In Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 715–16 (1983), the Court removed from the tribes their
power to regulate liquor.
643
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. at 159 (1973).
644
Id. at 161.
645
Professor Clinton describes the Douglas dissent as representing “perhaps, the last grand
defense of the Worcester dormant Indian Commerce Clause doctrine offered in the Supreme
Court.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1199.
646
Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 162.
647
Id. Even if the dissent properly characterized the New Mexico tax as a sales and use tax
and not an income tax, it might have reached the same conclusion by resolving what it thought
was an “ambiguity” in the statute in favor of the Tribe. The dissent also would have held the ski
enterprise to be a federal instrumentality. Id.
648
Cf. Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 282–83 (1898), supra notes 354–75 and accompanying text, which refused to grant special treatment for those doing business with the Indians on
a reservation.
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as their non-Indian competitors.649 Both, for example, would charge the same
amount of state and local sales tax on an equivalent transaction. Also, both
would pay the same amount of property taxes on identically owned properties.650
Second, Indians working off-reservation are subject to the same local and
state income taxes as their non-Indian co-workers, even if the former live onreservation.651 Consequently, a business’s salary structure will not be skewed
by Indian employees being freed of taxes that apply to their co-workers.652
Neither of these economic objectives, however, is the concern of the Indian
Commerce Clause.
D. The Cigarette Cases
1. Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead
Reservation
With his typical insight, Dean Getches sets the stage for Moe:
In the 1970’s, tribes throughout the country began to make use of
McClanahan’s affirmation that reservation activities were not subject to
state taxation. The viability of reservation businesses had historically been
frustrated by their locations, typically far from transportation and commercial centers, and by the absence of a trained work force. . . . The most
rewarding businesses were those whose products were typically subject to
high state taxes—cigarettes, liquor, and fireworks. Cigarette sales were especially attractive because of potentially high volumes, a large ratio of taxes to
wholesale price, and relatively low regulatory burdens. “Smokeshops” run
by enterprising tribal members popped up on many reservations.653
649

that

The amicus brief of the Montana Inter-Tribal Policy Board, on the other hand, argued

it would be an absurd and cruel result if the tax exemption of Indian tribes were interpreted to apply only to activities on the reservations. Many of the nation’s Indians
were restricted to economically unviable lands—largely those unwanted by the white
man—as reservations. To effectively restrict their tax immunity to such areas would
compound this injustice, and serve to shackle the tribes to such lands forever.
Brief of Montana Inter-Tribal Policy Board as Amicus Curiae, McClanahan v. State Tax
Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (No. 71-834), 1972 WL 136314, at *11.
650
Of course, an off-reservation vendor might well view it as unfair if it competes with onreservation vendors that enjoy a tax advantage. See Warren Trading Post Co., infra notes 425–68
and accompanying text; Central Machinery, infra notes 469–518; Moe, infra notes 654–739
and accompanying text; Colville, infra notes 740–915 and accompanying text.
651
Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 148–49.
652
Cf. Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg., 252 U.S. at 80 (1920). McClanahan had the theoretical
effect of encouraging reservation employers to hire Indians rather than non-Indians. In theory,
an employer would be able to pay less salary to Indian employees, who would be exempt from
state income taxation, than to non-Indian employees who would be taxable. This preference
assumes that state income taxes are reflected in salaries and that non-Indian employees actually
compete for jobs with Indian employees.
653
Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1600.
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Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation654
addressed the Montana cigarette excise tax,655 a subset of sales taxes,656 whose
legal incidence was imposed on the purchaser and not the retailer.657 As is
654
Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463,
465 (1976). The Tribes and their chairman joined in the suit.
655
The Montana cigarette tax was 12 cents on each package sold within the State; 4.5 cents
of the tax was allocated to the state’s general fund. Montana argued that the general fund
was used for the support of state government, including the educational system, which benefited Indians and non-Indians alike. Brief for Appellants, Moe, 425 U.S. 463 (Nos. 74-1656,
75-50), 1975 WL 173493, at *6. Montana claimed that the loss in tax revenue was over
$591,000. Id.
Another issue in the case, largely ignored by the Court, involved the Montana personal
property tax on motor vehicles owned by tribal members residing on the reservation. The lower
court held that the State could not impose this tax on Indians residing on the reservation, and
the Supreme Court affirmed without any detailed or lengthy analysis. Moe, 425 U.S. at 469.
656
See generally, Pomp, supra, note 177, at 6-11 to 6-13.
657
The Montana statute provided that the cigarette tax “shall be conclusively presumed to
be [a] direct [tax] on the retail consumer precollected for the purpose of convenience and
facility only.” Moe, 425 U.S. at 482. Had the tax been levied on the Indian vendor rather than
on the purchaser, McClanahan would have also applied to strike the tax, at least on sales to
Indians. The Indian Trader statutes that preempted the Arizona sales tax imposed on the vendor in Warren Trading would also preempt the Montana tax on sales to Indians. The analysis
in Warren Trading was not a function of the legal incidence of the tax, only on whether the
purchaser was an Indian. See supra note 426.
Dean Getches accuses the Court of “defer[ring] to a presumption in the Montana law that
the tax falls on the retail consumer, and thereby avoided looking at the realities of the tax’s
impact on the tribe. The state’s jurisdiction to impose the tax came through this loophole.”
Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1600–01. As a tax on consumption, the economic incidence of a cigarette excise is intended to fall on the purchaser. For decades, cigarette excise taxes
were fairly low and demand relatively price inelastic so that consumers probably did bear the
economic incidence of the tax. Recent increases in the level of the tax and changing attitudes
about smoking makes the incidence of cigarette excise taxes more uncertain. See Pomp, supra
note 177, at 6–12 n.48.
The legal incidence of a tax is independent of its economic effects. Legal incidence is a
matter of statutory interpretation. Economic incidence involves a determination of whose
economic position is affected by the tax. For example, the legal incidence of a tax might be
imposed on a vendor, but the economic incidence will fall on the consumer if the vendor
increases its price by the amount of the tax and there is no decline in the aggregate amount of
sales. For many years, this probably described the taxation of cigarettes.
In United States v. Tax Commission of Mississippi, the Court held that if a “[s]tate requires
that its sales tax be passed on to the purchaser and be collected by the vendor from him, this
establishes as a matter of law that the legal incidence of the tax falls upon the purchaser.” 421
U.S. 599, 608 (1975); see also Coeur D’Alene Tribe v. Hammond, 384 F.3d 674 (9th Cir.
2004) (legal incidence of a motor fuel tax was on a tribe who bought from a non-Indian distributor that collected the tax from the tribe). Hammond grew out of a challenge by the Coeur
D’Alene Tribe to Idaho’s motor fuels tax. Parallels exist with Wagon, infra notes 1290-1358
and accompanying text. For a very nice summary of the Idaho litigation, see Mark J. Cowan,
Anatomy of a State/Tribal Tax Dispute: Legal Formalism, Shifting Incidence, Potatoes, and the
Idaho Motor Fuel Tax, 8 Journal of Legal Tax Research 1 (2010).
If the legal incidence of a sales tax is on the purchaser, the tax cannot be applied to sales
to the United States. If the state does not require that the sales tax on the vendor be passed
forward and collected from the consumer, then United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720

Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4

01-Pomp.indd 1058

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=244384612/23/2010

11:03:43 AM

INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE AND STATE TAXATION

1059

typical with cigarette taxes, the Montana excise tax was collected by making
the wholesaler purchase tax stamps, which were affixed to each pack. The cost
of the stamps was assumed to be passed forward to the retailer, who in turn
was assumed to pass the tax forward to the customer. In this manner, the
cigarette tax was prepaid through the purchase of the stamps.658
The case arose when a reservation Indian who operated a smokeshop on
trust land leased from the Tribes was arrested for failing to possess a cigarette
retailer’s license and for selling unstamped cigarettes to both Indians and nonIndians.659 Justice Rehnquist,660 writing for a unanimous court, treated these
two situations separately, allowing Montana to tax the cigarettes sold to nonIndians but prohibiting it from taxing sales to Indians.661
a. Revisiting Mescalero and McClanahan
Justice Rehnquist started his substantive analysis by repeating Mescalero’s
description (dictum) of McClanahan:
[I]n the special area of state taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction or other
federal statutes permitting it, there has been no satisfactory authority for
taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried on
within the boundaries of the reservation, and McClanahan lays to rest any
doubt in this respect by holding that such taxation is not permissible absent
congressional consent.662

For a Justice with a reputation as being unsympathetic to the Indians,663
endorsing this sweeping generalization was curious. Justice Rehnquist could
(1982), holds that tax can be collected on sales to the federal government. Id. at 739. The
Court has held that “in determining whether a tax is within the state’s constitutional power, we
look to the incidence of the tax and its practical operation, and not its characterization by state
courts.” Int’l Harvester Co. v. Wis. Dep’t of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435, 441 (1944).
658
But see Int’l Harvester Co., 322 U.S. at 441.
659
Moe, 425 U.S. at 467. Pursuant to Public Law 280, Montana had assumed criminal
jurisdiction over the Indians on the Flathead Reservation. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes of Flathead Reservation v. Moe, 392 F. Supp. 1297, 1301 (D. Mont. 1975). The Tribes’
Brief stated that just like Arizona in McClanahan, Montana had not assumed taxing jurisdiction over the Indians. Brief for the Appellees (and Cross-Appellants), Moe, 425 U.S. 463 (Nos.
74-1656, 75-50), 1975 WL 173495, at *20 [hereinafter Brief for the Appellees (and CrossAppellants), Moe]. “[T]he state has not assumed general jurisdiction over tribal members on
the Reservation, and there is no way the state can enforce against tribal members the tax laws in
question. Jurisdiction is the power to compel, and the state lacks that power here.” Id. at *25.
660
Woodward and Armstrong report that Justice Rehnquist was assigned to write Moe
because his Christmas skit displeased Chief Justice Burger. Woodward & Armstrong, supra
note 361, at 412. They also quote a Supreme Court Justice referring to Indian cases as “peewee”
cases. Id. at 58. Woodward and Armstrong describe Rehnquist’s opinion in Moe as “wip[ing]
away decades of Douglas’s opinions,” but they do not specify which ones. Woodward &
Armstrong, supra, at 412.
661
In Colville, infra notes 740–915 and accompanying text, the Court upheld the Washington
cigarette tax on non-member Indian purchasers. See infra text accompanying notes 707–10.
662
Moe, 425 U.S. at 475–76 (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148
(1973)) (emphasis added).
663
Woodward & Armstrong, supra note 361, at 412.
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have distinguished McClanahan.664 The language he cited above referred to
taxes on land or income; Moe involved an excise tax on sales. McClanahan
interpreted a treaty with the Navajo Nation and the Arizona Enabling Act,665
which were similar to, but not identical to, the Treaty of Hell Gate and the
Montana Enabling Act in Moe.666 McClanahan involved an employee; Moe
involved a smokeshop competing with off-reservation smokeshops. Rehnquist’s subsequent emphasis on tax avoidance could have been another distinguishing feature.667
Indeed, Justice Marshall, the author of McClanahan, did not think he was
issuing the broad holding that Mescalero was now being cited as endorsing; to
the contrary, he based his decision on the interference by Arizona “with matters which the relevant treaty and statutes leave to the exclusive province of the
Federal Government and the Indians themselves.”668 Marshall also described
the issue in McClanahan as a “narrow one.”669 Nonetheless, Marshall, who was
still on the Court, had no reason to object to the elevation of McClanahan
into a broad principle of tax immunity for the Indians on the reservation.
Justice Rehnquist relied on the lower court’s finding, unchallenged by
Montana, that the treaty and statutes involved in Moe were “essentially the
664
The Tribes argued that their situation was similar to that in McClanahan. See Brief for the
Appellees (and Cross-Appellants), Moe, supra note 659, at *17–21.
665
Justice Rehnquist described McClanahan as involving “the language of the Navajo treaty
and the applicable federal statutes ‘which define the limits of state power.’” Moe, 425 U.S. at
475.
666
The Tribes’ brief before the U.S. Supreme Court described its argument before the district court as involving the Indian Commerce Clause, the Treaty of Hell Gate, and rejecting
the claim that Montana had jurisdiction under Public Law 280. Brief for the Appellees (and
Cross-Appellants), Moe, supra note 659, at *10. The Tribes’ arguments at the district court level
apparently took place before the Supreme Court’s decision in McClanahan, but the district
court ruled after McClanahan was decided.
The Tribes’ brief before the Supreme Court relied on McClanahan and argued that its Treaty
of Hell Gate “closely parallel[ed]” the Navajo treaty in McClanahan. Id. at *18. The Tribes
also argued that neither treaty “specifically immunizes the tribal group from state taxation,
but, as recognized in McClanahan, the general rule of interpreting Indians’ treaties in favor
of the tribes, Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930), which justifies immunizing the
Navajo from Arizona taxation, McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 175–76
(1972), also justifies immunizing the tribal parties here from Montana taxation.” Brief for the
Appellees (and Cross-Appellants), Moe, supra note 659, at *18–19. The Tribes also argued that
the Arizona Enabling Act was similar to the Montana Enabling Act. Id. at *19–20.
667
See infra notes 706–14 and accompanying text.
668
McClanahan v. Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973) (emphasis added).
669
Id. at 168. In Colville, infra notes 740–915, Rehnquist would subsequently make clear
that he viewed McClanahan as applying only to Indians on a reservation and did not extend to
those doing business with them. He would repeat Marshall’s caveat that McClanahan involved
a “narrow question.” Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134, 178 (1980) (citing McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 168). Under Rehnquist’s view, whether
the Montana tax was on the vendor or the purchaser would be irrelevant. If imposed on the
vendor, McClanahan would apply only to sales by that vendor to Indians; if imposed on the
purchaser, McClanahan would apply only to Indian purchasers.
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same as those involved in McClanahan.”670 This statement was made with no
elaborate discussion or analysis. Accordingly, Justice Rehnquist viewed the
combination of McClanahan and Mescalero as prohibiting the taxation of
Indian property, income, sales, or other activities of Indians on the reservation671 unless Congress provided otherwise, a proposition certainly consistent
with Worcester,672 which the Court did not cite, and with the Indian Commerce Clause, which Rehnquist subsequently tried to inter. Rehnquist would
subsequently limit McClanahan to Indians only, and not those doing business
with them.673
b. No Congressional Authorization for the Montana Tax
Rehnquist rejected every argument made by Montana that either distinguished
McClanahan or asserted a federal statutory basis supporting its powers of
taxation.674 The Court explicitly denied Montana’s argument that the General
Moe, 425 U.S. at 477 (citing an unpublished opinion of the District Court, Jurisdictional
Statement, App. 73, 81 n.9). This statement was reaffirmed at 392 F. Supp. 1297 and at
392 F. Supp. 1325 without any further discussion. Rehnquist accepted the statement in the
unpublished opinion and declared that “it would serve no purpose to retrace our analysis in
this respect in McClanahan.” Moe, 425 U.S. at 477. Hence, Moe proceeded as if McClanahan
controlled.
671
Rehnquist recognized that the Court in McClanahan looked “to the language of the
Navajo treaty and applicable federal statutes ‘which define the limits of state power,’” Moe, 425
U.S. at 475–76, a recognition that is inconsistent with Mescalero’s more sweeping generalization based on McClanahan, which he endorsed.
672
The State described Worcester as arising “out of another age and another time. Indians like
many other minority groups, were not then citizens and were not members of society in the
usual sense. That situation no longer prevails. Enlightened constitutional concepts demand a
boldly different approach which obliterates racial distinctions.” Brief for the Appellants, Moe,
425 U.S. 463 (No. 74-1656), 1975 WL 173493, at *13 [hereinafter Brief for the Appellants,
Moe]. The Tribes argued that under the holding in McClanahan, “‘applicable treaties and federal statutes’ [are] pertinent . . . against the ‘backdrop’ of the doctrine of Indian sovereignty,” id.
at *17 (citing McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172), and that “[w]hile recognizing certain qualifications to that doctrine as defined in [Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832)], the
Court found that the aspect of that doctrine that precludes state jurisdiction continues today
unless expressly revoked by Congress,” id.
673
See infra note 839 and accompanying text.
670

674

In attempting to distinguish McClanahan, the state pointed to a variety of factors:
reservation Indians benefited from expenditures of state revenues for education, welfare, and other services, such as a sewer system; the Indians had the right to vote and
to hold local and state office; and the Indian and non-Indian residents within the
reservation were substantially integrated as a business and social community. The
District Court also found, however, that the Federal Government “likewise made
substantial payments for various purposes,” and that the Tribe’s own income contributed significantly to its economic well-being. Noting this Court’s rejection of a
substantially identical argument in McClanahan, see 411 U.S. at 173, and n.12, and
the fact that the Tribe, like the Navajos, had not abandoned its tribal organization,
the District Court could not accept the State’s proposition that the tribal members
“are now so completely integrated with the non-Indians . . . that there is no longer
any reason to accord them different treatment than other citizens.” 392 F. Supp. at
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Allotment Act675 granted it taxing powers over the Indians. The Court also
1315. In view of the District Court’s findings, we agree that there is no basis for distinguishing McClanahan on this ground.
Moe, 425 U.S. at 476.
675
General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887). The Act’s benign
goal was to break up the reservations and communally-owned tribal land by transferring title
to a certain sized parcel to the federal government, which would hold it in trust for the benefit
of an Indian typically for a 25 year period (with both shorter or longer periods possible). While
in trust, the land would be inalienable and free from state tax:
The theory was that, when the trust period ended and the land was transformed
into fee simple status, the Indian owners would be assimilated into the agricultural
economy. Reservations would disappear over time, and the “Indian problem” would
be solved. It never turned out that way. Allotment was a disastrous policy. When the
allotments became alienable, sometimes much more quickly than originally planned,
huge amounts of Indian land were lost through sales and tax foreclosures.
Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 15.
The expectation was that few Indians would be sufficiently “civilized” to choose allotments, but that those who did could be considered eligible material for citizenship by
virtue of their ownership and cultivation of land. The system also assumed that those
who held allotments could freely dispose of them in contracts with whites; that many
would; and that Indians would often not secure favorable terms. These expectations
largely came to pass.
White, supra note 196, at 711–12.
“[M]any of the tracts were located beyond tribal members’ customary habitats, making
them difficult to reach. Tribal members were given as little as ten dollars to purchase seeds and
implements, making it difficult or impossible for them to farm.” Gould, Consent, supra note
6, at 829.
Because allotted land could be sold soon after it was received, many of the early allottees quickly lost their land through transactions that were unwise or even procured by
fraud . . . Even if sales were for fair value, Indian allottees divested of their land were
deprived of an opportunity to acquire agricultural and other self-sustaining economic
skills, thus compromising Congress’s purpose of assimilation.
Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251,
254 (1992); see also Arrell Morgan Gibson, The American Indian 507–10 (1980).
The federal government started allotting land as early as 1798. Land Tenure History, Indian
Land Tenure Found., http://www.iltf.org/resources/land-tenure-history (last visited Sept.
20, 2010). Some treaties provided for allotment-type provisions. See Keweenaw Bay Indian
Cmty. v. Naftaly, 452 F.3d 514, 516–21 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1053 (2006).
As early as the 1820’s a common pattern emerged. Speculators bought land from
Indians and then “borrowed” their money back, often in exchange for overpriced
goods, including whiskey . . . After selling their allotments Indians sometimes “took
to the swamps,” sometimes scavenged off their settler neighbors, or sometimes lived
in huts on land that had not been cleared for settlement. Eventually, most became
destitute or emigrated.
White, supra note 196, at 712. “Allotment would enable the government to inculcate in
Indians the ‘habits of industry and civilization’ that grow out of owning private property and
pursuing the Jeffersonian ideal of the yeoman farmer.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at
1623.
Land that was left over after being allotted was typically sold to settlers, which might
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have been the real goal of the Act from the outset. Another less benign motive was to
“deliberately . . . break down tribal cohesion and the authority of traditional tribal leaders by
changing the Indian land tenure system from communal tribal ownership to individuallyowned allotments.” Clinton, Supremacy, supra note 7, at 179. The settlers buying surplus land
could serve as role models, “inspiring the Indians to progress along the path to civilization.
Within a generation or two the tribes would fade, the reservations would vanish, and Indians
would be assimilated into the larger community.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at
1623.
It was the widely held, but erroneous, view of federal officials during the entire nineteenth century that the poverty of Indians resulted from their inability to appreciate and embrace the benefits of private property and understand how agriculture,
through hard work, could enrich a person and that person’s family. These officials
viewed Native Americans as primitive hunter-gatherers devoid of Christianity and
civilization. . . . The historical record is another matter . . . [B]efore Europeans arrived
intensive agriculture was common among Native Americans in most regions in North
America where soil and climate supported it.
Taylor, Onslaught, supra note 534, at 941–42.
Some of the allotted land was not suited for farming but even if it were, the Indians often
lacked the necessary agricultural skills. When the Indians attained the land in fee, they would
sometimes sell it or lease it. Heirs would often show no interest in using the land and would
thus sell it to non-Indians.
The policy failed. Indians did not reject their cultural roots, even as many became
landowners. The tribes struggled but survived, and reservations remained, albeit with
large numbers of non-Indian occupants. These new arrivals had taken up homesteads
on the surplus lands or had purchased parcels from Indian allottees. The announced
goals of the Allotment Act were not realized, but an enormous amount of land passed
into non-Indian hands.
Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1623.
Some 150,000 Indians were landless by 1933 and many tribes were destitute. To Grant
to Indians Living Under Federal Tutelage the Freedom to Organize for Purposes of Local SelfGovernment and Economic Enterprise: Hearings on S. 2755 and S. 3645 Before the S. Comm.
on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong. 59 (1934). For a discussion of allotment, see Ragsdale, supra
note 364, at 510–13; Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost their Land 257–90 (2005).
Professor Milner Ball claims there was no constitutional basis for allotment. Ball, Constitution,
supra note 7, at 71.
Between the General Allotment Act of 1887 and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,
Indian landholdings were reduced from 138 million acres to around 50 million acres. Kevin
Gover, An Indian Trust for the Twenty-First Century, 46 Nat. Resources J. 317 (2006). Twenty
million of the approximately 50 million were essentially unusable for agriculture. Readjustment
of Indian Affairs: Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the Committee on Indian Affairs, House of
Representatives, 73rd Cong. 15 (1934). More than 26 million acres of allotted land were transferred out of Indian hands once they passed out of trust status. Wilkinson, supra note 7, at
20. Sixty million of the 86 million acres lost to Indians were due to the surplus lands being
sold to non-Indians. Id. “Some of this individual allotted land was sold by arms-length transactions and some of it was lost by fraud, sharp dealing, mortgage foreclosures, and tax sales.”
Id. “Allotment and the other assimilationist programs that complemented it devastated the
Indian land base, weakened Indian culture, sapped the vitality of tribal legislative and judicial
processes, and opened most Indian reservations for settlement by non-Indians.” Id. at 19. This
trend in lost land has been reversed. “As tribes were gaining in the scope of their legal authority,
tribal land ownership also grew by sixteen million acres from 1970 to 1992.” Getches, supra,
at 1593.
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rejected the argument that tax immunity for the Indians would constitute an
invidious discrimination against non-Indians.676 Finally, the Court rejected
John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, see supra note 620, realized “that 2/3 of
American Indians were drifting towards complete impoverishment” because of allotment.
Ansson, supra note 432, at 508. “Tribal governmental entities were also in total disarray as the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), over the opposition of traditional Tribal government leaders,
asserted its authority to appoint leaders for the Tribe.” Id.
The policy of allotment was abandoned in 1934, by the Indian Reorganization Act, discussed supra notes 594, 620, 675, and infra note 1128, with the result that Indian country
can consist of tribal land, allotted trust land owned by individual Indians, fee land held by
Indians, fee land held by non-Indians, federal, state, county, or municipal land. This pattern
is often referred to as a “checkerboard,” although a patchwork quilt might be more appropriate. Furthermore, the surface estate might be owned by an individual and the subsurface
estate might be owned by a tribe, the United States, or a private entity. Wilkinson, supra
note 7, at 9. In extreme cases where little land remained in Indian hands, reservations might
be disestablished. In other cases, the reservation might have been reduced in size. The Indian
Reorganization Act provided that “[t]he existing periods of trust placed upon any Indian lands
and any restrictions on alienation thereof are hereby extended and continued until otherwise
directed by Congress.” 25 U.S.C. § 462 (2010).
National policy again swung in the opposite direction in 1953, when Congress unanimously endorsed the concept of termination—that is, disestablishment of Indian
tribes as political, legal, and self-governing entities. One hundred nine tribes were
terminated under this policy, though several have been reconstituted. In addition,
Congress enacted Public Law 280, which gave most states authority to declare jurisdiction over reservations, with or without tribal consent . . . By the early 1960s the
federal government realized that termination, like the 1887 assimilation policy, was
detrimental to Indian welfare. Congress changed federal Indian policy again, this
time to embrace tribal self-determination and self-sufficiency. Indian tribes are now
encouraged to govern themselves, to enhance tribal economic development, and to
provide for tribal education. Indian tribes strongly endorse the national policy of
self-determination.
Johnson & Martinis, supra note 194, at 4–5; see also Michael C. Walsh, Terminating the Indian
Termination Policy, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1181 (1983).
“[I]n 1970, President Nixon announced that the federal government should encourage
Tribes to attain levels of economic and political development. Since President Nixon’s pronouncement, the guiding federal policy has encompassed facilitating Tribal economic and
political development.” Ansson, supra, at 509. See also Emma R. Gross, The Origins of SelfDetermination Ideology and Constitutional Sovereignty, cited id. at n.51. The Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, enacted in response to President Nixon’s
leadership, “encouraged Tribes to expand their education, health, and infrastructure programs
through federal grants and contracts. Under this Act, Tribes have been allowed to assume the
administrative responsibility for programs that had been previously administered by the BIA.”
Id. at 509-10.
676
Justice Rehnquist thought the discrimination argument was foreclosed by Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). See Moe, 425 U.S. at 480. Mancari established that the unique
relationship between the federal government and the Indians can justify preferences that could
not be justified for other racial groups: “As long as the special treatment can be tied rationally
to the fulfillment of Congress’s unique obligations toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed.” Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555. Obviously, if this argument were
accepted “every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and reservations . . . would be
erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized.” Id. at 552. “Like Crow Dog before it, however, Mancari invited decisions in which
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the argument that the Tribes had abandoned their tribal organization.677
The Court concluded that the Montana cigarette sales tax on purchases
made by Indians “conflict[s] with the congressional statutes which provide the
basis for decision with respect to such impositions,”678 citing McClanahan
and Mescalero. Presumably, the “statutes” were the Treaty of Hell Gate and
the Montana Enabling Act.
The structure of the opinion with respect to Indian purchasers was to start
with the sweeping generalization based on McClanahan and then reject Montana’s attempt to distinguish that case. In short, the assumption was that the
State had no power to tax because “the treaty and statutes upon which the
Tribe relies in asserting the lack of state taxing authority ‘are essentially the
same as those involved in McClanahan.’”679 Montana had the burden of identifying congressional authorization to tax. The State unsuccessfully argued
that there was a federal statutory basis permitting the tax.680
c. Application of McClanahan
With no federal statute authorizing the Montana tax, Justice Rehnquist simply applied what had now become the “general rule” of McClanahan to cigarette taxes on Indian purchasers. He did not attempt to uncover the analytical
foundations of the proposition that “in the special area of state taxation,
absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it, there has
been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian
income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the reservation.”681
He did not explain why a cigarette excise tax should be treated as a tax on land
or income.682 Apparently the McClanahan rule, as interpreted by Mescalero,
had become one that “everyone knows.”683 Justice Rehnquist was undaunted
by the cigarette tax being neither a tax on land nor a tax on income. He
the distinctions that it had drawn to protect the rights of tribes and Indians would be turned
around.” Gould, Consent, supra note 6, at 836. Professor Frickey cites Mancari for the proposition that the Court has “explicitly rejected the notion that the congressional power over Indian
affairs is extra-constitutional.” Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 72.
677
Moe, 425 U.S. at 476.
678
Id. at 480–81.
679
Id. at 477.
680
Id. at 476. Professor Fletcher describes Moe as a balancing test, Fletcher, Indian Problem,
supra note 11, at 601–02 n.175 (citing Moe, 425 U.S. at 480), but I would disagree because
neither McClanahan nor Mescalero, upon which Moe relies, adopted such a test.
681
Moe, 425 U.S. at 475–76 (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973))
(emphasis added).
682
The tax was imposed on the purchaser so Justice Rehnquist had no need to explore how
McClanahan would apply if the tax were imposed on the vendor.
683

All of us concerned with tax theory and policy rely heavily on “everybody knows”
propositions, often without being conscious of the fact. When we go out of our way
to identify and to analyze these basic assumptions, challenging and exciting conclusions often emerge. And even when we come away from such exercises without
having reached solid conclusions, the questions that we have raised are themselves
fascinating.
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merely cited McClanahan, which involved an income tax, although the relevant Arizona Treaty and Enabling Act did not refer to income taxes at all,
and Mescalero,684 which the Court mistakenly believed involved an income
tax. His position was consistent with the Indian Commerce Clause, which
the Tribes had argued below (but less significantly) before the Court.685
d. The Indian Commerce Clause
If Rehnquist were willing to apply Mescalero’s sweeping endorsement of
McClanahan to strike down the Montana excise tax on non-Indian purchasers, essentially overturning Thomas v. Gay,686 he would be deified by the Indians and their supporters rather than vilified. But his fall from grace started
immediately with his treatment of the Indian Commerce Clause.
The Indian Commerce Clause was implicated because of a jurisdictional
issue in the court below. The jurisdictional issue arose because the case was
initially heard by a three-judge federal court. At that time, 28 U.S.C. 2281
required that a case raise a constitutional issue, other than the Supremacy
Clause, in order to convene a three-judge panel in a federal district court.687
Rehnquist concluded that the vendor license fee and excise taxes on purchases
by Indians “conflict[ed] with the congressional statutes which provide the
basis for decision with respect to such impositions.”688 By itself, that conflict
would not satisfy Section 2281. He stated his reasoning in a footnote:
[T]he basis for the invalidity of these taxing measures, which we have
found to be inconsistent with existing federal statutes, is the Supremacy
Clause . . . and not any automatic exemptions689 “as a matter of constitutional law” either under the Commerce Clause690 or the intergovernmentalNorman B. Ture, Taxation and the Distribution of Income, in Wealth Redistribution and
the Income tax (Arleen A. Leibowitz ed. 1978).
684
Moe, 425 U.S. at 480–81.
685
See supra note 666.
686
See supra notes 354–75 and accompanying text.
687
28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1973), repealed by Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 1,
90 Stat. 1119. “The tribes in Moe had sought to convene a three judge district court, entitling
them to a direct appeal to the Supreme Court. . . . The Court’s dislike for such appeals is legend
and justified.” Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 250.
688
Moe, 425 U.S. at 480–81 (citing McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1972);
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973)). Justice Rehnquist never specifically
identified which congressional statutes conflicted with the Montana tax, but presumably it was
the Treaty and Enabling Act. See supra note 678 and accompanying text..
689
Rehnquist’s reference to the lack of an “automatic exemption” has led to much handwringing about the Indian Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Richard D. Agnew, Note, The Dormant
Indian Commerce Clause: Up in Smoke?, 25 Am. Indian L. Rev. 353, 374 (2000–01) (the footnote in Moe “arguably trumps” the dormant Indian Commerce Clause, a “virtual squashing”
of a future dormant Indian Commerce Clause argument). Professor Clinton speculates that
the footnote was intended to “announce the final demise of any judicially enforceable dormant
Indian Commerce Clause limitations. Nevertheless, the effort was so cleverly disguised . . .
that the point must have been lost on most of the remaining members of the Court, as its later
decision in Colville suggests.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1205.
690
In the footnote, Justice Rehnquist referred to the “Commerce Clause,” but presumably he
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immunity doctrine.691 . . . If so, then the basis for convening a three-judge
court in this type of case has effectively disappeared, for this Court has
expressly held that attacks on state statutes raising only Supremacy Clause
invalidity do not fall within the scope of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2281. . . . Here,
however, the District Court properly convened a Sec. 2281 court, because at
the outset the Tribe’s attack asserted the unconstitutionality of these statutes
under the Commerce Clause,692 a not insubstantial claim since Mescalero
and McClanahan had not yet been decided.693

This assertion that Mescalero and McClanahan addressed the Indian Commerce Clause issue is perplexing.694 McClanahan involved an interpretation of
a treaty with the Navajos, and the Arizona Enabling Act. Mescalero concerned
a treaty, the New Mexico Enabling Act, and the Indian Reorganization Act.
Mescalero and McClanahan were traditional Supremacy Clause cases that did
not rely on the Indian Commerce Clause.
Justice Rehnquist’s view that the Indian Commerce Clause had no role
to play695 because of Mescalero and McClanahan may explain his failure to
meant the Indian Commerce Clause and not the Interstate or Foreign Commerce Clauses. The
Tribes had argued below that the Indian Commerce Clause gave Congress the exclusive power
to regulate commerce with Indian tribes. See Brief for the Appellees (and Cross-Appellants),
Moe, supra note 659, at *10. That argument was repeated before the Supreme Court without
much elaboration. Id. Rehnquist might have been comparing the automatic exemption under
the Indian Commerce Clause to the automatic exemption under the Interstate Commerce
Clause from state taxes imposed on the privilege of conducting an interstate business. That
“automatic” exemption, however, was struck down one year later in Complete Auto Transit, Inc.
v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (overruling Spector Motor Serv. v. O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602
(1951)). See supra note 447.
In Colville, infra notes 740–915 and accompanying text, the Tribes argued that Rehnquist’s
reference to an “automatic constitutional exemption” should be limited to situations involving
discrimination or infringement on tribal government, Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, Colville,
supra note 108, at *68, an obvious attempt at damage control.
691
Professor Milner Ball interprets this comment to mean that “inherent Indian sovereignty
does not count.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 105, but that seems to be an overly broad
interpretation of the intergovernmental doctrine.
The origins of the “automatic exemption” language seem to be Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v.
Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342, 365–66, where the Court rejected the proposition that restricted
Indian lands and the proceeds from them were—as a matter of constitutional law—automatically exempt from state taxation.
692
Presumably, the reference is to the Indian Commerce Clause but Rehnquist did not
specify. See supra note 690.
693
Moe, 425 U.S. at 481 n.17. One commentator describes Moe as “complet[ing] the emasculation of the Indian commerce clause and initiat[ing] a frustrating new Indian war. Since
Moe, Indian tribes throughout the United States have been fighting an escalating battle against
state taxing authorities encouraged by this opinion.” Minnis, supra note 7, at 289.
694
Neither McClanahan nor Mescalero involved the question of a three-judge federal court.
Neither case originated in the federal courts so that section 2281 was not implicated. Mescalero
rejected the intergovernmental immunity doctrine but said nothing about the Commerce
Clause. See Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 162–63.
695
“Selling cigarettes in Indian Country by a tribe to non-tribal members is patently Indian
commerce and thus a subject that the state—absent federal authorization—should have no
power to materially burden.” Minnis, supra note 7, at 298.
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even acknowledge the Solicitor General’s brief. The government argued that
the Indian Commerce Clause “ousts State jurisdiction over all matter within
Indian Reservations that significantly touch tribal interests and reserves that
area for federal regulation. This is, in effect, the approach of [Worcester] as
‘modified’ in [Williams v. Lee].”696 By failing to even mention the Solicitor
General’s brief, Rehnquist was reacting the same as Justice Marshall in Central
Machinery, making for strange bedfellows.697
e. Non-Indian Purchasers
One final issue remained: whether Montana could tax non-Indian purchasers. In terms of the revenue at stake, the viability of the smokeshops, and
the concomitant effects on the tribal economy, this issue overshadowed the
immunity the Court had just provided to Indian purchasers. Given Justice Rehnquist’s endorsement of Mescalero’s broad reading of McClanahan,
it might have been expected that non-Indians would be treated the same
as Indians and be similarly immunized from State taxation.698 Without any
real discussion, however, the Court drew a distinction between Indian purchasers, whom Montana could not tax, and non-Indian purchasers, whom
Montana could tax:699 “The Tribe would carry these cases significantly further
than we have done, however, and urges that the State cannot impose its cigarette tax on sales by Indians to non-Indians because ‘[i]n simple terms, [the
Indian retailer] has been taxed, and . . . suffered a measurable out-of-pocket
loss.’”700
696
Brief for the United States, Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation,
447 U.S. 134 (1980) (No. 78-630), 1979 WL 213469, at *25–26 [hereinafter Brief for the
United States, Colville]. Williams v. Lee was actually inconsistent with the Indian Commerce
Clause, see supra note 410, but declaring that would not be good lawyering. The government’s
spin on Williams v. Lee attempted to make the best of an inconvenient precedent. See Williams
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
One commentator notes that Justice Rehnquist, in his book, Supreme Court: How It
Was, How It Is (1987), describes the Commerce Clause as providing that Congress should
have the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states,”
failing to cite the Indian Commerce Clause at all. Minnis, supra note 7, at 298. “The Indian
Commerce Clause has been ellipsed by the judiciary.” Id.
697
See supra notes 517–19 and accompanying text.
698
The Indian Commerce Clause would not distinguish between Indian and non-Indian
purchasers; indeed, an off-reservation, non-Indian traveling to the reservation purposely to
purchase cigarettes would be more likely to constitute “commerce” than an Indian resident on
the reservation. Rehnquist’s dismissal of the Indian Commerce Clause made these questions
moot. See Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 161.
699
“Clearly, the Moe opinion never affirmatively considered the source of state power to tax
or otherwise regulate non-Indian activities in Indian country, including non-Indian commerce
with Indians, it simply assumed that such state power existed in the absence of federal preemption.” Clinton, supra note 22, at 1228 (emphasis added).
700
Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 481 (1976). Rehnquist
provided no citation for the quoted language but presumably it is from the Tribes’ brief. See
infra note 701 and accompanying text. Professor Laurence interprets this argument to be a
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The opinion does not describe the nature of the retailer’s loss, but the Tribes’
brief defined the loss as it being
forced to pay money to the state, and . . . forced to do this as a precondition
to operating an independent business under tribal regulation. This is a gross
interference with freedom from state regulation, even assuming the tribal
member can recoup all of the money he had to advance (interest-free) for
state purposes.701

In other words, the Tribes argued that even if the state can tax the non-Indian
purchasers, the vendor cannot be forced to collect the tax.702 The Tribes did
not make the broader argument that McClanahan applied to exempt the nonIndian purchasers.
In rejecting the Tribes’ claim, the Court cited the district court’s finding
that under the Montana statute the legal incidence of the cigarette tax was on
“the non-Indian consumer or user who saves the tax and reaps the benefit of
the tax exemption.”703 Exactly how this was a response to the Tribes’ argument
is unclear. The question was not whether the consumer had the obligation
to pay the cigarette tax, the consumer did,704 but whether the Indian vendor
could be forced to collect it. The issue was jurisdictional in nature, and the
district court’s views on the legal incidence of the tax were beside the point.
An analogy can be drawn with a state’s use tax. A consumer purchasing a
good from a remote vendor is subject to a state’s use tax; the jurisdictional
issue is whether that vendor can be forced to collect the use tax.705 The jurisdictional issue is not resolved by stating that the consumer is subject to the
use tax. If the consumer was not taxable in the first instance, the jurisdictional
issue would not even arise because there would be no tax to collect.
But Justice Rehnquist was hardly going to give Montana the battle but not
the war by holding that the vendor did not have to collect the tax:
dormant commerce clause argument. Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at
251.
701
Brief for the Appellees (and Cross-Appellants), Moe, supra note 659, at *23.
702
Professor Clinton describes Moe as reaching a “startling holding,” which is “totally inconsistent with the Indian Commerce Clause.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1203.
703
Moe, 425 U.S. at 481–82. Under the Tribe’s view, the finding by the District Court
that “it is the non-Indian consumer or user who saves the tax and reaps the benefit of the tax
exemption,” id., would be irrelevant.
Professor Milner Ball thinks that Justice Rehnquist’s description of the “tax as falling on
non-Indian consumers rather than the tribe,” is “questionable and assumes that state taxing
power is appropriate on reservations so long as its burden is not borne by the tribes.” Ball,
Constitution, supra note 7, at 103–04. This comment seems to confuse the legal incidence of
the tax, which Rehnquist’s comments focus on, with the economic incidence of the tax, which
Ball seems to focus on. The distinction between legal and economic incidence should be irrelevant under the Indian Commerce Clause.
In California State Board of Equalization v. Chemehuevi Tribe, the tribal smokeshops unsuccessfully tried to distinguish Moe and Colville on the grounds that the legal incidence of the
California tax fell on the vendor.
704
See Mont. Code Ann. §§ 16-11-133, 16-11-148 (2005).
705
See Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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[T]he competitive advantage which the Indian seller doing business on
tribal land enjoys over all other cigarette retailers, within and without the
reservation, is dependent on the extent to which the non-Indian purchaser
is willing to flout his legal obligation to pay the tax. Without the simple
expedient of having the retailer collect the sales tax from non-Indian purchasers, it is clear that wholesale violations of the law by the latter class will
go virtually unchecked.706

f. Tax Avoidance
Justice Rehnquist was undoubtedly correct in implying that many non-Indians who shopped for exempt cigarettes on the reservation were not going
to voluntarily pay the tax they were seeking to avoid.707 Tax avoidance would
706
Moe, 425 U.S. at 482. Professor Clinton describes Rehnquist as “simply assum[ing] away,
without discussion, the most critical question in the case—whether states could tax commerce
with Indian tribes consistent with the Indian Commerce Clause and, if so, what limitations, if
any, existed on such state taxing power.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1204.
It is possible that if the purchase by a non-Indian were exempt (contrary to the holding in
Moe), the consumer would not benefit by the full amount of the state tax that would otherwise be paid on off-reservation sales. The on-reservation vendor could raise the price of the
cigarettes to appropriate some of the benefit of the exemption. Professor Barsh reports that
the Director of Revenue of Washington State estimated that about 55–80% of the tax savings
(prior to Moe and Colville, see infra) were passed on to non-Indian purchasers, with the balance
being appropriated by the retailer. Barsh, Omen, supra note 15, at 29. See infra note 891.
707
Jenkins Act, 15 U.S.C. § 377 (1949) (repealed and reenacted Pub. L. No. 111-154
(2010)), adopted in 1949, requires vendors that sell or transfer for profit cigarettes in interstate
commerce (e.g., over the Internet or by mail) to anyone other than a licensed distributor to
report all sales and shipments into a state. Id. § 376. Violators are guilty of a misdemeanor and
subject to fines of not more than $1,000 and imprisonment of not more than 6 months. Id. §
377. Compliance with the Jenkins Act is uneven and some tribes claim that as sovereigns they
are not subject to the law. The Jenkins Act, http://www.free-cigarettes.com/thejenkinsact.html.
The Government Accounting Office estimates that three-quarters of all Internet sellers do not
report sales pursuant to the Jenkins Act. Special Report: Internet Tobacco Sales, Campaign for
Tobacco-Free Kids, http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/reports/internet.
The Jenkins Act applies only to sales in interstate commerce. A sale of cigarettes by a tribe
to residents of the same state in which the tribe is located might not be viewed as constituting
interstate commerce, notwithstanding that the cigarettes were manufactured in other states. If
this view prevailed, and if the sales to non-Indians in Moe involved consumers from Montana,
the Jenkins Act would not apply.
(For other federal law on cigarettes, see the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act, 18
U.S.C. Chapter 114, §§ 2341–46; Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1331–41; Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 4401–08.)
A recent “survey of the websites of Internet vendors that sell to U.S. consumers found that
158, or more than one in five, were located on Indian Tribal lands, with 80 percent of all
Tribal-land Internet sellers based on Seneca Tribal lands. . . . The survey also found that the
websites of Internet vendors based on Tribal lands were more likely than those of foreign or
other domestic Internet sellers to say explicitly that they sold tax-free cigarettes, kept all consumer information private, and did not report any information to tax authorities.” The Pact
Act and Indian Tribes, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/
research/factsheets/pdf/0362.pdf.
State tax administrators do not always find the Jenkins Act useful. They may receive the
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likely be reduced if the tax were collected from non-Indians, but whether the
vendors had a legal obligation to do so was the issue before the Court, and
Rehnquist’s argument was a classic example of assuming the conclusion.708
names and addresses of persons purchasing cigarettes free of tax, but the limited amount
involved per purchaser does not justify robust administrative enforcement efforts. In the aggregate, however, the lost revenue is impressive. In 2005, the states estimate a revenue loss of as
much of $1.4 billion annually in uncollected tobacco taxes through Internet sales. Special
Report: Internet Tobacco Sales, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/reports/internet. Excise taxes are even higher today than in 2005, so the revenue loss
should be even greater.
In 2010, Congress enacted the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act of 2009 (PACT Act),
Pub. L. No. 111-154, 124 Stat. 1087 (2010), requiring retailers of cigarettes who sell to those
who are not in the physical presence of the seller at the time of sale, to comply with all state and
local laws in the jurisdiction where those products are being delivered and to pay any existing
state or local excise taxes in advance of the sale or delivery. The PACT Act also provides that
the United States Postal Service shall not deliver any packages that it knows or has a reasonable
cause to believe contains cigarettes. Violations are subject to civil penalties, as well as felony
criminal prosecution punishable by imprisonment of up to three years.
Although the PACT covers only the United States Postal Service, in 2005 UPS Inc. had
already agreed to stop delivering cigarettes to individuals in the United States under an agreement reached with former New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer. DHL had previously
banned cigarette deliveries as well. In 2006, FedEx followed suit. Consequently, the only
remaining shipper of any significance was the United States Postal Service. Michael Gormley,
UPS Agrees to End Cigarette Deliveries to Individuals, Citizens Freedom Alliance, Inc.:
The Smoker’s Club (Oct. 24, 2005), http://www.smokersclubinc.com/modules.php?nam
e=News&file=article&sid=2229; Fed Ex Delivers New Policy to Fight Contraband Cigarettes,
AllBusiness (Feb. 10, 2006), http://www.allbusiness.com/retail-trade/food-stores/4488562-1.
html. I understand, however, that new carriers are coming forth to fill the vacuum, although
presumably they will not be shipping the amounts that the Post Office, DHL, FedEx, or UPS
were previously delivering.
The PACT was challenged by Red Earth LLC d/b/a Seneca Smokeshop and by Aaron
J. Pierce, both in the business of selling cigarettes over the Internet and through the mail
and by telephone. They alleged that the Act violated the Due Process, Equal Protection, and
Commerce Clauses, the Tenth Amendment, and was void for vagueness and inconsistent with
the sovereign rights of Native Americans. On July 30, 2010, the United States District Court
for the Western District of New York granted a preliminary injunction. Red Earth LLC v.
United States, Nos. 10-CV-530A, 10-CV-550A, 2010 WL 3061103 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).
708
This “tax avoidance” routinely occurs when consumers purchase goods from remote vendors that do not have to collect the home state’s use tax. The consumer is required to pay that
use tax even if the vendor does not collect it. Most consumers do not pay the use tax under
these conditions.
A non-Indian (and, as Colville, see infra notes 826–29 and accompanying text, would make
clear, a non-member of the tribe) who bought unstamped cigarettes on the reservation would
be subject to a use tax. Anyone purposely buying cigarettes on the reservation in order to avoid
the state tax could not be expected to voluntarily pay the use tax. If a vendor on the reservation was not required to collect the use tax, Montana would not be helpless, however. Besides
the federal initiatives described supra note 707, a state could follow the lead of Massachusetts
and identify cars making major purchases on the reservation and stop and search those cars
when they leave the reservation. This approach was once used by Massachusetts to discourage its residents from buying cheaper liquor across the border at New Hampshire-owned
stores, free of a sales or excise tax, which New Hampshire does not impose. During major
holidays, Massachusetts had stationed its state police in the parking lots of these stores. They
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Justice Rehnquist’s analysis reflected his understandable lack of sympathy
with the facts, which on a concrete rather than abstract level were not helpful
for the Indians. After all, non-Indians presumably shopped on the reservation
to avoid the Montana tax to the detriment of both the state fisc and the stores
located off-reservation that competed with the smokeshops. This was hardly
an appealing case for the Indians.709 Rehnquist’s response was based more on
policy grounds than on legal grounds.
Viewed more broadly, the tax avoidance that Rehnquist thought he was
stopping is ubiquitous under the Interstate Commerce Clause and was not
sui generis to the Indians. That clause prevents a state from requiring out-ofstate vendors to collect the state’s sales or use taxes unless “nexus” exists. A
vendor that has no physical presence in the state and only advertises through
the mail, television, radio, or the Internet, and ships goods into the state
using the U.S. mail or common carriers, has no Commerce Clause nexus
and cannot be forced to collect any sales or use taxes.710 If the consumer does
not voluntarily pay the use tax, which most individuals do not, tax avoidance
results. The vendor may well be a “co-conspirator” by advertising that it will
not collect any sales tax without informing the purchaser that a use tax may
be due.711
noted the Massachusetts license plate numbers of cars whose drivers just made large purchases and radioed the information to officers located on the Massachusetts side of the border,
who stopped and searched the cars. Philip Shishkin, Tax-Free Liquor Lures Buyers, Stirring
Crossborder Tensions, Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 2009, at A18, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB125236461011390855.html.
Part of the strategy was the hope that a few high profile incidents would have an in terrorem
effect, just the way the Internal Revenue Service likes to have a high profile conviction for tax
evasion during the height of the filing season. Martin S. Kaplan, What the IRS Doesn’t
Want You to Know 39 (9th ed. 2004). The right of Montana, however, to station its employees on the reservation over the objections of a tribe is more problematic than Massachusetts’s
right to station its employees in the parking lots of New Hampshire liquor stores.
709
The district court ruled for the State on the issue of sales to non-Indians and ruled for
the Indians on the issue of sales to Indians. Montana appealed and the Tribes cross-appealed.
In retrospect, the question can be raised whether the Tribes should have cross-appealed on an
issue having such unsympathetic facts.
710
Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). A vendor must also have Due Process
nexus, which requires that it purposefully avail itself of the taxing state’s marketplace. For a
discussion of Quill, see Pomp, supra note 177, at 3-1 to 3-3, 3-18 to 3-32, 9-70 to 9-75, and
9-82; infra note 774. Typically, Due Process nexus will be an easier test to satisfy than will
Commerce Clause nexus. But in the case of rented property, for example cars, the lessor may
satisfy the Commerce Clause because its leased property will be in a state, but not satisfy the
Due Process Clause if the lessor has no knowledge of where its property is located. See id. at
3-30 to 3-31.
711
Colorado recently adopted a law requiring certain remote vendors to either collect taxes
voluntarily or notify their customers of their use tax obligation and send a report to the appropriate tax department outlining the customer’s purchases. The Direct Marketing Association
filed suit on June 30, 2010 arguing that the law is unconstitutional. See Direct Mktg. Ass’n
v. Huber, Case No. 1:2010cv01546 (D. Colo. 2010); see also the Jenkins Act, supra note 707;
Amazon.com LLC v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 877 N.Y.S.2d 842 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2009).
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To combat this type of tax avoidance in the case of cigarettes, Montana,
which does not have a general sales tax,712 makes it a misdemeanor to use or
consume unstamped cigarettes.713 Tax avoidance can arise not only in the
case of purchases from Indians, but also from purchases over the Internet or
from vendors in a state (or country) having lower cigarette taxes (or none at
all). If no Commerce Clause nexus exists, Montana cannot make the seller
collect its cigarette tax714 and must depend on the voluntary compliance of
the consumer.
Justice Rehnquist’s fears about cigarette tax avoidance mirrored on a small
scale a much more severe and pervasive problem that exists in states with
general sales taxes. He did not seem to recognize that what he viewed as the
non-Indian purchaser’s “flouting his obligation” was not unique to the sale of
cigarettes on a reservation. The difficulty of collecting a tax from a consumer
who purchases tangible personal property outside the state is a pervasive
problem faced by all jurisdictions with general sales taxes.
Of course, that fact alone does not mean that Rehnquist should have been
estopped from dealing with the problem of cigarette tax avoidance, even
if there is a larger problem of general sales tax avoidance. Nonetheless, his
distinction between exempt Indian consumers and taxable non-Indian purchasers is troubling because he never defended that line drawing; instead, he
asserted it indirectly by accusing the Tribe of “carry[ing] these cases significantly further than we have done,”715 without explaining his response. If the
problem of tax avoidance is serious, Congress is the appropriate body to act.
At the heart of Moe was the proposition that “in the special area of state
taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it,
there has been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian reservation lands
or Indian income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the
reservation.”716 What is ironic is that Justice Rehnquist read the quoted language above loosely and expansively to cover a cigarette excise tax. If the language was elastic enough to apply to excise taxes on sales to Indians, then why
did it not cover sales to non-Indians?717 And why was Montana presumed to
have power to tax sales to non-Indians in the first place?
712
Montana is just one of five states that do not have a broad-based state sales tax. The others are Delaware, New Hampshire, Oregon, and Alaska. See generally Pomp, supra note 177,
at 6-2 to 6-3.
713
Mont. Code Ann. § 16-11-133 (2005) (providing, inter alia, that a person who uses or
consumes a cigarette within Montana, which is taken from a package that does not bear the
required tax stamp, is guilty of a misdemeanor). Presumably, this statute applies whether that
cigarette is smoked on- or off-reservation. A person can be imprisoned and subject to fines and
penalties. See infra note 737.
714
See Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992); supra note 710.
715
Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 481 (1976).
716
Id. at 475–76 (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973)).
717
“Moe resulted from the judicial evolution away from a legalistic approach to Indian law
and toward an amorphous pre-emption balancing test premised on a backdrop.” Minnis, supra
note 7, at 299. Rehnquist is no fan of balancing and would resist his analysis being character-
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g. Burdens of Collecting the Montana Tax
Rehnquist also perfunctorily dismissed the Tribes’ argument that to make the
Indian retailer an “‘involuntary agent’ for collection of taxes owed by non-Indians is a ‘gross interference with [its] freedom from state regulation’” under
Warren Trading.718 He described the burden as “minimal,”719 and not strictly
a tax at all,720 allowing him to bypass the troubling language in Mescalero
“dealing with the ‘special area of state taxation,’”721 which was the rationale
ized in that manner. Moreover, because Rehnquist upheld the Montana tax on sales to nonIndians, Minnis’s reference to “preemption” is unclear and seems unsupported by the Court’s
analysis. But see infra note 719.
718
Moe, 425 U.S. at 483. The district court recognized that a distinction between immune
Indian purchases and taxable non-Indian purchasers would impose complicated problems
of enforcement, and thus “deferred passing on these problems pending a decision by [the
Supreme Court].” Id. at 468 n.6. Although Rehnquist claimed that “[w]e, of course, express
no opinion on this question,” id., the Court seemed to do exactly that. And in Colville, infra
notes 740–915 and accompanying text, the Court referred to Moe as upholding “the collection requirement, as applied to purchases by non-Indians, on the ground that that it was a
‘minimal burden’ designed to aid the State in collecting an otherwise valid tax,” 447 U.S. 134,
151 (1980) (citing Moe, 425 U.S. at 483), but also claimed that Moe “expressed no opinion
regarding the ‘complicated problems’ of enforcement that distinctions between exempt and
nonexempt purchasers might entail,” id. at 151–52 (citing Moe, 425 U.S. at 480–81 n.16.)
719
Feldman thinks that McClanahan’s reference to a “state’s legitimate interests” and in
Moe to a “minimal burden” “prestaged a revolution in state jurisdiction cases: the Court’s
express adoption of a balancing test to determine the extent of state power in Indian country.”
Feldman, supra note 436, at 675 (emphasis added). I find nothing to support that statement.
It is also unlikely that Justice Rehnquist, who has expressed disdain for balancing tests both in
the context of Indian cases and elsewhere, see Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S.
941, 962 (1982); Kassel v. Consol. Freightways, 450 U.S. 662, 687–92 (1981); Nat’l League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 876 (1976), would agree. See also Clinton, Dormant, supra
note 22, at 1214. Nonetheless, Chickasaw Nation, infra notes 1271–89, 1359–72 and accompanying text, referred to this part of Moe as a balancing test. 515 U.S. 450, 458 (1995). See
also supra note 717.
Professor Clinton notes the inconsistency between a balancing test and the dormant Indian
Commerce Clause “first announced in Worcester [which] was a bright-line rule that automatically excluded state authority from any matter that involved Indian affairs in order to protect
the exclusive congressional power in the area.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1215.
720
Moe, 425 U.S. at 483.
721
Id. Justice Rehnquist did not address the burden that would be placed on the retailer
from having to verify whether the purchaser was a tribal member, the burden in keeping the
records necessary to obtain a refund from the state for the tax paid on the cigarettes sold to
tribal members, or the time value of money involved between the purchase of the stamps and
the refund.
For an approach by New York to reduce these burdens by allowing cigarette retailers to
purchase unstamped cigarettes based on an estimate of the amount of Indian purchasers, see
Department of Taxation & Finance of New York v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61, 66
(1994), which upheld these regulations against constitutional attack. The history of cigarette
taxation in New York is long and tortuous. Despite winning Milhelm Attea, litigation continues.
In 1995, George Pataki became Governor of New York. During the campaign, he promised
leaders of the New York Association of Convenience Stores that he would make it a priority
to end cigarette tax evasion on Indian lands. When the Tax Department did not enforce the
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for not taxing cigarette sales to Indians. Moreover, Rehnquist saw “nothing
Milhelm Attea regulations, the Association filed suit. In 1996, the Tax Department adopted
new regulations and gave the tribes four months to either negotiate plans with the state to
apply their own tribal surcharge or face collection of taxes by the State. That same year, the
state supreme court ruled in favor of the Association, requiring that New York either enforce
existing regulations or suspend cigarette taxes statewide. By 1997, the Tax Department negotiated interim compacts with a majority of tribes and began enforcing its regulations, including
intercepting shipments of untaxed cigarettes. In the same year, the appellate division upheld
the State supreme court’s opinion except for requiring that the taxes be suspended statewide
if the Tax Department did not enforce the regulations. Later that year, protests took place on
several reservations. Protestors burned tires along the Thruway and Interstate 81. Governor
Pataki suspended enforcement of the Tax Department’s regulations. Fearing further violence,
in 1997 Governor Pataki suspended the regulations and halted enforcement of the tax.
In 1998, the court of appeals overturned the appellate division and remanded the case to
the State supreme court. On remand, the court upheld the Tax Department’s suspension of the
regulations. In 2000, the appellate division upheld the State supreme court. When the U.S.
Supreme Court denied certiorari, the litigation ended, with the result that the State was legally
not collecting taxes on sales by the Indians to non-Indians.
In 2000, New York made it unlawful for any common or contract carrier (UPS, FedEx) to
knowingly transport cigarettes to any person in New York who is not authorized under the
statute to receive such cigarettes, which would include individual consumers. The following
year, the United States District Court held that the statute discriminated against interstate
commerce both on its face and in effect. Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Co. v. Spitzer, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7548 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). That decision was overturned by the Second Circuit in
Brown & Williamson v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200 (2nd Cir. 2003).
In 2003, Governor Pataki and the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe reached a tentative agreement
on land claims, casino, and tax issues. The Tribe agreed to collect and retain taxes equivalent to
state and local taxes on their cigarette sales to non-Indians so their prices were comparable to
those of surrounding non-Indian retailers. The agreement fell apart when the Tribe voted out
the leaders who negotiated it. The Tax Department then published draft regulations on collecting cigarette taxes. In response, the Seneca Indians launched a public relations campaign and
the Tax Department postponed the start of tax collection, and in the following year, suspended
indefinitely the start of tax enforcement, fearing possible violence. In 2005, legislation was
enacted requiring the Tax Department to begin collecting cigarette taxes. In 2006, Governor
Pataki refused to enforce any tax collection.
In 2006, a group of retailers and the Association sought an order directing the Governor
to collect cigarette taxes. In 2007, the State supreme court dismissed the suit on the lack of
standing. In a separate case, the State supreme court issued an injunction barring the Tax
Department from implementing the tax collection law.
In 2008, the City of New York filed suit in the federal district court seeking an order barring
eight of the largest cigarette dealers on a Long Island Indian reservation from selling cigarettes
tax-free to the public. In 2009, the court issued a temporary injunction but stayed it to give
the Tribe a chance to appeal. In coordinated raids, Cayuga and Seneca Counties seized untaxed
cigarettes from the Cayuga Indian Nation’s convenience stores. The State supreme court ruled
that there was sufficient legal authority for the raids, but the appellate division of the State
supreme court granted a preliminary injunction against the counties from prosecuting felony
tax evasion charges, pending a subsequent hearing. In 2009, the State supreme court ordered
the Cayuga Indian Nation to stop selling untaxed cigarettes and ruled that the counties could
hold onto the cigarettes seized during their 2008 raids as evidence. The appellate division of
the State supreme court overturned this case. In 2010, the Tax Department proposed new regulations. NYS Tax Department Proposes Regulation to Address Issue of Tax-Free Sales of Cigarettes
to Indians, N.Y. State Dep’t of Tax. & Fin. (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.tax.state.ny.us/
press/2010/cigreg02232010.htm. Most recently, the Cayuga Nation won a case immunizing
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in this burden which frustrates tribal self-government” under the Williams v.
Lee doctrine,722 which was not exactly an exhaustive treatment of the issue:723
“We see nothing in this burden which . . . runs afoul of any congressional
enactment dealing with the affairs of reservation Indians.”724
h. Inapplicability of Warren Trading
The Tribes also made a Warren Trading argument,725 which Rehnquist easily
them from prosecution for selling untaxed cigarettes on the reservation. Cayuga Indian Nation
of N.Y. v. Gould, 930 N.E.2d 233 (N.Y. 2010). As this Article goes to press in September of
2010, there are both federal and state injunctions in place against the tax department. The
federal suit involving the Senecas and Cayugas argues that New York lacks jurisdiction to regulate Indian nations. The State suit challenges on procedural grounds the expedited manner in
which the Tax Department adopted regulations. Carolyn Thompson, NY Appeals Court Halts
Indian Cigarette Tax Plan, Indian Country Today (Sept. 7, 2010), http://www.indiancountrytoday.com/national/NY-appeals-court-halts-Indian-cigarette-tax-plan-102104144.html.
For further details ad nauseum, see 15-Year Chronology of NYS Tax Evasion/Enforcement Issue,
N.Y. Ass’n of Convenience Stores, http://www.nyacs.org/documents/15-yearchronology.
pdf. See also infra note 733. The story is far from over.
722
Moe, 425 U.S. at 483. For a criticism of this treatment of Williams v. Lee, see Ball,
Constitution, supra note 7, at 104–05; Barsh, Omen, supra note 15, at 35 (“[If Rehnquist is
right] it is difficult to see what it was in Williams [v. Lee] that did frustrate tribal self-government.”). Professor Ball’s comments indicate the frustration that many commentators feel about
the uselessness of the infringement doctrine.
The Tribes’ brief argued that if Montana could impose its tax then the Indians would be
deterred from ever imposing their own tax, which would preclude raising needed revenue. That
deterrence, the Tribes argued, would violate Williams v. Lee. Brief for the Appellees (and CrossAppellants), Moe, supra note 659, at *23–24.
A Williams v. Lee argument could also be based on the critical role the exemption from state
tax served in generating economic activity for the Tribes. Rehnquist implicitly rejected this
argument by describing the competitive advantage of the Indian seller as dependent on the
extent to which the non-Indian purchaser was willing to flout his legal obligation to pay the
tax. A Williams v. Lee argument was inconsistent with Justice Rehnquist’s characterization of
the case as involving tax avoidance.
723
“Other cases are similar in their paucity of discussion of the infringement test.” Laurence,
Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 243.
724
Moe, 425 U.S. at 483.
725

[In Warren Trading] a non-Indian who traded with Indians on the Navajo Reservation
was held to be exempt from the Arizona gross proceeds tax, basically because of federal preemption in the field of Indian commerce. Here, the Indian commerce involves
Indians selling to non-Indians. Surely, if a non-Indian is exempt from state tax laws
because of Indian commerce, then an Indian also is exempt.
Brief for the Appellees (and Cross-Appellants), Moe, supra note 659, at *24. This argument
focused improperly on the identity of the vendor rather than on the identity of the purchaser,
which is the focus of the Indian Trader statutes. 25 U.S.C. section 261 provides that “[t]he
Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall have the sole power . . . to make such rules and regulations as he may deem just and proper specifying . . . the prices at which . . . goods [are] sold to
the Indians,” 25 U.S.C. § 261 (emphasis added). The Tribes’ argument could have been better
couched in terms of the Indian Commerce Clause.
Although the Tribes’ brief asserts that the vendor in Warren Trading was a non-Indian, which
seems likely, Black’s opinion was silent on the point. Rehnquist does not mention whether the
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disposed of:
[T]hat case involved a gross income tax imposed on the on-reservation sales
by the trader to reservation Indians. Unlike the sales tax here, the tax was
imposed directly on the seller, and, in contrast to the Tribe’s claim, there
was in Warren no claim that the State could not tax that portion of the
receipts attributable to on-reservation sales to non-Indians. Our conclusion
in Warren that assessment and collection of that tax “would to a substantial extent frustrate the evident congressional purpose of ensuring that no
burden shall be imposed upon Indian traders for trading with Indians on
reservations,” does not apply to the instant case.726

Warren Trading was probably not the Tribes’ strongest argument.727 Justice
Rehnquist’s response was correct, but a bit wide of the mark. His attempt
to distinguish Warren Trading as involving a gross income tax on the vendor misunderstood that Arizona was applying a sales tax measured by gross
receipts.728 The Montana excise tax was a subset of sales taxes. Moreover, Justice Black’s analysis in Warren Trading did not turn on the legal incidence of
the tax. Legal incidence is irrelevant to the goal of the Indian Trader statutes,
which is to prevent fraud.729
The reason that Warren Trading had no application is straightforward: the
Indian Trader statutes govern only sales to Indians.730 Congress was concerned
about the Indians being defrauded. The assumption was that non-Indians
needed no protection. Any discussion in Warren Trading, or Central Machinery, of the Indian Trader statutes was irrelevant to sales to non-Indians.731
Indian vendors in Moe were licensed as Indian Traders, a point that Central Machinery would
make irrelevant four years later. See supra notes 469–518.
726
Moe, 425 U.S. at 482 (emphasis added).
727
See supra notes 725–26; infra notes 728–31.
728
See supra note 426. Rehnquist’s mischaracterization, although not inspiring confidence,
was harmless error.
729
The Arizona sales tax in Warren Trading was imposed on the vendor and Moe involved
a Montana excise tax imposed on the consumer. But had Arizona imposed its tax on the
consumer, the preemption issue would have been the same. The Indian Trader statutes, which
are intended to protect the Indians from fraud, are indifferent to how a statute is drafted.
Moreover, under the common pattern of sales taxation, though not followed by Arizona, the
tax is required to be collected from the consumer. Under this pattern, the legal incidence is
typically viewed as falling on the consumer. See United States v. Tax Comm’n of Miss., 421
U.S. 599, 599, 608 (1975); supra note 657.
730
25 U.S.C. section 261 provides that the “Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall have
the sole power . . . to make such rules and regulations as he may deem just and proper
specifying . . . the prices at which such goods [are] sold to the Indians.” 25 U.S.C. § 261
(emphasis added).
In Colville, discussed infra notes 740–915 and accompanying text, the Court states without
any support or discussion that the Indian Trader statutes were not intended to cover sales to
Indians who were not members of the tribe on whose reservation the sale was being made. 447
U.S. 134, 155–56 (1980). The relevant part of the statute, however, refers only to “Indians.”
25 U.S.C. § 261 (2010).
731
Justice Rehnquist stated that “there was in Warren no claim that the State could not tax
that portion of the receipts attributable to on-reservation sales to non-Indians,” Moe, 425 U.S.
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More fundamentally, however, a preemption argument like that in Warren
Trading suggests that a state has the right to impose a tax in the first instance
unless it conflicts with a federal statute.732 The flaw in the part of Rehnquist’s
opinion dealing with the non-Indian purchasers is that he never established
why Montana had that right. Without that right being established, there
would be no legitimate tax for the Indian Trader statutes to preempt.
Justice Rehnquist’s sense of outrage that the Indians were somehow co-conspirators in tax avoidance drove his analysis. The holding in Moe impacted,
perhaps severely, reservation smokeshops throughout the country.733 What
was not directly impacted by the case, however, was tribal revenue. Any
decline in smokeshop business that resulted from having to collect the Montana tax on sales to non-Indians directly affected the Indian retailer but did
not directly affect Tribal revenues. The Tribes did not tax the sale of cigarettes
and did not tax the profits of the smokeshops. Nor did the Tribes operate any
smokeshops on their own.
As in Warren Trading, the Tribes in Moe had not imposed their own excise
tax on the sale of the cigarettes.734 Moe, like Warren Trading, has the salutary effect of avoiding any double taxation of Indian consumers should the
Tribes enact such a tax in the future; double taxation of non-Indian consumers would nonetheless occur.
at 482, suggesting that the issue had been conceded. What was actually said was that “[a]ppellant’s challenge to these statutes is limited to the State’s attempt to apply them to gross income
from sales made on the reservation to reservation Indians.” Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz.
State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685, 686 n.1 (1965); see supra text accompanying note 431.
732
See supra notes 425–68 and accompanying text.
733
“Rehnquist turned an opinion that was in favor of the Indians into an opinion that
indicated that in most cases they would lose.” Woodward & Armstrong, supra note 361, at
412. “Instead of resolving a tribal-state dispute, Moe and its progeny have greatly exacerbated
it and have created a significant potential for physical violence and even open hostilities.”
Minnis, supra note 7, at 291. This warning came true when New York tried to enforce its
cigarette regulations against the Seneca, who closed down a 30 mile stretch of the New York
State Thruway in protest. See Irving, Seneca Nation Angered by New York Cigarette Tax Law,
News from Indian Country (Dec. 2008), available at http://indiancountrynews.net/index.
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5305&Itemid=33 (last visited Sept. 20, 2010):
[A] massive protest riot by the Seneca Indians from the Cattaraugus Reservation in
Western New York closed down sections of the New York State Thruway and parts of
Routes 5, 20, and 17. Eleven people were arrested, twelve State Troopers were taken
to the hospital, and a dozen police cars were damaged. In the wake of the protests,
state officials reached an agreement with the Seneca leaders: the state would pull back
the troopers that had been placed at the reservations if the Senecas would return to
the bargaining table to once again attempt to reach an agreement. The talks broke
down within two days, resulting in another protest rally at the Capitol.
See also Karen L. Folster, Comment, Just Cheap Butts, or an Equal Protection Violation?: New
York’s Failure to Tax Reservation Sales to Non-Indians, 62 Alb. L. Rev. 697, 707–08 (1998);
supra note 721.
734
The tribes were authorized by their constitution to tax cigarette sales within the reservation, but they had not done so at the time of the litigation. Brief for the Appellees (and CrossAppellants), Moe, supra note 659, at *10.
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Left unaddressed was the effect of the Montana tax on the Tribes’ economic
development and whether that violated Williams v. Lee.735 Indian livelihoods
were presumably affected, with indirect consequences for the Tribe.736 These
issues were presented in the next cigarette tax case the Court would hear,
Colville.
i. An Alternative: Drawing a Line Between the Right to Impose a Tax and
the Obligation of a Vendor to Collect a Tax.
With the benefit of hindsight, the Indians might have been better off drawing
a line between Montana’s right to tax a transaction occurring on the reservation and its right to make a vendor collect the State’s use tax on cigarettes sold
to non-Indians.737 The analogy would be with a state’s right to make an outof-state vendor collect that state’s use tax even if it could not make that same
vendor collect the state’s sales tax.738 This distinction would make no difference in Moe, where collecting the Montana tax eliminated the tax advantage
of on-reservation purchases, but would be of substantial significance in cases
735
The State’s brief contained a cryptic reference to the tribal council approving the purchase
of cigarettes for resale by tribal members and “charg[ing] an administrative fee for the service.”
Brief for the Appellants, Moe, supra note 672, at *6. The brief did not mention how much
was raised by this fee. The Tribes’ brief also refers to this administrative fee without giving
the amount. Brief for the Appellees (and Cross-Appellants), Moe, supra note 659, at *10. The
Court did not mention this fee.
The Court also showed little concern for the vendors located off-reservation who presumably were losing much business because of the tax-free sale of cigarettes on-reservation. See,
e.g., Folster, supra note 733, at 710, indicating that off-reservation vendors were losing about
$1 billion a year in sales.
736
In Colville, the Court described Moe as establishing the principle that a state may impose
a nondiscriminatory tax on non-Indian customers even if it “seriously disadvantages or eliminates the Indian retailer’s business with non-Indians.” 447 U.S. 134, 151 (1980). Moe had the
effect of closing numerous smokeshops around the country, along with the resulting unemployment. See, e.g., Gene Mustain, Defiant Tribes of the Seneca Nation and Two Other Tribes
Have Refused to Accept a State Tax Deal Designed to Level the Playing Field Between Indian
and Upstate Merchants, N.Y. Daily News (May 4, 1997), available at www.nydailynews.com/
archives/news/1997/05/04/1997-05-04_defiant_tribes_the_seneca_na.html (last visited Sept.
20, 2010); David B. Caruso, Indian Smoke Shops Feeling Heat on Taxes, REZNET, available at
www.reznetnews.org/article/Indian-smoke-shops-feeling-heat-taxes-39180 (last visited Sept.
20, 2010).
737
Because Montana does not have a general sales tax, it does not have a use tax. Montana,
however, makes it a misdemeanor for a resident to consume a cigarette within the state “taken
from a package that does not bear the required” stamps (referred to as an “insignia” in the
statutes). Mont. Code Ann. § 16-11-133 (2005). See supra note 713.
738
Compare the companion cases of McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944), and
General Trading Co. v. Iowa, 322 U.S. 335 (1944). In Dilworth, Justice Frankfurter refused
to require an out-of-state vendor to collect the sales tax levied by the customer’s home state
whereas in General Trading, under nearly identical circumstances, he required the out-of-state
vendor to collect the home state’s use tax imposed on the customer. Once the Court cleared the
way for states to require out of-state vendors to collect the use tax, little litigation subsequently
occurred on the requirements for requiring the collection of a sales tax. Justice Rehnquist does
not address this issue. See also Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 104.
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where the tax at issue would not be collected by an Indian or a tribe on
behalf of the ultimate taxpayer. This distinction would have established (or
reinforced) the proposition that a state does not have the power to tax transactions occurring in Indian country between the Indians and third-parties,739
whether the third parties are Indians, as was true in Moe, or non-Indians.
This distinction would be of critical importance in the case of income taxes,
severance taxes, property taxes, and other so-called direct taxes, as opposed to
indirect taxes like sales tax.
2. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation,740 the Tribes
purposely operated their own smokeshops from which they earned profits,
and also taxed the sale of cigarettes, generating another source of revenue.741
The Tribes could thus demonstrate how they were directly affected by the
Washington tax.742 Several issues were presented, but the most significant
according to the Court was whether the Tribal taxes or the Tribes’ earning
revenue from the smokeshops “ousted” the State of Washington’s cigarette
tax on purchases by nonmembers of the Tribes.743 The legal incidence of the
Washington tax was on the purchaser.744 Colville was a splintered opinion
739
In its next major cigarette case, Colville, see infra notes 740–915 and accompanying text,
the Court refers to Thomas v. Gay as rejecting the essence of this proposition. See infra 846–56
and accompanying text.
740
447 U.S. 134 (1980). The consolidated cases involved the Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Reservation, Makah, and Lummi Tribes, and the Yakima Indian Nation.
741
Dean Getches states that after Moe, “several tribes restructured their operations, making
it easier to demonstrate the impact of state taxation.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14,
at 1601. The Colville Tribes were one of those. “Prior to the time Moe reached the Supreme
Court, the Colville Tribes, aware of the dangers posed by the sparse facts of Moe, carefully constructed a tribal tobacco enterprise utilizing the protection of every available element of federal
and Indian law.” Pirtle, et al., supra note 19, at 28.
742
The Court described the Indian dealers as making a large majority of their sales to nonIndian residents of nearby communities who bought on the reservation especially to take
advantage of the claimed exemption from the state taxes. The savings of approximately $1 per
carton, “makes the trip worthwhile. All parties agree that if the State were able to tax sales by
Indian smokeshops and eliminate that $1 saving, the stream of non-Indian bargain hunters
would dry up.” Colville, 447 U.S. at 145.
Colville also involved Washington’s motor vehicle, mobile home, camper, and travel trailer
taxes. The State conceded that it could not impose these taxes on vehicles used wholly within
the reservation. Id. at 162 n.29. In a very short part of the opinion, the Court struck down
these taxes, relying on Moe. Id. at 163.
743
Id. at 138. Washington also imposed its general five percent sales tax on the sale of tangible personal property to the sale of cigarettes. Id. at 145. Because of Moe, this tax did not
apply to on-reservation sales to reservation Indians. Id. at 150–51.
744
Id. at 142 n.9. The Tribes disputed this interpretation of the statute, arguing the legal
incidence was on them. Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, Colville, supra note 108, at *122.
Washington also imposed a products tax on cigars and pipe tobacco. Wash. Rev. Code, §
82.26. The district court concluded that that tax fell upon the Indian sellers and not upon
the non-Indian purchasers. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington,
446 F. Supp. 1339, 1355 n.15 (E.D. Wash. 1978), rev’d, 447 U.S. 134 (1980). The State did
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with Justice White writing for the majority, and Justices Rehnquist, Brennan,
and Stewart writing separate concurrences and dissents.745
a. Why Moe Did Not Resolve Colville.
Moe did not resolve Colville for six reasons: (1) unlike in Moe, the Tribes
here imposed their own taxes on cigarette sales and obtained further revenues
by participating in the cigarette enterprise at the wholesale or retail level,746
and could demonstrate that they were directly affected by the Washington
tax;747 (2) there was no claim in Moe that reservation smokeshops were put
out of business but in Colville the lower court found that the combination
of Tribal and Washington taxes would “destroy” the cigarette business;748 (3)
not appeal from this holding and agreed that this tax could not be imposed on sales by tribal
dealers. Colville, 447 U.S. at 140 n.2; Appellants’ Opening Brief, Colville, 447 U.S. 134 (No.
78-630), 1979 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1817, at *93. The district court also upheld the sales
tax as applied to sales of goods to non-Indians other than cigarettes. The Tribes did not contest
this holding presumably because the heart of their litigating strategy was that the tribal sales
tax on cigarettes ousted the state tax.
The State never contended that: it could impose its excise taxes on reservation Indians with
respect to activities taking place solely within reservations boundaries; the land, whether held
in fee or trust, or in any restricted status, made any difference regarding the tax liability of
Indian retailers; or congressional consent to the state assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations pursuant to Public Law 280 included the assumption of state taxing jurisdiction over Indian tribes and Indians residing on the reservation. Brief of Appellants,
Colville, 447 U.S. 134 (No. 78-630), 1979 WL 200126, at *55.
745
According to Dean Getches, the “Court did not reach its decision easily. The case was
vigorously debated . . . from almost the opening day of the 1979 Term until its close in June,
1980.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1602. Apparently, Justice Brennan drafted what
he thought was going to be the majority opinion, denying Washington the right to tax all reservation sales to Indians. Brennan initially wrote that non-member Indians should be treated
the same as members. Id. at 1603 n.129.
746
The Tribes’ brief also stated that in Colville there was a more comprehensive pattern of
tribal regulation than in Moe. See Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, Colville, supra note 108, at
*86–88. The Court did not address this distinction.
As more fully discussed in Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005),
infra notes 1290–1358 and accompanying text, a tribe that acts simultaneously as a taxing
sovereign as well as an entrepreneur might gain nothing economically from imposing a tax. In
other words, whether the tribe receives $20 in tax and $80 in profit or $100 in profit and no
tax is economically the same. Under such circumstances, double taxation is a formal argument
because the injury a tribe is complaining about is the impact of the state tax on economic activity on the reservation. And that impact is the same whether a tribe has $100 in profits and no
tax or $80 in profits and $20 in tax.
747
In Moe, the tribes received revenue from an “administrative fee.” See supra note 735. In
Colville, Washington argued that this fee meant that Moe was indistinguishable from Colville
because tribal revenue was actually at stake in each case. See Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes,
supra note 108, at *50. The district court in Moe did not view the fee as tantamount to a tax
stating that “the tribes have not imposed any tax on the cigarettes sold in the smokeshops.”
Confederated Salish of Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue,
392 F. Supp. 1325, 1313 (D. Mont. 1975).
748
See Brief for the United States, Colville, supra note 696, at *26–27. The Tribes’ expert
witness testified that if the tribal and state excise taxes were applied to sales on the reservation,
the Indian stores “would have a price disadvantage and could no longer successfully compete
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the Tribes documented that cigarette revenues financed tribal services;749 (4)
Washington required a more onerous level of record keeping than Montana
did in Moe;750 (5) Moe left open the question of whether a state could tax purchases by Indians who were not members of the taxing tribe (no disagreement
existed that a state could not tax sales to tribal members);751 and (6) Washington seized shipments of unstamped cigarettes en route to the reservation from
wholesalers outside the state.752
b. “Rehabilitating” the Indian Commerce Clause
As in Moe, the Court was also faced with an initial jurisdictional issue involving whether a three-judge federal court was properly convened below under
section 2281.753 In response to Justice Rehnquist’s footnote in Moe, which
perhaps was a conscious attempt to inter the Indian Commerce Clause,754
Justice White engaged in a rehabilitation of sorts:755
There is language in that [Moe] footnote, however, which suggests that the
insubstantiality of Commerce Clause756 claims such as those before us flows
from [Mescalero and McClanahan]—both of which were decided before the
present suits were filed . . . . Neither Mescalero nor McClanahan “inescapably
render[s] the [Tribes’ Commerce Clause] claims frivolous” because neither
with nearby cigarette retailers located off the Reservation.” Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes,
Colville, supra note 108, at *110. The district court felt that the “State tacitly concedes the
Tribes’ source of cigarette tax revenue would dry up if they were forced to add the State tax to
the costs of their cigarettes. . . . Thus, each tribe’s ability to fund its sponsored programs would
suffer substantial interference.” Id.; see also id. at *88–89. But see supra note 746.
749
The tax revenues were devoted in part to social services, such as a home for the elderly and
alcohol rehabilitation. Pirtle, et al. supra note 19, at 29.
750
See infra notes 822–25 and accompanying text.
751
Initially, Washington asserted that it could tax all tribal cigarette sales, even if the buyer
were an Indian. The State based this argument on its acceptance of civil jurisdiction under
Public Law 280. After this theory was rejected in Bryan v. Itasca County, Washington abandoned the argument with respect to tribal members. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 142 n.8 (1980).
752
Despite these considerable differences, Justice White thought that the Court in Moe “considered a state taxing scheme remarkably similar” to Colville. 447 U.S. at 150. Although the
Court does address the differences, the statement may offer an insight into White’s mindset.
See also John Fredericks III, State Regulation in Indian Country: The Supreme Court’s Marketing
Exemptions Concept, A Judicial Sword Through the Heart of Tribal Self-Determination, 50 Mont.
L. Rev. 49, 50 (“Colville was factually similar to Moe.”).
753
See supra notes 687–93 and accompanying text.
754
See supra note 689.
755
The Tribes’ briefs also emphasized the importance of the Indian Commerce Clause. In a
scholarly section of the brief authored by Professor Clinton, the Tribes argued that the state tax
was prohibited by the Indian Commerce Clause. Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, supra note
108, at *69–90. In an attempt to distinguish Moe, the brief argued that the Indian Commerce
Clause refers to “Tribes” and not “Indians.” Moe involved an Indian and not a tribe. Id. at *81.
This was a clever way to distinguish Moe, but was without any support in the case law. See
supra note 171.
756
Like Rehnquist in Moe, White does not distinguish between the Indian Commerce
Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause. Presumably he means the former.
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holds that that Clause is wholly without force in situations like the present.
And even [the Moe footnote] merely rejects the stark and rather unhelpful
notion that the Commerce Clause provides an “automatic exemptio[n] as
a matter of constitutional law” in such cases. It does not take that Clause
entirely out of play in the field of state regulation of Indian affairs.757

White’s rehabilitation takes on even more force because he wrote Mescalero.
But as will be seen, his comment was more rhetoric than reality.
c. The Right of a Tribe to Impose Its Own Tax
Turning to the merits of the case, the Court first rejected Washington’s argument that the Tribes had no power to impose their cigarette taxes on nontribal
purchasers.758 Justice White acknowledged that the “power to tax transactions
occurring on trust lands and significantly involving a tribe or its members is
a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested
of it by federal law or necessary implications of their dependent status.”759
Unfortunately for the Indians, he did not stop there and proceeded to condition this “fundamental attribute of sovereignty.” The power of taxation may
be exercised over nonmembers so far as they accept “privileges of trade, residence, etc., to which taxes may be attached as conditions.”760 This tension in
the source of the power of taxation—whether it is an inherent power or one
conditioned on the consent of the persons taxed—would remain unresolved
until Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe761 clarified that taxation is an “an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary instrument of
757
Colville, 447 U.S. at 147–48. The Court also found that the Tribes’ attack on the seizure
of cigarettes bound for the reservation presented a sufficient Indian Commerce Clause argument to support the convening of a three-judge panel. Id. at 148–49.
The Tribes’ briefs limited the reference to “automatic” in the Moe footnote to situations
involving discrimination or infringement on tribal government. “Notwithstanding the lack
of any automatic constitutional exemption for Indians generally, a constitutional violation is
shown when a tribe demonstrates either discrimination against Indian commerce by state law
or state impairment of the political and economic relations of the tribal governments themselves.” Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, supra note 108, at *113.
758
The term “nontribal purchasers” presumably encompassed both non-member Indians
and non-Indians. This argument was directed at the Colville, Makah, and Lummi Tribes, the
legal incidence of whose tax fell on the purchaser. The legal incidence of the Yakima tax did not
fall on the purchaser. Colville, 447 U.S. at 152 n.28. White also perfunctorily dismissed the
argument that federal statutes and treaties preempted the Washington tax. Id. at 155.
759
Id. at 152. In a 2001 case striking down a Navajo hotel occupancy tax applied to nonmembers staying at a non-Indian owned hotel on non-Indian fee land located within the
reservation, the Court emphasized the narrowness of the Colville excerpt in the text, stressing
the reference to “trust land” and “significantly involving a tribe or its members.” Atkinson
Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 653 (2001). See supra note 331; infra notes 592, 759,
762, 880, 1075.
760
Colville, 447 U.S. at 153. Justice White allowed for the possibility that tribal powers in
general might be “divested” because of the Tribe’s dependent status. Divestiture might occur if
tribal sovereignty were inconsistent with the “overriding interests of the National Government.”
White’s examples of divestiture involved only non-tax cases. Id. at 153–54.
761
455 U.S. 130 (1982), discussed infra notes 1058–1130 and accompanying text.
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self-government and territorial management.”762
762
Id. Merrion put into sharp focus the difference in how the power of taxation is conceptualized. The taxpayers in Merrion had entered into a lease to exploit resources on the reservation.
Id. at 135. Many years later, the Tribe adopted a severance tax, which it sought to impose on
Merrion. Because the power of taxation was held to be an inherent attribute of sovereignty, the
Court upheld the tax. Id. at 136, 159. For earlier cases upholding Indian taxes on narrower
grounds, see Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1905), and Morris v. Hitchcock, 194
U.S. 384 (1904). Merrion held that the power to tax “derives from the tribe’s general authority,
as sovereign, to control economic activity within its jurisdiction, and to defray the cost of providing governmental services by requiring contributions from persons or enterprises engaged
in economic activities within that jurisdiction.” 455 U.S. at 137. But see Atkinson Trading Co.
v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001), supra notes 331, 592, 759, 762; infra notes 880, 1075, which
may limit Merrion.
Professor Ansson reports that taxation is one of the six inherent powers that tribes possess.
The others are: “the power to determine form of government, the power to define conditions
for membership, power to administer justice and enforce laws, the power to regulate domestic
relations of its members, and the power to regulate property use.” Richard J. Ansson, Jr., State
Taxation of Non-Indians Whom do Business With Indian Tribes: Why Several Recent Ninth Circuit
Holdings Reemphasize the Need for Indian Tribes to Enter into Taxation Compacts with their
Respective State, 78 Or. L. Rev. 501, 502 (1999).
In Merrion, the Secretary of the Interior had approved the tribal taxes. In Kerr-McGee Corp.
v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195 (1985), a non-Indian taxpayer attacked the right of the Navajos
to impose a business activities tax and a possessory interest tax without the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior. The Navajos had never adopted a constitution pursuant to the IRA.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, held that such approval was not required.
“The [IRA] does not provide that a tribal constitution must condition the power to tax on
Secretarial approval. Indeed the terms of the IRA do not govern tribes, like the Navajo, which
declined to accept its provisions.” Id. at 198. Even tribes that have constitutions dependent on
government approval of their taxes can amend such constitutions to remove that requirement.
Id. at 199. The government is “firmly committed” to tribal self-government and the power to
tax is “an essential attribute of such self-government.” Id. at 201. The Court recognized that
tribal governments can achieve “independence from the Federal Government only by financing their own police force, school and social programs.” Id. at 201. The Court also emphasized
that Congress could if it wanted erect “checkpoints that must be cleared before a Tribal Tax can
take effect.” Id. at 198 (citing Merrion, 455 U.S. at 155).
Upon receipt of the decision in Kerr-McGee, the Navajo Tribal Council declared that day
to be a holiday known as “Navajo Nation Sovereignty Day.” Krakoff, supra note 12, at 1166.
Professor Williams, however, issues a dissenting view about the case.

The Navajos have assumed the essential trappings of a ‘civilized’ government that
lend to their actions a legitimacy no longer requiring, perhaps, the closely monitored
federal supervision present in Merrion. They vote like the white man, they elect their
representatives like the white man, they tax like the white man. They even provide
the same type bureaucratic judicial morass to dissatisfied taxpayers as the white man.
Therefore, they must be possessed of a similar normative vision as the white man.
Williams, Algebra, supra note 216, at 283. See also Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S.
645 (2001), discussed supra notes 331, 759, 762; infra notes 880, 1075, which appears to
curtail Merrion by conditioning the taxation of non-Indians on their consent, at least in some
circumstances.
Professor Krakoff thinks that the combination of Atkinson and Hicks, discussed supra notes
269, 331; infra notes 830, 1075, 1077, means that “tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians exists
only in very limited circumstances.” Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time:
Judicial Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 1177, 1233 (2001).
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d. The Washington Tax Is Not Preempted by Either the Tribal Tax or Federal
Statutes
After upholding the power of the Tribes to impose their own tax, the Court
turned to their principal argument. The Tribes argued that their taxation and
operation of the cigarette business ousted the Washington tax. They conceded that most purchasers were non-Indians looking to buy cigarettes free of
the State tax. If both the tribal and the Washington tax applied,763 however,
reservation sales would be at a competitive disadvantage and substantial revenues would be forfeited, revenues that were financing essential governmental services including programs to combat poverty and underdevelopment.764
Because of the threat to tribal revenue,765 the Tribes alleged that the Washington tax was pre-empted by federal statutes regulating Indian affairs,766 was
As referred to above, this “double tax” argument was a formal one. See supra note 746.
Colville, 447 U.S. at 154.
765
The Court agreed that
763
764

Indian tobacco dealers make a large majority of their sales to non-Indians—residents
of nearby communities who journey to the reservation especially to take advantage
of the claimed tribal exemption from the state . . . taxes . . . All parties agree that if
the State were able to tax sales by Indian smokeshops . . . the stream of non-Indian
bargain hunters would dry up. In short, the Indian retailer’s business is to a substantial degree dependent upon his tax-exempt status, and if he loses that status his sales
will fall off sharply.
Id. at 145.
766
These statutes included the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, the Indian Financing Act
of 1974, the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, and the Indian
Trader statutes. Colville, 447 U.S. at 155.
The Solicitor General’s brief made a broader sovereignty argument:
[The rights of the Yakima Nation] to govern within its diminished territory free of
State interference is not a privilege conferred by federal law, but, rather, the residuum of aboriginal sovereignty—the role of treaties and statutes being primarily to
limit, territorially or otherwise, the extent of tribal autonomy . . . This approach
is, moreover, consistent with the Court’s tradition of treating interference with the
right of tribal self-government as an independent ground for excluding the application of State law, separate from a conflict with federal legislation. E.g., [Mescalero,
McClanahan, Moe].
Brief for the United States, Colville, supra note 696, at *44–45.
These cases would not seem to support the argument. Mescalero had nothing to do with
taxation on a reservation, and Moe relied on McClanahan, which relied on the 1868 Treaty and
the Arizona Enabling Act. Id. at *45 n.5.
The government once again emphasized the Indian Commerce Clause:
The analysis is simply that the Constitution itself—as exemplified in the Indian
Commerce Clause—ousts State jurisdiction over all matter within Indian Reservations
that significantly touch tribal interests and reserves that area for federal regulation.
This is, in effect, the approach of [Worcester] as “modified” in Williams v. Lee . . . Or
more modestly, it can be said that State law is pre-empted when the tribe, acting
within the sphere of its residual sovereignty, has “occupied the field.”. . . In neither
case, however, is it strictly necessary to invoke “particular treaties and specific federal
statutes.”. . . Rather, the doctrine has been described as deriving from a “general preTax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4

01-Pomp.indd 1085

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=244384612/23/2010

11:03:47 AM

1086

SECTION OF TAXATION

inconsistent with the principles of tribal self-government, and was invalid
under the negative implications of the Indian Commerce Clause.767 With
respect to that Clause, the Tribes argued that the Washington tax “interferes
with prerogatives concerning relations with the tribes which are constitutionally reserved exclusively to the federal government.”768 Accordingly, they
challenged the right of Washington to levy the tax on non-Indians in the first
place, regardless of whether they had a Tribal tax or whether federal statutes
existed that would preempt the tax. Rehnquist never addressed that issue in
Moe.
Justice White, however, shared the same tax avoidance mindset that dominated the Moe analysis. He thought the Tribes had no more claim to the
moral high ground than did the tribes in Moe. The Court viewed the Tribes
in each case as merely asserting the right to market a tax exemption.
Had White wanted, he could have limited Moe. The impact on the Tribes
was less immediate in Moe, which is why the Colville Tribes restructured
their cigarette taxes.769 Compared to Colville, tribal revenues in Moe were
not directly affected because the Tribes were not directly involved in the sale
of cigarettes: they did not tax such sales and did not act as a retailer or distributor. Moe could have been distinguished and limited on this ground with

emption analysis” that builds on broad principles of allocation of powers and duties
with respect to Indians as between federal and State authority.
Id. at *46.
767
Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, supra note 108, at *5. The Solicitor General proposed a
simple analytical framework.
For the usual case in which State regulation or taxation directly reaches non-Indians
within a Reservation but also touches tribal interests, the controlling principle was
summarized two decades ago in Williams v. Lee . . . To this basic rule we need only
add that State jurisdiction will also be defeated if it invades an area preempted by
federal regulation, or tribal regulation authorized by federal law.
Brief for the United States, Colville, supra note 696, at *25.
768
Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, supra note 108, at *30. The Tribes characterized Worcester
v. Georgia as “specifically premised upon the negative implications of the Indian Commerce
Clause.” Id.
The appellants in their brief argue that the State of Washington should be given plenary authority to regulate the Indian tribes in their own regulation and taxation of
on-reservation tobacco sales to Indians and non-Indians. The power to regulate trade
with the Indian Tribes, however, is textually committed to Congress by [the Indian
Commerce Clause]. The appellants ask for nothing less than a judicial amendment
to the Constitution so as to empower the States, or at least Washington State, to
regulate trade with the Indian tribes. What the appellants seek is the evil the Indian
Commerce Clause was designed to avert.
Brief of Amici Curiae Quinalt Indian Nation, Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (No. 78-630), 1979 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 1314, at *15–16.
769
See supra notes 653, 741–52 and accompanying text.
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Colville viewed as presenting a new question.770
The reality, however, is that Moe already had a negative effect on the smokeshops, with the concomitant secondary and tertiary effects on a tribe’s economy. After Moe, the smokeshops could, of course, continue selling exempt
cigarettes to Tribal members. But non-Indians, who paid a “new” state tax,
would no longer have an incentive to go out of their way to purchase nowtaxable cigarettes on the reservation if they could buy identically taxed cigarettes closer to home. If the smokeshops were a major source of employment
for reservation Indians, the negative spillover effects on economic development were obvious.
The Colville majority had no interest in distinguishing or limiting Moe; it
viewed the Tribes in each case as co-conspirators in tax avoidance:
It is painfully apparent that the value marketed by the smokeshops to persons coming from outside is not generated on the reservations by activities
in which the Tribes have a significant interest. What the smokeshops offer
these customers, and what is not available elsewhere, is solely an exemption
from state taxation.771 . . . We do not believe that principles of federal Indian
law, whether stated in terms of pre-emption, tribal self-government, or otherwise, authorize Indian tribes thus to market an exemption from state taxation to persons who would normally do their business elsewhere.772

770
The Tribes’ brief argued that “in Moe there was no showing that imposition of the state
tax would have any impact on the Tribes whatsoever.” Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, supra
note 108, at *52. The majority dismissed this difference between the two cases in a footnote:
“Moe makes clear that the Tribes have no vested right to a certain volume of sales to nonIndians, or indeed to any such sales at all.” Colville, 447 U.S. at 151 n.27. Professor Milner
Ball thinks the Court “appears impatient with any delay in prosecution of the subtle state tax
war on the tribes.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 109.
771
Anna-Marie Tabor notes,

This attitude may reflect in part the Court’s attitude toward the cigarette business
at issue in Colville. It may also be symptomatic of a general distrust for taxation
and a belief that the right to impose taxes must be earned by the sovereign power.
The Court failed, however, to explain why tax-based competition would be any less
appropriate between a tribe and a state than it would be between two states, appearing to hold tribal taxation to a different and higher standard than state taxation.
Anna-Marie Tabor, Sovereignty in the Balance: Taxation by Tribal Governments, 15 U. Fla. J. L.
& Pub. Pol’y 349, 369 (2004).
Professor Milner Ball is undoubtedly correct in thinking that the quoted language in the
text “is a repetition of the pejorative reference in the earlier Moe case to Indian sellers profiting
from purchasers who were willing to flout their obligation.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7,
at 107.
772
Colville, 447 U.S. at 155. “Capital-poor, thinly populated, and short on transportation
and communications infrastructure, tribes can do little to attract new business ventures other
than to create local regulatory and tax advantages.” Barsh, Reservation Wealth, supra note 5, at
572. These constraints would also describe many small developing countries.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4
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Notably missing from this list was the Indian Commerce Clause,773 but it
was clear that nothing other than a direct federal mandate would convince
the Court that the sales to non-Indians were immunized from tax.
An additional fear motivated the Court. If a tribal tax were to oust the
state tax, what would keep the Tribes from imposing a trivial sales tax and
operating gas stations, liquor stores, and department stores on the reservation
free of the Washington sales tax?774 Could a tribal cigarette tax or sales tax of
773
Perhaps the Court thought that the reference to “pre-emption” encompassed the Indian
Commerce Clause.
774
See Colville, 447 U.S. at 155. The Tribes’ brief stated that “it is a common feature of state
tax programs to set lower tax rates relative to surrounding states in order to encourage business
or industry to locate in that state. Indian tribes should not be denied the same instruments of
policy which are commonplace among the states.” Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, supra note
108, at 63 n.38.
Some commentators have criticized the Court for not appreciating that the states routinely
engage in marketing tax incentives through the use of tax holidays, credits, exemptions, and
other special provisions, and therefore the Indians should not be singled out for criticism. See,
e.g., John Fredericks III, State Regulation in Indian Country: The Supreme Court’s Marketing
Exemptions Concept, A Judicial Sword Through the Heart of Tribal Self-Determination, 50 Mont.
L. Rev. 49, 64 (1989). These incentives have been attacked as violating the dormant Interstate
Commerce Clause, but the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to rule on them. The closest it came
was DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, which challenged Ohio’s tax incentives in part on the
grounds that they were an unconstitutional discrimination against interstate commerce. 547
U.S. 332, 338 (2006). The Court never reached the merits in that case, holding that the plaintiffs did not have standing. Id.
A state adopting a tax incentive voluntarily concedes part of its tax base in the short-term;
the hope is that the incentive encourages so much new economic activity that would not otherwise have occurred that the increased tax revenue will offset the cost of the incentive in forgone taxes. Colville did not involve the Tribe conceding its own tax base. As the Court viewed
Colville, the Tribe was trying to give away the State’s tax base, an entirely different matter. Of
course, when a state like Delaware chooses not to have a sales tax, it attracts purchasers from
other states. If these purchasers do not voluntarily pay the use tax when they return home, the
result is that Delaware is negatively impacting other states’ revenues, the way a tribe would be
doing if it could sell cigarettes free of state tax.
Professor Taylor claims that “the Supreme Court, under a due process line of analysis, permits tax-free interstate catalogue, mail-order, and internet sales of goods.” Taylor, Onslaught,
supra note 534, at 961. This statement contains two minor errors. First, the Court has ruled
in Quill v. North Dakota that the Due Process Clause requires remote vendors that purposely
avail themselves of a state’s marketplace to collect the sales or use tax on such transactions,
but only if the “substantial nexus” requirement of the Commerce Clause is satisfied. 504 U.S.
298 (1992). Remote vendors of the type referred to by Professor Taylor are purposely availing
themselves of the marketplace; hence, it is the Commerce Clause and not the Due Process
Clause that is the rub. Second, the Court has clearly held that the consumer is obligated to pay
the use tax on the transaction so that there is no “tax-free” purchase; the issue is whether the
vendor can be required to collect that tax on the sale, which was one of the issues in Moe and
Colville. With the exception of goods that have to be registered (e.g., cars, planes, boats) and
purchases by businesses (at least the larger ones), most purchasers do not voluntarily pay the
use tax. See Pomp, supra note 177, at 6-36 to 6-39.
Had Colville been decided in favor of the Tribes, a non-Indian could buy goods at a reservation department store free of the Washington sales tax. The consumer would, however, be
subject to Washington’s use tax. See Wash. Rev. Code § 82.12.020 (2010). “There is levied
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0.0001%, for example, oust a state tax?775 The line-drawing and compliance
problems were obvious, at least to a Court that had already upheld a Montana
tax on sales to non-Indians in Moe.
The Tribes cited numerous statutes and treaties they claimed preempted
Washington’s taxes. This argument became relevant only once the Court
rejected the Tribes’ position that the State had no power in the first place to
levy a tax. Justice White had no trouble rejecting the authorities the Tribes
identified: the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,776 the Indian Financing
and collected from every person in this state a tax or excise for the privilege of using within
this state as a consumer any: (a) Article of tangible personal property acquired by the user in
any manner . . . .” Id. § 82.12.020(1). Voluntary compliance with the use tax by individuals is
low and Washington would want the use tax collected by the department store. The question
would then become whether the Tribe could be required to collect the State’s use tax, even
though Washington would not have been able to tax sales on the reservation (had Colville been
decided in favor of the Tribes). As suggested in the text, see notes 737–39 and accompanying
text, the Court could have held in Moe that a state has no right to tax sales made on the reservation, whether to Indians, non-member Indians, or non-Indians, but that the use tax nonetheless had to be collected by the vendor. That would eliminate the fear of massive tax avoidance.
This result would not appease the Indians because it would deprive them of the tax advantage
they were seeking, but it would establish an important principle that would benefit them in
cases involving other types of taxes, such as income taxes, severance taxes, or property taxes
where a consumer is not seeking the advantage of not paying a sales tax on a purchase.
Suppose, however, that a tribal vendor were required to collect the Washington use tax but
refused. Tribal sovereign immunity would prevent a suit by the State against a tribe. Okla. Tax
Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 514 (1991). The Court
has suggested that a state could enforce its cigarette tax without proceeding directly against
a tribe—which it cannot do—by: proceeding against individuals as agents of the tribe for
failing to collect the tax; collecting taxes from wholesalers off-reservation; seizing cigarettes
off-reservation; entering into collection arrangements with a tribe; or seeking Congressional
legislation. Id. See, for example, Dep’t of Taxation & Finance v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., where
the Court upheld New York’s use of quotas on untaxed cigarettes shipped to the reservations
based on “probable demand” for cigarettes by Indians. 512 U.S. 61, 76 (1994). The Supreme
Court reversed the lower court, which found that the regulatory scheme violated the Indian
Trader statutes. “The ‘balance of state, federal, and tribal interests in this area’ thus leaves more
room for state regulation than in others.” Id. at 73 (citation omitted); see also Snyder v. Wetzler,
603 N.Y.S.2d 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 644 N.E.2d 1369 (N.Y. 1994); State ex rel.
Okla. Tax Comm’n, 815 P.2d 667 (Okla. 1991); Gord v. Wash. Dept. of Revenue, 749 P.2d
678 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987). Some of these approaches could be extended to the department
store hypothetical.
Professor Ansson notes that after the Potawatomi decision, supra, state and tribes began
entering into cigarette compacts. Ansson, supra note 432, at 545.
775
Justice Brennan in dissent stated that “these fears are substantially overdrawn,” but did
not offer any specific reasons for his insouciance. Colville, 447 U.S. at 173.
776
For a discussion of the Indian Reorganization Act, see Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411
U.S. 145, 150–52 (1973). According to Howard, one of that Act’s sponsors, “[t]he program
of self-support and of business and civic experience in the management of their own affairs,
combined with the program of education, will permit increasing numbers of Indians to enter
the white world on a footing of equal competition.” Id. at 152 (quoting 78 Cong. Rec. 11,732
(1934) (remarks of Rep. Howard)). Washington’s brief repeated this quote and asked how that
goal would be “served by providing the Indian[s] with a huge competitive advantage over nonIndian cigarette retailers?” Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 744, at *81.
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Act of 1974, the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of
1975, the Washington Enabling Act, and treaties. He concluded that while
these showed a “congressional concern with fostering tribal self-government
and economic development, none goes so far as to grant tribal enterprises selling goods to nonmembers an artificial competitive advantage over all other
businesses in a State.”777 The inference was that Washington had the right to
tax unless prohibited by Congress. Had the State only the powers given to it
by the government, White would have noted that none of the federal statutes
had anything to do with taxes.778
White held that the Washington Enabling Act immunized reservation land
and land-derived income from tax by the State;779 at issue here, however, were
sales taxes assessed against nonmembers of the Tribe.780 There were no treaties
directly on point.
e. Rejection of Warren Trading
Justice White also had no trouble dismissing the Indian Trader statutes discussed in Warren Trading.781 In Moe, Rehnquist’s treatment of Warren Trading was wrong on most points782 but ultimately right in its conclusion that
the Indian Trader statutes governed only sales to Indians and not sales to
non-Indians. But that interpretation had no relevance in Colville where the
issue was not non-Indians, but rather nonmember Indians. The Indian Trader
statutes do not distinguish between member and nonmember Indians, refer777
Colville, 447 U.S. at 155. He also dispensed with the Washington Enabling Act as having
nothing to do with nonmembers of the Tribes. Id. at 156. It is not clear in this context whether
Justice White was using the term “nonmembers of the Tribes,” to mean non-Indians and nonmember Indians, or only non-member Indians.
778
Dean Getches describes White as dealing with the preemption argument in “a conclusory
way”:

It took him less than a page to dismiss five federal statutes and several treaties alleged
to be in conflict with the state’s taxation of reservation sales. The gist of the decision was that the tribe should not be able to use its sovereign status to its economic
advantage . . . .
Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1604. More fundamentally, a preemption analysis
assumes the state has the right to tax unless prohibited by Congress.
Professor Milner Ball finds an “impressive array of federal legislation regulating Indian
commerce, supporting tribal economic development, prohibiting Washington from taxing
reservation land and income, approving the tribal tax ordinance, and sanctioning tribal selfgovernment. Even so, Justice White found no preemption of the state tax.” Ball, Constitution,
supra note 7, at 108.
779
Colville, 447 U.S. at 156. Justice White did not quote the Enabling Act, but it does not
refer to income.
780
Id. Professor Fletcher notes that the Court is “suspicious of the authority asserted by
Indian tribes over nonmembers.” Fletcher, Supreme Court, supra note 14, at 163. The “Court
has acted to protect the economic interests of non-Indians, non-Indian-owned companies, and
the tax base of state and local governments—all at the direct expense of tribal economic and
taxation interests.” Id.
781
Colville, 447 U.S. at 155–56.
782
See supra notes 725–32 and accompanying text.
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ring only to “Indians.”783 Moreover, the congressional intent of protecting
the Indians from being defrauded784 would apply to nonmember Indians as
well. Both the language and intent of the statutes would reject any distinction between member and nonmember Indians.785 Nonetheless, without any
783
25 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) provides that the Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall have the
sole power to make such rules and regulations as he may deem just and proper specifying the
prices at which goods are sold to the Indians.
784
H.R. Rep. No. 23-474, at 11 (1834), stated that the purpose of the Indian Trader statutes was to prevent the Indians from being defrauded. Central Machinery Co. v. Ariz. Tax
Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160, 163 (1980); see supra notes 476–79 and accompanying text.
785
More generally, the term “Indian” has no single definition. One possible origin of the
term was Christopher Columbus, who thought he had landed on parts of the Indies and called
the inhabitants Indians. Prucha, The Great Father, supra note 25, at 6.

As a general rule . . . there are two qualifications for a person to be considered an
Indian:
(1) the person has some Indian blood; and
(2) the person is recognized as an Indian by members of an Indian tribe or community.
Federal law defines “Indian” in many different ways. The Bureau of the Census defines
Indians as individuals who identify themselves as Indians. The BIA [Bureau of Indian
Affairs] generally defines an Indian as a person who:
(1) is a member of a tribe recognized by the federal government;
(2) lives on or near a reservation; and (3) is one-quarter or more Indian ancestry.
The Indian Education Act of 1988 uses a much broader definition that encompasses
people of one-eighth Indian ancestry, self-identified Indians, residents of state reservations, and urban Indians.
Comm. on Indian Affairs, The Tribal Nations of Montana: A Handbook for
Legislators 19 (1995), available at http://opi.mt.gov/pdf/TitleI/MTTribal.pdf. Condition
(2) of the BIA definition especially seems problematic.
The Office of American Indian Trust of the U.S. Department of the Interior comments
that:
It is important to understand the difference between the ethnological term “Indian”
and the political/legal term “Indian.” The protections and services provided by the
United States for tribal members flow not from an individual’s status as an American
Indian in an ethnological sense, but because the person is a member of a tribe recognized by the United States and with which the United States has a special trust
relationship. This special trust relationship entails certain legally enforceable rights
and responsibilities.
Frequently Asked Questions Concerning American Indians & Alaska Natives, U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., http://aspe.hhs.gov/SelfGovernance/faqs.htm (last visited Sept. 17,
2010).
According to the U.S. Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs, the term
“Native American” came into usage in the 1960s to denote the groups served by the BIA,
that is, American Indians and Alaska Natives (Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts of Alaska). Later,
some federal programs broadened the term to include Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders.
Many Indian groups objected to this subsequent expansion of the term. Today, the preferred
practice is to use individual tribal affiliations whenever possible, otherwise to use “American
Indian.” See id. Eskimos and Aleuts in Alaska, however, are two culturally distinct groups and
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analysis, Justice White merely announced that the statutes incorporated a
“congressional desire comprehensively to regulate businesses selling goods to
reservation Indians but no similar intent is evident with respect to sales by
Indians to nonmembers of the Tribe.”786 Of course, the statutory language
expressed exactly that intent.787
f. Inapplicability of Williams v. Lee (Again)
White was similarly dismissive of the Tribes’ Williams v. Lee argument. In
Moe, a Williams v. Lee argument was difficult because no tribal revenue was
directly at stake. In Colville, by contrast, the Indian taxes were purposely
are sensitive about being referred to as an “Indian”; instead, these groups prefer to be referred
to as “Alaska Native.” Id.; see also Stephen L. Pevar, The Rights of American Indians and
Their Tribes 1 n.* (2002) (preferring the term “Indian” to “Native American” because most
Indians and Indian organizations use the term “Indian,” and virtually all federal laws and agencies related to Indian affairs use “Indian”).
“The term ‘Indian Tribe’ means any Indian or Alaska Native tribe, band, nation, pueblo, village or community that the Secretary of the Interior acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe,”
25 U.S.C. § 479a (2006), pursuant to the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-454, § 102, 108 Stat. 4791, 4791 (1994); see also William C. Canby, Jr.,
American Indian Law in a Nutshell 4 (5th ed. 2009) (“At the most general level, a tribe is
simply a group of Indians that is recognized as constituting a distinct and historically continuous political entity for at least some governmental purposes.”).
Although the terms “Indian tribe” and “Indian nation” “have been used interchangeably in
Indian treaties and statutes[] . . . the term nation usually refers to a government independent
from any other government, possessing the power of absolute dominion over its territory and
people.” Pevar, supra, at 21. As such, Indian tribes are not nations because their autonomous power over their land and people has been limited by the federal government. See id.
Nevertheless, “[s]ome tribal governments prefer to call themselves nations rather than tribes,
often reflecting the belief that the United States has no right to exercise any power or authority
over them.” Id.
786
Colville, 447 U.S. at 155–56 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The Tribes’ Brief was
no more persuasive in Colville than in Moe on the Indian Trader issue. See supra notes 725–32
and accompanying text.
In Warren Trading Post, the Court held an Arizona tax on the gross proceeds of a
federal trader doing a retail trading business with Indians on the reservation to be preempted. In the instant case, the circumstances are reversed in that it involves Indian
federal traders selling to non-Indians, but the reasoning of this Court suggests that
the ultimate conclusion ought to be the same.
[S]ince the federal traders are Indians, the preemptive scope of the statutes should be
broader in scope.
Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, supra note 108, at 117–18. The Tribes’ Colville argument
repeated the same error made in Moe in focusing on the identity of the vendor rather than the
identity of the customers. The Indian Trader statutes disregard whether the vendor is an Indian
or not. The Brief also argued that the holding in Warren Trading was not directly implicated
in Moe because “so far as the opinion reveals, [the Indian retailers] neither applied for nor
obtained federal traders licenses.” Id. at *119 n.71. This argument was held to be irrelevant in
Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 164; see supra notes 469–518 and accompanying text. In their
Petition for Rehearing, Colville, 447 U.S. 134 (No. 78-630), 1980 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS
1628, at *9–10, the Tribes refined the Indian Trader argument.
787
See supra notes 783–86 and accompanying text.
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structured so that tribal revenue was directly implicated. The Tribes argued
that a loss of taxes would interfere with their self-government by depriving
them of revenue for financing essential government programs.788 The destruction of a major sector of their economy would seem to satisfy even a narrow
interpretation of infringement.
g. Value Generated on the Reservation
After misciting McClanahan for the proposition that “[t]he principle of tribal
self-government . . . seeks an accommodation between the interests of the
tribes and the Federal Government, on the one hand, and those of the State,
on the other,”789 which suggests a balancing test, the Court concluded that
the interest in raising revenue is:
788
Colville, 447 U.S. at 154. The Tribes’ Brief identified the amounts that the Colville Tribe
earned from its cigarette tax and stated that the revenue was used for a broad spectrum of
governmental programs, but did not express the amounts as a percentage of what was spent in
the aggregate on such programs. Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, supra note 108, at *7–8. The
Tribes argued that the state tax would dry up sales and jeopardize the governmental programs
the tribal tax financed. Id. at 13. The Brief contrasted this result with that in Williams v. Lee,
where “the interference with self-government struck down by the Court was simply an ‘undermining’ of the authority of tribal courts.” Id. at *60. For a discussion of tribal courts, see Frank
Pommersheim, The Contextual Legitimacy of Adjudication in Tribal Courts and the Role of the
Tribal Bar As an Interpretive Community: An Essay, 18 N.M. L. Rev. 49 (1988).
Washington argued that Williams v. Lee was inapplicable because it merely preserves the
immunity of reservation Indians from state law but does not protect non-Indians. “Nothing
in the concept of ‘tribal self-government’ would allow an Indian Tribe to market its immunity
from state law to non-Indians.” Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 744, at *30. The State
also argued that the Tribes “failed to demonstrate that elimination of cigarette sales as a revenue
source would threaten the self-governing ability of the Tribes.” Id. “No one claims that the
Tribe will be unable to govern their members if they cannot raise revenues by selling cigarettes
to non-Indians.” Id. at *69.

[O]nly a little more than two percent of the Yakima Tribe’s revenues expended on
governmental and tribal programs were derived from its cigarette tax. Certainly, elimination of this revenue source could well reduce the amount of revenues that the Tribe
could spend elsewhere, but it can hardly be said to actually threaten the self-governing
ability of the Tribe.
Id. at 70.
[T]he record . . . is devoid of any evidence relating to the impact of the Tribes’ inability to market a tax exemption upon the self-governing ability of the Tribe. There is no
evidence as to the percentage of cigarette tax revenues expended on tribal programs.
There is no evidence as to which—if any—tribal programs will be curtailed as a result
of the loss of cigarette tax revenues derived from sales to non-Indians.
Id. at 73.
789
Colville, 447 U.S. at 156 (emphasis added). The Court referred to McClanahan v. State
Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 179 (1973), in support for the statement in the text, but the
page cited does not mention the federal government. The language presumably being cited
actually reads: “[i]n these situations, both the tribe and the State could fairly claim an interest
in asserting their respective jurisdictions.” Id. Apparently, the Court took it for granted that
the federal government should be allied with the Indians. Presumably, that implicit judgment
reflects the guardian or trust philosophy, discussed supra notes 36, 215, 257, 352, 434 and
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strongest when the revenues are derived from value generated on the reservation by activities involving the Tribes and when the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services. The State also has a legitimate governmental interest
in raising revenues, and that interest is likewise strongest when the tax is
directed at off-reservation value and when the taxpayer is the recipient of
state services. . . . Washington’s taxes are reasonably designed to prevent the
Tribes from marketing their tax exemption to nonmembers who do not
receive significant tribal services and who would otherwise purchase their
cigarettes outside the reservations.790

“Washington does not infringe the right of reservation Indians to ‘make
their own laws and be ruled by them’ merely because the result of imposing
its taxes will be to deprive the Tribes of revenues which they currently are
receiving.”791
Justice White was attempting to formulate some principled line-drawing
that would stop what he viewed as illegitimate tax avoidance while protecting
legitimate economic activities. He was unwilling to place definitive weight on
whether a state tax negatively impacted tribal revenue, as that would shelter
tax avoidance. Nonetheless, if the loss in revenue meant the curtailment of
spending on police, fire, education, or welfare, the case for treating a state
tax as infringing on a tribe’s ability to govern is more compelling. More sympathetic facts for the Indians may well produce a different outcome from
Colville,792 especially because a few years later the Court acknowledged that
tribes “can gain independence from the Federal Government only by financing their own police force, schools, and social programs.”793
The Court seemed to be incorporating a balancing test as part of the Williams v. Lee tribal self-government test. In weighing the respective interests of
the parties, the Court placed no weight on an activity like the purchase and
resale of cigarettes, which did not reflect value “generated on the reservation

accompanying text and why the Solicitor General appears as amicus curiae on behalf of the
Indians.
One of the earliest examples of balancing a state’s interests against federal interests under
the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause occurred in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325
U.S. 761 (1945). One of the traditional arguments against balancing, that the Court sits
as superlegislature and violates the separation of powers doctrine, was also expressed in that
case by Justices Black and Douglas dissenting. See id. at 784–95 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at
795–96 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In the case of state taxes, however, the primary tests set forth
in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), see supra note 186 and the references cited therein, do not involve balancing.
790
Colville, 447 U.S. at 156–57.
791
Id. at 156 (citation omitted).
792
In Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit
struck down Montana taxes on coal. The taxes “interfere[d] with tribal economic development
and autonomy. The state interests they promote[d] may or may not [have been] sufficiently
legitimate to overcome these conflicts, but even if they [were], the taxes [were] not narrowly
tailored in pursuit of these interests.” Id. at 903.
793
Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195, 201 (1985).
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by activities in which the Tribes have a significant interest.”794 To the Court,
the Tribes were only marketing an exemption to transitory non-Indians, just
the way Moe characterized the Indians there as benefiting from purchasers
“willing to flout” their legal obligations.795 Washington, on the other hand,
had what the majority viewed as a legitimate interest in protecting its tax base
and raising revenue from the nonmember purchasers who benefited from offreservation, State-provided services.
Superficially, “value generated on the reservation” suggests a promising tool
to separate out legitimate and worthy activities from those that reek of tax
avoidance.796 The problem, however, is that the concept does not provide a
bright-line test. Retailers, for example, generate value by buying large quantities from wholesalers and distributors and reselling in small quantities to consumers. If they did not generate any value, retailers would not be profitable
and would be out of business.
The smokeshops generate value the way department stores add value.
Indeed, department stores merely do on a large scale what the smokeshops
do on a small scale. Each buys in bulk at wholesale and resells at retail. But
cigarettes are highly taxed, easy to transport, and easily resold free of tax. The
Court viewed them as contraband. The Court was less concerned about a
rigorous definition of generating value and more concerned about tax avoidance.
The Court’s reference to “value generated on the reservation” has remained
undeveloped.797 Did the Court use the term in a cultural context? Would
Moe, 447 U.S. at 155.
See 425 U.S. at 482.
796
In an amicus brief in Ramah Navajo School Board, infra notes 1024–30 and accompanying
text, the Government, in an attempt to minimize the precedential value of Colville, described
the case as a “brake on the abusive exploitation of a tax exemption [and] as announcing an
exception, not the general rule.” Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae,
supra note 364, at *3. One commentator suggests that the “Court’s analysis seems to implicate
a ‘value added’ theory of taxation of the type utilized by the European economic community,”
Fredericks, supra note 752, at 64, but there is no support for this proposition.
797
The only subsequent U.S. Supreme Court case to refer to Colville’s “value generated” was
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, which involved California’s regulation of tribal
bingo. 480 U.S. 202 (1987), superseded by statute, Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No.
100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988). The State argued based on Colville that the Band was “merely
marketing an exemption from state gambling laws.” Id. at 219. The Court responded by noting
that the Band was “not merely importing a product onto the reservation for immediate re-sale
to non-Indians.” Id. The Band “built modern facilities which provide recreational opportunities and ancillary services to their patrons, who do not simply drive onto the reservations,
make purchases and depart, but spend extended periods of time there, enjoying the services
the Tribes provide.” Id. The Maine Supreme Court reached the opposite holding, striking
down tribal bingo. Penobscot Nation v. Stilphen, 461 A.2d 478 (1983). See also Hoopa Valley
Tribe v. Nevins, 881 F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir. 1989), Indian Country, U.S.A. v. Oklahoma, 829
F.2d 967, 986 (10th Cir. 1987); Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895, 899 (9th
Cir. 1987); Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. Waddell, 50 F.3d 734, 739 (9th
Cir. 1995); Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Stovall, 216 F. Supp. (D. Kansas 2002); Winnebago
Tribe of Neb. v. Morrison, 512 F. Supp. 2d (D. Kansas 2007), Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. City
794
795
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the Court have been more accepting of products like jewelry, rugs, pots, and
dream catchers, which it might have viewed (albeit patronizingly) as more
“Indian”?798 Or did it want to see a greater investment in labor and capital
than that represented by the buying and reselling of cigarettes?799 Or was the
term meant to refer to activities that, unlike cigarettes, did not compete with
off-reservation activities? If there was no such competition, off-reservation
businesses would not be disadvantaged by an exemption, and the State would
not lose tax revenue.
Presumably, the Court would have been no more sympathetic in Colville
if instead of cigarettes the Tribe sold gasoline or liquor. But if a tribe grew its
own tobacco on the reservation, which it used in the manufacturing of cigarettes on the reservation, would that tip the scale in favor of ousting a state
tax?800 Similarly, if on the reservation a tribe explored for and produced its
Vending of Muskogee, 1991 Okla. LEXIS 47, *22 (Apr. 23, 1991). These cases all struggle,
unsuccessfully in my opinion, to breathe life into the value generated concept but do little
more than use terms like “the tribe’s contribution to the product,” “the product was created on
the reservation,” or “the tribe invested considerable time and resources.”
According to one commentator, “[i]t is hard to see the relevance of this ‘value generated’
theory, at least as it has been applied by the court, other than as a means of giving political
justification to a rule that prohibits tribes from ‘marketing exemptions.’” Fredericks, supra note
752, at 63.
798
“I doubt that retailers generally would be happy with the implication that they add no
value to the economies in which they operate, but one can nevertheless understand the Court’s
conclusion that the activity in Colville was not distinctively Indian.” Jensen, supra note 9, at
79.
There is some mystery about what the Court meant by “value generated on the reservation.” If the enterprise in Colville did not constitute value generated on the reservation, we may wonder what the Court thinks of the similar services and market
exploitation that are integral to the United States economy. Does the Court think
these are values generated on the continental United States?
It is difficult to escape the impression that Justice White, and the Court had in mind
a particular view of what constitutes legitimate Indian business: the only good Indian
economy is a primitive one. “Value generated on the reservation” seems to translate:
selling blankets, pots, jewelry, and headdresses to non-Indian tourists. Or spearing
fish and hunting game with bows and arrows.
Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 108.
799
The Connecticut Department of Revenue Services ruled that sales of meals prepared
and served within Indian country are not subject to the State sales tax because the value of
the meals is generated within Indian country. Similarly, sales of lodging located within Indian
country are not subject to the State sales tax because the value of the lodging is generated
within such country. Conn. Dep’t of Rev. Serv., Rul. No. 2002-3.
800
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, the Tribes bought the
cigarettes from distributors located outside of Washington. 447 U.S. 134, 144 (1980).
Colville and Moe are especially and bitterly ironic since the business taxed and subject
to elimination was tobacco. Tobacco and its smoking were the Indians’ idea, a “value
generated” on their land. Perhaps the Court saw no irony. For Indians, the pipe and
its smoking are religious; tobacco is a gift. Originally, Indians gave away tobacco
and the technology of its growth and smoking. Because tobacco as a commodity
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own oil, which it refined into gasoline that it sold at its own gas stations on
the reservation, would that satisfy the Court? Activities that are commonly
viewed as, or defined under federal or state law, as manufacturing, mining, or
production801 should satisfy the “value generated” rubric.802
The Court’s reference to the taxpayer’s being the recipient of “tribal
services”803 is even less likely than “value generated” to resolve future cases.
Services come in many sizes and shapes. To the extent a tribe might maintain
roads; provide police, fire, or ambulance services; provide a judicial system;
or have laws governing commercial activities, a non-Indian who purchases
goods on the reservation can be viewed as the beneficiary of Indian-provided
services.804 The Court has been willing to accept the benefits of an “organized
society” as satisfying the Due Process Clause.805
h. Indian Commerce Clause Limited to Preventing Discrimination
With respect to the Indian Commerce Clause, Justice White made two
statements suggesting an earlier, more halcyon period. “It can no longer be
seriously argued that the Indian Commerce Clause, of its own force, automatically bars all state taxation of matters significantly touching the political
was a non-Indian concept, perhaps the Court thought its value could not have been
Indian-generated.
Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 110. If Professor Ball is correct, there is an additional irony.
The British colonists grew tobacco, which exhausted the soil and led to the taking of Indian
land. See supra note 42.
801
In White Mountain v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), infra notes 916–84 and accompanying text, Ramah Navajo School Board v. New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832 (1982), infra notes
985–1057 and accompanying text, and Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982)
infra notes 1058–1130 and accompanying text, involving timber, construction services, and
minerals respectively, the states did not claim that no value was being generated on the reservation. These cases, however, all involved non-Indians providing the good or service.
802
Professor Taylor raises the question whether a non-Indian who buys a Whopper at a
Burger King owned by an Indian trader on the Navajo reservation would be subject to the
Arizona transaction privilege tax (sales tax). Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 896–97. He
and I would reach the same conclusion—that the transaction should be exempt. I would reach
that conclusion, however, under the value generated language of Colville; he would apply the
Indian Trader statute. My problem with his analysis is that the Indian Trader statutes apply
only to sales to Indians. Id. The Connecticut Department of Revenue Services would also
exempt this sale because the value would be generated on the reservation. See supra note 799.
803
Colville, 447 U.S. at 157.
804
The difficulty of weighing and comparing services can be illustrated by assuming that
the threat of crime is much higher on the reservation than off the reservation. In that case,
the value of a tribal police force might well be greater than the value of a State trooper offreservation. The Indians might also be the beneficiaries of off-reservation educational programs
that teach about ethnic diversity, tolerance, or more specifically, about the culture and history
of local tribes. These difficulties are hopeless.
In Atkinson Trading, the Court was unimpressed by the benefits provided by the Navajo to
the patrons of a non-Indian owned hotel located on fee land within a reservation. See supra
note 759 and the references cited therein.
805
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 190 (1989).
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4

01-Pomp.indd 1097

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=244384612/23/2010

11:03:49 AM

1098

SECTION OF TAXATION

and economic interests of the Tribes.”806 The “Clause may have a more limited role to play in preventing undue discrimination against, or burdens on,
Indian commerce.”807 But what earlier period was he referring to when the
Clause did automatically bar state taxation of matters significantly touching
the political and economic interests of the Tribes?808 And more limited than
what? He offered no examples and would have been hard pressed to have
done so.809
Applying his new formulation of the Indian Commerce Clause, Justice
White merely noted that Washington’s taxes were applied in a nondiscriminatory manner to all transactions in the State and that while the result of
the State and Tribal taxes was to “lessen or eliminate tribal commerce with
nonmembers, that market existed in the first place only because of a claimed
exemption from these very taxes. The taxes under consideration do not burden commerce that would exist on the reservations without respect to the
exemption.”810 This assumed the conclusion: the issue was whether Washington had the right to assert its tax. Once again, the view that the Indians
were engaged in the illegitimate marketing of an exemption, not worthy of
protection, drove the analysis.811
806
Colville, 447 U.S. at 157 (citing Moe, 425 U.S. at 481 n.17) (emphasis added). Because
Justice White had earlier described a similar statement by Rehnquist in Moe as “unhelpful,” id.
at 148, that he would now be endorsing it is odd.
807
Colville, 447 U.S. at 157 (emphasis added). The Tribes’ brief argued that the State tax,
when added to the Tribal taxes, imposed a multiple tax burden on Indian commerce that was
not shared by off-reservation commerce.

By analogy to the Interstate Commerce Clause decisions of this Court, this result is
impermissible. A state may no more discriminate against Indian than foreign or interstate commerce. The Washington State tax does not give credit for taxes paid to the
Tribes, and, if imposed, will not only discriminate against, but will actually destroy
the protected commerce.
Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, supra note 108, at 16.
“[T]he result achieved by the Burger Court leaves the dormant interstate commerce clause
doctrine a far more potent limit on the exercise of state power than the negative implications of
the Indian commerce clause. As a general rule, states may not impose the burdensome multiple
taxation sanctioned in Colville.” Robert N. Clinton, State Power Over Indian Reservations: A
Critical Comment on Burger Court Doctrine, 26 S.D. L. Rev. 434, 441 (1981). But see supra
note 746.
808
Perhaps he was referring to all the times that the federal government and the tribes cited
the Clause; if so, the Court disregarded each one of these as a source of protection.
809
In commenting on an earlier draft of this Article, Professor Fletcher speculates that the
Court may have simply been sending a message to the tribes and the Solicitor General to cease
making this type of argument.
810
Colville, 447 U.S. at 157. “The argument that the Tribe’s tax exemption is justified
because to remove it would burden commerce created by the exemption is indeed circular,
and the Court rightly rejected it.” Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 228.
The first of his comments goes right to the heart of the Court’s misanalysis; the second seems
wrong—the Court did not reject it but rather endorsed it.
811
Apparently, Colville had originally been decided in favor of the Tribe and assigned to
Justice Brennan. Regarding the Indian Commerce Clause, Brennan had written “rarely does
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In a sense, the Indians were asking to be treated the same as out-of-state
vendors that do not have nexus with Washington and thus do not have to
collect the State’s sales tax. And the Court responded by treating them worse.
That is, as discussed above,812 had non-tribal members or non-Indians purchased cigarettes in another state or foreign country, the out-of-state retailer
without nexus could not have been required to collect the Washington excise
tax, and almost certainly the consumer would not have voluntarily paid it
upon returning home.813 Any advantage of the lower rate would have inured
to the benefit of the purchaser, albeit because of his or her noncompliance
with the law. Unlike the out-of-state vendors, the Indians have nexus with
Washington by virtue of their location within the State; their protection from
being made involuntary tax collectors would be sourced in the Indian Commerce Clause rather than in the Due Process and Interstate or Foreign Commerce Clauses that protect out-of-state vendors.
i. Role of a Credit for the Tribal Taxes
One sliver of hope for the Indians in future cases is that the Court seemed
to preserve an opportunity for the Tribes to offer empirical evidence that a
state tax burdened commerce with them, notwithstanding that this approach
would be inconsistent with viewing the Tribes as marketing a tax exemption.
We cannot fault the State for not giving credit on the amount of tribal taxes
paid. It is argued that if a credit is not given, the tribal retailers will actually
be placed at a competitive disadvantage, as compared to retailers elsewhere,
due to the overlapping impact of tribal and state taxation. While this argument is not without force, we find that the Tribes have failed to demonstrate
that business at the smokeshops would be significantly reduced by a state tax
without a credit as compared to a state tax with a credit.814
the talismanic invocation of constitutional language or rigid conceptions of state and tribal
sovereignty shed light on difficult problems” of state power on reservations. Preso, supra note
41, at 461. As Brennan circulated drafts, it became apparent that he had lost a majority and
asked Chief Justice Burger to reassign the opinion. Prior to reassignment, Justices White and
Rehnquist circulated drafts suggesting that the Indian Commerce Clause had no effect until
Congress acted. Id. This view seems entirely unwarranted by the history of the Clause.
812
See Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
813
The purchasers would have been taxable upon their return because of possessing the
untaxed cigarettes in the State. See Wash. Rev. Code § 82.24.020(1) (2010). Assuming the
reservation is considered part of Washington within the meaning of the statute, the purchasers
would have become taxable upon taking possession of the untaxed cigarettes on the reservation.
814
Colville, 447 U.S. at 157 (emphasis added). Once the Court rejected the Indian
Commerce Clause and Williams v. Lee arguments, the tribes were left arguing that the multiple
taxation resulting from the imposition of both a state and tribal tax on the same transaction or
activity was invalid. I have suggested that this was an entirely formal argument. See infra notes
890–903, 1349–54 and accompanying text.
The tribes have had more success politically in negotiating tax compacts with the states,
which eliminate or reduce that multiple taxation. See Mark J. Cowan, Double Taxation in
Indian Country: Unpacking the Problem and Analyzing the Role of the Federal Government in
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The Court responded to the Tribes’ plea for a credit with an empirical
argument rather than a conceptual analysis. Whatever the force of the Tribes’
argument, the reality is that a credit would not make much of a difference
under the facts of Colville. A credit would merely ensure that on-reservation
sales of cigarettes would bear the same total tax as off-reservation sales. Purchasers living off-reservation would have no tax incentive to drive onto the
reservation if there were more conveniently located local stores (unless the
smokeshops undercut the price that cigarettes were selling off-reservation).
The Tribes would continue to lose sales because, even with a credit, they
would lose the tax advantage they were seeking.
The group that would be most affected by a credit would be taxable purchasers living on the reservation. The credit would mean that the total tax
on cigarettes would be the same for sales made on- or off-reservation. Such
persons would have no tax incentive to purchase cigarettes off-reservation as
they otherwise would if no credit existed.815 A credit would also be significant
Protecting Tribal Governmental Revenues, 2 U. Pitt. Tax Rev. 93, 133–36 (2005) [hereinafter Cowan, Double Taxation]. See National Conference on State Legislatures and National
Congress of American Indians, Government to Government: Models of Cooperation Between
States and Tribes 72-77 (2002), reporting that nearly “every state that has Indian lands within
its borders has reached some type of tax agreements with the tribes.” Id. at 72. One commentator reported that 200 agreements exist that require a tribe to collect taxes that approximate
the taxes that would be collected by non-tribal retailers, with the tribes keeping or sharing the
revenue. Anna-Marie Tabor, Sovereignty in the Balance: Taxation by Tribal Governments, 15 U.
Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 349, 398 (2004).
Another commentator claims that after Cotton Petroleum removed the fear of preemption
from the states, no tax sharing agreements have been concluded. Jeanne S. Whiteing, Tribal
and State Taxation of Natural Resources on Indian Reservations, 7 Nat. Resources & Env’t L.
Rev. 17, 59 (1993). Whiteing also claims that federal legislation was once discussed that would
prohibit state taxes on reservation natural resources, or provide a federal tax credit for tribal
taxes or state taxes. Id. Nothing has come of these suggestions and the current political climate
is not conducive to such discussions. See also U.S. Dept. of Federated Highway Administration,
American Indian Sales of Motor Fuels: Assessment of Reporting and Policy Recommendations 11-13
(2005); National Conference of State Legislatures, Piecing Together the State-Tribal Tax Puzzle
3-9 (2005).
For an earlier discussion of tax collection compacts, see Barsh, Reservation Wealth, supra
note 5, at 575–76.
Professor Cowan notes that the details of compacts can vary, but typically the state will
recognize the tribe as exempt from taxation. In return, the tribe will “collect the state tax from
nonmembers and remit a set percentage of the collections . . . .” Cowan, supra, at 133–34.
For a concise discussion of the various compacts, see Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 7, at
725–26.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 adopted a series of tax incentives that
apply only to reservations, which were intended to deal with the issue of multiple taxation.
Id. at 136. Professor Cowan also discusses a congressional proposal to allow a federal income
tax credit for taxes paid in Indian country, id. at 140–41, and discusses other creative roles for
Congress, id. at 142–49. See also The Indian Tribal Government Tax Status Act of 1982, which
granted the tribes many of the federal tax advantages of being a state. Int. Rev. Code of 1986,
sec. 7871.
815
A credit would allow the tribes to increase their tax to the amount of the state tax without
increasing the cost to a purchaser. If the credit encouraged taxable purchasers that lived or
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if the Indians were willing to undercut the price of off-reservation cigarettes
by reducing on-reservation prices and absorbing the reduction in profits.
The Court well understood that the credit would not be an economic victory for the Tribes:
It is evident that even if credit were given, the bulk of the smokeshops’ present business would still be eliminated, since nonresidents of the reservation
could purchase cigarettes at the same price and with greater convenience
nearer their homes and would have no incentive to travel to the smokeshops
for bargain purchases as they do now.816

The Court also understood that non-tribal members and non-Indians
living on the reservation who might otherwise drive off-reservation to buy
cigarettes free of the Tribal tax would, with a credit, be encouraged to buy onreservation. Presumably, these two categories of purchasers would be outside
of any concern that the Tribes were marketing a tax exemption because they
were already on the reservation.
But the Tribes have not shown whether or to what extent this would be
the case, and we cannot infer on the present record that by failing to give a
credit Washington impermissibly taxes reservation value by deterring sales
that, if credit were given, would occur on the reservation because of its location and because of the efforts of the Tribes in importing and marketing the
cigarettes.817

Consequently, the Court left the smokeshop door open a crack, treating
Colville in part as a failure of proof case,818 although it might be an unusual
situation where a tribe could capitalize on that opening.
White’s handling of the credit issue is ironic (if not gratuitous). Granting
a credit would address his concerns about the marketing of a tax exemption. Because a credit would ensure that purchasers paid the same overall tax
burden (presumably the Tribal tax would be equal to the State tax),819 there
would be no exemption to market. Consequently, White rejected the very
approach that would have resolved his concerns about the Indians having an
unfair advantage by marketing an exemption.
worked on the reservation to buy on the reservation rather than off-reservation, the increase in
the tribal tax (compared with a post-Colville world with no credit) would help offset the loss in
tax revenue from the off-reservation purchasers who would have no tax reason to purchase on
the reservation even with a credit.
816
Colville, 447 U.S. at 158. In other contexts, such as corporate or personal income taxes,
where the tax would not directly affect the price of a good, the issue of a credit could be more
important.
817
Id.
818
Compare Cotton Petroleum, infra notes 1224–25 and accompanying text.
819
As long as a tribal tax is less than the state tax, a credit will have the effect of taxing all
cigarette sales on the reservation at the state rate. Whether a tribe has no tax, a very low tax, or a
tax equal to the state tax will not affect the amount of tax paid by the purchaser—that amount
will be determined by the state rate. Consequently, a tribe has an incentive to increase its tax
to the maximum amount that will be creditable.
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j. Preemption and Collection Burdens
The Court made short shrift of four remaining issues. First, the Tribes’ taxes
did not preempt the State taxes. “There is no direct conflict between the state
and tribal schemes, since each government is free to impose its taxes without
ousting the other,”820 another example of ipse dixit reasoning.821
Second, Moe had allowed Montana to impose minimal burdens on Indian
vendors to aid in collecting the tax. Justice White concluded that Washington’s collection burdens on the Tribe were “legally indistinguishable” from
those upheld in Moe.822 Despite the insouciance underlying this conclusion,
White did not engage in any comparative analysis of the compliance costs.
Justice White ignored the more onerous burdens that Washington imposed in
Colville compared with those imposed by Montana in Moe.823 Unlike Montana in Moe, Washington required the smokeshops to keep detailed records
of taxable and nontaxable transactions. The number and dollar volume of
taxable sales to nonmembers had to be recorded. With respect to exempt
sales, the smokeshops had to record and retain for inspection the names of
all Indian purchasers, their tribal affiliations, the reservations on which such
sales occurred, and the dollar amount and dates of sales. Unless the Indian
purchaser was personally known to the smokeshop, a tribal identification
card had to be presented.824
The Tribes, however, had not placed any evidence in the record on the compliance burden. The Indians failed to meet their burden of proof of showing
that the “State’s recordkeeping requirements for exempt sales are not reasonably necessary as a means of preventing fraudulent transactions.”825
Once Justice White upheld the Washington tax, the bar was set very high
for the Indians to argue successfully that the collection burdens were unreasonable. Having gone to the extent he did to uphold the tax, White was not
about to let allegations of collection difficulties and burdens prevail. Like
Justice Rehnquist in Moe, White was not going to give the battle to the State
but have it lose the war.
Colville, 447 U.S. at 158.
It would have been a stronger argument on this point had the Court pursued the theme
that the tax had no independent economic significance. See infra notes 890–96, 1315–17,
1349–55 and accompanying text.
There is an undeveloped suggestion that if the tribal taxes served nonrevenue goals perhaps
the result would be different. Colville, 447 U.S. at 158. White also concluded that Congress
did not intend to authorize the Tribes to preempt otherwise valid state taxes. Id.
822
Id. at 159.
823
See id. at 134.
824
Id. at 159.
825
Id. at 160. Professor Milner Ball feels that the “standard for this proof is virtually impossible to satisfy, for tribes must show that the state’s imposition of the involuntary agency is
‘not reasonably necessary as a means of preventing fraudulent transactions.’ Apparently a tribe
would have to demonstrate that the obligation both interferes with its self-government and is
unnecessary for reasons having nothing to do with the tribe.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7,
at 105–06.
820
821
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k. State Taxation of Non-Member Indians
With respect to the third of the four issues, which should have been the
heart of the case, the Court upheld Washington’s taxation of nonmember
Indians in two short paragraphs.826 Taxing nontribal members would not
“contravene the principle of tribal self-government, for the simple reason that
nonmembers are not constituents of the governing Tribe. For most practical
purposes those Indians stand on the same footing as non-Indians resident
on the reservation.”827 White stated that federal statutes, even read broadly,
“cannot be said to pre-empt Washington’s power to impose its taxes on Indians not members of the Tribe.”828 Implicit in this phrasing is the assumption
that Washington had this power in the first place. Once again, the Court
assumed away the very issue before it. As Professor Milner Ball puts it,
“[t]his innovation was not only without precedent but contrary to
precedent . . . Washington had no such power. No state had such power . . . [S]
tates may not tax Indian commerce with Indians within Indian country.”829
With his typical acumen, Professor Taylor has challenged Colville’s treating
nonmember Indians the same as non-Indians:
[A]s often as not the non-member Indians are spouses or relatives of members or are frequently employees of the tribe. Under these circumstances,
the tribe clearly has an interest in promoting the family life of its members
and in hiring employees to provide needed services.

826
The Court did not reach this issue in Moe because Montana failed to raise it on appeal,
Colville, 447 U.S. at 160. Under a Washington regulation, reservation Indians were exempt
from state cigarette and sales taxation only if the purchase took place on the reservation of the
tribe to which the Indian belonged. Wash. Admin. Code § 458-20-192 (2010); Appellants’
Opening Brief, supra note 744, at 91.
827
Colville, 447 U.S. at 161. The Court noted that there was “no evidence that nonmembers
have a say in tribal affairs or significantly share in tribal disbursements.” Id.
828
Id. at 160. Only two statutes were cited, the Major Crimes Act and the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934. Rather remarkably, Justice White cited these Acts as demonstrating congressional intent not to exempt non-member Indians from state taxation, notwithstanding that neither statute addressed state taxation nor dealt with the difference between
member and non-member Indians. See id. at 160–61.
829
Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 106. Professor Ball’s comments could be equally
addressed to Moe.
Washington claimed that the question “is whether the federal government has preempted the
field with regard to state taxation of Indians who have left their own reservations.” Appellants
Opening Brief, supra note 744, at 92. “[A]bsent clear statutory guidance courts will not imply
tax exemption.” Id. at *92–93. This formulation assumes the State has the right to tax in the
first instance.
The State also argued that taxation of non-members of the tribe “cannot interfere with tribal
self-government for the simple reason that those Indians are neither constituents nor subject to
the jurisdiction of the reservation tribe.” Id. at *96. This argument (and language) is mirrored
in the opinion.
For a sociological attack on White’s drawing a line between member Indian and non-member Indians, see Clinton, supra note 807.
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It is also important to note that many tribes have a history of inclusion,
adoption, consolidation, and amalgamation. Given this history, it is inappropriate for the Court to assume that non-member Indians have no role
to play in the social, cultural, spiritual, economic, and political life that
constitutes an Indian tribe.830

More specifically,
It is very significant that the Colville Reservation itself is an amalgamation
of more than one tribe brought together by the process of federal dispossession of their lands. This intermingling reflects general historical forces
that caused many members of different tribes to find themselves together
on a single reservation. The process of sorting out these intermixings is an
essential attribute of tribal sovereignty.831

830
Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 898. Professor Gould is equally critical of the distinction between members and nonmembers.

A grave[] consequence was that the Court could use political status distinctions, and
its concept of the congressional trust responsibility, to trivialize tribal claims for equal
protection. Still graver was the prospect that the Court would use the concept of
political status to confine the powers of tribal governments to their membership,
thereby eliminating their sovereignty over their territory.
Gould, Tough Love, supra note 11, at 680.
831
Taylor, Onslaught, supra note 534, at 963. The Court cited Colville with approval in Duro
v. Reina, holding that a tribal court did not have criminal jurisdiction over a non-member who
was accused of committing a crime on the reservation. 495 U.S. 676, 706–07 (1990). For
Professor Taylor’s critical analysis of this use of Colville by Duro, see Taylor, Onslaught, supra,
at 968. Duro was overruled by a federal statute, which was upheld in United States v. Lara, 541
U.S. 193, 196, 215–16 (2004).
Professor Clinton views Duro as illustrating the “Court’s concern that nonmembers have no
political control whatsoever over the scope and nature of tribal law and procedure.” Clinton,
Dormant, supra note 22, at 1237. But “nonmembers have a political say in the federal government which possesses the ultimate power to determine whether the continued exercise of
tribal authority over nonmembers is fair and equitable in any particular circumstances.” Id.
at 1238. The more fundamental question is who should legislative inertia favor: the Indians
or the states? Should the states have no power to tax unless they can lobby Congress to grant
that power, or should they be viewed as having the power unless the Indians can lobby for an
exemption?
Professor Taylor identified pre-Colville state income tax cases in Minnesota, Montana, and
New Mexico that apply McClanahan equally to both tribal and non-tribal members, not treating the latter as if they were non-Indians, which is what Colville does. Taylor, Onslaught, supra,
at 959–63. After Colville, New Mexico reversed its position. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t
v. Greaves, 864 P.2d 324, 325–26 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993). In a post-Colville case, Wisconsin
upheld the state income taxation of a non-tribal member, a Menomonee Indian, who lived and
worked on the Oneida reservation, was divorced from a tribal member, and had two children
who were members of the Oneida tribe. LaRock v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, 621 N.W.2d 907
(Wis. 2001). Professor Taylor criticizes that case in Taylor, Onslaught, supra note 534, at 973.
Idaho, Oregon, and North Dakota have statutes treating non-tribal members the same as tribal
members and exempting the former from state income taxes under the same circumstances as
the latter. Id. at 975.
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l. Seizure of Cigarettes in Transit
Finally, the Court upheld the State’s seizure of unstamped cigarettes in transit
to the Tribes from out-of-state distributors. The Court acknowledged that the
cigarettes were exempt at the time of their seizure,832 but for Justice White the
more relevant facts were that the Tribes refused to collect and remit validly
imposed taxes, and that the seizures took place off-reservation “in locations
where state power over Indian affairs is considerably more expansive than it is
within reservation boundaries. [Cf. Mescalero.] By seizing cigarettes en route
to the reservation, the State polices against wholesale evasion of its own valid
taxes without unnecessarily intruding on core tribal interests.”833
The Indian Commerce Clause could have been viewed as preventing this
burden on commerce with the Tribes, especially because at the time of the
seizure no tax was yet owed. In addition, the Court did not address whether
seizing cigarettes before any tax was owed might violate the Due Process
Clause.834

832
Colville, 447 U.S. at 161. The Court’s statement seemed to contradict what the State
alleged. According to the State, “[u]nder Washington law, unstamped cigarettes moving in
interstate commerce consigned to a person in the state [were] contraband unless the consignee
[was] an authorized purchaser.” Unstamped cigarettes purchased for sale to non-members of
the Tribe would constitute contraband. Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 744, at 103.
833
Colville, 447 U.S. at 162. Washington also claimed that it could enter the reservation and
seize stocks of cigarettes intended for sale to nonmembers. The Court refused to consider this
argument because it was not properly raised. Id.
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505,
514, the Court acknowledged the sovereign immunity of the tribe and suggested that a state
might enforce its cigarette tax by: suing individuals acting as agents for the tribe, confiscating
untaxed cigarettes off-reservation in transit to the reservation, collecting taxes from upstream
wholesalers off-reservation, negotiating collection agreements with the tribes, or seeking congressional assistance. See Stacy L. Cook, State Collection on Indian Sales to Nontribal Members:
States Have a Right Without a Remedy, 31 Washburn L. J. 130 (1991); 498 U.S. 505, 514
(1991); see also Dep’t of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61 (1994) (upholding a New York regulation that imposed various reporting and collection burdens on wholesalers selling to the tribes, including a regime of quotas for the sale of unstamped cigarettes). Dean
Getches describes Milhelm Attea as the first case in which the Court “expressly resolved a case
through interest balancing.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1628; see also Potawatomi,
498 U.S. 505 (1991). For a general discussion of tribal sovereign immunity, see Canby, supra
note 3, at 101–14.
834
The Tribe did not make an Indian Commerce Clause argument. Instead, they argued
that the seizures violated the Due Process Clause. See Brief of Appellee, Yakima Nation at 9,
Colville, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (No. 78-630), 1979 WL 200128.
Washington’s brief cited state cases in support of the proposition that states have the “power
to seize cigarettes as contraband even though in the course of interstate commerce when the
cigarettes are within the state contrary to state cigarette tax statutes.” Appellants’ Opening
Brief, supra note 744, at 105. For a thorough analysis of the seizure issue, see Michael Minnis,
Judicially-Suggested Harassment of Indian Tribes: The Potawatomis Revisit Moe and Colville,
16 Am. Indian L. Rev. 289, 303–06 (1991). Minnis concludes that the seizure of interstate
cigarette shipments bound for Indian tribes is a much more difficult issue than the Court has
recognized. Id. at 303.
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m. Rehnquist’s Concurrence
i. The Indian Commerce Clause. Justice Rehnquist wrote a separate
concurring opinion.835 He rejected the majority’s modest resurrection of the
Indian Commerce Clause.836 He lost no time in attempting to re-bury it:
Since early in the last century, this Court has been struggling to develop a
coherent doctrine by which to measure with some predictability the scope
of Indian immunity from state taxation. In recent years, it appeared such
a doctrine was well on its way to being established. . . . That doctrine, I
had thought, was at bottom a pre-emption analysis based on the principle
that Indian immunities are dependent upon congressional intent [citing
McClanahan, Mescalero, Moe] at least absent discriminatory state action prohibited by the Indian Commerce Clause. I see no need for this Court to
balance the state and tribal interests in enacting particular forms of taxation
in order to determine their validity. Absent discrimination, the question is
only one of congressional intent. Either Congress intended to pre-empt the
state taxing authority or it did not. Balancing of interests is not the appropriate gauge for determining validity since it is that very balancing which we
have reserved to Congress.837 I concur in the Court’s conclusion, however,
that the cigarette tax is valid because Congress has not pre-empted state
authority to impose the tax.838

Justice Rehnquist endorsed the majority’s erosion of the Indian Commerce
Clause, reducing it to protection against discriminatory state actions.839 So
limited, the Clause would have been irrelevant in any of the cases he cited
(McClanahan, Mescalero, Moe) because none involved a discriminatory tax.
McClanahan involved Arizona’s nondiscriminatory personal income tax;
Mescalero addressed New Mexico’s nondiscriminatory sales tax; and Moe
835
He dissented with respect to the majority’s treatment of the state excise tax on motor
vehicles. Colville, 447 U.S. at 190.
836
Apparently Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence was originally intended to be a dissent to
Justice Brennan’s majority opinion. When Brennan was unable to garner enough votes for his
position, he became a dissenter. Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1605.
837
The reference to “we” is ambiguous. Apparently it refers to the Constitution. Professor
Jensen speculates that with “judicial sympathy for tribal interests on the wane, the result of
balancing is likely to be that a state may proceed with a tax that falls on nonmembers.” Jensen,
supra note 9, at 73. Another commentator is also skeptical about the Indians prevailing under
a balancing test. “Predictably, if any significant state interest is found, states nearly always have
a larger absolute interest that invariably prevails over the smaller absolute Indian interest, even
though the Indians’ interest may be geometrically greater in a relative sense.” Minnis, supra
note 834, at 299. One of the difficulties with a balancing test is the difficulty of comparing
and evaluating competing interests. While the term “geometrically greater” suggests some kind
of quantitative test, which some cases may lend themselves to, others may require a qualitative
test. Like most balancing tests, a court is adrift without a rudder.
838
Colville, 447 U.S. at 176–77 (emphasis added). Justice Rehnquist was generally critical
of balancing tests. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 962 (1982);
Kassel v. Consol. Freightways, 450 U.S. 662, 687–92 (1981); Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833, 876 (1976).
839
Colville, 447 U.S. at 157.

Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4

01-Pomp.indd 1106

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=244384612/23/2010

11:03:50 AM

INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE AND STATE TAXATION

1107

concerned Montana’s nondiscriminatory cigarette tax.840 The majority cited
nothing in support of this formulation of the Indian Commerce Clause, and
Rehnquist did no more than merely endorse the majority. Discrimination is
a key factor in interpreting the Interstate Commerce Clause, however,841 and
the majority’s formulation blurred the distinction between the two.
Justice Rehnquist agreed that McClanahan did not resolve the extent to
which Indian sovereignty would be recognized in the rare case where no federal treaties or legislation existed842 (which Rehnquist did not acknowledge
was the situation, ironically, in Colville).843 In that rare situation, “this ‘residue’ of sovereignty is no greater than the freedom from nondiscriminatory
taxation held sufficient to protect sovereignty in other areas of constitutionally derived immunities.”844 Rehnquist did not mention that McClanahan,
Moe, and Colville all involved nondiscriminatory taxes, so that his “residue of
sovereignty” would be worthless.
At the same time, Rehnquist recognized that the tradition of Indian sovereignty could be useful in ascertaining congressional intent. McClanahan
determined that historically Indians were “exempt from taxes on Indian
ownership and activity confined to the reservation and not involving nonIndians.”845 No treaty or statute altered that tradition. Mescalero, by contrast,
held there was no similar tradition immunizing off-reservation activities, and
there were no treaties or statutes altering that result.
The “rare” case where no federal treaties or legislation existed is the very
situation where the Indian Commerce Clause should be in play. The history
of the Indian Commerce Clause shows that the struggle between the states
and the federal government over control of the Indians had nothing to do
with discrimination per se. The emphasis on discrimination would have come
as a surprise to Chief Justice Marshall, whose seminal cases emphasized the
sovereignty of the Indians.

840
See id. at 177. Justice Rehnquist also cited Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976),
not discussed in this Article, which involved a nondiscriminatory property tax.
841
See, e.g., Fulton v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996); New Energy v. Limbach, 486 U.S.
269 (1988); Bacchus Imports v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981); Bos. Stock Exch. v.
State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977). For a thorough treatment of the area, see Philip M.
Tatarowicz, Federalism, The Commerce Clause and Discriminatory State Tax Incentives: A Defense
of Unconditional Business Tax Incentives Limited to In-State Activities of the Taxpayer, 60 Tax
Law. 835 (2007).
842
Colville, 447 U.S. at 177 n.2.
843
In Moe, Justice Rehnquist accepted the lower court’s finding that the Montana treaty and
statutes were “essentially the same as those involved in McClanahan.” 425 U.S. at 477; 447
U.S. at 177 n.2. There was no similar finding in Colville.
844
Colville, 447 U.S. at 177 n.2.
845
Id. at 178.
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ii. Rehnquist’s Distortion of Thomas v. Gay. Justice Rehnquist thought
Thomas v. Gay846 best illustrated the relevant “backdrop” to interpreting congressional intent.847 His broad reading of that case was unsurprising.
The . . . Tribes maintain that the tax at issue is impermissible, though permissible in Moe, because here the Tribes are raising governmental revenues
and establishing commercial enterprises. The effect of the state tax then
would be to reduce the tribe’s governmental revenues and force the tribe to
choose between losing those revenues by forgoing its tax or subjecting reservation retailers to a competitive disadvantage compared to those retailers
outside the reservation not subject to the tribal tax. These may be the facts,
but they are facts which Thomas v. Gay held to be irrelevant to the recognition of a sovereign tribal immunity.848 . . . It is apparent therefore that the
backdrop relevant to this action is one of no sovereign immunity.849

In Thomas, the taxpayers argued that the Oklahoma territorial property
tax had to be invalidated because the revenues which the Indians received as
lessor would be directly reduced. Lessees would be unwilling to pay the same
rent to use Indian grazing lands once their cattle became taxable. The Thomas
Court rejected this argument essentially because it viewed the tax on the lessees’ cattle as too remote and indirect850 to be deemed a tax upon the lands
or privileges of the Indians.851 Rather astonishingly, Rehnquist described the
Tribe’s involvement in Thomas as “far more direct”852 than in Colville. His
support for that description was that in Thomas the lessor was a tribal leasing
enterprise. Rehnquist did not explain why that was “more direct” than the
Tribes’ involvement in Colville as both the taxing sovereigns and as wholesalers or retailers.
The Thomas Court emphasized the “remoteness” of the tax.853 But “remoteness” is hardly an apt description of the Washington tax in Colville, which in
combination with the “Tribal tax,”854 the Court assumed would destroy the
169 U.S. 264 (1898), discussed supra notes 354–75 and accompanying text.
Colville, 447 U.S. at 182.
848
Id. at 183.
849
Id. at 183–84.
850
By the end of the 19th century, the Court commonly conceptualized state taxation in
terms of its direct or indirect burdens on interstate commerce. Taxes imposing direct burdens were invalid whereas taxes imposing indirect burdens were upheld. See, e.g., DiSanto v.
Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927); S. Ry. Co. v. King, 217 U.S. 524 (1910); Erb. v. Morasch,
177 U.S. 584 (1900); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U.S. 194 (1897); Pullman’s Palace Car
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 (1888). The test was
a legal one and not economic in nature. Richard D. Pomp, State and Local Taxation 1-7 to
1-8 (6th ed. 2009). “This test . . . did little more than place labels on the result rather than analyze whether the state law should stand.” Stephen M. Feldman, Preemption and the Dormant
Commerce Clause: Implications for Federal Indian Law, 64 Or. L. Rev. 667, 689 (1986).
851
169 U.S. at 274–75.
852
447 U.S. at 184.
853
The Thomas Court also misdescribed Utah & Northern, see supra notes 359–60 and
accompanying text.
854
See infra notes 890–94, 1315–17, 1349–54 and accompanying text.
846
847

Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4

01-Pomp.indd 1108

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=244384612/23/2010

11:03:51 AM

INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE AND STATE TAXATION

1109

smokeshops.
Two further differences with Thomas exist. First, the Tribes in Colville documented that their tobacco revenues financed tribal services; this aspect of
Thomas was unaddressed because the Indians were not parties to that case.
Second, in Colville the State tax imposed administrative collection burdens on
the Tribes; in Thomas the lessee paid the tax with no reporting obligation on
the Indian lessors. Add to these differences that Thomas was decided in 1898,
using analytical tools that the Court would subsequently abandon,855 and
that the Thomas Court rejected the taxpayer’s argument by simply announcing ipse dixit that the territorial was remote and indirect, and Rehnquist’s
pronouncement that the case “best illustrates the relevant backdrop” requires
a more generous reading of precedent than is palatable.
iii. Rehnquist’s Misreading of Silas Mason. The liberties Rehnquist
took in describing Thomas856 paled in comparison with his blatant misstating
of the facts in Henneford v. Silas Mason.857 Justice Rehnquist cited Silas Mason
in support of the heart of his argument:
When two sovereigns have legitimate authority to tax the same transaction,
exercise of that authority by one sovereign does not oust the jurisdiction
of the other858 . . . In [Silas Mason] this Court upheld a state tax on one of
its resident’s use of goods purchased in another State without regard to the
fact that the other State’s competitive ability to tax the same transaction was
obviously reduced. The Court observed that such a tax was permissible even
if no credit for the other state tax were allowed.859

A cursory reading of Silas Mason is enough to see that it contradicts Justice Rehnquist. That 1937 case involved Washington’s use tax on tangible
personal property purchased elsewhere and brought into the State. Washington provided a credit for sales taxes paid to other states on the purchase of
such property so that, contrary to Justice Rehnquist’s assertion, the issue of
whether the use tax would be permissible without a credit was not raised.860
The credit meant that out-of-state purchases (i.e., interstate commerce) were
not discriminated against. Reflecting the typical judicial reluctance to decide
issues not before it, the Silas Mason Court stated:
See Richard D. Pomp, State and Local Taxation 1-8 to 1-19 (6th ed. 2009).
Dean Getches describes Rehnquist as “press[ing] his point with a vigor that seems inappropriate for a concurring opinion until one discovers that it was originally written as a dissent
from Justice Brennan’s proposed majority opinion.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at
1606. I do not mind “vigor” as long as it is intellectually honest.
857
300 U.S. 577 (1937).
858
Colville, 447 U.S. at 184 n.9.
859
Id. (emphasis added).
860
See Silas Mason, 300 U.S. at 587. The Court had previously recognized that the effect of
the credit was to equalize the taxation of purchases whether made in-state of out-of-state. “The
effect of [Washington’s tax system in Silas Mason] was nondiscriminatory treatment of in-state
and out-of-state purchases.” Bos. Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 331 (1977).
For a wonderful presentation of the issues, see Tatarowicz, supra note 841.
855
856
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We have not meant to imply by anything said in this opinion that allowance
of a credit for other taxes paid to Washington made it mandatory that there
should be a like allowance for taxes paid to other states. . . . It will be time
enough to mark [limits on state taxing powers] when a taxpayer paying in
the state of origin is compelled to pay again in the state of destination. This
statute by its framework avoids that possibility. The offsetting allowance has
been conceded, whether the concession was necessary or not, and thus the
system has been divested of any semblance of inequality or prejudice.861

Not even a crabbed reading of this excerpted language can support Rehnquist’s description of Silas Mason. Moreover, under contemporary doctrine,
the question left open in 1937 would appear to be resolved under the socalled internal consistency doctrine,862 and today nearly all states that levy a
use tax provide a credit for sales taxes paid to other states.863
iv. Rehnquist’s False Parallel with State Taxation of Those Doing Business with the Federal Government. Justice Rehnquist also tried to bolster the
Washington tax by citing a series of Supreme Court cases for the proposition
that a state tax is constitutional even if its economic incidence falls on the
federal government.
Even the sovereign immunity of the Federal Government would not prevent the effects of a tax comparable to those in issue. . . . Thus the State,
through its exercise of taxing authority, can effectively require the Federal
Government to forgo revenues which would otherwise be available to it in
order to remain competitive as an enterprise.864
In all areas of tax immunity, this Court has staunchly refused to consider the permissibility of a tax by reference to the economic burdens
which it imposes if those burdens are nondiscriminatory and satisfy due
process. . . . If Indians are to function as quasi co-sovereigns with the States,
they like the States, must adjust to the economic realities of that status as
every other sovereign competing for tax revenues, absent express intervention by Congress.865
300 U.S. at 587.
See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 192 n.6 (1995). Jefferson
Lines also described Silas Mason as upholding a use tax “which provided credit for sales taxes
paid to any State.” Id.
863
Rehnquist may have been misled by Washington’s Brief in Colville, which stated that
“[j]ust as two sister states may each impose its own tax upon income earned in one state by the
resident of another (Maine v. New Hampshire, 426 U.S. 660 (1976)) or upon the same item
of personal property, if purchased in one state and used in another ([Silas Mason]), so also the
Tribe and the State each have the power to tax.” Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 744,
at *29. The Brief failed to note that in the case of an income tax, states grant a credit to their
residents for income taxes levied by other states on income earned in those states. Similarly, in
the case of a use tax, states grant a credit for any sales taxes levied on the purchase of the good
that subsequently becomes subject to a use tax. See Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 192 n.6.
864
Colville, 447 U.S. at 184 n.9.
865
Id. at 185–86 (citation omitted). Simply put, Rehnquist was saying to the Indians “you
cannot have your cake and eat it too.”
861
862
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Justice Rehnquist correctly summarized the law governing state taxation of
those doing business with the federal government. But the premise that the
doctrine upholding state taxes whose impact falls on the Federal Government
should be applied in pari materia to the Indians is simply wrong.
Much of the doctrine dealing with state taxation of those doing business
with the federal government was established during the Great Depression and
World War II. During that period, the federal government became actively
involved in the economy, and the states were desperate for tax revenue. The
cases of that era relaxed prior judicial constraints (often highly formalistic) by
disregarding whether the burden of a state tax fell on the federal government,
which was true of cost-plus contracts that were commonplace during the war.
This paradigmatic shift allowed the states to share in the increased economic
activity generated by the federal government, especially important for states
that were home to federal contractors or federal facilities.
These federal cases reflected the political reality of that era. More fundamentally, the cases also reflected a pragmatic legal safeguard unique to the
Federal Government. Congress can always intervene and prohibit any state
tax that is unacceptable, although imagining any nondiscriminatory state tax
posing a serious threat to the federal government is difficult. True, Congress
can always intervene on behalf of the Indians as well and prohibit oppressive
state taxes, but as a political matter the government is more likely to act when
it perceives a threat to its self-interest, including the federal fisc. The interests
of the Indians are less likely to trigger congressional intervention. As will
be seen, Justice Rehnquist apparently read the politics differently because he
viewed Congress as a source of protection for the Indians.
As a practical matter, a nondiscriminatory state tax is not likely to severely
impact a federal activity the way that Moe and Colville most likely destroyed
business with the smokeshops (absent some kind of tax-sharing agreement or
compact).866 Any state tax falling on the federal government would impose a
trivial burden and be unlikely to have any real impact.867
The constitutional prohibition against a discriminatory state tax means
that the federal government rides the coattails of state taxpayers. That is, to
levy a high rate of tax on the federal government requires that state taxpayers
accept that same rate applied to themselves. Realistically, therefore, state taxes
present no serious threat to the federal fisc.868 Moe and Colville, by contrast,
illustrate how even a nondiscriminatory state tax can wipe out a sector of a
tribe’s economy.
See supra note 814; infra note 901.
From a narrower perspective, a federal agency issuing a contract might worry about the
effect of a state tax on the cost of the contract. An agency has a limited budget, and the more
that is spent on state taxes the less available for other uses. This type of concern might trigger
congressional intervention.
868
Nothing similar to a Williams v. Lee test has ever been applied to state taxes on the Federal
Government, presumably because realistically no state could ever infringe on the Federal
Government’s ability to make its own laws and be ruled by them.
866
867
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Justice Rehnquist cited two sources of protection for the Indians to show
that they are not “helpless hostages of the State absent judicial intervention.”869
First, reiterating a theme he already expounded, Rehnquist underscored that
the Indians cannot be subject to a discriminatory tax.870 Considering that
Moe and Colville (as well as the other leading cases discussed above) involved
nondiscriminatory state taxes, this first protection is of more theoretical than
practical significance.871
Second, the Indians were protected by Congress, which can always intervene. This view, however, puts the onus on the Indians to overcome legislative inertia. That is, a state tax would stand unless Congress overcame its
normal legislative inertia and state opposition, and prohibited the offending
tax. This approach would replace judicial protection with political protection,
an approach that has been rejected in other areas of constitutional law. The
Indians could certainly be excused if they viewed Congress somewhat skeptically, if not cynically, as their protector.
Justice Rehnquist’s views, if extended to interstate commerce, would eliminate the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause. The Court would not evaluate
whether a state tax imposed undue burdens on interstate commerce because
Congress would make that evaluation. Only discriminatory taxes would be
struck down by the courts. This philosophy is consistent with Justice Rehnquist’s more general aversion to balancing tests,872 and it mirrors the philosophy of Justices Scalia873 and Thomas,874 who reject the existence of a dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine.875
Justice Rehnquist found that under the teaching of Mescalero, Congress’s
failure to prohibit the nondiscriminatory Washington cigarette tax was dispositive.876 The only protection the Tribes had was from nondiscriminatory
Colville, 447 U.S. at 186 n.11.
For example, a state could not tax sales on the reservation without taxing off-reservation
sales. Id. Similarly, a state could not tax sales on a reservation at a higher rate than sales off a
reservation.
871
Because a court would ultimately be involved in determining whether illegitimate discrimination exists, Rehnquist’s description that this protection would not involve “judicial
intervention” is misleading.
872
See supra note 719 and accompanying text; infra note 883 and accompanying text.
873
Justice Scalia’s views are set forth in Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State
Department of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 259–65 (1987). Dean Getches notes that “Justice
Scalia has candidly summarized his view of the Supreme Court’s approach to Indian law as a
search for ‘what the current state of affairs ought to be.’” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14,
at 1642 (emphasis in original).
874
Justices Scalia and Thomas reject the Dormant Commerce Clause but draw an exception
for discriminatory taxes. Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part; Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); United Haulers Ass’n. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid
Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part; Thomas, J., concurring
in judgment).
875
Moreover, if these two sources of protection (protection from discriminatory taxation
and protection by Congress) were applied to the intergovernmental immunity cases, the Court
would have started down a very different path as well.
876
See Colville, 447 U.S. at 185 (1980).
869
870
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taxation held sufficient to protect sovereignty in other areas of constitutionally derived immunities.877 The burden was on the Tribes to find an explicit
expression of immunity, which they could not do.878 That Washington could
not find an explicit congressional authorization to impose its tax was irrelevant. Chief Justice John Marshall would be aghast.
n. Brennan’s Dissent
i. The Majority Undermines the Tribes’ Sovereign Authority to Regulate and Tax Cigarettes. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented
because they viewed the Washington tax as undermining the Tribes’ sovereign authority to regulate and tax cigarettes on trust lands. In addition, the
Washington tax conflicted with activities expressly approved by the federal
government.879 Justice Stewart dissented separately.
Brennan started with a brief doctrinal overview. First, “Indian reservations do not partake of the full territorial sovereignty of States or foreign
countries. The result has been to blur the boundary between state and tribal
authority.”880 Second, unless the Tribes consent, “state law does not reach onreservation conduct involving only Indians.”881 Third, “a significant territorial
component of tribal power” exists so that “state taxes on the off-reservation
activities of Indians are permissible” and “tribal laws will often govern the on877
878

Id. at 177 n.2.

In the area of state taxes on reservations, Justice Rehnquist has developed a test that
severely limits tribal immunity from state taxes. The Rehnquist test is simply to ask
whether Congress has spoken to the particular type of tax the state wishes to impose,
and whether Congress intended that Indian lands be immune. The intent of Congress
in each case is ascertained by determining whether there has been a traditional immunity for Indians against imposition of this type of tax. If traditional immunity exists,
and Congress has spoken on the subject and has not removed the immunity, the
intent of Congress presumably is to retain the immunity for the Indians. If there is
no finding of “traditional immunity,” however, Congress’s silence means no tribal
immunity exists. Congress must specifically preempt state action in the area of the
tax for the state’s taxing power to be limited. Rehnquist’s test is contrary to the Indian
law doctrine disfavoring the application of state laws on a reservation where Congress
has expressed no clear intent.
Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, 16 Pub.
Land L. Rev. 1, 21–22 (1995).
879
Colville, 447 U.S. at 165. They concurred with the majority’s striking down the motor
vehicle tax. Id. at 164–65.
880
Id. at 165–66. See Atkinson Trading, discussed supra notes 331, 592, 762; infra note 1075,
which seems to adopt this view in striking down a Navajo hotel occupancy tax imposed on the
guests of a non-Indian hotel on non-Indian fee land on the reservation.
881
Colville, 447 U.S. at 166. The examples the dissent gave covered the adoption of children by on-reservation tribal members, Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976); the
income derived by reservation Indians from reservation sources, McClanahan v. Ariz. State
Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); on-reservation sales to reservation Indians, and personal
property taxes on property owned by such Indians, Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
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reservation conduct of non-Indians.”882 Fourth, if a conflict exists “between
state and tribal authority over on-reservation conduct involving Indians and
non-Indians, a relatively particularistic look at the interests of the state and
the tribe and the federal policies that govern relations with Indian tribes is
appropriate.”883
[T]he preceding results flow from an intricate web of sources including
federal treaties and statutes, the broad policies that underlie those federal
enactments, and a presumption of sovereignty or autonomy that has roots
deep in aboriginal independence. The prevalent mode of analysis is one of
pre-emption. It takes as its starting point the exclusive power of the Federal
Government to regulate Indian tribes and proceeds to bound state power
where necessary to give vitality to the federal concerns at stake. Only rarely
does the talismanic invocation of constitutional language or rigid conceptions of state and tribal sovereignty shed light on difficult problems.884

This formulation is noteworthy for three reasons. First, the dissent refers to
a presumption of sovereignty or autonomy and the Government’s exclusive
power to regulate the tribes, so it is unclear who has the burden to “bind”
the state. Second, if no federal concerns can be identified, then presumably
a state statute will be upheld, which seems to undercut the presumption and
the “exclusive power of the Federal Government.” Brennan was obviously not
attempting to resurrect Worcester. Third, the dissent omits any explicit reference to the Indian Commerce Clause. The reference to the “exclusive power
of the Federal Government” could be read as an oblique reference to that
Clause. If the caveat that “only rarely does the talismanic invocation of constitutional language” shed light on difficult problems is meant to refer to the
Indian Commerce Clause, then this was hardly a resounding endorsement of
that Clause. But it is unclear if that is what the dissent intended, and the rest
of Brennan’s opinion (not excerpted above) relies not on the Constitution,
but rather on the federal policy of encouraging tribal self-government and
stimulating economic and commercial development, described as “of central
importance in analyzing any conflict of state and tribal law.”885 There was no
explicit mention of the Indian Commerce Clause anywhere in Brennan’s dissent. (Justice Stewart’s dissent, by contrast, would refer to the Clause.)
ii. Limiting Moe. Analytically, Brennan had to limit the reach of Moe
so that it did not control Colville. Brennan distinguished Moe as involving a
private cigarette business; in Colville, by comparison, the Tribes were acting
in federally sanctioned ways by raising governmental revenues, establishing
commercial enterprises, and struggling to escape from a “century of oppres882
Colville, 447 U.S. at 166–67 (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145
(1973) and Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959)).
883
Id. at 167. This particularistic examination of the interests suggests the type of balancing
that is anathema to Rehnquist.
884
Id. at 167–68 (citing Moe and McClanahan) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
885
Id. at 168–69.
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sion and paternalism.”886 Unlike Moe, the Washington tax directly reduced
tribal revenue. The combination of the Washington and tribal taxes put the
smokeshops at a disadvantage. And the State tax injected Washington law
onto a reservation transaction that the Indians had chosen to subject to their
own laws.887
Brennan viewed the majority as putting the Tribes to an unsatisfactory
choice between tribal self-government and commercial development. The
Tribes are
free to tax sales to non-Indians, but doing so will place a burden upon
such sales which may well make it profitable for non-Indian buyers who
are located on the reservation to journey to surrounding communities to
purchase cigarettes.888 Or they can decide to remain competitive by not
taxing such sales, and in the process forgo revenues urgently needed to fill
governmental coffers. Commercial growth, in short, can be had only at the
expense of tax dollars. And having to make that choice seriously intrudes on
the Indians’ right “to make their own laws and be ruled by them.”889

Id. at 169–70 (quoting Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 152).
Id. at 170.
888
In an attempt to limit Moe, the dissent stated that this problem was entirely absent in
that case, which technically was true because there were no tribal taxes and the holding in Moe
could be viewed as merely establishing that on-reservation and off-reservation purchases by
non-Indians would be subject to the same state tax. As a practical matter, however, off-reservation non-Indians were hardly going to drive to the reservation to buy cigarettes and pay the
same tax that applied off-reservation. While on-reservation non-Indians had no reason to buy
off-reservation after Moe because the state tax would be paid in either event, presumably the
smokeshops did not exist to service that group. Brennan viewed Moe as maintaining neutrality
between on- and off-reservation purchases, creating “a situation in which persons were encouraged to buy cigarettes on the basis of factors other than tax benefits and avoidance—factors
like geographical location and convenience.” Id. at 171 n.6. Those factors, of course, did not
favor the Indians.
889
Colville, 447 U.S. at 171 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959)). The dissent
recognized that the choice between taxes and economic development could be viewed as commonplace because states have to balance their revenue needs against the economic impact
of their taxes. The dissent dismissed the relevance of the state analogy on the grounds that
if a state imposes a high tax and consumers purchase goods elsewhere, they will nonetheless
be subject to a use tax that out-of-state vendors will have to collect in some circumstances.
Nonetheless, the Indians cannot require off-reservation vendors to collect tribal use taxes. But
more to the point, the tribes are the “special beneficiaries of certain federal concerns and policies. As a result, the tradeoffs and frictions that may be inevitable in the state-state context
demand special scrutiny in the state-reservation context. Tribes may lack the tools needed to
protect themselves, and protecting them is an important federal concern.” Id. at 171 n.7.
Dean Getches describes the dissent as wanting to treat the reservation as a tax-free enterprise
zone. Getches, supra note 14, at 1604. The Court rejected that goal as long ago as 1898 in
Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898). Tax-free enterprise zones are used by the states to encourage development in blighted areas, typically the inner cities. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability
Office, Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Community Program: Improvements
Occurred in Programs, But the Effect of the Programs is Unclear (GAO-06-727)
(2006).
886
887
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o. Do the Tribal “Taxes” Have Independent Economic Significance?
What is misleading about Colville is the Court’s acceptance that the Tribal
taxes were “real.” The Tribes were apparently both the retailer and the taxing sovereign.890 If that is true, then the taxes had no independent economic
significance.
Before the adoption of a Tribal tax, cigarettes had to sell at a price that
made them competitive with off-reservation vendors. If the Washington tax
did not apply on the reservation, which is what the Tribes assumed prior to
Moe, cigarettes on the reservation could be priced the same as cigarettes selling off-reservation (ex-tax). The inapplicability of the Washington tax would
give the Tribes a competitive edge.891 That edge would be preserved if the
Tribe adopted its own sales tax but lowered the base price of the cigarettes
on the reservation by the amount of the tax. Under that condition, the total
sales price of cigarettes on the reservation with the Tribal tax (but without the
Washington tax) would be the same as before the Tribe adopted its tax.
To illustrate, if cigarettes were selling for $X before the adoption of a $Y
tribal tax, their base price could be reduced so that after the adoption of a
Tribal tax they would continue to sell for $X with the tax. Their competitive
edge would still come from the lack of the Washington tax.892
Put differently, suppose that without a tribal or Washington tax, the Tribe
was receiving net revenue from the smokeshops it owned in the amount of
$100. Assume cigarettes were selling at a price without any taxes for the same
890
The Court describes the Colville, Lummi, and Makah Tribes as retailers, and that the
cigarettes remained the property of the Tribes until sold. Colville, 447 U.S. at 144. The Court
also describes the Tribes as distributing the cigarettes to the tobacco outlets and collecting the
wholesale distribution price and a tax. Id. That description is more consistent with the Tribes
being a wholesaler, yet the Court contrasts them with the Yakima, which acts as a wholesaler.
Id. “While the Colville, Lummi, and Makah Tribes function as retailers, retaining possession of the cigarettes until their sale to consumers, the Yakima Tribe acts as a wholesaler.” Id.
The district court opinion adds further confusion. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation v. Washington, 446 F. Supp. 1339, 1347 (E.D. Wash. 1978). The discussion in the
text proceeds as if the Tribes were both the taxing sovereign and retailer. Whatever the actual
facts in Colville, the discussion in the text would apply to Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi
Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005), where the Tribe was clearly wearing both hats: taxing sovereign
and retailer. It would also apply to Merrion and Cotton where again the tribes were wearing
both hats.
891
To the extent the reservation smokeshops had costs of doing business that were comparable to off-reservation competitors, the base price of cigarettes on-reservation (ex-tax) would
approximate the base price of cigarettes sold off-reservation (ex-tax). Without having to charge
a state tax, cigarettes at the smokeshops could be priced so that the purchaser received the full
tax savings or the sellers could capitalize some of the benefit and increase the price. See supra
note 706.
892
Presumably, the Tribes set the base price of their cigarettes to maximize their profits. If
that price were $X before the Tribal tax were adopted, it would remain at $X after the Tribal
tax were adopted. If the smokeshops increased their prices above $X to take into account the
tax, and if that produced even more profits than they were making before the tax, the logical
question is why weren’t they selling cigarettes at that higher price in the first place? Admittedly,
this is a rarified discussion.
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amount they were selling for off-reservation (ex-tax). Assume the Tribe now
adopts a tax and lowers its base price of cigarettes by the amount of the tax so
that there is no change in the demand for cigarettes. Consumers see the same
price as before, only now the Tribe will receive its net revenue partially in the
form of a tax. Instead of receiving $100 of net revenue as before, assume the
Tribe now receives $80 of net revenue and $20 of tax. There is no economic
difference between these two situations. The “tax” is a formal distinction.893
Why would the Tribe adopt a “tax” that had no independent economic significance? One explanation is that the existence of a “tax” was an attempt to
enhance its litigating position. Although the Tribes ended up losing Colville
anyway, the Court accepted that the “tax” was real and had economic significance. Also, the tax would have real economic significance if there were
non-Tribal owned smokeshops (although there does not appear to have been
any).894 Perhaps there were marketing considerations, in that the Tribes advertised the lower ex-tax price of cigarettes.
After losing Colville, the Tribe could not offer non-Indians or non-member
Indians (“taxable purchasers”) the advantage of buying free of the Washington tax. Unless the smokeshops’ cost of doing business was significantly lower
than those of its off-reservation competitors so that it could lower the base
price of cigarettes,895 there was little it could do to attract onto the reservation
taxable purchasers. But the heart of the issue was not the Tribal tax. With or
without the Tribal tax, the viability of the smokeshops depended on not having to collect the Washington tax. From this perspective, Colville added very
little to Moe except for allowing the State to tax non-member Indians.
Assuming that the tax-inclusive price of cigarettes on the reservation was
close to the tax-inclusive price of cigarettes off-reservation, sales might still be

893
Conceivably, the Tribe could have been viewed as previously imposing a tax equal in
amount to 100% of its net revenue, and was now reducing that tax. See Richard D. Pomp &
Stanley S. Surrey, The Tax Structure of the People’s Republic of China, 20 Va. J. Int.’l L. 1, 3
(1979).
The issue of what constitutes a tax when the taxing sovereign is simultaneously the vendor
(or owner of a resource) has a parallel in the Internal Revenue Code. Congress grants a credit
for foreign income taxes. When the foreign sovereign wears both hats, the issue arises of how
much of a payment by a taxpayer to a foreign country should be viewed as a creditable income
tax? This issue is especially important for the U.S. multinational oil companies. A foreign
country that owns the oil may not care if it receives its sought after revenue in the form of a
royalty or an income tax. The oil companies, however, greatly prefer paying a creditable income
tax rather than a deductible royalty. For the U.S. rules, see Int. Rev. Code of 1986, Reg. Secs.
1.901-2, 1.901-2A. See Michael J. McIntyre, International Income Tax Rules of the
United States 5-17 to 5-21 (2nd ed. 2000); John P. Steines, Jr., International Aspects of
U.S. Income Taxation 303-08 (2004). For a very good early discussion, see Joseph Isenbergh,
The Foreign Tax Credit: Royalties, Subsidies, and Creditable Taxes, 39 Tax L. Rev. 227 (1984).
894
Another possibility is that despite what the Court stated, the Tribes were not acting as
retailers, see supra note 890.
895
See supra note 891 and accompanying text.
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made to taxable purchasers who lived on the reservation.896 And sales would
continue to be made to Tribal members who had no incentive to purchase
off-reservation where they would have paid the Washington tax, which was
higher than the Tribal tax. But the smokeshops did not exist to sell to these
groups.
Justice Brennan knew that requiring Washington to grant a credit for the
Tribal “taxes” would eliminate the marketing of an exemption and would
ensure that consumers would be neutral about where to purchase cigarettes.897 Without the credit, the Tribes “court economic harms when they
enact taxes of their own,”898 and this possibility “erodes the Tribe’s sovereign
authority and stands the special federal solicitude for Indian commerce and
governmental autonomy on its head.”899 That statement would be correct if
the Tribes were not both a retailer and taxing sovereign.900 Brennan concluded
that Washington could “not impose a tax that forces the Tribes to choose
between federally sanctioned goals and places their goods at an actual competitive disadvantage.”901
If the Tribes were both a retailer and the taxing sovereign, then a credit
would only encourage a tribe to adopt a tax equal to the State tax and reduce
the base price of its cigarettes accordingly. To illustrate, if the Tribe sold $100
of cigarettes and had no Tribal tax, a credit would be irrelevant. If, however,
the Tribe were to adopt a tax and reduce its prices accordingly so that it now
sold $80 of cigarettes and collected a creditable Tribal tax of $20, the State
would sacrifice $20 of revenue, yet there might be no effect on reservation
sales because there would be no change in tax-inclusive reservation prices.902
Where a tribe acts only as a taxing sovereign, and thus has no control over
the price of the underlying cigarettes, however, the issue of a credit becomes
896
Before the district court, the State conceded that if both the Washington and tribal taxes
were imposed, “it is painfully apparent that very few, if any, cartons of cigarettes would have
been sold.” Appellants’ Opening Brief, Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian
Reservation, 446 F.Supp. 1339 (E.D. Wash. 1978), 1979 U.S. Briefs LEXIS 1817, at *96. The
State did not realize that the Tribes could lower the base price of their cigarettes to offset the
tribal tax. The district court in ruling for the tribes accepted that “with regard to a commodity
as highly price elastic as cigarettes, the result will be the depletion of an already limited tribal
tax base, probably destruction of the tribal enterprises and elimination of essential revenues
needed for tribally sponsored programs.” Id. at *97.
897
Colville, 447 U.S. at 172.
898
Id.
899
Id.
900
See supra notes 890–93 and accompanying text.
901
Colville. 447 U.S. at 173. The dissent proceeded to chide the majority for deciding the
collection issue when the district court failed to do so. Id. at 173–74. One commentator
reported that after losing the case, the Colville Tribe closed all of its smokeshops. Richard J.
Ansson, Jr., State Taxation of Non-Indians Whom Do Business With Indian Tribes: Why Several
Recent Ninth Circuit Holdings Reemphasize The Need For Indian Tribes To Enter Into Taxation
Compacts With Their Respective State, 78 Or. L. Rev. 501, 543–44 (1999) (citing a phone
interview with a tribal attorney).
902
The status quo ante is assumed to be one where the Tribes had no taxes of their own and
the State offered no credit.
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relevant.
Of course, all of this is a highly stylized discussion, which has a greater
import if a tribe is both a sovereign and a vendor.903 But it does underscore
that the issue under those conditions was more complicated than the Court
appreciated, and that Moe, rather than Colville, was the key case. Once Moe
held that a state could tax non-Indians, the sought-after tax advantage was
lost.
p. Stewart’s Willingness to Require a (Meaningless) Credit for the Tribal
Taxes
Unlike Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice Stewart’s dissent explicitly
referred to the Indian Commerce Clause, although he was unwilling to interpret it as prohibiting the Washington tax. According to Justice Stewart,
when a State and an Indian tribe tax in a functionally identical manner the
same on-reservation sales to nontribal members, it is my view that congressional policy conjoined with the Indian Commerce Clause requires the
State to credit against its own tax the amount of the tribe’s tax. This solution
fully effectuates the State’s goal of assuring that its citizens who are not tribal
members do not cash in on the exemption from state taxation that the tribe
and its members enjoy. On the other hand, it permits the tribe to share with
the State in the tax revenues from cigarette sales, without at the same time
placing the tribe’s federally encouraged enterprises at a competitive disadvantage compared to similarly situated off-reservation businesses.904

Like White’s and Rehnquist’s focus on discrimination, Stewart’s emphasis
on a credit moves the interpretation of the Indian Commerce Clause away
from its roots and closer to the Interstate Commerce Clause.905
Justice Stewart’s reasoning would be identical if the issue were whether
Washington had to provide a credit against its use tax for sales taxes paid to
State X having a lower sales tax. To paraphrase the reasoning above using the
more general sales and use tax, a credit fully effectuates [Washington’s] goal
of assuring that its citizens who are not [residents of X] do not cash in on
the [lower rate of X’s sales taxes that X residents enjoy]. On the other hand,
it permits [X] to share with [Washington] in the tax revenues from cigarette
sales, without at the same time placing [X’s businesses] at a competitive disadvantage compared to similarly situated businesses in [Washington].
Seen from this perspective, Justice Stewart’s interpretation of the Indian
Commerce Clause dovetails with the Interstate Commerce Clause and treats
the Tribes as if they were a state.906 The Founders, however, never intended
See supra note 890; infra notes 909–10 and accompanying text.
Colville, 447 U.S. at 175. The Court’s analysis is more relevant when a tribe is acting as
a taxing sovereign and not as a vendor of the taxed goods. Otherwise, the credit can result in a
loss in state revenue without any encouragement of reservation sales. See supra note 902.
905
See supra notes 807, 810, 870–71 and accompanying text.
906
Justice Stewart viewed the tribes as enjoying a “power at least equal to that of the State to
tax the on-reservation sales of cigarettes to nontribal members.” Colville, 447 U.S. at 174–75.
903
904
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that the Indian Commerce Clause be viewed in pari materia with the Interstate Commerce Clause,907 and Justice Stewart did not view the Indian Commerce Clause of its own force as prohibiting the Washington sales tax on
reservation sales.
The credit operates exactly as Justice Stewart describes, but is not going to
provide “funds for the maintenance and operation of tribal self-government.”908
A credit will not give the Indians the tax advantage they were seeking in being
able to sell to non-Indians and non-member Indians free of a state tax. At
best, a credit would ensure that the tax rate on cigarettes sold on the reservation will be equal to the rate on off-reservation sales.909
A credit would encourage the tribe to adopt a tax (or increase the rate of an
existing tax) equal to the amount that would creditable. A taxable purchaser
would not be any worse off, and the effect would be to transfer revenue from
the state to the tribe. The group whose decision might be affected by the
credit in a situation where a tribe was not also a vendor would be those living
on the reservation, whether non-member Indians or non-Indians. This group
would be subject to the Tribal and State tax and thus benefit from the credit,
which would remove a tax incentive to purchase off-reservation.910
In other situations, a credit might be extremely valuable at eliminating
double taxation. For example, a credit would eliminate the double taxation
that would otherwise result from the simultaneous imposition of a tribal and
state income tax, or the simultaneous imposition of a tribal and state severance tax.911
q. The Economic Implications of Moe and Colville
The combination of Moe and Colville imposes a dilemma for tribes in the
case of cigarettes, liquor, gasoline, and the like.912 Moe and Colville remove
the advantage of selling goods on the reservation without a state tax. If a
tribe is both a sovereign and a vendor and imposes its own tax, it can lower
the base price of the goods it sells to offset its own tax, but it can never offer
non-Indians and non-member Indians the advantage of buying without a
state tax. Where a tribe is not a vendor, it can continue levying its own tax,
See supra notes 180, 190, 283 and accompanying text.
Colville, 447 U.S. at 175.
909
For a general discussion, see Cowan, Double Taxation, supra note 814.
910
Cotton Petroleum, infra notes 1131–1270 and accompanying text, involved the simultaneous assertion of a tribal severance tax and a state severance tax. The Court refused to grant
any relief from the resulting multiple taxation.
911
See supra notes 890–93 and accompanying text. Justice Stewart drew a distinction
between the taxes levied by the Colville, Lummi, and Makah Tribes, which functioned like
the State’s general sales tax, and the tax levied by the Yakima Tribe, which was imposed on the
retailer and not required to be added to the ultimate retail sales price. Because of this difference, Justice Stewart would not have required a credit for the Yakima tax. He did not pursue
the issue discussed in the text that when a tribe is both the sovereign and the vendor, the existence of a tribal tax has no independent economic significance.
912
See supra text accompanying note 653.
907
908

Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4

01-Pomp.indd 1120

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=244384612/23/2010

11:03:53 AM

INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE AND STATE TAXATION

1121

but the smokeshops are likely to suffer a decline in revenue as non-tribal
members and non-Indians shop off-reservation. The tribe would be left taxing its captive market, that is, those living and working on the reservation
that have no easy access to off-reservation stores (assuming no black market
develops).913 Even without a tribal tax, however, Moe already ensured that
off-reservation non-Indians had no tax incentive to shop on-reservation (Moe
had not addressed the issue of non-tribal members).
After Moe and Colville, on-reservation non-Indians and non-members lost
the tax incentive to purchase on reservation. But if there were no tribal taxes,
they also had no tax reason to shop off-reservation. If there were a tribal
tax, however, they would be discouraged from purchasing on the reservation,
unless that tax were creditable (or there were other relief arrangements). A
tribe could adopt other types of taxes on the smokeshops, such as an income
tax, a property tax, an excise tax on doing business, a business activities tax,
and the like. Double taxation could still result depending on whether a state
imposes similar taxes and what relief mechanisms it adopts.914 In the shortterm, these alternatives may not be as attractive as selling cigarettes free of
state tax. If, however, Moe and Colville encourage tribes to pursue more substantial forms of economic development, the long-term consequences of these
cases could be positive.915

913
The Yakima Tribe had a population that was one-fourth enrolled tribal members and
three-fourths non-members living on the reservation. Bess Lee Chen, What About Colville, 8
Am. Indian L. Rev. 161, 167 (1980). If the non-members were a captive market because they
had no easy transport and rarely left the reservation, they might continue to buy cigarettes
and pay the double tax. They might also stock up on cigarettes when they happened to be
off-reservation. If the captive market were large, a black market might be expected to emerge,
as persons purposely bought cigarettes off-reservation free of the tribal taxes with the intent of
reselling them on-reservation. Even if the tribes imposed a use tax to deal with this situation,
they would still need a way of enforcing it. The smokeshops could, of course, cut their prices
so that even with the tribal and state taxes, cigarettes would still be cheaper on the reservation
than off, but the reduction in profits might not make this a viable option. See supra note 891.
An intriguing question starkly posing the sovereignty issue would be whether a tribe could
require an off-reservation vendor to collect a tribal use tax on the sale of goods sent onto the
reservation. Without any analysis, the dissent in Colville stated that “it is highly unlikely that
the Tribes . . . could require sellers elsewhere in Washington to collect tribal taxes.” Colville,
447 U.S. at 171 n.7.
914
For a discussion of the double tax issue, see Cowan, Double Taxation, supra note 814, at
95–96.
915
Unlike many other tribes, the Yakima did not depend solely on cigarette sales because it
also sold timber. Chen, supra note 913, at 167–68. One commentator reported that smokeshop closings in Washington “have created losses of tribal revenues of $200,000” and that
some tribes were planning to sell liquor and DMSO, a pain reliever that was not approved by
the FDA. Id. at 168 n.25.
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E. The Preemption/Balancing Cases
1. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker
The next reference to the Indian Commerce Clause was in White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker.916 The case involved the application of the Arizona
motor carrier license tax917 and use fuel taxes918 to Pinetop, an enterprise919
that—pursuant to a contract with a tribal corporation—was logging on the
reservation.920 The legal incidence of each tax was on the company, but the
Tribe agreed contractually to reimburse Pinetop and intervened as a plaintiff.921 Timber operations provided an overwhelming percentage of the Tribe’s
profits from all of its enterprises. Timber profits funded governmental, health,
916
448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980). The Court handed down White Mountain and Central
Machinery, discussed supra notes 469–518 and accompanying text, two weeks after Colville.
The state taxes were struck down in White Mountain and Central Machinery but upheld in
Colville. According to Dean Getches:

The different results left lawyers and scholars puzzled as to the applicable rules. Only
three Justices had voted in the majority in all three cases! The boundaries of tribal tax
immunity became fuzzy, lying somewhere between Colville and the other two cases.
Still, it was not unreasonable at the time to see White Mountain-Central Machinery
as stating the general rule and Colville, which pieced together a majority from four
opinions based on separate rationales, as an exception.
Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1608.
917
The license tax was imposed on every common motor carrier of property and every
contract motor carrier of property. The tax was 2.5% of the carrier’s gross receipts, White
Mountain, 448 U.S. at 139, to support the “maintenance of Arizona highways from parties
who enter into business arrangements which look directly to the inordinate use of public highways to realize pecuniary benefits.” Brief for Petitioners, at 23, White Mountain, 448 U.S. 136
(No. 78-1177), 1979 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1274, at *23 [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners]
(citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40-641 (1979)).
918
The excise or use fuel tax was designed to partially compensate the State for the use of its
highways. It was imposed at eight cents per gallon of fuel used in the propulsion of a motor
vehicle on any highway within the State. White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 140. Pinetop conceded
liability for both taxes for travel on State highways within the reservation. Id. at 140 n.6. The
Tribe conceded that its roads were “within this State.” Brief for Petitioners, supra note 917, at
*25.
919
The Court described Pinetop as “an enterprise consisting of two non-Indian corporations,” and as a joint venture corporation. White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 137–38, 153 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). The Tribe’s brief describes Pinetop as the “business name of two Oregon corporations . . . which jointly conduct the logging business . . . .” Brief for Petitioners, supra note
917, at *8 n.1.
920
A tribal enterprise (FATCO) managed, harvested, processed, and sold timber. FATCO
contracted “with six logging companies, including Pinetop, which perform certain operations
that FATCO could not carry out as economically on its own.” White Mountain, 448 U.S. at
139.
921
Id. at 140. When Pinetop contracted to undertake the timber operations for FATCO,
both parties assumed no state taxes would be owed. After Arizona assessed the taxes at issue,
FATCO agreed to pay them to avoid the loss of Pinetop’s services. Id. at 140 n.7. The Tribe’s
Brief stated that the economic burden of the taxes fell entirely on it. Brief for Petitioners, supra
note 917, at *13. This statement is unremarkable given the agreement to reimburse Pinetop
was made after the fact when there were no opportunities to shift the tax.
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education, welfare, and social programs.922 Timber on the reservation trust
land was owned by the United States for the benefit of the Tribe and could
not be harvested for sale without consent of Congress.923 The operations were
subject to extensive federal control.924
a. Justice Marshall and the Indian Commerce Clause
Justice Marshall, writing again for the majority, started the opinion with a
reminder that “[l]ong ago the Court departed from Mr. Chief Justice Marshall’s view that ‘the laws of [a State] can have no force’ within reservation
boundaries,”925 and stressed that tribes retain “attributes of sovereignty over
both their members and their territory.”926 Consequently, there was “no rigid
rule by which to resolve the question whether a particular state law may be
applied to an Indian reservation or to tribal members.”927
Congress has broad power to regulate tribal affairs under the Indian
Commerce Clause. [The Indian Commerce Clause] and the “semi-independent position” of Indian tribes have given rise to two independent but
related barriers to the assertion of state regulatory authority over tribal reservations and members. First, the exercise of such authority may be preempted by federal law. See, e.g., [Warren Trading, McClanahan].928 Second,
it may unlawfully infringe “on the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them.” [Williams v. Lee].929 The two barriers
922
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 917, at *15. The revenue used to fund the Tribe’s programs
was derived almost entirely from tribal enterprises and of these, timber operations provided
over 90% of the Tribe’s annual profits. Id.; see also White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 146–48.
923
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 917, at *16.
924
See White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 138, 146–48.
925
White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 141 (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561
(1832)).
926
Id. at 142 (citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)).
927
Id.
928
Professor Wilkinson refers to this barrier as subject matter preemption “because it involves
the analysis of federal statutes dealing with discrete substantive areas of regulation such as commerce, criminal jurisdiction, health and education, and resource management.” Wilkinson,
supra note 7, at 93. See supra notes 436–37.
929
448 U.S. at 142. In Ramah Navajo School Board v. New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832 (1982), infra
notes 985–1057 and accompanying text, this second barrier was described as “interfer[ing] with
the tribe’s ability to exercise its sovereign functions.” 458 U.S. at 837. Commentators sometimes refer to the second barrier as an “infringement of tribal sovereignty.” See, e.g., Stephen M.
Feldman, Preemption and the Dormant Commerce Clause: Implications for Federal Indian Law,
64 Or. L. Rev. 667, 669 (1986). Feldman argues that the second barrier should be analyzed
under the Dormant Indian Commerce Clause and balance state interests against federal and
tribal interests. Id. But the second barrier has its roots in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959),
supra notes 376–424 and accompanying text, which was not a balancing test.
Professor Wilkinson refers to this second barrier as “geographical preemption,” which is
“purely territorial because it assesses the extent to which state law is ousted due solely to the
creation of an Indian reservation by joint federal-tribal action, or unilateral federal action, in a
treaty or treaty substitute.” Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 93.
In a non-Indian case, the Court has stated that state law is preempted where either Congress
has occupied the field with respect to the subject matter the state law seeks to regulate or the
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are independent because either, standing alone, can be a sufficient basis930
for . . . [striking down a state statute]. They are related, however, in two
important ways. The right of tribal self-government is ultimately dependent
on and subject to the broad power of Congress. Even so, traditional notions
of Indian self-government are so deeply engrained in our jurisprudence
that they have provided an important “backdrop,” against which vague or
ambiguous federal enactments must always be measured.931

The role Justice Marshall was ascribing to the Indian Commerce Clause
was unclear. He asserted that the Indian Commerce Clause in combination with the semi-independent position of the tribes gave rise to barriers
to state statutes. The first of the two barriers, preemption, however, invokes
the Supremacy Clause.932 Neither of the cases he cited in support, Warren
Trading and McClanahan,933 involved the Indian Commerce Clause. Indeed,
both cases would have been decided identically even if no Indian Commerce
Clause existed.934
The second barrier, set forth in Williams v. Lee, mentioned the Indian
Commerce Clause only by citation in a footnote.935 It is hard to tease a foundational role for the Indian Commerce Clause out of that case. And nothing
in Williams v. Lee recognizes the possibility that the Indian Commerce Clause
on its own might prohibit a state statute even if there were no relevant federal
statute or treaty. His “two barrier” doctrine was hardly a sweeping endorsement of the Court’s right under the Indian Commerce Clause to strike down
state law conflicts with federal law. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157–58
(1978). A conflict exists if the state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id. at 158 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see also Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (factors include
whether “[t]he scheme of federal regulation [is] so pervasive to make reasonable the inference
that Congress left room for the states to supplement it”; whether “the federal statutes ‘touch a
field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system [must] be assumed to
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject’”; whether state enforcement “presents
a serious danger of conflict with the administration of the federal program.”); supra notes
436–37, 928.
930
White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 143.
931
Id. (citing McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Commissioner, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973)).
Dean Getches views Marshall’s opinion as the “Court’s clearest and most forceful articulation of the McClanahan rule.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1607. But the Indian
Commerce Clause did not play a role in McClanahan.
932
Obviously, the federal statutes have to be constitutional, that is, Congress must have had
the right to enact them in the first instance. The Indian Commerce Clause might well be the
source of Congress’s power to enact the federal statute that will prohibit or preempt the state
statute, but that does not seem to be the context in which Justice Marshall is referring to the
Clause.
933
See Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. 832, 837 (1982). He also cited Williams v. Lee, but
presumably that was for the second of the two barriers.
934
Assuming again that the statutes reflected a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power.
See supra note 932.
935
See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), discussed supra notes 421–22 and accompanying text.
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a state statute in the absence of any applicable federal statute.
In addition, his reference to the Indian Commerce Clause seems unnecessary to his two otherwise pedestrian comments. No one would disagree that a
state law can be preempted by a federal statute. And his citation of Williams
v. Lee did no more than quote the holding in that case.
b. Justice Marshall’s Views on Preemption
More significant was Justice Marshall’s apparent response to Justice Rehnquist’s views on preemption. Marshall warned that,
[t]he unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty make it generally unhelpful to apply to federal enactments regulating Indian tribes those standards
of pre-emption that have emerged in other areas of the law. Tribal reservations are not States, and the differences in the form and nature of their sovereignty make it treacherous to import to one notions of pre-emption that
are properly applied to the other.936 The tradition of Indian sovereignty over
the reservation and tribal members must inform the determination whether
the exercise of state authority has been pre-empted by operation of federal
law [Moe] . . . . [T]his tradition is reflected and encouraged [in federal
statutes] demonstrating a firm federal policy of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic development. Ambiguities in federal law have been
construed generously in order to comport with these traditional notions of
sovereignty and with the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence
[McClanahan]. We have thus rejected the proposition that in order to find a
particular state law to have been pre-empted by operation of federal law, an
express congressional statement to that effect is required [Warren Trading].
At the same time any applicable regulatory interest of the State must be
given weight [McClanahan] . . . and “automatic exemptions ‘as a matter of
constitutional law’” are unusual [Moe, n.17].937
936
For example, in non-Indian areas, courts presume that state law is not preempted.
Ambiguities are resolved in favor of the state. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504 (1992). As Warren Trading, supra notes 425–68 and accompanying text, and Central
Machinery demonstrate, supra notes 469–518 and accompanying text, no similar presumption
exists in the Indian cases.
Policies of promoting tribal self-government and economic development, unique to Indian
law, might also inform a preemption analysis. Feldman claims that the “primary difference
between Indian preemption and preemption in other fields was the influence of the backdrop
of tribal sovereignty and the canons of construction that favored the tribes.” Feldman, supra
note 929, at 686. “Contemporary Indian preemption, however, now focuses upon weighing
federal and tribal interests against state interests. Thus, state interests are given undue prominence. Contemporary Indian preemption therefore appears to be a preemption in name only.”
Id. at 687.
937
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143–44 (1980). In an internal
Supreme Court memorandum, Justice White wrote “[a]t least the clear implication in Moe was
that automatic exemptions of this type are not recognized at all.” Preso, supra note 41, at 463
n.124. Marshall responded:

I do not agree that the statement . . . in Moe—referring to automatic exemptions as a
matter of constitutional law—should be read as broadly as you suggest. Certainly the
language of the footnote does not extend that far. Moreover, a number of our cases
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This last reference to Justice Rehnquist’s footnote in Moe, without any criticism, would seem to endorse it, yet the proposition is at odds with Justice
Marshall’s earlier reference to the Indian Commerce Clause. The Rehnquist
footnote attempts to undercut the Indian Commerce Clause, but Marshall
cites the Clause as a foundation for his two barrier doctrine.
Marshall elaborated on the first of his two barriers, preemption: “[w]hen
on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at issue, state law is generally inapplicable, for the State’s regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and
the federal interest in encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest
[Moe, McClanahan].”938 The language he used, however, seems more akin to
a balancing test than a preemption analysis.
On-reservation conduct involving only Indians, like in McClanahan, was
the easy case. More difficult questions arise when non-Indians are involved.939
In that situation, Justice Marshall endorsed a “particularized inquiry into the
nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed
to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law.”940 This language was ambiguous enough to be
confused with a balancing test, which is the way some subsequent cases have
interpreted it,941 although nowhere does White Mountain use that phrase.942
In addition, a “particularized inquiry” is inconsistent with the prominent
role Justice Marshall assigned to the Indian Commerce Clause. The Founders
intended no “particularized inquiry” into the respective interests of the states,
recognize the principle that the exercise of state authority over the reservation may
be impermissible, not because it is “preempted” in the ordinary sense, but because it
infringes on tribal self-government. . . . This principle, I think, is difficult to reconcile
with the view that “automatic” or “constitutional” exemptions are not recognized at
all.
Id. at 463–64. Marshall misstated the Moe footnote, which referred to “exemptions ‘as a matter
of constitutional law’ either under the Commerce Clause or the intergovernmental-immunity
doctrine.” His infringement example was apparently a reference to Williams v. Lee, and not the
Indian Commerce Clause, unless he viewed that case as being an application of the Clause.
938
White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 144.
939
Moe, of course, involved both Indians and non-Indians. Marshall’s earlier references to
Moe were presumably to sales to Indians rather than sales to non-Indians.
940
White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 145.
941
See, e.g., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 100 (2003), discussed infra notes 1290–1358 and accompanying text. A leading casebook also refers to the
White Mountain balancing test. Anderson, et al., supra note 208, at 432 (emphasis added).
Commentators agree. See, e.g., Rebecca Tsosie, Separate Sovereigns, Civil Rights, and the Sacred
Text: The Legacy of Justice Thurgood Marshall’s Indian Law Jurisprudence, 26 Ariz. St. L. J. 495,
506 (1994).
942
Dean Getches agrees that White Mountain has been misinterpreted. “An oblique reference to ‘interests’ has been taken as an invitation for courts to balance interests subjectively and
search for a result that ought to obtain, without guidance from the historical tradition of tribal
sovereignty.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1608. Unlike Getches, I do not find the
reference to be oblique and Marshall’s description of a “particularized inquiry into the nature
of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake” invited a balancing test. Dean Getches is certainly correct, however, that like any balancing test objectivity will be replaced by subjectivity.
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the tribes, and Congress when they adopted that Clause. Such an inquiry was
also inconsistent with Williams v. Lee, which gave no weight to the interest of
Arizona in that case. To the contrary, it was the interests of the Navajos that
provided a constraint on the State; the case made no mention of any State
interest.
Despite this confusion, when Marshall applied his “particularized inquiry”
test to the facts in White Mountain, it was clear that he meant a preemption
analysis and not a balancing test.943 He proceeded to hold that the federal government’s regulation of the harvesting of Indian timber is “comprehensive,”944
controls “the most minute details of timber production,”945 and is
so pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed in
this case. . . . There is no room for these [state] taxes in the comprehensive
federal regulatory scheme. In a variety of ways, the assessment of state taxes
would obstruct federal policies. And equally important, [the State has] been
unable to identify any regulatory function or service performed by the State
that would justify the assessment of taxes for activities on [Bureau of Indian
Affairs’ roads] and tribal roads within the reservation.946

The State taxes would undermine the federal policy “guaranteeing Indians
that they will ‘receive . . . the benefit of whatever profit [the forest] is capable
of yielding.’”947 The taxes would “undermine the Secretary’s ability to make
the wide range of determinations committed to his authority concerning
the setting of fees and rates with respect to the harvesting and sale of tribal
timber.”948 These statements suggest that Marshall’s particularized inquiry was
intended to be a preemption approach rather than a balancing test.949 Marshall characterized Arizona as merely arguing that it could tax non-Indians
whenever there is no express congressional statement to the contrary.950 “That
is simply not the law. In a number of cases we have held that state author-

943
The Tribe and Pinetop never suggested a balancing test; they argued the Arizona taxes
were preempted by federal law, or were an “unlawful infringement on tribal self-government.”
See White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 138.
Professor Milner Ball describes White Mountain as removing tribal sovereignty and selfgovernment as “real doctrinal factors,” and preemption becomes the sole meaningful test of
whether state taxes shall be allowed in Indian country. State taxation will be allowed unless
federal legislation excludes it. Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 107.
944
See White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 145.
945
Id. at 149.
946
Id. at 148–49.
947
Id. at 149 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 141.3(a)(3) (1979)).
948
Id. at 149. In its Brief, the Tribe made both a preemption argument and a Williams v. Lee
argument. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 917, at *30–31.
949
The lower court had concluded that the federal regulatory scheme did not “occupy the
field.” White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 141.
950
See id. at 150–51.
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ity over non-Indians acting on tribal reservations is preempted even though
Congress has offered no explicit statement on the subject.”951
c. The Role of Economic Incidence
The Court also noted that it was “undisputed that the economic burden of
the asserted taxes will ultimately fall on the Tribe.”952 Marshall did not explain
the significance of this comment. Moe and Colville were graphic examples
of where the economic burden of the state taxes had severely impacted the
smokeshops, and the Court was indifferent. Warren Trading was also unconcerned about the incidence of the Arizona tax and stated that it “would put
financial burdens on [the vendor] or the Indians,”953 indicating that whether
the tax fell on the Indians was irrelevant. In a footnote in White Mountain,
Marshall explained:
Of course, the fact that the economic burden of the tax falls on the Tribe
does not by itself mean that the tax is pre-empted, as [Moe] makes clear.954
Our decision today is based on the pre-emptive effect of the comprehensive
federal regulatory scheme, which, like that in [Warren Trading], leaves no
room for the additional burdens sought to be imposed by state law.955

One is left wondering why Marshall even noted what turns out to be an irrelevant factor: the burden (economic incidence) of the tax.956 Unfortunately,
951
Id. at 151 (citing Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965);
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959)). He also emphasized the geographical component
to tribal sovereignty, “which remains highly relevant to the pre-emption inquiry; though the
reservation boundary is not absolute, it remains an important factor to weigh in determining
whether state authority has exceeded the permissible limits.” White Mountain, 448 U.S. at
151.
952
Id. at 151.
953
Warren Trading Post v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685, 691 (1965) (emphasis
added).
954
Colville would have been an even better illustration than Moe.
955
White Mountain, 448 at 151 n.15. For a discussion of Warren Trading and the preemption analysis, see supra notes 436–45 and accompanying text. One difference with Warren
Trading was that in White Mountain the Government had actually controlled a number of
fees and prices the Indians would pay or receive. The reason why the Indian Trader statutes in
Warren Trading were not discussed in White Mountain was presumably because Pinetop was
providing a service and not selling tangible personal property. This was the position taken by
the Solicitor General. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 1979 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 1279, at *16 n.9. See supra note 516 and accompanying text; infra note 986.
956
Professor Jensen tries to reconcile the sentence to which the footnote is appended with
the text of the footnote. “[I]t is hard to understand how the textual sentence could have survived the editing process if it did not mean something, and the footnote says only that economic burden is not enough by itself to result in preemption.” Jensen, supra note 9, at 77
(emphasis in original).
The Government’s amicus brief, however, made the point that

[n]one of the Court’s previous decisions involves a situation where the economic
burden of a tax nominally imposed on a non-Indian party will be borne by the Tribe.
For example, in Thomas v. Gay, the Court found that the burden of a tax on cattle
owned by a non-Indian lessee of reservation lands was ‘too remote and indirect’ to
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the footnote will lead to confusion.957
Like Warren Trading, there was no evidence in the White Mountain record
about the issue of economic incidence. Normally, the issue of economic incidence is a tricky empirical question, and not resolved by who actually remits
the tax. For example, just because a consumer might pay a sales tax does not
mean that the incidence of that tax actually falls on the consumer. But White
Mountain was not a normal situation. At the time the contract was negotiated between Pinetop and FATCO,958 neither party thought state taxes would
be due. Consequently, state taxes could not have been taken into account in
setting the contract price. After the taxes were assessed, “FATCO agreed to
pay them to avoid the loss of Pinetop’s services.”959 Under those unusual circumstances, the Tribe actually did bear the economic incidence of the taxes
because of the difficulty of passing them through to Pinetop (or to anyone
else).
Nevertheless, whether the tax was borne by the Tribe should have been
irrelevant, just the way it was in Warren Trading and Colville.960 The statutory
scheme simply left no room for a state tax, regardless of its economic incidence. Marshall’s footnote—irrelevant as it was—would be used against the
Indians in subsequent cases.961
Arizona made a feeble attempt at asserting its interests by referring to a
“general desire to raise revenue,”962 which hardly merited any consideration.
The roads used by the logging company were “built, maintained, and policed
exclusively by the Federal Government, the Tribe, and its contractors.”963
Consequently, Arizona could not claim a quid pro quo to justify its tax. The
reality was that Arizona had nothing to do with the logging operations, just
the way it had no responsibility for the reservation in Warren Trading. Left
unaddressed, however, was whether the State would have had a stronger case
be regarded as a tax on the Indian lessors. And in Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, the
Court focused only on the claim that the burden of the state tax fell on the Indian
cigarette retailers because they were required to collect the taxes at the time they
made sales.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12–13, White Mountain v. Bracker, 448 U.S.
136 (1980), 1979 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1276, at *12–13. Colville, which obviously contradicts the Brief, had not been decided yet. But even in Moe, while the short-term burden fell
on the retailers, who lost business, in the longer term that loss would have secondary effects
on the tribe.
957
See Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 854 (1982), infra notes
985–1057 and accompanying text.
958
See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 956, at *16. The Government’s
brief describes the contracts as being approved and even to a considerable extent drafted by
agents of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. See id.
959
White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 140 n.7.
960
Warren Trading, 380 U.S. at 691; supra notes 446, 769–72 and accompanying text.
961
See, e.g., infra note 977 and accompanying text.
962
White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 150.
963
Id. The opinion refers to both logging and the use of the roads. The Court did not address
the fact that the tax was on the use of the roads whereas the regulations concerned logging.
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had it provided more services on the reservation.964
Marshall concluded the opinion by holding that White Mountain was
indistinguishable from Warren Trading.965 There was no need to analyze the
second of his two-barrier test, Williams v. Lee.966
d. Particularized Inquiry and Balancing
As will be seen, the “particularized inquiry” language will morph into a balancing test, which will be used against the Indians. White Mountain was a
straightforward, traditional pre-emption analysis, despite Marshall’s language
inviting a “particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and
tribal interests at stake.” As future cases will illustrate, a large analytical price
was paid for this loose language.
According to one commentator, until White Mountain,
Indian preemption had paralleled preemption in other fields. Indian preemption cases followed traditional preemption principles, focusing on the
search for congressional intent. The primary difference between Indian preemption and preemption in other fields was the influence of the backdrop
of tribal sovereignty and the canons of construction that favored the tribes.
In other words, the Court was more likely to find congressional intent to
preempt [a state tax] in Indian cases than in others. . . . Contemporary
Indian preemption, however, now focuses upon weighing federal and tribal
interests against state interests.967

964

Where, as here, the Federal Government has undertaken comprehensive regulation
. . . where a number of the policies . . . are threatened by the [Arizona taxes], and
where [the taxes cannot be justified] except in terms of a generalized interest in raising
revenue, we believe that the proposed exercise of state authority is impermissible.
White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 151 (relying on Warren Trading).
965
White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 152–53. Marshall emphasized that the Tribe had been
largely free to run the reservation and its affairs without state control and that Arizona had
no duties or responsibilities respecting the Indians. Id. at 152. Justice Black expressed similar
sentiments in Warren Trading. See supra notes 454–56.
966
As part of its Williams v. Lee argument, the Tribe stated that “application of that doctrine
may fairly allow inquiry into the substantially [sic] of both the tribe’s and the State’s legitimate
interests in having a given activity subject to or free from state regulation.” Brief for Petitioners,
supra note 917, at *31. Because the State’s interests were so insignificant, this formulation was
useful from a litigating strategy, but nothing in Williams v. Lee suggests an inquiry into a state’s
interests. The Tribe’s formulation invited a balancing test: “Examination of all the legitimate
indicia of tribal interests and of all the legitimate indicia of state interests in this case shows
that the state interests in collecting these taxes fall far short of justifying the palpable intrusion
they would cause into the internal affairs of the Indians.” Id. at *31–32.
967
Feldman, supra note 929, at 686–87. Feldman claims that “if Congress intended to preempt state law, the Court should not have the flexibility under a balancing test to uphold the
state laws in violation of congressional intent.” Id. at 694. I doubt that even a generous balancing test would encourage a court to override a clear finding of congressional intent. Obviously,
however, there will be disagreements about the degree of clarity regarding intent.
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The “balancing of interests test that the Court uses under the dormant interstate commerce clause is remarkably similar to the balancing test that the Court
uses in contemporary Indian preemption and infringement analyses.”968
To be sure, inquiring into a state’s interests can be compatible with a preemption analysis. A classical preemption analysis would determine what
Congress intended when it adopted a statute. Congress might well have taken
into account a state’s concerns in formulating the statute. Analytically, this
approach would be less “balancing” per se and more determining what weight
Congress should be viewed as having given a state’s interest when it enacted a
federal statute. Warren Trading can be viewed as consistent with this formulation when it emphasized that “since federal legislation has left the State with
no duties or responsibilities respecting the reservation Indians, we cannot
believe that Congress intended to leave to the State the privilege of levying
this tax.”969
In any event, White Mountain’s preemption analysis has come to overshadow the Williams v. Lee infringement test, the second of Marshall’s two
barriers to “the assertion of state regulatory authority over tribal reservations
and its members.”970 In addition, preemption has come to encompass a balancing test, weighing the federal and tribal interests against the state’s interests, with a backdrop of tribal sovereignty that presumably places a thumb on
the scales in favor of the Indians. The preemption test appears to take into
account the same values as the infringement test, leading Professor Jensen
to conclude that in the tax context “preemption has effectively swallowed
infringement.”971 Where no federal statute applies, however, so that preemption would be irrelevant, the infringement test would have independent significance, as would (or should) the Indian Commerce Clause.
In terms of the fundamental issue of whether a state can tax without federal
authorization, Marshall conceded that issue with his “particularized inquiry”
language, his two-barrier test, and his preemption analysis. These approaches
evaluate an already existing tax. No federal statute existed in White Mountain authorizing the Arizona tax, but the decision assumes no congressional
authorization was needed. To be sure, as long as Marshall sat on the Court,
Id. at 691.
Warren Trading Post v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685, 691 (1965) (cited in
White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 152).
970
White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 142.
971
Jensen, supra note 9, at 62.
968
969

[T]he balancing test mandated in preemption analysis is supposed to take into
account tribal interests—weighing federal and tribal interests against state interests,
and doing so with tribal sovereignty as a “backdrop.” A state tax on non-Indians that
did in fact infringe on tribal self-government would almost certainly be treated as
being preempted as well.
Id. The Williams v. Lee opinion, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), however, gave no weight to the state
interests at stake; balancing clearly does. And a pure preemption analysis would not “mandate”
a balancing test.
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a state would have difficulty satisfying the hurdles he established. Once the
composition of the Court changed, however, the Indians and those doing
business with them would be left with less protection.
e. Stevens’s Dissent
Justice Stevens972 wrote in dissent for himself and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist. According to Stevens, Warren Trading relied on both the threat that
Arizona’s tax would “disturb and disarrange” a pervasive scheme of federal
regulation and the lack of any State interest that could justify imposing the

972
Professor Frickey describes Stevens as “a leading advocate on the Court of overturning
much of Chief Justice Marshall’s legacy.” Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 199, at 423 n.172.
Dean Getches describes Stevens as having “no allegiance to the foundation principles drawn
from two centuries of the Court’s Indian law decisions.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14,
at 1635. Stevens exerts

significant influence on the Court’s current Indian law jurisprudence. Stevens has put
his own brand on Indian law, arguing continually against the sovereignty and special
status of tribal governments. In a series of cases, Stevens and Rehnquist took turns
expressing their minority view that the preemption analysis should not begin with a
presumption in favor of preempting state law in Indian country.
Id. Stevens is “willing to make policy choices in Indian jurisdiction cases with little more support than his perception of the ‘balance of interests.’” Id. at 1652.
Justice Stevens was no fan of Indian sovereignty. “At one time [the tribes] exercised virtually unlimited power over their own members as well as those who are permitted to join their
communities. Today, however, the power of the Federal Government over the Indian tribes
is plenary.” National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 851 (1985).
For a penetrating critique of this statement, see Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 20–22,
34–43. Claiborne describes Stevens as “not hostile to the Indian cause.” Claiborne , supra note
11, at 587. Professor Goldberg describes Stevens as the “most attentive to tribal sovereignty
and property claims.” Carole Goldberg, Finding the Way to Indian Country: Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg’s Decisions in Indian Law Cases, 70 Ohio St. L. J. 1003, 1017 (2009).
Justice Stevens’s retirement this summer allows us a chance to review his legacy in
relation to federal Indian law and policy. Justice Stevens ascended to the Supreme
Court as the sole appointee of President Ford in late 1975. He voted in exactly 100
cases related to Indian law and tribal interests during that period. Loosely speaking,
Justice Stevens is the sitting Justice most likely to support tribal interests in the last
decade, but his voting record in the 1980s and 1990s was overwhelmingly opposed
to tribal interests. His seeming reversal in this context is fairly remarkable. Justice
Stevens generally speaking favored tribal interests in treaty rights cases and statutory
interpretation cases (less so), but was a serious opponent in tribal immunity and
taxation cases.
The Stats: Overall voting record: 31 votes in favor of tribal interests; 63 votes against;
and 7 votes unclassifiable. Voting from 1976–1983: 14 votes in favor; 20 votes
against; 1 unclassifiable. Voting from 1985–2000: 9 votes in favor; 41 votes against;
4 unclassifiable. Voting from 2001–2009: 8 votes in favor; 2 votes against; 1 unclassifiable.
The Indian Law Legacy of Justice Stevens, Turtle Talk (Apr. 9, 2010), http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2010/04/09/the-indian-law-legacy-of-justice-stevens/.
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tax.973 The dissent rejected the first ground because the $5,000–$6,000 of
taxes imposed on Pinetop974 were trivial compared with its profit of over $1.5
million for “the Indian tribal enterprise.”975 “It is difficult to believe that these
relatively trivial taxes could impose an economic burden that would threaten
to ‘obstruct federal policies.’”976
Ignoring the majority’s footnote that disclaimed it was relying on the economic incidence of the tax falling on the Tribe,977 the dissent found “the
Court’s reliance on the indirect financial burden imposed on the Indian Tribe
by state taxation of its contractors disturbing.”978 According to the dissent,
Warren Trading found an exception to the general rule979 that a tax is not
invalid simply because it is passed forward to an exempt person. This exception was because Congress had chosen to regulate the relationship between
a tribe and non-Indian trader to such an extent that there was no room for
the additional burden. In White Mountain, however, the state tax of $5,000$6,000 was unlikely to have a serious adverse impact on the tribal business so
no similar inference about congressional intent should be drawn.980
The difficulty with the dissent’s reasoning was that Warren Trading never
expressed the sentiment now being attributed to it. Moreover, there was nothing in the record in Warren Trading about the effects of the two percent Arizona tax. Further, Congress could have intended with its extensive control
of timbering, which the dissent does not challenge, to preempt any state tax,
whether trivial or serious, thus obviating any need to determine the impact
on a case-by-case, year-by-year basis. The dissent would invite endless future
litigation and line drawing as each taxpayer would argue that in its particular
973
White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 157. For reasons not discussed in the text, the dissent would
have vacated the Arizona Court of Appeals’ opinion and remanded the case. See id.
974
The Government’s brief stated that there was “no clear basis in the record for” calculating
the amount of Arizona taxes paid by Pinetop. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae,
supra note 956, at *29. The Tribe’s Brief claimed that Pinetop paid over $30,000. Brief for
Petitioners, supra note 917, at *27. The Arizona Court of Appeals suggested the taxes were only
$9,000 per year. According to the Tribe, this amount “was taken by that court from a speculation in the State’s Brief which was not grounded in the evidence of record.” Id. In its reply brief,
the Tribe asserted that the “true total effect of these taxes falls between $20,000 and $50,000
a year. The present discounted value of such exactions ranges from hundreds of thousands of
dollars to more than a half-million dollars.” Petitioners’ Reply Brief, White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (No. 78-1177), 1980 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1625,
at *7.
975
White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 158–59. The reference to “Indian tribal enterprise” presumably described Pinetop, but was not technically correct. Pinetop was not a “tribal enterprise”
but rather a joint venture between two non-Indian corporations. Id. at 137–38. The tribal
enterprise was FATCO, which managed, harvested, processed, and sold timber. Pinetop was
under contract with FATCO. Id. at 139.
976
Id. at 159.
977
Id. at 151 n.15.
978
Id. at 159.
979
The dissent cited United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958), a case upholding the state
taxation of those doing business with the Federal Government.
980
White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 159.
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case the state tax was substantial and imposed “serious adverse impacts.” A
taxpayer that lost this issue in one year would presumably be free to relitigate
in some future year as circumstances changed (e.g., an increase in taxes or a
decline in profits or even a loss).981
With respect to the lack of any legitimate interest in Arizona’s imposing a
tax, the dissent suggested that Pinetop might well have a right to be free from
taxation under the Due Process Clause.982 This argument was reminiscent of
Justice Black’s comments in Warren Trading,983 although he never cited that
Clause. The argument could serve as a separate cause of action, independent
of a preemption analysis. A Due Process argument would be particularly relevant if no federal statutes existed so that no preemption argument would be
available. On the other hand, the lack of State services might be a factor to
be taken into account in discerning congressional intent under a preemption
analysis.984
2. Ramah Navajo School Board v. New Mexico
Two years after White Mountain, Ramah Navajo School Board v. New Mexico
raised similar issues.985 The question in Ramah was whether federal law preempted New Mexico’s gross receipts tax (sales tax) imposed on a non-Indian
construction company that built a school on the Navajo reservation under
contract with the Navajo School Board (Board). The tax was imposed on the
payments received under the contract. During the construction, the contractor986 paid the gross receipts tax and, pursuant to standard industry practice,
981
The dissent in Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 638–53 (1981), discussed infra note 1105, would have similarly invited endless litigation.
982
White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 158.
983
See Warren Trading v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965); supra notes 454–63
and accompanying text.
984
See supra notes 457–58 and accompanying text.
985
458 U.S. 832 (1982).
986
Nothing in the record indicated whether the contractor was “licensed under the Indian
Trader regulations.” Jurisdictional Statement, Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. New Mexico, 458 U.S.
832 (1982) (No. 80-2162), 1981 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1303, at *16 n.5 [hereinafter
Jurisdictional Statement]. If the contractor were viewed as providing services, I have argued
that the Indian Trader statute would not apply. See supra note 516. The Board, however, anticipated and rejected this argument.

It would be a strained interpretation indeed to read the terms “trader” and “trade” in
a restrictive way by excluding those business activities by non-Indians on reservations,
such as large-scale construction projects, that have the most economic impact, especially since 25 U.S.C. 262, enacted several years after Section 261, is not restricted
to “goods.”
Brief of the School Board, Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832 (1982)(No.
80-2162), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1164, at *51 [hereinafter Brief of the School Board].
As a policy matter, the Board is right, but the statutory language does not allow that reading.
See supra note 516; see also Brief of the State of New Mexico, Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. New
Mexico, 458 U.S. 832 (1982) (No. 80-2162), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1165, at *49
[hereinafter Brief of the State of New Mexico].
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was reimbursed by the Board.987 The construction contract provided that the
Board would be entitled to any refund of the gross receipts tax if it were
invalidly paid.988 The New Mexico gross receipts tax was the same one as in
Mescalero.989
a. Justice Marshall’s Particularized Inquiry
Justice Marshall, writing again for the majority, relied on his analysis in White
Mountain, and reiterated that each case “requires a particularized examina-

Arizona v. Blaze Construction Co., 526 U.S. 32 (1999), upheld the Arizona sales tax on construction services performed on a reservation under contract with the United States. Professor
Taylor describes the case as “holding that federal Indian trader statute did not preempt” the
Arizona sales tax. Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 844 n.18. The Indian Trader statutes,
however, were not at issue in that case. See also infra note 1308, 1326 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of Blaze, see Richard J. Ansson, Jr., Protecting Tribal Sovereignty: Why States
Should Not Be Able To Tax Contractors Hired By The BIA To Construct Reservation Projects For
Tribes: Blaze Construction Co. v. New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department: A Case Study,
20 Am. Indian L. Rev. 459 (1995-96).
987
The Board’s Brief claimed that the contractor would not have contracted with the Board
had it not secured a promise of reimbursement for the sales taxes. Brief of the School Board,
supra note 986, at *13. The Board’s Jurisdictional Statement claimed that the “unavoidable tax
burden imposed on the Navajo Board has prevented completion of the facilities.” Jurisdictional
Statement, supra note 986, at *17. New Mexico’s Motion to Dismiss or Affirm stated “[t]here
was no particular building or facility that could not be built because of the gross receipts tax.”
Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832 (1982)
(No. 80-2162), 1981 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 1302, at *5 [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss or
Affirm]. New Mexico also asserted that the Board
included New Mexico gross receipts tax [and the contractor] included gross receipts
tax as part of the total construction cost bid. The construction contracts between the
School Board and [the contractor] providing for the gross receipts tax as a cost of
construction were approved by the BIA.
Id. at *4.
The contractor paid the sales tax to the State and passed the “economic burden” of the tax
to the Board as part of the “periodic construction draw procedure, in accordance with the
construction contracts providing for the contractor to ‘pay all sales, consumer, use and other
similar taxes required by law’ and ‘to comply with sales and use taxes laws.’” Id. at *5.
988
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 835–36. At some point, the executive director of the
Board questioned whether the contractor was liable for the gross receipts tax, and a clause was
put into the contract recognizing that the Board could litigate the issue and would be entitled
to a refund. Brief of the State of New Mexico, supra note 986, at *14.
The Board’s Brief argued that the fact that the legal incidence of the tax was on the contractor should be disregarded. Legal incidence is a fiction if the economic incidence falls on
the Board, which does not have the ability to pass the tax on to anyone else. “Ramah Navajo
School Board and its children . . . were forced to absorb this tax by sacrificing school facilities.”
Brief of the School Board, supra note 986, at *56. The State countered that the Board was able
to pass the economic burden of the tax to the United States like any merchant or contractor.
Brief of the State of New Mexico, supra note 986, at *33. In an unrelated case, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the legal incidence of the New Mexico sales tax was on the
seller of goods and services. United States v. New Mexico, 581 F.2d 803 (10th Cir. 1978).
989
See supra notes 595–96 and accompanying text.
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tion of the relevant state, federal, and tribal interests,”990 enshrining that
methodology as the accepted starting point when non-Indians are involved.
He issued the now standard caveat that “[t]he question whether federal law,
which reflects the related federal and tribal interests, pre-empts the State’s
exercise of its regulatory authority is not controlled by standards of pre-emption developed in other areas.”991 The traditional notions of tribal sovereignty
inform the analysis. Ambiguities in federal law are “construed generously” in
favor of the Indians, and preemption does not require an explicit congressional statement.992 (Unfortunately for the Indians, he does not require an
explicit congressional statement authorizing a state tax.)
Marshall found that the federal government had a long history of educating
Indian children,993 and the federal regulatory scheme was so comprehensive
and pervasive that Ramah was “indistinguishable in all relevant respects from
White Mountain.”994 “[The New Mexico sales tax], although nominally falling on the non-Indian contractor, necessarily impedes the clearly expressed
federal interest in promoting the ‘quality and quantity’ of educational opportunities for Indians by depleting the funds available for the construction of
Indian schools.”995 Put simply, the more money that went to pay taxes the less
available for brick and mortar.
Justice Marshall easily and quickly disposed of the argument that no federal
statute expressly preempted the New Mexico tax. That argument was “clearly
foreclosed by [White Mountain, Warren Trading, and Williams v. Lee].”996
990
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 838 (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,
448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980)).
991
Id. at 838 (citing White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 143–44).
992
Id.
993
Id. at 839–40.
994
Id. Because White Mountain was indistinguishable from Warren Trading, White Mountain,
448 U.S. at 152–53, presumably Ramah was indistinguishable from Warren Trading as well.
995
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 842.
996
Id. at 843. The Board argued that the tax frustrated a vital Navajo governmental function—education—and was therefore barred by Williams v. Lee. Brief of the School Board,
supra note 986, at *15–16.

[T]he tax constitutes an extra and unauthorized burden on the educational process at
Ramah. It contributes to overcrowding and similar physical and instructional problems in this Navajo school on the Navajo Reservation. The tax thus interferes with a
conceded governmental priority of both the Navajo Tribe and the United States to
produce educated Navajo citizens, a need which this Court has long recognized as
essential in a democratic society.
Reply Brief of School Board, Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 1982
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1164 (No. 80-2162), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1163, at *11–12
(citing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). True to the Williams v. Lee
case, the Board was not making a preemption argument; indeed, it cited no federal statute with
which the New Mexico tax conflicted.
The State characterized the “infringement on sovereignty” test as “clearly a standard in need
of revision, for there are no objective criteria in its formulation and its only real content has
come simply from a case by case inclusion and exclusion of sets of facts.” Brief of the State
of New Mexico, supra note 986, at *30. It argued that the Board was independent of the
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Apparently Williams v. Lee had been cut loose from its roots and had now
been accepted as a preemption case by the Court. (Justice Black, the author
of Williams v. Lee, was no longer on the Court.)
New Mexico hardly had the high moral road in Ramah. Navajo children
attended a small public high school near the reservation until the State shut it
in 1968.997 Because there were no other public high schools reasonably close
to the reservation, the children were forced to either abandon their schooling,
or attend a federal Indian boarding school far from the reservation.998
Having declined to take any responsibility for the education of these Indian
children, the State is precluded from imposing an additional burden on
the comprehensive federal scheme intended to provide this education—a
scheme which has “left the State with no duties or responsibilities.” [Warren
Trading]. Nor has the State asserted any specific, legitimate regulatory interest to justify the imposition of its gross receipts tax.999

This argument had a due process flavor and might have been an independent ground for striking down the New Mexico tax even if no federal statutes
and regulations existed.1000
b. Possible Role of State Services
Justice Marshall, however, gratuitously stated that if New Mexico “were
actively seeking tax revenues for the purpose of constructing, or assisting in
the effort to provide, adequate educational facilities for Ramah Navajo children,” “[t]his case would be different.”1001 Perhaps this was meant as a carrot
for the states to take on more of the costs of educating the Indians1002 (or as
a sarcastic comment on New Mexico’s closing the high school, which led to
the construction that triggered the tax at issue). If the former, it is unclear
whether Marshall would require as a precondition to the tax that the State
Tribe and was not covered by the Williams v. Lee doctrine. Id. at *32. Nor did the economic
burden of the tax fall on the Board but rather on the United States. Id. at *32–33. The Board
responded by noting that tribal court systems, the subject of Williams v. Lee, were funded by
the federal government and that the size of the Navajo Nation requires that it delegate authority to local units of government. Reply Brief of the School Board, supra at *13–14.
997
A lawsuit to reopen the school was unsuccessful. Brief of the School Board, supra note
986, at *9.
998
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 834. Two years after the high school was shut,
the Tribe established its own school board. The Bureau of Indian Affairs provided funds and
the Board operated a school in the abandoned high school, creating what is viewed as the
first independent Indian school in modern times. Id. President Nixon hailed the school as a
“notable example” of Indian self-determination in his Message to Congress on Indian Affairs,
July 8, 1970. Brief of the School Board, supra note 986, at *10.
999
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 843.
1000
Justice Marshall cited Warren Trading, where the Court made a similar argument. See
supra notes 425–68 and accompanying text.
1001
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 844 n.7.
1002
The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act authorizes the Secretary
of the Interior to enter into contracts with any state to construct educational institutions for
Indian children. 25 U.S.C. § 458 (2006).
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earmark the revenues for the education of Navajo children, or whether it
would be enough that the revenues be available as part of the general budget.
Whatever Marshall intended, this dictum invites states to defend a tax on
reservation activities by identifying services they provide to the Indians, an
invitation that will be accepted in subsequent cases.1003
c. New Mexico’s Defense
Like Arizona in White Mountain, New Mexico had little to rely on in defending its tax. “The only arguably specific interest advanced by the State is that
it provides services to [the contractor] for its activities off the reservation.”1004
Justice Marshall rejected this argument with an assertion more than an explanation: Although the State may have conferred substantial benefits on the
contractor qua state contractor, these could not “justify a tax on the construction of a school on tribal lands pursuant to a contract with the Tribe.”1005 Presumably, the tax on the contractor’s off-reservation activities was an adequate
quid pro quo for the services provided off-reservation by New Mexico. The
inference is that the State could tax the contractor’s on-reservation activities if
it provided services to the Tribe.
d. Marshall’s Views on Economic Incidence
Marshall stated that the State’s argument “is not a legitimate justification
for a tax whose ultimate burden falls on the tribal organization.”1006 Justice
See, e.g., infra notes 1175–78 and accompanying text.
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 843–44. New Mexico also argued that the services it
provided to the Ramah Navajo Indians justified the tax, although these benefits did not relate
to the construction of the school. Brief of the State of New Mexico, supra note 986, at *45–47.
In addition, New Mexico argued that the “balancing of interests inquiry mandated by [White
Mountain] heavily favors” it. Id. at *47. This argument was undercut because it received some
federal funding to reimburse it for these services. 458 U.S. at 845 n.10. Note, however, that
New Mexico conveniently misdescribed White Mountain’s preemption analysis as a balancing
test.
New Mexico’s other argument was that Congress had not specifically and expressly preempted the tax, which Justice Marshall made short shrift of by declaring “this argument is
clearly foreclosed by our precedents. [White Mountain, Warren Trading, Williams v. Lee].”
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 843.
1005
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 844 (emphasis in original). Central Machinery v.
Arizona State Tax Commission, 448 U.S. 160 (1980), discussed supra note 440, held that the
Arizona tax on a reservation sale was preempted by the Indian Trader statutes, notwithstanding
the substantial services provided off the reservation by the State to the vendor. Ramah Navajo
Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 844 n.9.
1006
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 844. Marshall also made a formalistic argument
that the statute imposed the tax on the privilege of engaging in business, but such privilege was
exclusively bestowed by the federal government. Id. This formalism had been rejected in the
context of the Interstate Commerce Clause a few years earlier in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (upholding a Mississippi sales tax on the “the privilege of doing
business” within the State when applied to an interstate business). Had New Mexico lost on
this issue, the statute could have been redrafted to cure the constitutional defect, which is true
of many formalistic argument and shows why they should not be given much weight.
1003
1004
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Marshall’s reference to the ultimate burden of the tax falling on the tribe summarizes a more complicated reality, which shows the wisdom of avoiding an
elusive search into economic incidence. The bids each contractor submitted
for the project included the New Mexico sales tax, although it was not identified as such.1007 If Congress appropriated funds for whatever the amount of
the bid, the government bore the full amount of the tax, although it might
not have been aware of the New Mexico sales tax. If Congress had only a fixed
amount to budget, the more that went for taxes the less that was left over for
brick and mortar. In that event, the Tribe would have borne the tax by “getting less school.”1008 The facts were unclear.
The better point, however, was not on whom the economic incidence of
the tax fell, a complicated question, but rather that any State tax on reservation activities could not be justified by services provided by New Mexico off
the reservation—activities that New Mexico was already taxing under its sales
1007
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 835. The bid specifications required prospective
bidders to include “all taxes required by law.” Id. at 842 n.6. The bidders included the New
Mexico sales tax, but did not identify it as such as a separate line item. Id. Marshall stated that
there is “absolutely no indication that Congress was even made aware of the existence of these
taxes when it appropriated funds for the construction of the Ramah Navajo school.” Id. If
Congress were aware that it was approving the New Mexico sales tax, Marshall’s preemption
argument would have been seriously undercut. For a similar issue in Central Machinery, see
supra notes 498–505 and accompanying text.
The Board’s Jurisdictional Statement described the construction process as follows:

Congress appropriated funds in a series of enactments from 1972 through 1977 for
the construction of new school facilities. These appropriations were unusual. They
were directed specifically to the Board, which has legal title to the new facilities, the
Interior Department serving primarily as a conduit for the funds. Each appropriation
contained language providing that the monies were to be used ‘for the construction
of school facilities’ by the [Board]. . . The federal construction monies were disbursed through contracts between the Board and the Interior Department’s Bureau
of Indian Affairs obligating the Board to construct the facilities. . . . When succeeding phases of construction were funded by Congress, the Board issued successive
subcontracts. . . . Each contract . . . contained a provision under which the Board
was required to reimburse [the contractor] for all taxes in the nature of sales taxes for
which [the contractor] might be assessed on account of its work on this project. [The
contractor] had insisted on such a provision in [its bid].
Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 986, at *15–16. While this statement might have established the Board’s right to a refund of the tax, it did not establish that Congress might have
been aware of the New Mexico sales tax.
1008
One scenario is that Congress put the construction project out to bid, awarded it to the
low bidder, and then appropriated the necessary funds. Alternatively, Congress might have first
appropriated a fixed sum of money for the project. The New Mexico sales tax might then be
viewed as being borne by the Indians in the sense that less funds were available for the actual
construction because of the tax. Although this latter scenario seems contrary to the facts, the
Court may be assuming it: “This [New Mexico sales tax] burden, although nominally falling on the non-Indian contractor, necessarily impedes the clearly expressed federal interest in
promoting the ‘quality and quantity’ of educational opportunities for Indians by depleting the
funds available for the construction of Indian schools.” Ramah, 458 U.S. at 842.
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tax.1009 The off-reservation activities could not justify a tax on the contractor’s
on-reservation activities when the State provided no benefits on the reservation. The implicit premise of this argument is that the reservation is separate
and distinct from New Mexico. If the reservation is viewed as merely a part
of the State, like a municipality or a county, no reason would exist why New
Mexico could not tax a business on its activities in that sub-jurisdiction as a
quid pro quo for services it provided elsewhere in the State.1010
e. The Solicitor General and the Indian Commerce Clause
In the context of this Article, one notable feature of Ramah was that the
Solicitor General filed two amicus briefs supporting the Board. In the first,
the Government suggested a “modest general rule.”1011 On-reservation activities involving a tribe should be presumptively beyond the reach of State law,
unless the State could demonstrate that its intrusion into reservation affairs
was either condoned by Congress or justified by a compelling need to protect
legitimate State interests.1012

1009
Justice Marshall comes close to endorsing this argument in a footnote. “Presumably, the
state tax revenues derived from [the contractor’s] off-reservation business activities are adequate
to reimburse the State for the services it provides . . .” Id. at 844 n.9. The dissent overreacted
to the use of “presumably.”

The Court’s “presumptions,” however, are no substitute for the considered judgment
of the state taxing authority. Indeed, in assessing the validity of a state tax, the Court
has previously recognized that the State’s interests are strongest when the taxpayer is
the recipient of state services. [Colville]. To the extent presumptions are relevant, the
Court has inverted the one that ought to apply.
Id. at 852 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Colville, however, was a tax avoidance case, which
dealt with consumers who drove to the reservation to purchase cigarettes free of the Washington
tax. If the Indians did not collect the tax, the sale would effectively be tax-free. In Ramah, by
contrast, New Mexico was taxing the contractor’s gross receipts on its off-reservation transactions. Tax avoidance was not an issue.
1010
This perspective would be a response to the argument that if a state provided no services
on a reservation, it had no right to tax activities on that reservation. For the clearest statement
of that argument, see Warren Trading, discussed supra notes 454–63 and accompanying text.
1011
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Urging Reversal, Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd.
v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832 (1982) (No. 80-2162), 1982 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 1169, at *28 [hereinafter Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Urging
Reversal].
1012
Id. This rule would not apply if: the tribe was not implicated, such as white-on-white
crime, see, e.g., United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882); property taxes were assessed
against non-Indian property, see, e.g., Utah & Northern Ry., 116 U.S. 28 (1885), discussed
supra note 321; the reservation situs is a pretext for avoiding state jurisdiction, see, e.g., Colville,
discussed supra note 707; or non-Indian activities on the reservation do not involve a tribe or
significantly impinges on tribal interests, see, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,
557–67 (1981). The rule would apply regardless of the legal incidence of a state tax. Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Urging Reversal, supra note 1011, at *29, *36.
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The Solicitor General argued that relying on this principle of tribal sovereignty alone “provides a clearer guide for decision of cases like the present
one.”1013 One benefit of this approach was that:
[A] relatively uniform set of rules can be developed. Since the residual sovereignty of every Indian tribe is presumptively alike, and does not derive
from federal delegation, it should no longer be necessary to eke out preemptive meaning in the particular provisions of disparate treaties, enabling
acts, other federal statutes, or implementing regulations.1014

One advantage, according to the Solicitor General, of stressing tribal sovereignty rather than preemption was avoiding the “tension created by the focus
on the pervasiveness of federal regulations . . . in a day when the Political
Branches are committed to encouraging tribal self-government, in part by
loosening federal control of reservation affairs.”1015 Put differently, the fewer
the number of federal statutes, the less likely a preemption argument would
be available.1016
The Solicitor General had no trouble identifying the source of tribal sovereignty: “it is the residuum of the aboriginal independence of the tribes,
limited by their assuming a dependent status vis-à-vis the United States and
reduced in particular matters by subsequent Congressional action.”1017 But
was there a constitutional source for the protection of tribal sovereignty? After
all, a “State’s assertions of jurisdiction, normally complete over its territory
and its citizens, [are] subject only to the barriers imposed by the [F]ederal
Constitution or federal law.”1018 “[T]he most important constitutional text
is the Indian Commerce Clause, which, as its history reveals, is both the
primary source of Congressional power over white-Indian relations and an
important restraint on State jurisdiction over that intercourse.”1019 After a
brief historical review, the Solicitor General concluded that “the Indian Commerce Clause effectively ‘nationalizes’ our relations with the Indian tribes.
Not only is plenary power over the intercourse given to Congress; the States
surrendered what prerogatives they previously claimed in this area, subject, of
course, to any re-delegation of authority.”1020
The Solicitor General’s first exception to his proposed approach was for
Id. at *30.
Id. It is unclear why the Solicitor General had to rely on notions of residual sovereignty
for this point. If the Court wanted to develop a uniform set of rules, it could do so with a
uniform interpretation of the Indian Commerce Clause. In the end, neither the language of
the Clause nor concepts of residual sovereignty on their own point in any uniform direction;
it is up to the Court to impose that uniformity with its interpretations.
1015
Id. at *30–31.
1016
Justice Marshall thought the opposite, see supra notes 574–78 and accompanying text,
which perhaps explains his resistance to this proposal.
1017
Id. at *31.
1018
Id. at *31–32.
1019
Id. at *32–33.
1020
Id. at *34.
1013
1014
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state action that Congress condoned. This exception was unremarkable and
dictated by the Supremacy Clause. But the exception for state action justified
by a “compelling need to protect legitimate State interests” appears to be the
Solicitor General’s own gloss,1021 and was perhaps an attempt to incorporate
the Moe and Colville tax avoidance situations, or meant to be a “police powers” exception. Perhaps building in an “escape clause” was an attempt to make
the argument more attractive than a more absolutist approach. In any event,
the connection between this exception and the Indian Commerce Clause was
not obvious and was not developed in the Government’s brief.
Whatever its rationale, an exception for a “compelling state need” would
inevitably invite litigation. The Government was unhappy with the existing
doctrine because “it is apparent that State courts and lower federal courts
are not always able to discern the teaching of this Court’s precedents when
they turn on a ‘particularized inquiry,’ with few general guidelines.”1022 True
enough—but it is hard to see how replacing a “particularized inquiry” with
evaluating “compelling needs” would improve the quality and predictability
of the decisions.
The Solicitor General was willing to concede that the Indian Commerce
Clause of its own force did not “automatically” bar all “state taxation of matters
significantly touching the political and economic interests of the Tribes.”1023
In short, the government’s brief avoided proposing a more sweeping, more
absolutist interpretation that would return the Indian Commerce Clause to
its roots. The latter would occur a few months later when the Government
filed its second brief.
The Solicitor General’s first brief was dated January 25, 1982. Perhaps
appreciating some of the conceptual weaknesses in its position, less than three
months later the Government filed a supplemental brief.1024 The Solicitor
General apparently had a conversion since the January brief.1025 After arguing that Thomas v. Gay should not be extended1026 and that Colville should
Id. at *28. A Lexis search did not turn up any use of that term by the Supreme Court.
Id. at *27.
1023
Id. at *35 (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134, 157 (1980), which referred to Rehnquist’s footnote in Moe, discussed supra notes
689–95 and accompanying text.
1024
Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v.
Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982) (No. 80-2162), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1162.
The Solicitor General’s justification for the supplemental brief was that the other major amicus
brief for the State joined issue with the United States, and the Court “ought to have the benefit
of the views of the United States articulated in less abbreviated form than in the brief now on
file.” Id. at *2. In reality, the second brief articulated a new position.
1025
For example, the first brief claimed that “[w]ithout attempting to revive” Worcester, it
may be possible to “articulate a more modest general rule for determining when State regulation or taxation of activities or transactions within an Indian reservation are permissible.”
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Urging Reversal, supra note 1011, at *27–28.
By contrast, the second brief attempts to revive Worcester and proposes a rule that is hardly
“modest.”
1026
Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 1024, at *7.
1021
1022
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be limited to anti-tax avoidance situations,1027 the Government turned to the
heart of this second brief: the Indian Commerce Clause.
[W]e once again raise the banner of the Indian Commerce Clause, emboldened by the Court’s most recent opinion [Merrion]1028 in which the Clause
is given honorable mention and [Worcester] is apparently restored to full
standing as a seminal precedent. . . . We read the Indian Commerce Clause
as deciding no more than that all intercourse between tribal Indians within
their reservations and outsiders is, presumptively, an exclusive federal concern, in which the States are off limits, until and unless Congress determines
otherwise . . . all we say is that the Constitution requires congressional
leave before the States intervene in Indian affairs1029 . . . . In the face of an
unchanged constitutional text, it seems a little late in the day to weigh in
against such an established consensus and ask the Court to repudiate the
constitutional settlement reached two centuries ago.1030

Despite the Solicitor General’s powerful defense of the Indian Commerce
Clause, the reality was the opposite of what the government suggested. It was
“a little late in the day” to expect the Court to endorse this “constitutional
settlement.”
f. Marshall’s Rejection of the Solicitor General
Justice Marshall rejected the Solicitor General’s proposal.1031 Marshall’s explanation suggests he was responding to the government’s first brief and not the
second.

Id. at *7–8.
See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982), discussed infra notes
1058–30. Merrion was handed down on January 25, 1982, the same day that the Solicitor
General’s first brief was filed. It is possible, as the quotation in the text suggests, that the second
brief was inspired by the Merrion decision.
1029
Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 1024, at *9–10.
The Brief reviewed the history of the Indian Commerce Clause and declared:
1027
1028

Few things are clearer in our early history than the long and hard, but ultimately
successful, effort to nationalize Indian affairs—as a matter of constitutional law . . . .
[T]here was fundamental agreement that Indian affairs was one area that belonged
to the central government. . . . From the start, the objective was not merely to confer power on the national government to manage Indian affairs, but to disable the
colonies or States from doing so. If, as we submit, the architects of the Constitution
eventually succeeded, that achievement ought not lightly be cast aside.
Id. at *13–14.
1030
Id. at *19–20.
1031
Putting the best spin on Marshall’s reaction to the Solicitor General’s proposal, Feldman
says that the “Court, however, did not reject the test; it merely did ‘not believe it necessary
to adopt’ the test at that time.” Feldman, supra note 436, at 694. Cases decided after Ramah
suggest that the Court will be even less willing to adopt the test today. Those who believe that
the Indian Commerce Clause should be resurrected will no doubt view Marshall as rejecting
the opportunity presented by the Solicitor General, but he may not have had the votes to have
done otherwise.
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The Solicitor General [suggests we] hold that on-reservation activities
involving a resident tribe are presumptively beyond the reach of state law
even in the absence of comprehensive federal regulation, thus placing the
burden on the State to demonstrate that its intrusion is either condoned by
Congress or justified by a compelling need to protect legitimate, specified state
interests other than the generalized desire to collect revenue.1032
We do not believe it necessary to adopt this new approach—the existing
pre-emption analysis governing these cases is sufficiently sensitive to many
of the concerns expressed by the Solicitor General. Although clearer rules
and presumptions promote the interest in simplifying litigation, our precedents announcing the scope of pre-emption analysis in this area provide
sufficient guidance to state courts and also allow for more flexible consideration of the federal, state, and tribal interests at issue.1033 We have consistently admonished that federal statutes and regulations relating to tribes
and tribal activities must be “construed generously in order to comport
with . . . traditional notions of [Indian] sovereignty and with the federal
policy of encouraging tribal independence.”1034 This guiding principle helps
relieve the tension between emphasizing the pervasiveness of federal regulation and the federal policy of encouraging Indian self-determination.1035

Remarkably, Marshall made no mention that the Government’s second
brief had taken a more absolutist approach. Indeed, the opinion never even
mentioned that the Government filed a second brief.
Certainly in Justice Marshall’s hands, the existing doctrine was adequate
to protect the interests of the Indians, who had won full or partial victories
in Williams v. Lee, Warren Trading, McClanahan, Mescalero, Central Machinery, White Mountain, Ramah, and Merrion, although some of these came
with high analytical costs that would haunt the Indians going forward. But
the Indians had not lost a case that Justice Marshall authored. Perhaps the
“[d]evil you know is better than the one you don’t” explains his rejection of
the Government’s first brief with its “compelling state need language,” but
that exculpatory provision had been dropped from the second brief. Even if
Justice Marshall sensed that the tide might be turning, as earlier unanimous
decisions1036 were now giving way to splintered opinions, he might not have
had the votes to adopt the Government’s more sweeping approach in the
1032
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 845 (1982) (emphasis
added). The italicized language is a paraphrasing of the Solicitor General’s argument in the
first brief, but not the second.
1033
This flexibility is more characteristic of a traditional balancing test under the dormant
Interstate Commerce Clause rather than a traditional preemption analysis. Accord, Feldman,
supra note 436, at 694.
1034
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 846 (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164,
174–75 (1973); Warren Trading Post v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685, 690–91 (1965)).
1035
Id.
1036
See, e.g., McClanahan, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), supra notes 519–91 and accompanying
text; Warren Trading, 380 U.S. 685 (1965), supra notes 425–68 and accompanying text.
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second brief.1037
One situation where the Solicitor General’s proposed test (in either brief )
would make a difference would be if no federal statute (or treaty) existed.
With no preemption argument available, the Indian Commerce Clause
could, on its own force, prohibit a state statute. In earlier cases, however, Justice Marshall indicated that he thought this situation was highly unlikely.1038
Given that assumption, Marshall had no incentive to embrace the government’s proposal and embark in a new and unknown direction.
g. Rehnquist’s Dissent
Justice Rehnquist,1039 writing in dissent and joined by Justices White and
Stevens, rejected the majority’s reliance on White Mountain, viewed the reservation activity as free of federal regulation, and again accused the Court of
according the Tribes greater immunity than that of the United States.1040
“[T]he scope of reservation immunity from nondiscriminatory state taxation [is] a question of pre-emption, ultimately dependent on congressional
intent . . . the tradition of Indian sovereignty stands as an independent barrier
to discriminatory taxes, and otherwise serves only as a guide to the ascertainment of the congressional will.”1041 The burden of proof seems to be placed on
the Indians to show why a state should not be allowed to tax.
Most of the dissent was spent arguing that the regulations were neither
1037
“Although the Court does not adopt [the Solicitor General’s] suggestion it appears to
suggest that on another occasion it might be prepared to reconsider the Solicitor General’s
position, a position which moves a step closer to that of John Marshall in Worcester.” Walters,
supra note 11, at 144 n.68. I do not find any language in the opinion that would justify
Walters’s optimism and subsequent cases belie it.
1038
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172 n.8.
1039
“Rehnquist tends to deny federal preemption of state laws on Indian reservations when
preemption would be beneficial to Indians.” Johnson & Martinis, supra note 194, at 20.
1040
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue of N.M., 458 U.S. 832, 847 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see supra notes 864–68 and accompanying text. Justice Rehnquist
began his dissent by characterizing the majority as “reprov[ing] the New Mexico Court of
Appeals for failing to heed our precedents, much as a disappointed parent would rebuke a
wayward child.” Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 847 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Professor
Laurence describes the dissent as demonstrating a “testiness largely missing from previous
Marshall-Rehnquist Indian law exchanges.” Robert Laurence, Thurgood Marshall’s Indian Law
Opinions, 27 Howard L. J. 3, 70 (1984).
1041
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 848 (emphasis added). One commentator summarized the White Mountain and Ramah preemption cases as follows:

Preemption is more likely to be found where there is a history of federal involvement
both by Congress and by the executive branch; where the extent of authorized executive involvement is broad; and where executive agencies have exercised their authority
extensively. Competing state interests may also be included in the analysis. Where
the regulated activity has weak off-reservation effects, state interests will not weigh
heavily against competing interests of the federal and tribal governments. Specific
statutory language is likely to be a component of the analysis.
Tabor, supra note 771, at 392. This excerpt starts by describing a preemption test, but ends
with comments more typical of a balancing test.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4
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comprehensive nor pervasive and thus rejected the reliance on White Mountain. But it also accused the majority of “bestow[ing] its favors on a new
analytical framework in which the extent of economic burden on the tribe,
and not the pre-emptive effect of federal regulations, appears to be the paramount consideration.”1042 “A careful reading of the Court’s opinion demonstrates that the single, determinative factor in its judgment is the fact that the
challenged state taxes have increased the financial burden of constructing a
tribal school . . . by depleting the funds available for the construction of Indian
schools.”1043 The dissent reduced the majority’s preemption argument to the
simple proposition that the tax was prohibited because its burden fell on the
Tribe.1044
Although that characterization was too glib, Marshall did help muddy the
waters. In White Mountain, he was careful to note that “the fact that the economic burden of the tax falls on the Tribe does not by itself mean that the
tax is preempted, as [Moe] makes clear.”1045 In Ramah, however, he described
White Mountain as a case where “we found it significant that the economic
burden of the asserted taxes would ultimately fall on the Tribe.”1046 The dissent cited Colville, Moe, and Mescalero as firmly establishing the proposition
that the impact of a tax on a tribe is not determinative.1047
i. The Indians Have Greater Immunity than the Federal Government.
Characterizing the majority’s opinion as relying on the burden of the tax
allowed Rehnquist to again argue that the Indians had greater immunity from
state taxes than the United States.1048 A long line of Supremacy Clause cases
have immunized the United States from state taxes whose legal incidence fell
on the government (or its instrumentalities).1049 “[I]mmunity may not be
conferred simply because the tax has an effect on the United States, or even
because the Federal Government shoulders the entire economic burden of
the levy.”1050
As discussed above,1051 this statement accurately captures the law about
state taxation of the federal government, but Justice Rehnquist’s premise that
the tribes should be taxable whenever the federal government would be taxRamah Navajo Sch. Bd, 458 U.S. at 848 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. (emphasis in original).
1044
Id.
1045
White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 151 n.15. Colville would have been a better citation because
the burden of the tax directly fell on the tribes rather than indirectly as in Moe. See supra notes
741–42, 763–67 and accompanying text.
1046
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 844 n.8.
1047
Id. at 854 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Mescalero seems inapposite because it involved
off-reservation activities.
1048
Id. at 854 n.4 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see supra notes 864–68 and accompanying
text.
1049
See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720 (1982); United States v. Cnty. of
Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977).
1050
U.S. v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. at 734.
1051
See supra notes 864–68 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 1157–61 and accompanying text.
1042
1043
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able was wrong.1052
Not only is there no reason why tribal immunity from state taxation should
be coterminous with federal immunity, or lack thereof, but also since McClanahan in 1973, Indian employees resident and working on a reservation have
a greater state income tax immunity than federal employees resident and
working on a reservation. That is, a state can impose its income tax on the
salary of the federal employee1053 but not, as McClanahan holds, on the salary
of the Indian employee.
ii. Relationship Between the Subject Matter of a Tax and the Object
of a Regulation. While many of the dissent’s arguments addressed the nature
of the federal regulations and were limited to the facts of Ramah, one merits comment because of its more general applicability. The dissent argued
that the regulations dealt with education and did not regulate school construction, which was the taxed activity,1054 essentially drawing a distinction
between Congress’s goal of educating Indians and the means of implementing
that goal. “[T]he regulations on which the Court relies [for its preemption
holding] do not regulate school construction, which is the activity taxed.
They merely detail procedures by which tribes may apply for federal funds in
order to carry out school construction. . . . The BIA simply does not regulate
the construction activity which the State seeks to tax.”1055 Marshall did not
dispute Rehnquist but suggested the same argument could have been made
in White Mountain,1056 which merely raised the obvious question of whether
Marshall correctly decided that case as well.1057
Logically, no reason exists why the statute or regulations that are being
challenged have to deal precisely with the same transaction on which the tax
is imposed. The issue is whether they “leave no room for the state tax.” True,
the more closely aligned the subject matter of the tax and the object of the
regulations, the stronger the argument for preemption. But a tax can interfere
with, or thwart, the goal of a statutory scheme without the tax being imposed
on the activities that are the subject of the regulation. Conversely, notwithstanding that a tax might be imposed on the same transactions covered by the
1052
Rehnquist viewed the preemption doctrine and the federal government’s immunity as
having their roots in the Supremacy Clause. That does not mean, however, they should be
interpreted identically for the reasons suggested in the text. Nonetheless, Justice Rehnquist
argued that because “both immunities derive from precisely the same source—the supremacy
of federal law—I find the Court’s decision today inexplicable.” Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458
U.S. at 857 n.6.
1053
Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
1054
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd, 458 U.S. at 851. This theme was advanced by New Mexico. See
Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, supra note 987, at *7–8.
1055
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 851–52.
1056
Id. at 841 n.5.
1057
Professor Jensen is skeptical about whether Ramah would be decided the same way today.
“One cannot be sure, of course, but Ramah was decided at a time when the Indian canons, and
judicial sympathies for American Indian tribes more generally, were in full force. State taxes
with potentially unhappy consequences for tribes or tribal members were disfavored. That
seems no longer to be the case.” Jensen, supra note 9, at 72.
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regulations, the latter may still not be pervasive or comprehensive enough to
justify preempting the tax.
In a sense, Justice Rehnquist was raising a classical slippery slope argument.
Could the New Mexico income tax paid by the construction workers be preempted on the theory that their wages were higher because of that tax, which,
in turn, increased the cost of the construction? In the end, the more closely
aligned the subject matter of the federal regulations with the base of the state
tax, the less steep the slope.
F. The Natural Resource Cases
1. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe1058 upheld the Tribe’s power to adopt a severance tax on the production of oil and gas1059 by non-Indian lessees of wells
on the reservation after the leases had been entered into. Once again, Justice
Marshall wrote the majority opinion; Justice Stevens dissented,1060 joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist.
a. Origin of a Tribe’s Right of Taxation
At the core of the case was the origin and basis of a tribe’s power of taxation.
At the time they were entered into, the leases did not mention any Tribal
severance tax, which had not yet been adopted.1061 The issue was whether

1058
455 U.S. 130 (1982). There were two consolidated cases involving 21 lessees. Id. at 133.
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico enjoined the tax, ruling that
the Tribe had no authority to impose it, and that the tax violated the Commerce Clause. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the power of taxation was an inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty that was not divested by Congress or by
treaty. The court also found no violation of the Interstate Commerce Clause. Id. at 136.
1059
The severance tax applied to “any oil and natural gas severed, saved and removed from
Tribal lands.” Id. at 133. For a discussion of the procedural aspects of challenging tribal tax
provisions, see Anna-Marie Tabor, Sovereignty in the Balance: Taxation by Tribal Governments,
15 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 349, 364–65 (2004).
1060
Stevens circulated a draft that was initially intended to be the majority opinion, but
subsequently became the dissent. Justice Marshall circulated a dissent that became the majority
opinion. Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1619 n.201.
1061
The Tribe was organized under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. Its original constitution, approved by the Secretary of the Interior in 1937, declared that the Tribe’s powers
included all those powers possessed in the past, in addition to those specifically conferred by
Section 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act. Subsequent revisions to the Tribe’s Constitution
in 1960 and 1968 elaborated on these powers. Brief for the Secretary of the Interior, Merrion
v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (Nos. 80-11 and 80-15), 1981 WL 389704, at
*2 [hereinafter Brief for the Secretary of the Interior]. Immediately after passage of the Act,
the Solicitor of Interior interpreted this language to include the power to tax. Powers of Indian
Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14, 18 (1934). In 1969, the constitution was revised to give the tribal
council, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the power to impose taxes and fees
on non-members of the Tribe doing business on the reservation. Brief for the Secretary of the
Interior, supra, at *2.
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the Tribe could impose such a tax after the leases had been executed.1062 The
taxpayer argued that it had not consented to a severance tax so that the Tribe
had no power to levy one after the fact. The Tribe argued that the power to tax
was inherent in its being a sovereign, independent of whether Merrion had
consented. Accordingly, it was also irrelevant that the Tribe did not condition
Merrion’s lease or its entry onto the reservation on its consent to be taxed.
Merrion’s consent was simply unnecessary.
Justice Marshall started off directly and unambiguously, citing Colville for
the proposition that the “power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands
and significantly involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute
of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested of it by federal law or
necessary implication of their dependent status.”1063
The power to tax is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is
a necessary instrument of self-government and territorial management. This
power enables a tribal government to raise revenues for essential services.
The power does not derive solely from the Indian tribe’s power to exclude nonIndians from tribal lands. Instead, it derives from the tribe’s general authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity within its jurisdiction, and to
defray the cost of providing governmental services by requiring contributions from persons or enterprises engaged in economic activities within that
jurisdiction.1064

Unlike in McClanahan, tribal sovereignty was not a platonic notion relegated to a back drop.1065 The Court identified the ways in which the taxpayers benefited from the Tribe. The taxpayers availed themselves of the privilege
of carrying on business on the reservation, and benefited from tribal services
and “advantages of a civilized society” assured by tribal government.1066 Mar1062
Effective 1977, the Tribe levied a severance tax on “any oil and natural gas severed, saved
and removed from Tribal lands.” Brief for the Secretary of the Interior, supra note 1061, at
*2.
1063
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137 (citing Colville, 447 U.S. at 152).
1064
Id. (emphasis added). This statement is consistent with Marshall’s opinion in Iowa
Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) (“Tribal authority over the activities
of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty.”). “This recognition of the responsibilities of tribes today—their duty to act as municipalities and to provide
the amenities commonly expected from governments—is central to a definition of legitimate
tribal interests.” Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 108. As long ago as 1879, the Senate stated that
the tribes “undoubtedly possess the inherent right to resort to taxation to raise the necessary
revenue for the accomplishment of these vitally important object—a right not in any sense
derived from the Government of the United States.” S. Rep. No. 698, 45th Cong., 3d. Sess.,
at 1–2 (1879).
1065
See supra note 558 and accompanying text.
1066
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137–38 (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Dep’t. of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207,
228 (1980) (quoting Japan Line v. Los Angeles, 441 U.S. at 445 (1979))). Marshall apparently
based this part of the opinion on the government’s brief, which argued that unlike the nonIndians attracted onto a reservation in Colville, the taxpayers here availed themselves of the
substantial privilege of carrying on business on the reservation, and benefited substantially in
their occupation of reservation lands from the provision of police and fire protection and other
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shall compared the Tribe to numerous other governmental entities that levy
a similar tax when they provide comparable services.1067 There was nothing
exceptionable in requiring a business to contribute taxes to the general cost
of tribal government.1068
Unfortunately from the perspective of the Indians, Justice Marshall went
on to condition this power of taxation by endorsing Colville’s statement that a
tribe’s interest in levying taxes on nonmembers to raise “revenues for essential
government programs . . . is strongest when the revenues are derived from
value generated on the reservation by activities involving the Tribes and when
the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services,”1069 and concluded that this
“surely is the case here.”1070
This citation to Colville is unfortunate in two respects. First, if the Indians
truly have the sovereign power of taxation, it should not be divested under
the Colville approach. Second, Colville dealt with a tax avoidance situation,
which need not have been generalized and gratuitously elevated to a more
general principle.
The majority distinguished three old decisions cited by the dissent1071 and
rejected the proposition that the power of taxation derived solely from the
Tribe’s power to exclude non-Indians from tribal land.1072 Limiting the power
in the manner the dissent suggested would contradict “the conception that
Indian tribes are domestic, dependent nations, as well as the common understanding that the sovereign taxing power is a tool for raising revenue necessary

governmental services, as well as the advantages of a civilized society. Brief for the Secretary of
the Interior, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (Nos. 80-11 and 80-15),
1981 WL 389704, at *14. The Government cited, inter alia, Exxon and Japan Line, discussed
supra notes 180, 192, 463.
1067
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 138.
1068
Id. at 137–38.
1069
Id. at 138 (citing Colville, 447 U.S. at 156–57).
1070
Id. at 138; see also Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195, 201
(stating that a tribe’s power to tax is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty, and prior approval
by the Secretary of the Interior is not necessary in the absence of a specific statutory requirement).
1071
See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 141–44 (discussing Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904);
Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906); Maxey
v. Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243, 54 S.W. 807 (Ct. App. Ind. T. 1900), aff’d, 105 F. 1003 (8th Cir.
1900)).
1072
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 141. The Court appeared to reject the implicit divestiture doctrine.
“We have considered [Indian tribes] as invested with the right of self-government and jurisdiction over the persons and property within the limits of the territory they occupy, except so far
as that jurisdiction has been restrained and abridged by treaty or act of Congress.” Id. at 140.
“Only the Federal Government may limit a tribe’s exercise of its sovereign authority.” Id. at
147 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978)). “Because the Tribe retains
all inherent attributes of sovereignty that have not been divested by the Federal Government,
the proper inference from silence . . . is that the sovereign power . . . remains intact.” Id. at
148 n.14.
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to cover the costs of government.”1073 Marshall also rejected the argument
that various federal statutes preempted the severance tax or divested the Indians of their power of taxation.1074
Responding to the dissent’s position that the power to tax derived from the
power to exclude, Marshall offered a classical “the whole includes the lesser”
type of argument.
Nonmembers who lawfully enter tribal lands remain subject to the tribe’s
power to exclude them. This power necessarily includes the lesser power
to place conditions on entry, on continued presence, or on reservation
conduct, such as a tax on business activities conducted on the reservation.
When a tribe grants a non-Indian the right to be on Indian land, the tribe
agrees not to exercise its ultimate power to oust the non-Indian as long as
the non-Indian complies with the initial conditions of entry. However, it
does not follow that the lawful property right to be on Indian land also
immunizes the non-Indian from the tribe’s exercise of its lesser-included
power to tax or to place other conditions on the non-Indian’s conduct or
continued presence on the reservation.1075
1073
Id. at 141. The reference to “domestic dependent nation” is from Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831), and was Chief Justice Marshall’s oxymoronic description of
the status of an Indian tribe. See supra notes 220–28 and accompanying text; supra note 224.
Cherokee Nation was decided by the Court in 1831; since that time the expression has been
used by the Supreme Court in only eight cases, including Merrion.
1074
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 150–52.
1075
Id. at 144–45 (emphasis in original). Had Merrion owned the land on which it was producing oil, the Tribe might not have been able to levy a severance tax under Atkinson Trading
Co. Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001). Atkinson prevented the Navajo Nation from imposing
its hotel occupancy tax on patrons of a hotel located on land owned by non-Indians within the
reservation, despite the Navajo’s provision of various services to the hotel and its guests.
The Merrion Court proclaimed that neither

the United States, nor a state, nor any other sovereignty loses the power to govern
the people within its borders by the existence of towns and cities therein endowed
with the usual powers of municipalities, nor by the ownership nor occupancy of the land
within its territorial jurisdiction by citizens or foreigners.
455 U.S. at 143 (citing Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 952 (8th Cir. 1905) (emphasis in Buster)).
Atkinson, however, claims that the Court never endorsed Buster’s statement that an Indian
tribe’s jurisdiction to govern the inhabitants of a country is not conditioned or limited by the
title to the land which they occupy in it. To the contrary, “only full territorial sovereigns enjoy
the ‘power to enforce laws against all who come within [their] territory,’ and Indian tribes ‘can
no longer be described as sovereigns in this sense.’” Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 653 n.5 (quoting
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685 (1990)). For a discussion of Duro, see supra notes 336, 831.
Atkinson raises questions about the viability of tribal property taxes on non-Indian fee lands
and tribal sales taxes on sales made by non-Indians on non-Indian fee land. In commenting
on Atkinson, Professor Fletcher notes that “Federal Indian policy supported the exercise of the
tribal tax in Atkinson; indeed, it actively supported it,” citing the Tribal Tax Status Act and the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Fletcher, Supreme Court, supra note 14, at 177. (“In the Tribal
Tax Status Act, Congress stated that its intent was to ‘create the development environment
necessary for true economic and social self-sufficiency.’”) Id. (The Indian Tribal Government
Tax Status Act of 1982 granted the tribes many of the federal tax advantages of a state. See Int.
Rev. Code of 1986, sec. 7871.)
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The majority correctly characterized the dissent’s argument as confusing
the two hats the Tribe wore: commercial partner and taxing sovereign.1076
Atkinson applied Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981), which denied a tribe
the right to regulate fishing and hunting by non-members on land not owned by the tribe. The
Montana Court stressed that because fishing was not a significant part of the tribe’s activities,
id. at 566, the tribe had an insufficient interest in regulating it—hardly true of Merrion. The
Court applied a presumption that “exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status
of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation.” Id. at 564. The
Court acknowledged two exceptions: “A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or
other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe
or its members, through commercial dealings, contracts, leases, or other arrangements,” and
a tribe retains “inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on
fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” Id. at 565–66.
Atkinson described Montana as showing that “Indian tribe power over nonmembers on nonIndian fee land is sharply circumscribed,” Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 650, and that an “Indian tribe’s
sovereign power to tax—whatever its derivation—reaches no further than tribal land.” Id. at
650, 653.
Professor William Rice is reported to have described Montana as holding that “Brown
people don’t regulate white people.” N. Bruce Duthu and Dean B. Suagee, Supreme Court
Strikes Two More Blows Against Tribal Self-Determination, 16 Nat. Resources & Env’t. 118,
121 (2001). For a discussion of Atkinson, see Leonika Charging, Atkinson Trading Company
v. Shirley: A Taxing Decision on Tribal Sovereign Power, 47 S.D. L. Rev. 134 (2002); Gould,
Tough Love, supra note 11; Tabor, supra note 771, at 369–72.
“The highly contextual determinations that have followed the Montana approach offer lawyers no promise of clarity and tribes no hope for an end to the Court’s bit-by-colonial-bit
diminishment of their sovereignty.” Ball, John Marshall, supra note 193, at 1191. Montana was
applied in Brendale v. Confederate Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989),
upholding a tribe’s zoning powers over non-Indian fee land located in an area of the reservation that was not open to the public. The non-Indian owners wanted to develop the land in a
manner that would threaten the “political integrity, economic security, or the health or welfare
of the tribe.” Id. at 431. “In Brendale, three tangled opinions, none with majority support,
offered very different assessments of Montana’s meaning and produced a tangle of new limits
on tribal regulation of reservation land use.” Ball, John Marshall, supra note 193, at 1191; see
also Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (tribe had no adjudicatory power over a
personal injury arising from an accident on a state highway running through the reservation);
South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993) (denying a tribe the right to regulate hunting
and fishing in a reservation area Congress opened to the public after the tribe gave it up for a
reservoir).
One of the common criticisms of Montana is that it relied on the discredited decision in
Oliphant and its “implicit divestiture” theory. See, e.g., Duthu & Suagee supra note 331, at 119;
N. Bruce Duthu, Implicit Divestiture of Tribal Powers: Locating Legitimate Sources of Authority
in Indian Country, 19 Am. Indian L. Rev. 353 (1994). For an insightful critique of Montana,
see Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Court’s Use of the Implicit Divestiture Doctrine to Implement Its
Imperfect Notion of Federalism in Indian Country, 36 Tulsa L. J. 267, 269 (2000).
1076
The failure to recognize that a tribe can wear both hats simultaneously has kept the
Court from appreciating that from an economic perspective, a “tax” may be just a formal label.
That is, if a tribe were to otherwise keep all the revenue from an activity that it conducted, it
may make no economic difference if it subsequently adopts a tax and now receives part of that
revenue from the tax. See supra notes 890–93, 909–10 and accompanying text; infra notes
1315–17, 1349–55 and accompanying text.
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Wearing its first hat, the Tribe, like any landowner, entered into a lease calling
for a royalty. Wearing its second hat, the Tribe, like any sovereign, imposed a
tax.1077 Although a landowner could not unilaterally renegotiate a previously
executed lease, a sovereign can impose a tax any time it wants. 1078
b. The Interstate Commerce Clause
The majority also upheld the tax against an Interstate Commerce Clause challenge. Unlike Merrion’s first argument that the Tribe did not have the power
to levy a tax, an attack under the Interstate Commerce Clause assumes the
right to levy a tax.
The Court acknowledged that reviewing the tax under the Interstate Commerce Clause had “conceptual difficulties,”1079 but proceeded to do so anyway. At least two “conceptual difficulties” can be identified. First, Congress
implicitly authorized the severance tax.1080 The tax was adopted pursuant to
a series of federal checkpoints that had to be cleared before a tribal tax could
take effect,1081 and was thus authorized by Congress. It was irrelevant that
1077
“It is an article of faith among American Indian tribes, and most scholars who write
about them, that tribes possess the powers of inherent sovereigns. . . . What many tribes and
scholars are only now discovering is that the Supreme Court all but ended this territorial
conception of tribal power more than twenty years ago [in Montana v. United States].” Gould,
Tough Love, supra note 11, at 669
“Montana has replaced Worcester as the paradigm of tribal sovereignty. . . . Sovereignty
over territory is now supplanted by sovereignty based upon consent.” Id. at 692. Writing long
before Atkinson, Professor Williams sounded a similar warning. “The tribe’s majority status
[in Merrion], an important legitimating factor in the exercise of political power in United
States legal and political theory, thus distinguishes Merrion from Oliphant, [see supra notes 336,
1075; infra note 1114,] where non-Indians constituted an unrepresented racial and landholding majority.” Williams, Algebra, supra note 216, at 276.
1078
See, e.g., Veix v. Sixth Ward Building & Loan Association of Newark, 310 U.S. 32 (1940);
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). One limited exception is when
a statute is narrowly directed at a particular subset of persons under circumstances in which a
contractual right is created. If a person accepts the invitation of the statute to engage in certain
behavior, the government might be liable by changing the statute. See, e.g., Centex v. United
States, 395 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2005); First Nationwide Bank v. United States, 431 F.3d 1342
(Fed. Cir. 2005). Nothing even approaching this situation would involve a sovereign’s decision
to impose a tax. It also seems clear that the sovereign could impose a tax on events taking place
earlier in the taxable year. Due Process considerations, however, might limit how far back in
time a state can go when it adopts a new tax. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994).
This issue was not present in Merrion.
1079
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 153.
1080
This is one of the two difficulties referred to by Marshall. See id. at 155 n.21. Another
difficulty was that the taxpayers’ discrimination argument, not discussed in the text, assumed
that the transportation of minerals across the boundary of the reservation constituted interstate
commerce. Id. at 158 n.24. If the reservation is considered to be part of New Mexico, where
the severance took place, there would be no interstate commerce—just minerals moving from
one part of New Mexico to another.
1081
Id. at 155. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985), rejects
reading Merrion as holding that such “federal checkpoints” are a precondition for a tax to be
constitutional. In Kerr-McGee, the Court upheld a Navajo tax where there were no “federal
checkpoints” because, unlike in Merrion, the Tribe was not subject to the Indian Reorganization
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Congress had the power to require that approval under the Indian Commerce Clause, or “by virtue of its superior position over the tribes,”1082 rather
than under the Interstate Commerce Clause.1083 Either source of the power
would suffice to uphold the tax from attack under the Interstate Commerce
Clause.1084
The second conceptual difficulty is that the tribes are not “states.” Any analysis of the tax should proceed under the Indian Commerce Clause, not the
Interstate Commerce Clause.1085 Because Congress had explicitly approved
the severance tax, any attack under the Indian Commerce Clause should be
easily repelled.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior, correctly
argued that the language, structure, and purpose of the Interstate Commerce Clause did not, of its own force, limit the tribes in their dealings
with non-Indians.1086 The government accurately observed that the “Framers contemplated that the remedies [for inimical tribal legislation] would
be the negotiation or renegotiation of treaties, the enactment of legislation
governing trade and other relations, or the exertion of superior force by the
United States Government.”1087 The Solicitor General, however, then misstated the Framers’ intent by claiming that “if the Commerce Clause does
impose restrictions on tribal activity, those restrictions must arise from the
Indian Commerce Clause, and not its interstate counterpart.”1088
Act (IRA). Id. at 198. Congress is free to impose such “checkpoints” (again illustrating the tension between the Indians being “sovereigns” and Congress having plenary power over them),
but if Congress has not done so, the tribes are free to impose their own taxes. In Kerr-McGee,
the Court determined that Congress had not enacted legislation requiring Secretarial approval
of Navajo tax laws. Id. Kerr-McGee recognized that under the IRA, a tribe must obtain approval
from the Secretary of the Interior before adopting or revising its constitution to announce its
intention to tax nonmembers. Further, the Secretary had to approve any severance tax that was
actually enacted. The IRA, however, does not apply to all tribes. If, as Merrion holds, taxation is
an inherent attribute of sovereignty, a tribe not subject to the Indian Reorganization Act could
nonetheless enact a severance tax.
1082
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 155 n.21. Professor Milner Ball describes Congress’s acting pursuant to its superior position as acting on the “basis of might, not constitutional law.” Ball,
Constitution, supra note 7, at 1, 99. “Superior position, in the form of a proposition with
judicial backing, may be traced to United States v. Kagama.” Id. at 50. Although Marshall in
Merrion did not cite Kagama and Lone Wolf, “those cases and their reasoning are the source of
the idea.” Id. at 54.
1083
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 155 n.21.
1084
That the Tribe has the inherent power of taxation would not automatically satisfy the
Interstate Commerce Clause. For example, the states have the inherent power of taxation, yet
their taxes must satisfy the Complete Auto tests, described infra note 1095 and accompanying
text. If Congress were to authorize a state to adopt a particular tax, however, like a severance
tax, presumably that would immunize it from a Commerce Clause challenge.
1085
“As separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, [Indian] tribes have historically
been regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority.” Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
1086
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 153.
1087
Id.
1088
Id. (emphasis added).
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Justice Marshall corrected this misstatement: “To date, however, this Court
has relied on the Indian Commerce Clause as a shield to protect Indian tribes
from state and local interference . . . .”1089 This statement, while historically
accurate,1090 was particularly incongruous coming from Justice Marshall—
who never applied the Indian Commerce Clause in this manner1091 and who
rejected attempts by the Solicitor General in Central Machinery and Ramah to
breathe some life into the Clause.1092
Despite the inapplicability of the Interstate Commerce Clause, Marshall inexplicably proceeded to analyze the severance tax under that Clause.
“The tax challenged here would survive judicial scrutiny under the Interstate Commerce Clause, even if such scrutiny were necessary.”1093 Marshall
started his Interstate Commerce Clause analysis with Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady,1094 which has come to be interpreted as sustaining a tax “if it is
applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly
apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly
related to the services provided by the State.”1095
The taxpayers focused their attack primarily on the nondiscrimination
requirement. That attack turned on a technical interpretation of the taxing statute, which the Court rejected.1096 The taxpayers also contended that
because New Mexico could tax the same mining activity at full value, the
Tribal tax imposed a multiple tax burden on interstate commerce, violating
1089
Id. at 153–54. “The use of the Indian commerce clause as a shield to protect Indian
tribes from state and local interference is a capsule summary of the constitutional dimension
of Worcester v. Georgia. It is a far cry from preemption based on the supremacy clause alone
and from the contention that any other constitutionally based claim is frivolous.” Robert S.
Pelcyger, Justices and Indians: Back to Basics, 62 Or. L. Rev. 29, 40-41. (1983).
Justice Marshall also stated that the Court has not relied on the Indian Commerce Clause
to authorize tribal regulation of commerce without any constitutional constraints. 455 U.S.,
at 154. This issue had not been presented in any earlier case and Marshall cited nothing in
support of his statement.
1090
“[T]he Indian Commerce Clause originally was not conceived as a federal power to
regulate Indians, but, rather, as a federal power to regulate non-Indians who dealt with Indians
in Indian country.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1218–19.
1091
In the opinion below, the Tenth Circuit stated:

[N]o court has analyzed how the tribes are limited in their taxing power by the
Indian Commerce Clause. We hold the standard to be used in applying that clause
is whether a tribe’s tax legislation infringes upon the national interest in maintaining
the free flow of interstate trade. Our view is that the national interest is measured by
traditional analyses.
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 545 (10th Cir. 1980). The court held the
severance tax did not violate the Indian Commerce Clause. Id. at 547. The question is why a
court is in a better position than Congress to determine when a tribal tax might “infringe upon
the national interest in maintaining the free flow of interstate trade.” Id.
1092
See supra notes 517–18, 1011–35 and accompanying text.
1093
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 156.
1094
430 U.S. 274 (1977).
1095
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 156 (citing Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279).
1096
Id. at 157–58. See supra note 1080.
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the Commerce Clause. The Court described the multiple taxation issue as
arising where two or more taxing jurisdictions
point to some contact with an enterprise to support a tax on the entire
value of its multistate activities, which is more than the contact would justify. This Court has required an apportionment of the tax based on the
portion of the activity properly viewed as occurring within each relevant
State. . . . This rule has no bearing here, however, for there can be no claim
that the Tribe seeks to tax any more of [Taxpayers’] mining activity than the
portion occurring within tribal jurisdiction.1097 Indeed, [Taxpayers] do not
even argue that the Tribe is seeking to seize more tax revenues than would be
fairly related to the services provided by the Tribe1098 . . . . In the absence of
such an assertion, and when the activity taxed by the Tribe occurs entirely on
tribal lands, the multiple taxation issue would arise only if a State attempted
to levy a tax on the same activity, which is more than the State’s contact with
the activity would justify. In such a circumstance, any challenge asserting
that tribal and state taxes create a multiple burden on interstate commerce
should be directed at the state tax, which, in the absence of congressional
ratification, might be invalidated under the Commerce Clause.1099

The Court made it clear that because Merrion was not challenging the State
tax, it was not expressing any opinion on that issue.1100
Justice Marshall’s dicta merit several comments. First, Marshall seemed to
be adopting language of the fourth prong of Complete Auto (although he did
not cite the case in this part of the analysis) when he noted that the taxpayers
1097
Id. at 158 n.26. This part of the Court’s statement conforms to the due process nexus
standards of the 14th Amendment that apply when a state exercises its powers of taxation. The
Due Process Clause requires “a ‘minimal connection’ between the interstate activities and the
taxing State, and a rational relationship between the income attributed to the State and the
intrastate values of the enterprise.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425,
436–37 (1980). The Bill of Rights and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
do not apply to the tribes. The Indian Civil Rights Act incorporates a stripped down version of
the Bill of Rights that imposes certain conditions on the actions of the tribes. One condition
is that a tribe cannot take “private property for a public use without just compensation,” 25
U.S.C. § 1302 (2006), which could be interpreted as encompassing under a different rubric
the 14th Amendment due process constraints that apply to the states. The Act also prohibits
tribes from denying to “any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws.” Id.
The Court has held that the Act does not create a private cause of action that could be pursued
in the federal courts; instead, any actions must be pursued in tribal courts. Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 69–72 (1978).
Apparently, Congress’s predominant concern in passing the Act was to provide procedural
rights in criminal trials. Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal
Governments, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1343, 1359 (1969). For a general discussion of the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968, see Canby, supra note 3, at 394–405; Stephen L. Pevar, The Rights of
Indians and Tribes 278–91 (3rd ed. 2002).
1098
When the Tribe tried to introduce at trial evidence of the services it provided, the taxpayers successfully argued that such evidence was irrelevant to their case. Merrion, 455 U.S.
at 157 n.23.
1099
Id. at 158–59 n.26 (emphasis in original).
1100
Id.
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“do not even argue that the Tribe is seeking more tax revenues than would be
fairly related to the services provided by the Tribe.”1101 The fourth prong of
Complete Auto was essentially eliminated in Commonwealth Edison,1102 however, and the Court’s dicta inviting that the issue be revisited would prove to
be ill founded just seven years later in Cotton Petroleum.
Second, the activity of “severance” occurred simultaneously within the
reservation and within New Mexico. Both could be viewed as having equal
claims to tax the severance. Like the Tribe, the State must also show that its tax
was not “more than the State’s contact with the activity would justify.”1103 Part
of those contacts would presumably be the services the State provided. The
Court indicated that both the Tribe and the State must justify their respective taxes in terms of services provided (assuming the reference to “contacts”
includes “services”). Presumably, the Tribe and the State must satisfy the same
standard.
If the Tribal tax was commensurate with services provided, and the State
taxes were not, then the State tax might be viewed as creating a multiple
tax burden. But the opposite is equally true. If the Tribal tax were not commensurate with services it provided, but the State tax was, then the Tribal tax
should be viewed as creating multiple taxation.
Third, any attempt to compare taxes with services is almost guaranteed to
be meaningless. Language like “fairly related to the services provided,” suggests some kind of qualitative or quantitative evaluation. Justice Marshall,
however, had properly rejected that type of evaluation just one year earlier
in a case that also involved a severance tax (albeit not one imposed by the
Indians). In Commonwealth Edison, the taxpayers, utility companies, unsuccessfully argued that the Montana severance tax had to relate to the value of
services provided by the State.1104
Justice Marshall’s majority opinion in Commonwealth Edison is worth quoting at length, not only because it sheds light on how to interpret his comments
in Merrion, but also because of the insight it offers into the more general (and
misguided) theme that has played a prominent role in some of the Indian tax
cases—the extent to which taxes have to be related to services.
[Taxpayers] only complaint is that the amount the State receives in taxes far
exceeds the value of the services provided to the coal mining industry. In
objecting to the tax on this ground, [Taxpayers] may be assuming that the
Montana tax is, in fact, intended to reimburse the State for the cost of speId. at 158.
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), upheld the constitutionality of Montana’s severance tax under the Interstate Commerce Clause. “[A] severance tax is
like a real property tax, which has never been doubted as a legitimate means of raising revenue
by the situs state.” Id. at 624. But see Am. River Transp. Co. v. Bower, 813 N.E.2d 1090 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2004); Sylvia Dennen, The Fourth Prong: The Court’s Neglected Stepchild?, 33 State
Tax Notes 743 (2004).
1103
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 158.
1104
453 U.S. at 609–11.
1101
1102
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cific services furnished to the coal mining industry. Alternatively, [Taxpayers]
could be arguing that a State’s power to tax an activity connected to interstate commerce cannot exceed the value of the services specifically provided
to the activity. Either way, the premise of [Taxpayers’] argument is invalid.
Furthermore, [Taxpayers] have completely misunderstood the nature of the
inquiry under the fourth prong of the Complete Auto Transit test.
The Montana Supreme Court held that the coal severance tax is “imposed
for the general support of the government,” and we have no reason to question this characterization of the Montana tax as a general revenue tax . . . .
This Court has indicated that States have considerable latitude in imposing general revenue taxes. The Court has, for example, consistently rejected
claims that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands
as a barrier against taxes that are “unreasonable” or “unduly burdensome.”
Moreover, there is no requirement under the Due Process Clause that the
amount of general revenue taxes collected from a particular activity must
be reasonably related to the value of the services provided to the activity.
Instead, our consistent rule has been:
Nothing is more familiar in taxation than the imposition of a tax upon a
class or upon individuals who enjoy no direct benefit from its expenditure,
and who are not responsible for the condition to be remedied.
A tax is not an assessment of benefits. It is, as we have said, a means of distributing the burden of the cost of government. The only benefit to which
the taxpayer is constitutionally entitled is that derived from his enjoyment of
the privileges of living in an organized society, established and safeguarded
by the devotion of taxes to public purposes. Any other view would preclude
the levying of taxes except as they are used to compensate for the burden on
those who pay them, and would involve abandonment of the most fundamental principle of government–that it exists primarily to provide for the
common good.
There is no reason to suppose that this latitude afforded the States under the
Due Process Clause is somehow divested by the Commerce Clause merely
because the taxed activity has some connection to interstate commerce;
particularly when the tax is levied on an activity conducted within the
State. . . . To accept [Taxpayers’] apparent suggestion that the Commerce
Clause prohibits the States from requiring an activity connected to interstate commerce to contribute to the general cost of providing governmental
services, as distinct from those costs attributable to the taxed activity, would
place such commerce in a privileged position. . . . When, as here, a general
revenue tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce and is apportioned to activities occurring within the State, the State “is free to pursue its
own fiscal policies, unembarrassed by the Constitution, if by the practical
operation of a tax the state has exerted its power in relation to opportunities
which it has given, to protection which it has afforded, to benefits which it
has conferred by the fact of being an orderly, civilized society.1105
1105
Id. at 621–25 (emphasis in original). The dissent in Commonwealth Edison would have
entertained a trial on the issue of whether the Montana severance tax was fairly related to the
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In light of these comments, only the most sanguine of taxpayers would
assume they could prevail in arguing that a tax should be struck down because
of a comparison between what is paid and the services received. The one
exception is a situation that Warren Trading presented, in which the State had
no responsibilities for the reservation and provided no services whatsoever.1106
In that case, the state simply provided no benefits, opportunities, or protections that could justify a quid pro quo. But as discussed above,1107 even that
statement is less categorical than first appears, depending on how broadly the
notion of benefits, opportunities, or protections is defined.
c. The Majority Refuses to Save Merrion from Not Anticipating a Tribal Tax
In a sense, the Court refused to rescue Merrion from its lack of foresight in
drafting its lease agreement.1108 Merrion could have drafted a clause preventing the Tribe from imposing any taxes in the future on its activities on the
reservation.1109 Because it failed to do so, Merrion could no more complain
about the enactment of a new tribal tax than could someone who went into
business before a state adopted a personal income tax or a sales tax. Unless
there are extenuating circumstances,1110 no one has the right to freeze the tax
law as it existed in the year in which he or she made a business or investment
decision, and that general proposition was implicitly extended to those doing
business with the Tribe.
True, Merrion might not have ever anticipated that the Tribe would have
enacted a tax on its activities; the leases were entered into in 1953 at a time
when the extant Tribal constitution did not provide for taxing powers.1111
services provided by the State, a fruitless undertaking. One can imagine economists in tow on
both sides—with the de rigueur computer printouts—engaged in cerebral discussions about
the aesthetic damage of strip mining, the nature and value of State services, including that of
providing an organized society. Moreover, this could be a recurring event if the State were to
periodically adjust its rates, change its mix of taxes, alter the type and amount of services it
provided, or if the taxpayer changed the nature of its activities.
1106
See supra notes 454–63 and accompanying text.
1107
See supra notes 454–63, 964, 1003–10 and accompanying text; infra notes 1179–82,
1256, and accompanying text.
1108
Apparently, some Navajo leases prohibit the tribe from taxing leaseholds granted to nonmembers. Fulwood, Of Tribes and Taxes: Limits on Indian Tribal Power to Tax Nonmembers,
1986 Utah L. Rev. 729, 749 (1986). In general, investors are free to strike whatever tax deal
they can with the Indians. One strategy might be for the tribes to adopt taxes so that they can
be given away as a bargaining chip with investors. For a discussion of how investors use the
Indians as a tax shelter, see Mark J. Cowan, Leaving Money on the Table(s): An Examination of
Federal Income Tax Policy Towards Indian Tribes, 6 Fla. Tax Rev. 345, 367–68 (2004).
1109
Indeed, those structuring transactions with the Indians on the reservation should attempt
to negotiate a no-tax clause or at least negotiate an agreement about how the transaction will
be taxed.
1110
See supra note 1078.
1111
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 134–35. In commenting on an earlier draft of this article, Professor
Fletcher notes that in 1953 Congress was actively engaged in the termination period and the
tribes were viewed by the mining companies and by the Department of the Interior as “exploitable.”
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Nonetheless, Merrion could have, but did not, contract against that possibility and had to live with the consequences. “[S]overeign power, even when
unexercised, is an enduring presence that governs all contracts subject to the
sovereign’s jurisdiction, and will remain intact unless surrendered in unmistakable terms.”1112 Moreover, Merrion had benefited through the years from
police protection and other services so that it did not have a strong equitable
position.1113 By not contracting for a “no-tax” clause, Merrion was assumed to
have taken the risk that the Tribe would exercise its sovereign powers sometime in the future.1114
d. Stevens’s Dissent
Justice Stevens wrote for the dissent, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Justice Stevens struck the theme that while the tribes have
broad powers over their own members, their powers over nonmembers are
narrowly confined.1115 The dissent read Maxey v. Wright, Morris v. Hitchcock,
and Buster v. Wright1116 for the proposition that the “power of an Indian tribe
to impose a tax solely on nonmembers doing business on the reservation
derives from the tribe’s power to exclude those persons entirely from tribal
lands or, in the alternative, to impose lesser restrictions and conditions on
a right of entry granted to conduct business on the reservation.”1117 “Tribal
1112
Id. at 148. “[T]here is no ‘use it or lose’ rule that applies to taxing power.” Jensen, supra
note 9, at 23.
1113
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137–38.
1114
Apparently, New Mexico increased its severance tax some time after Merrion had entered
into its leases with the Tribe and no argument was made that the State’s action was illegal. Brief
for the Secretary of the Interior, supra note 1066, at *18.

Under Merrion, a tribe can tax a nonmember company with presumably significant
“justifiable expectations” to the contrary in a circumstance where the tribe has agreed
to allow the company on the reservation. Yet, absent congressional authorization or
clear nonmember consent, a tribe cannot criminally sanction nonmember residents
of the reservation [Oliphant, Duro], cannot regulate nonmembers who hunt or fish on
nonmember fee lands unless their conduct threatens a core tribal interest [Montana],
might be able to zone some nonmember lands on the reservation [Brendale], and yet
cannot even regulate the hunting or fishing of transient nonmembers who come to a
federal recreational area within the reservation [Bourland].
Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 50. Without attempting to analyze all of the cases
Frickey cites, I would disagree with any characterization that Merrion had “justifiable expectations” of not being taxed when it failed to negotiate a no-tax clause with the Tribe. Also, what
is “justifiable” is a function of what the law is, so there is a circularity in determining what is
“justifiable” to determine what the law is.
1115
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 170–71 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens thought that the “tribes’
sovereignty over their own members is significantly greater than the States’ power over their
own citizens. Tribes may enforce discriminatory rules that would be intolerable in a nonIndian community.” Id. at 170.
1116
See supra note 1071 and accompanying text.
1117
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 181–83 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Professor Laurence describes the
dissent’s analysis as having “a technical precision . . . but the reading depends on a narrow,
indeed grudging acceptance of tribal sovereignty . . . .” Laurence, Thurgood Marshall, supra note
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powers over nonresidents are appropriately limited because nonmembers are
foreclosed from participation in tribal government.”1118 “In this Nation each
sovereign governs only with the consent of the governed.”1119
The dissent feared that
an Indian tribe may with equal legitimacy contract with outsiders . . .
and . . . after the contract is partially performed—change the terms of the
bargain by imposing a gross receipts tax on the outsider. If the Court is willing to ignore the risk of such unfair treatment . . . because the Secretary of
the Interior has the power to veto a tribal tax, it must equate the unbridled
discretion of a political appointee with the protection afforded by rules of
law.1120

e. Policy Considerations Regarding the Taxation of Nonresidents
The dissent could have bolstered these comments by comparing the equivalent situation of an outsider contracting with a state. A state can enter into
a contract with a nonresident and then adopt a new tax that reduces the
profit the outsider was expecting.1121 One political safeguard that outsiders
have, however, is that because a state cannot discriminate against them under
the Interstate Commerce Clause (or, in the case of an individual, also the
470, at 67. Professor Laurence claims that Stevens “sees the power to exclude as one granted by
the Europeans and the United States Constitution to the tribes; to Justice Marshall, the power
to exclude is one retained from original sovereignty.” Id. at 66.
Claiborne, writes that:
Indian Tribes are, of course, “domestic” sovereignties. In this respect, they are deemed
to have surrendered (willingly or not) to the United States much the same powers the States surrendered by forming the “more perfect Union.” But there are, of
course, important differences. Tribes, unlike States, are not directly constrained by
the Bill of Rights or the Reconstruction Amendments. On the other hand, they are
not protected by the Tenth Amendment and congressional power over them is almost
unlimited. What is more, even without legislation, Tribes, because of their ‘dependent status’ vis-à-vis the United States, are deemed to have relinquished the right to
alienate their land except to the United States or with its approval, and also the right
to punish non-members. In sum, tribal sovereignty is a precarious thing subject to
diminution, even perhaps destruction, at the will of Congress.
Claiborne, supra note 11, at 595–96. The constitutional right to travel, see, e.g., Saenz v. Roe,
526 U.S. 489 (1999), does not limit the Indians right to exclude nonmembers from a reservation.
1118
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 183. In addition, Stevens argued that in “becoming part of the
United States,” the tribes had “yielded their status as independent nations” and had no power
over non-Indians. Id. at 160.
1119
Id. at 173 (quoting Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 426 (1979)). See generally Richard B.
Collins, Indian Consent to American Government, 31 Ariz. L. Rev. 365 (1988).
1120
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 190.
1121
Exactly that situation occurred in 1991 when Connecticut adopted a personal income
tax, which applied to existing contracts the State had with nonresidents. To take an easy
example, nonresident employees of the State became subject to the tax even if they sincerely
believed, and relied upon, all of the anti-income tax rhetoric that had marked earlier discussions over fiscal reform, suggesting that a personal income tax would never be enacted.
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Privileges and Immunities Clause),1122 any new tax has to apply equally to
residents, i.e., voters. In a sense, while nonresidents do not vote, their interests are protected by residents who do.1123 The outsiders ride the coattails of
the insiders, which presumably is why a tax on nonresidents is not normally
viewed as violating the slogan, “no taxation without representation.”
One significant difference exists with many tribes, however. If there are
few local economic actors—which may be why a tribe is turning to outsiders in the first place—the normal political protection for nonresidents may
not exist. In other words, a new tax may be nondiscriminatory on its face,1124
but as a practical matter, may apply only to nonresidents, who are the only
significant economic players.
Commonwealth Edison1125 (authored by Justice Marshall) presented this
very situation. The Montana severance tax in that case was nondiscriminatory
on its face, that is, it applied uniformly to the severance of coal whether used
within the State or outside the State. As a practical matter, however, nearly all
(90%) of the Montana coal was destined for outsiders and the Court assumed
the tax was passed forward to nonresidents. The tax could be described as
discriminatory in fact. But because the tax was facially nondiscriminatory,
the Court held it did not discriminate against interstate commerce. Presumably, nonresidents did not have the political protection of riding the coattails
of Montana voters, who did not bear the burden of the tax. Quite possibly,
Montana voters would have endorsed “sticking it to outsiders.”
More generally, states often impose facially neutral taxes that are politically
attractive to voters because of the disproportionate impact on nonresidents
who do not vote. Special excise taxes on rental cars and hotels, Delaware’s fees
on incorporation, Alaska’s overwhelming reliance on the taxation of oil and
gas, and Nevada’s taxes on gambling, for example, are attractive to residents
of those states because they are presumably paid predominately by nonresidents.1126 A tribal severance tax is consistent with this philosophy. Drawing
1122
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; see Richard D. Pomp, State and Local Taxation, Ch.
4 (6th ed. 2009).
1123
Residents under contract with Connecticut, for example, also became subject to that
State’s personal income tax in 1991, see supra note 1121. The adoption of Connecticut’s personal income tax was especially contentious and nonresidents had the assurance that they were
riding the coattails of residents pursuing their own self-interests.
1124
Under the Interstate Commerce Clause, a facially discriminatory tax is “virtually per se
invalid.” Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (2008) (citing Oregon Waste, Inc. v. Dep’t.
of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1979)).
1125
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 624 (1981).
1126
Even “tourist taxes,” however, will be paid by some residents. For example, some upstate
New York residents come to New York City for recreation, stay in hotels, and pay the excise
taxes on hotel rooms. Similarly, New York residents who do not own cars (common in New
York City) will rent cars and pay the excise taxes on rental cars. But these are the exceptions
and not the rule.
The political goal of these tourist taxes is to have them paid by nonresidents (i.e., nonvoters)
but determining their economic incidence can be a difficult empirical question. For example,
hotel room rates may be lower because of the excise tax than they would be if there were no
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any kind of justiciable line between acceptable and non-acceptable Indian
taxes having a disproportionate impact on nonresidents would be impossible,
and unnecessary for at least four reasons.
First, some tribes have few activities they can tax. A tribe has no interest in
taxing an activity at such a high level that it drives away business. Certainly
states are timid about flexing their tax muscles for fear of hurting economic
development and tribes can hardly be expected to be voracious and rapacious
revenuers to the point of destroying what little economic activity they might
be able to attract.
Second, while corporations do not vote, their employees do. These employees also have no interest in seeing a tribe (or a state) adopt a philosophy of
“taxing what the traffic will bear,” for fear of losing their jobs or discouraging
business from creating jobs. And while corporations might not vote, they do
lobby and have more access to the power structure than do nearly all voters.
Third, in the case of certain tribes and states, the nonresident investor might
have some leverage. The fact that there may not be any residents serving as a
proxy for their interests is, ironically, the very situation in which the outsider
may have enough leverage to protect itself through its negotiations with a
tribe. The outsider might well have enough clout to negotiate, if not a no-tax
clause, or a tax holiday, then at least favorable treatment. Merrion did not
do this, although one suspects that in 1953 when the leases were executed, it
could have easily negotiated a “no tax” clause.
Fourth, Congress is always the final arbiter of situations where the local
political process might break down and offer inadequate protections for nonvoters. That Congress has infrequently intervened in issues of state taxation
illustrates that concerns for economic development can be expected to act as
a brake on tendencies to overtax nonvoters. But Congress can be expected
to intervene if a tribe purposely uses its taxing powers, for example, to force
lessees to abandon their leases so they can be taken over or given to others.1127
Justice Marshall recognized this safety valve by noting,
[T]he Tribe’s authority to tax nonmembers is subject to constraints not
imposed on other governmental entities: the Federal Government can take
away this power, and the Tribe must obtain the approval of the Secretary
such taxes. That observation would be only the starting point in trying to trace through the
effects of that lowered price.
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, see supra note 186 and the citations therein, Justice
Blackmun suggested that taxes “tailored” to single out interstate businesses should receive extra
scrutiny, 430 U.S. at 288 n.15, but his advice has gone unheeded.
1127
The trial court made a finding of fact that the producers would be able to pass the majority of the tax on to their customers, but if they had to absorb the tax,
the ability of some of the lessees to operate profitably some of the existing oil wells
on the reservation would be substantially limited; those lessees not able to profitably
operate wells ‘would be required to shut down such wells resulting in a loss of natural
resources and an unjust return of the wells to the Jicarilla Apache Tribe’ . . . .
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 540 (10th Cir. 1980).
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before any tax on nonmembers can take effect.1128 These additional constraints minimize potential concern that Indian tribes will exercise the power
to tax in an unfair or unprincipled manner, and ensure that any exercise of
the tribal power to tax will be consistent with national policies.1129

With the exception of the reference to the Secretary, the same statement
could be made of Congress’s ability to prohibit under the Interstate Commerce Clause an offending state statute.
Many commentators view Merrion as a great victory for the Indians;1130
1128
That requirement was true in Merrion because the Tribe was subject to the IRA. As KerrMcGee makes clear, 471 U.S. 195 (1985), supra note 1081, that requirement is not necessary.
After Merrion, the Secretary of the Interior approved guidelines “to assist Indian tribes in
the exercise of their inherent authority to tax mineral activities within their jurisdiction,” and
to “consider interests of other persons affected by their taxing ordinances.” Williams, Algebra,
supra note 216, at 279 n.231. According to the American Indian Law Newsletter, the

patent effect of the . . . regulations is to make it enormously more difficult for tribes
to enact severance taxes . . . and make it vastly easier for the Secretary to disapprove
such ordinances on the simple ground that they fail to meet any one of a number of
complicated, costly and time-consuming requirements; and to make any ordinance
which is approved much more vulnerable to legal challenges from the resource companies which would pay a tribal severance tax.
Id.

1129
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982). Professor Williams has criticized Merrion as drawing “upon European-derived legal discourse on Indian rights to delimit
tribal taxing authority over non-Indians.” Williams, Algebra, supra note 216, at 274. Professor
Williams argues more generally that

American Indian Nations have been judged and their legal rights and status determined in European legal thought and discourse by alien and alienating norms
derived from the European’s experience of the world. The central texts of contemporary Federal Indian law, beginning with its grounding legal text, the Doctrine of
Discovery, deny respect to American tribal peoples’ fundamental human rights of
autonomy and self-determination.
Robert A Williams, Jr., Learning Not to Live With Eurocentric Myopia: A Reply to Professor
Laurence’s Learning to Live With the Plenary Power of Congress Over the Indian Nations, 30 Ariz.
L. Rev. 439, 439 (1988).
[M]odern Federal Indian law, as well as those lawyers who write and practice in the
field, ought to be liberated from a genocidal, imperialist past and adopt a perspective
of tolerance and respect for the fundamental human right of American Indian people
to self-determination which can only be achieved through decolonization.
Id. at 440. William’s article, like so much of his writing, raises issues that many persons would
just as soon ignore. It makes a paper on Indian taxation appear downright quotidian.
1130
But see Williams, Algebra, supra note 216, at 275 (“Merrion can be interpreted as a
victory for Indian tribes only from a thoroughly myopic, un-Americanized perspective. The
Court balanced the concern that tribes might act in an ‘unfair or unprincipled manner’ with
the comforting fact that secretarial approval ensures ‘that any exercise of the tribal power to tax
will be consistent with national policies.’” (quoting Merrion, 455 U.S. at 141)).
[T]his “victory” for tribes is clearly contained by the Court’s structural subordination
of tribal self-governing powers within the hierarchical matrices of the United States
political and legal theory . . . . Merrion should be read as but a part of the long litany
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true enough, but a victory that would soon be blunted by Cotton Petroleum,
which upheld the simultaneous imposition of a state severance tax without
any relief for the resulting multiple taxation. The combination of Merrion and
Cotton meant that resource-endowed tribes would have to share that tax base
with the states.
2. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico
Seven years after Merrion, Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico1131 upheld the
simultaneous imposition of severance taxes by a state and a tribe without
apportionment or relief for the resulting double taxation. The taxpayer was
related to the entity that challenged the Tribal taxes in Merrion. After losing
that case, Cotton now attacked the New Mexico oil and gas taxes. Significantly, the Tribe was not a party to the case.1132
Cotton, a non-Indian corporation, extracted and marketed oil and gas on
trust land owned by the United States for the benefit of the Jicarilla Tribe.1133
The Tribe, pursuant to the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (hereinafter
1938 Act), entered into the leases.1134 Mineral leases constituted the primary
source of the Tribe’s general operating revenue.1135
Cotton paid royalties and production taxes to the Tribe,1136 and also paid
five oil and gas severance taxes to New Mexico. Because these taxes overlapped, Cotton’s total oil and gas severance tax burdens were approximately
14% of the value of production, whereas off-reservation producers paid only
8% of value.1137

of European derived legal texts which seek to hierarchically subordinate the Indian’s
self-defining vision within the universalized structures of the white man’s legal and
political worldview. The implication that the tribe would be prohibited from exercising its taxing authority should tribal mineral development policies conflict with
the United States’ sovereign interests undermines the Court’s upholding of “Indian
sovereignty.”
Id. at 278–79.
1131
Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
1132
“For 50 years following Rickert [in 1903] nearly all reservation tax cases involved nonIndian lessees; in none was an Indian or Indian tribe directly represented.” Barsh, Reservation
Wealth, supra note 5, at 561 n.116.
“Just as Indian land was the object of white settlers in the nineteenth century, so Indian
minerals are the object of white-dominated urban centers hungry for additional sources of
energy in the twentieth century.” Carole E. Goldberg, A Dynamic View of Tribal Jurisdiction to
Tax Non-Indians, 40 Law and Contemp. Probs. 166, 166 (1976).
1133
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 168.
1134
Id.
1135
Id. at 167.
1136
The Tribe’s taxes were upheld in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
1137
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 168–69. The State claimed that the economic burden
of its taxes was not passed onto the Tribe. Brief of Appellees State of New Mexico, Cotton
Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327),1987 U.S. Briefs 1327, at *7 [hereinafter Brief of
Appellees State of New Mexico].
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a. The Merrion Footnote
The issue was whether New Mexico could tax the on-reservation production
of oil and gas by a non-Indian company. Cotton’s primary argument was
based on dictum in a footnote in Merrion.1138 That footnote explained that
one of the reasons the Court rejected Merrion’s Interstate Commerce argument was that it made no attempt to show that the Jicarilla Apaches were
seeking to tax more than what was fairly related to services provided by the
Tribe.1139 The footnote also suggested that the New Mexico tax in Merrion
“might be invalid under the Commerce Clause if in excess of what ‘the State’s
contact with the activity would justify.’”1140 Because Commonwealth Edison
1138
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 169 (citing Merrion, 455 U.S. at 158–59 n.26). Cotton
could not challenge the validity of the Tribe’s severance tax because that argument was rejected
by Merrion. The argument that the Tribal tax preempted the State tax was rejected by Colville.
There was a lack of evidence that the multiple taxation negatively impacted the Tribe, and
Cotton apparently vacillated on a preemption argument. See infra note 1140. Cotton was
boxed into a fairly weak litigating posture.
1139
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 169. As discussed above, under the best of circumstances
this is a fairly weak argument. See supra notes 1094–1107 and accompanying text.
1140
Id. (quoting Merrion, 455 U.S. at 158–59 n.26 (emphasis in Merrion)). According to
the Tribe’s amicus brief, Cotton disclaimed a preemption argument and discussed it only as a
backdrop for its Commerce Clause argument. Brief of Jicarilla Apache Tribe as Amicus Curiae
in Support of the Appellants, Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 1987 U.S. S.
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1327, at *7–8 [hereinafter Brief of Jicarilla Apache Tribe as Amicus Curiae in
Support of the Appellants]. The New Mexico Court of Appeals summarized Cotton’s litigation
theory as “contend[ing] that this case is not a preemption case because the economic impact on
the Tribe is minimal and is not a primary consideration. . . . It asks us to adopt a new analysis
to apply to non-Indian producers who enter into lease agreements with tribes for on-the-reservation operations.” Cotton Petroleum v. State, 745 P.2d 1170, 1172 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987).
In keeping with its litigation strategy, apparently Cotton made no effort to analyze the impact
of the State taxes on the Tribe and did not seriously challenge on appeal the trial court’s findings of fact that there was no such impact. Id. at 1174. In its amicus brief, the Tribe described
Cotton as not developing the factual record needed to evaluate a preemption claim and argued
that it should not be allowed to assert that theory. Brief of Jicarilla Apache Tribe as Amicus
Curiae in Support of the Appellants, supra, at *6. An amicus brief filed by the Crow Tribe et al.
argued that there was no final judgment on the preemption issue by the highest court in New
Mexico so that the U.S. Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to consider this argument. Brief
Amici Curiae of the Crow Tribe et al., Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 1987
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1327, at *11.
At oral argument, Cotton suggested the New Mexico Court of Appeals was wrong in concluding that it had disclaimed a preemption argument.

QUESTION: But if you said in the New Mexico Court of Appeals that it is not a
preemption case
COTTON: I didn’t say that, Mr. Chief Justice.
QUESTION: Well, but I—let me read again what the New Mexico Court of Appeals
said you said, and I asked you whether that was a correct statement. “Cotton, on the
other hand, contends this is not, a preemption case because the economic impact on
the tribe is minimal and is not a primary consideration.” Now, is that a correct statement of the position you took in the New Mexico Court of Appeals?
COTTON: No, it is not, Mr. Chief Justice.
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authored by Justice Marshall had effectively rejected a similar argument, Cotton Petroleum had a steep obstacle to overcome. But even if Commonwealth
Edison had not existed, Cotton still would have had a tough burden to bear.
Relying on that footnote, Cotton argued that the New Mexico taxes
imposed on reservation activity are valid only if related to actual expenditures
by the State in relation to the activity being taxed. Cotton presented evidence
at trial tending to prove that the New Mexico taxes far exceeded the value of
services it received.1141 Cotton did not attempt to prove that the State taxes
imposed any burden on the Tribe.1142 Cotton also argued that the New Mexico taxes were preempted by the 1938 Act.1143 Finally, it argued that weighing
the respective state, federal, and tribal interests, the New Mexico taxes interfered with the federal interest in promoting tribal economic self-sufficiency
and were not justified by an adequate state interest.1144
b. The Tribe’s Amicus Briefs
After the trial below, the Tribe filed an amicus brief arguing that the New
Mexico taxes substantially interfered with its ability to raise its own tax rates
and would diminish the desirability of on-reservation leases.1145 The Tribe also
expressed a “particular concern” about the failure of New Mexico to provide
QUESTION: The court was wrong then in saying it.
COTTON: Yes.
We said--and the next sentence makes it clearer. We said that when you have a
Commerce Clause inquiry, you look at the controlling acts of Congress, Congress
to see if there are any—if you see—to see if there are any, and then you look to the
Commerce Clause. We said the preemption concept was a background here. So, we
didn’t—we didn’t say it wasn’t a preemption case. We said the preemption issues were
a part and parcel of the Commerce Clause issues.
Transcript of Oral Argument, Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 1988 U.S.
Trans. LEXIS 114, at *41–42 [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument]. See also infra note
1199.
1141
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 170. Cotton also argued that the taxes paid by all nonmember producers far exceeded the value of services that the State provided to the reservation
as a whole. Id. Cotton Petroleum’s Reply Brief cited the record below for the proposition that
the Jicarilla Tribe and the United States provide 90% of the governmental services on the reservation. Reply Brief of Appellants Cotton Petroleum Corp., supra note 1141, at *3–4 [Reply
Brief of Appellants Cotton Petroleum Corp.]. The brief claimed that the New Mexico oil and
gas taxes from reservation producers, including Cotton, equaled 400% of the estimated State
services provided to the reservation. Id. at *4.
1142
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 170. Because there was no evidence of serious economic
impact on the Tribe, Cotton thought its best argument was under the Interstate Commerce
Clause rather than arguing preemption. Cotton Petroleum, 745 P.2d at 1172; see also supra note
1140. Many tribes, however, believe the double taxation discourages businesses from operating
on a reservation. Cowan, Double Taxation, supra note 814, at 95–96.
1143
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 177. The Court rejected this argument. Id. at 177–83.
1144
Id. at 177.
1145
Id. at 170. This latter argument is reminiscent of Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898),
discussed supra notes 354–75 and accompanying text.
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services commensurate with the taxes collected.1146 After the Tribe filed its
brief, the New Mexico District Court upheld the New Mexico taxes, rejecting Cotton’s theory of the case and concluding that the taxes had no adverse
impact on tribal interests and were not pre-empted by federal law. The court
also held that the taxes were consistent with the Due Process Clause and the
Commerce Clause.1147
The Tribe then filed an amicus brief before the New Mexico Court of
Appeals. Unlike Cotton, the Tribe argued that the New Mexico taxes could
not withstand a traditional preemption analysis. The Tribe conceded that
“state laws, to the extent they do not interfere with tribal self-government,
may control the conduct of non-Indians on the reservation.”1148 The Tribe
maintained, however, that the taxes interfered with its ability to raise taxes
and thus with its right to self-government.1149 The appellate court rejected this
argument because the record contained no evidence of any adverse impact on
the Tribe;1150 to the contrary, there was evidence that the Tribe could have
imposed even higher taxes without any adverse effect.1151
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 170.
Id. at 171–72.
1148
Id. at 172.
1149
Id. In its amicus brief before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Tribe argued that it was irrelevant that the New Mexico Court of Appeals found that Cotton had proven no actual interference with the Tribe’s economic development or sovereignty. Brief of Jicarilla Apache Tribe as
Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellants, supra note 1140, at *26–27. It was irrelevant that
Cotton paid the taxes and not the Tribe; to make anything turn on that fact would resurrect the
incidence test rejected in Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832
(1982). Brief of Jicarilla Apache Tribe as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellants, supra
note 1140, at *27. The Tribe also argued that it was irrelevant that Cotton continued to drill on
the reservation or that the Tribe could have imposed higher taxes. Id. at *27–28. It is not a prerequisite to preemption that the state taxes actually disrupt reservation activity. Id. The Tribe
cited White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), for the proposition that
an actual burden need not be shown. Brief of Jicarilla Apache Tribe as Amicus Curie in Support
of the Appellants, supra note 1140, at *28. “The proper question under this Court’s decisions
is whether requiring Pinetop [in White Mountain] or Cotton to pay state taxes is compatible
with the federal and tribal interests in the activity.” Id. at *28 n.12 (emphasis in original). “If
the market would bear a 14% tax burden, then the tribe is entitled to that full amount, not
whatever fraction remains after the state takes as much as it wishes.” Id. at *28 n.11. “Under
the analysis applied by the court of appeals, preemption depends on the vagaries of supply and
demand: the state is free to tax the on-reservation production of the tribe’s minerals up to the
point at which the tax forces price increases high enough to reduce demand for the minerals
produced, or possibly until the producer’s return on investment is reduced to the point it
invests elsewhere . . . . This entire approach to preemption is misguided. The particularized
inquiry mandated by White Mountain is not an inquiry into transitory market conditions.” Id.
at *30–31. See also supra note 1140 and infra note 1199.
1150
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 172–73. Professor Clinton, however, claims that the record
“demonstrated that multiple state and tribal taxation discriminated against Indian oil and gas
development in preference to reserves located outside of Indian lands.” Clinton, Dormant,
supra note 22, at 1244.
1151
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 172–73. The New Mexico Supreme Court refused to hear
the case. Cotton Petroleum v. State, 745 P.2d 1159 (N.M. 1987).
The Appellate Court noted that Cotton and not the Tribe paid the taxes, that the record
1146
1147
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contained no evidence of an impact on tribal sovereignty, and that Cotton drilled 12 new wells
while subject to both the State and Tribal taxes. Cotton Petroleum v. State, 745 P.2d 1170,
1175 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987). The Appellate Court also rejected Cotton’s argument that was
based on the Merrion footnote. Id. at 1173–74.
The Tribe opposed certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Brief of Jicarilla Apache
Tribe as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to the Appellants at 2–3, Cotton Petroleum, 745 P.2d
1170 (No. 9268). The Tribe was not a party to the proceedings in the New Mexico courts and
had no chance to shape the record. “Cotton made no effort at trial to prove the impact its state
tax burden had on the Tribe. Cotton did not seriously challenge the trial court’s findings of fact
that there was no such impact.” Id. Cotton relied heavily on an Interstate Commerce Clause
argument rather than a preemption argument.
New Mexico opposed the filing of the Tribe’s amicus brief before the Supreme Court.
The [Tribe’s] accusation . . . that New Mexico discriminates against the tribe in
the distribution of state education funds is incorrect and appears to be an effort to
inflame the Court. It was the fear of this type of misrepresentation of fact—not tested
by cross-examination and not a part of the record in this case because the tribe chose
not to be a party—that motivated New Mexico not to consent to the tribe’s filing
[an amicus brief ].
Brief of Appellee State of New Mexico at 31 n.37, Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No.
87-1327), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 160, at *56 n.37 [hereinafter Brief of Appellee State
of New Mexico]. The State argued that the taxes imposed no burden. Id. at *7.
At trial, Cotton called the President of the Tribe as a witness, who testified that he did not
object to the State’s taxation of Cotton and did not suggest that the New Mexico tax hindered
economic development or the Tribe’s ability to raise taxes. Id. at *9–10. His only concern was
that the State was not providing enough expenditures on the reservation. Id. Why Cotton
wanted that testimony is unclear and proved detrimental to its case. Presumably, the Tribe
hoped that New Mexico would have to increase the level of its services on the reservation if it
won the case. New Mexico used the testimony of the Tribal President to cast dispersions on
why the Tribe did not seek to intervene in the case. Id.
The testimony by the President of the Tribe was not only unhelpful to Cotton but also
troubled the Supreme Court. At oral argument, the following exchange took place:
Cotton: Yes. The tribal chairman testified in the trial. He focused on—that the imbalance between the substantial taxes imposed by New Mexico and the lack of services.
And he said if you’re going to tax at this level, let’s have some significantly greater
services. . . .
QUESTION: Yes, but it doesn’t—it didn’t—it didn’t—the tribe doesn’t claim that
their self-government or their economy is being hurt by New Mexico’s tax.
Cotton: Well, the amicus brief of the tribe says it has a chilling effect. It said that
because of these overlapping taxes—this is page 1 and page 2 of the amicus brief. It
said we are having . . . it’s complicating and making more difficult new—new oil and
gas deals. It also says on page 2 that it’s . . . it’s taking away from the attractiveness of
oil and gas deals on the reservation, and it’s increasing the expenses of doing business
for—not only for present operators of the tribe, but future operators.
QUESTION: Do I understand correctly that from now on—I mean, after this thing
arose—the tribe took the position that it would be a partner in any oil and gas deals
and thereby preclude the state from having any taxes on it? Is that right? Is that what’s
happening now?
Cotton: No. And there’s a suggestion by the New Mexico brief. It is simply incorrect.
And I think your question, Justice O’Connor, is very relevant.
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c. State Taxes are Presumptively Valid
Justice Stevens, writing for a six-person majority, set forth the analytical
framework as follows:
This Court’s approach to the question whether a State may tax on-reservation oil production by non-Indian lessees has varied over the course of
the past century. At one time, such a tax was held invalid unless expressly
authorized by Congress; more recently, such taxes have been upheld unless
expressly or impliedly prohibited by Congress.1152

Justice Stevens cited no Indian tax cases in support of this position.
Instead of citing any Indian tax cases, Stevens relied on the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine for support.1153 During the early part of the
20th century this doctrine prohibited state taxes that imposed direct or indirect economic burdens on the federal government or its instrumentalities.1154
At one time, the Indians fell within this doctrine, being viewed as “wards”
of the federal government. For example, in 1922, Gillespie v. Oklahoma1155
applied the doctrine to strike down a state tax on income derived by a nonIndian lessee from the sale of his interest in oil produced on Indian land. “[A]
tax upon such profits is a direct hamper upon the effort of the United States
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1140, at *4–5, Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No.
87-1327).
1152
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 173.
1153
Id. at 173–76. That doctrine did not figure prominently in the briefs of Cotton or New
Mexico. Brief of Appellants Cotton Petroleum Corp., Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No.
87-1327), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 159; Brief of Appellees State of New Mexico, supra
note 1137.
1154
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 174–75. The doctrine still prohibits a state tax directly
imposed on the federal government or on an Indian tribe. For example, a sales tax imposed
directly on the federal government would be unconstitutional, notwithstanding that a sales tax
imposed on the vendor would be constitutional even if the economic incidence of the tax fell
on the government. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4. Wheat.) 316 (1819); South Carolina
v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 523 (1988). The same analysis would result if a tribe were substituted
for the federal government. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 768 (1985). See supra
note 357. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995), discussed
infra notes 1272–89 and accompanying text, and Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation,
546 U.S. 95 (2003), discussed infra notes 1290–1358 and accompanying text, are consistent
with this approach.
1155
257 U.S. 501, 506 (1922) (cited by Justice Stevens in Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at
174); see also United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 (1903) (applying federal instrumentality
doctrine to strike down state taxes on land held in trust by the United States for Indians, and
improvements on such land, and state taxes on personal property bought with government
money for the use and benefit of the Indians).
To tax [allotted] lands is to tax an instrumentality employed by the United States
for the benefit and control of this dependent race, and to accomplish beneficent
objects . . . . [I]f they may be taxed, then the obligations which the government has
assumed in reference to these Indians may be entirely defeated.
Rickert, 188 U.S. at 437–38.
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to make the best terms that it can for its wards.”1156
During the Great Depression, however, the Court started relaxing this
doctrine so that the states had greater flexibility to tax the increased involvement of the federal government in the economy.1157 In 1938, Gillespie was
squarely overruled by Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp.1158 By World
War II, when the states were taxing private-sector contractors working for the
federal government, sometimes under cost-plus contracts, the doctrine was
“thoroughly repudiated.”1159
Thus, after Mountain Producers was decided, oil and gas lessees operating
on Indian reservations were subject to nondiscriminatory state taxation as
long as Congress did not act affirmatively to pre-empt the state taxes . . . .
[A] state can impose a nondiscriminatory tax on private parties with
whom . . . an Indian tribe does business, even though the financial burden
of the tax may fall on the . . . tribe. . . .1160
The question for us to decide is whether Congress has acted to grant the
Tribe such immunity, either expressly or by plain implication.1161

d. Misuse of the Intergovernmental Doctrine
There is a gaping non sequitur in Justice Stevens’s use of the intergovernmental immunity doctrine. That doctrine (and its repudiation) has nothing to do
with whether a state has the right to levy a tax in the first instance. In other
words, the intergovernmental doctrine was applied defensively to exempt
Indians (or federal instrumentalities) from an otherwise legitimate state tax.
Its repudiation simply meant no exemption existed under that doctrine. A tax
that is otherwise permissible will not run afoul of the now defunct intergovernmental doctrine, but that tax must still be permissible in the first instance.
Nonetheless, Stevens proceeded as if the New Mexico taxes were valid unless
preempted.
e. No Federal Preemption
Justice Stevens described the inquiry into whether any federal legislation had
preempted the New Mexico tax as primarily an exercise in examining Congressional intent, with the history of tribal sovereignty serving as the necessary
1156
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 174 (citing Weston v. Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449,
468 (1829)). In Choctaw, Oklahoma & Gulf Railroad Co. v. Harrison, 235 U.S. 292, 298
(1914), the Court characterized a non-Indian mineral lessee as a federal instrumentality free of
state tax. But see Thomas v. Gay, supra notes 354–75 and accompanying text.
1157
See supra notes 865–68 and accompanying text.
1158
303 U.S. 376, 386–87 (1938). See Barsh, Reservation Wealth, supra note 5, at 562.
1159
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 174 (quoting South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. at 520).
1160
Id. at 175. In its reply brief, Cotton agreed that the federal government immunity argument “does not carry the day.” Reply Brief of Appellants Cotton Petroleum Corp., supra note
1141, at *14.
1161
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 175–76.
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backdrop.1162 He paid homage to White Mountain (preemption is not controlled by mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty)1163
and Ramah (each case requires a particularized examination of the relevant
state, federal, and tribal interests), and acknowledged that although congressional silence no longer entails an immunity from taxation for private parties doing business with the tribes, preemption is not limited to cases where
Congress expressly, rather than impliedly, preempts the state tax.1164 Finally,
he repeated the maxim that ambiguities in federal law are generally resolved
in favor of tribal independence.1165 Any hope that the New Mexico tax would
be preempted by the application of these doctrines would soon be dashed.
Justice Stevens’s assertion that non-Indians were subject to nondiscriminatory state taxation—provided Congress did not act affirmatively to preempt the
tax—assumes that a state has, in the first instance, the power to levy a tax.
Justice Stevens does not explain the source of that power. In that sense, the
opinion is consistent with Moe and Colville, which also assumed, without
discussion, that the states had the power to tax cigarette sales to non-members
and non-Indians on the reservation. Those cases could be read narrowly to
apply only to tax avoidance situations, the “marketing of an exemption.” But
Stevens had no desire to limit Colville.
The Court assumed that New Mexico had the power to tax and then placed
the burden on Cotton to show whether Congress had exempted the Tribe,
“either expressly or by plain implication.”1166 Justice Stevens made it clear
that the Court would no longer require an explicit federal authorization of

1162
Id. at 176. Cotton’s Reply Brief argued that the “field of Indian affairs is one of a very
limited number of subject areas where the ‘federal interest is so dominant’ that congressional intent to preempt the field can be assumed.” Reply Brief of Appellants Cotton Petroleum
Corp., supra note 1141, at *20. The Tribe’s amicus brief argued that

Congress has attempted to strengthen and promote the ability of tribes to manage
their territory and natural resources and to undertake economic activity within their
reservations that will permit them to function as viable governments. In light of these
overriding federal goals . . . an assertion of State authority must be viewed against any
interference with the successful accomplishment of the federal purpose.
Brief of Jicarilla Apache Tribe as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellants, supra note 1140,
at *9. The Tribe characterized the New Mexico Court of Appeals decision as requiring that the
State taxes actually reduce Tribal revenue as a precondition to a preemption argument. “This
Court has never incorporated this mechanical condition into the preemption analysis.” Id., at
*14.
1163
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 176.
1164
Id. at 176–77.
1165
Stevens “talked the talk” although he would not “walk the walk.”
1166
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 175–76.
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a state tax.1167 He ignored the Indian Commerce Clause and the Williams v.
Lee doctrine.
Much of the opinion then focused on Cotton’s argument that the New
Mexico taxes were preempted1168 by federal laws and policies which protect
tribal self-government and strengthen impoverished reservations. Cotton
relied heavily on the 1938 Act, describing it as “exhibit[ing] a strong federal
interest in guaranteeing Indian tribes the maximum return on their oil and
gas leases,”1169 and that the federal and tribal governments “exercise comprehensive regulatory control over the reservation.”1170 “[W]eighing the respective state, federal, and tribal interests, Cotton concludes that the New Mexico
taxes unduly interfere with the federal interest in promoting tribal economic
self-sufficiency and are not justified by an adequate state interest.”1171
Justice Stevens rejected these arguments. He concluded the 1938 Act
“neither expressly permit[ted] state taxation nor expressly preclud[ed] it”1172
but was consistent with “an intent to permit state taxation of nonmember
lessees.”1173 The Court also held that the Indian Reorganization Act, the
Indian Financing Act, and the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act of 1975 did not preempt the New Mexico tax.1174
f. Rejection of White Mountain and Ramah
In response to Cotton’s argument that White Mountain and Ramah preempted
the New Mexico taxes, the Court first noted that both cases emphasized that
1167

[T]hese assumptions turn the original understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause
on its head and takes federal Indian law back to the confederation period when states
continued to assert claims of inherent sovereignty in Indian country to detriment of
both the exercise of federal Indian affairs powers and the tribes.
Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1218.
1168
Cotton had not pressed the preemption argument as an independent claim before the
New Mexico Court of Appeals, but the Supreme Court nonetheless treated the issue as properly before it. The issue was addressed by the Tribe’s amicus brief at the Court of Appeals.
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 176 n.11. See supra notes 1146–48 and accompanying text.
1169
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 177.
1170
Id.
1171
Id.
1172
Id.
1173
Id. at 183. Justice Stevens’s interpretation is well criticized in Taylor, Framework, supra
note 23, at 871–72. Taken out of context, the statement in the text could be read to mean that
state permission to tax was required, but Stevens assumed that New Mexico had that right and
the only issue was whether Congress had preempted the state taxes.
1174
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 183 n.14. Professor Jensen describes Cotton as “[p]erhaps
the most important modern preemption case,” and “sometimes characterized as the death
of preemption.” Jensen, supra note 9, at 74. “At a minimum, Cotton reflected a Court much
less supportive of tribal interests than had been true only seven or eight years earlier.” Id.
He concludes that after Cotton, “statutes that support the idea of tribal self-determination in
general—the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, for example—are apparently irrelevant in
the ‘particularized’ analysis. They are ignored in balancing.” Id. at 75. I think the die had been
cast before Cotton.
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the test is a flexible one, sensitive to the state, federal, and tribal interests,
and then relied on the findings of the New Mexico District Court to distinguish those cases. That court found that the State provided services to both
the Tribe and Cotton costing approximately $3 million per year.1175 Cotton
conceded that over a four-year period, New Mexico provided it with services
costing nearly $90,000 but then compared this with the more than $2.2 million in paid taxes.1176 Justice Stevens correctly rejected Cotton’s “proportionality” standard, which was not endorsed by either White Mountain or Ramah
(or any non-Indian case),1177 describing both cases as involving “complete
abdication or noninvolvement of the State in the on-reservation activity.”1178
Stevens did not opine on what minimum amount of State services would
be necessary before a taxpayer’s proportionate argument would be rejected.
That is, if a state provided no services, a taxpayer can argue that it should
not be required to pay a tax. That position goes back to Warren Trading1179
1175
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 185. The Court did not identify the nature of those services. Pirtle, Morisset, Schlosser and Ayer emphasize that there was no indication that these
benefits were related to the on-reservation activity New Mexico sought to tax. Pirtle, et al.,
supra note 19. Their comments ignore the $90,000 in services that Cotton admitted were
provided to it. See infra note 1176 and accompanying text.
1176
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 170 n.6, 185. In its brief, the State argued that

New Mexico provides substantial services to both the Jicarilla Tribe and Cotton.
The amount of direct state expenditures on the reservation is approximately $3 million per year. The state also provides the benefits of living in an organized society to
Cotton and the tribe. The state per capita spending per Jicarilla member is equal to or
greater than the per capita spending on non-Indian citizens. The state’s expenditures
do not discriminate against the Jicarilla Reservation or its members. The state, the
tribe and the federal government all provide services on the Jicarilla Reservation. The
state provides services on the reservation that substantially benefit the reservation.
Jicarilla Apaches use many services provided by the state off the reservation.
Brief of Appellees State of New Mexico, supra note 1137, at *7–8,
1177
In Ramah, the Court dismissed the State’s argument “that the significant services it provides to the Ramah Navajo Indians justify the imposition of [its] tax” on the grounds that the
benefits were unrelated “to the construction of schools on Indian land.” Ramah Navajo Sch.
Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 845 n.10 (1982).
1178
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 185. In Ute Mountain Tribe v. Homans, No. 07-CV-00772
(D. N.M. 2009), the court struck down New Mexico’s taxes on oil and gas extraction.
This case falls much closer to Bracker and Ramah than to Cotton Petroleum. First,
there is a significant backdrop of tribal sovereignty. Second, although the State of
New Mexico is not absolutely uninvolved in oil and gas operations on the New
Mexico lands, its involvement is minimal. Third, the economic burden falls heavily
on the Tribe. Fourth, to the extent that State of New Mexico regulations are adopted
by the [Bureau of Land Management, it] does so far its own purposes; it cannot be
said that the State of New Mexico in fact regulates oil and gas operations on the New
Mexico lands.
Id.

1179
Warren Trading Post v. Arizona, 380 U.S. 685, 691. One of the earliest versions of this
argument can be found in Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898), discussed supra notes 373–74
and accompanying text.
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and is what Stevens referred to as a “complete abdication or noninvolvement
of the State in the on-reservation activity.”1180 But what if a state provided
more than a de minimis amount of services but nonetheless relatively insignificant? Presumably the taxpayer’s argument would still be rejected to avoid
entertaining “nightmarish administrative burdens.”1181 Moreover, Justice Stevens properly understood that a proportionality argument was “antithetical
to the traditional notion that taxation is not premised on a strict quid pro
quo relationship between the taxpayer and the tax collector.”1182 Nonetheless,
the conundrum is that in the kind of preemption and balancing approaches
the Court has developed, comparing the amount of taxes with the amount of
services could be relevant.
Justice Stevens also distinguished White Mountain and Ramah by citing the
District Court’s finding that unlike in those cases, here the economic burden
of the State tax did not fall on the Tribe.1183 Marshall had muddied this issue
previously.1184 But economic incidence is such a tricky empirical question,
and one that can change over time, even for the same taxpayer, that it is a
meaningless issue to drive the analysis in most cases.
Nevertheless, one can appreciate Stevens’s reaction that if the New Mexico taxes have no economic impact on the Tribe, why should they be struck
down? Stevens presumably was encouraged in this view by the finding of the
District Court that the Tribe could have increased its taxes without adversely
affecting on-reservation production.1185
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 185.
Id. at 185 n.15.
1182
Id.
1180
1181

The only benefit to which the taxpayer is constitutionally entitled is that derived
from his enjoyment of the privileges of living in an organized society, established
and safeguarded by devotion of taxes to public purposes . . . . Any other view would
preclude the levying of taxes except as they are used to compensate for the burdens on
those who pay them, and would involve the abandonment of the most fundamental
principle of government—that it exists primarily to provide for the common good.
Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 522–23 (1937). Determining the value and
benefits of roads, police, fire, a legal infrastructure, and so forth illustrates the wisdom of the
Court’s approach. See also Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981); supra
notes 462–63, 804–05 and accompanying text.
1183
The New Mexico Court of Appeals used the fact that the Tribe participated in the litigation, not as a party, but as an amicus, as evidence that the State taxes did not directly interfere
with the Tribe. Cotton Petroleum, 745 P.2d at 1171. The Supreme Court cited the large number
of amicus briefs filed by oil and gas companies (e.g., Texaco, Chevron, Union Oil, Phillips
Petroleum, Exxon, and Mobil) as evidence that “the primary burden of the state taxation falls
on the non-Indian taxpayers,” Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 187 n.18. This “evidence” is
rather silly; whatever the economic incidence of the multiple taxes in Cotton, the oil industry
certainly wanted to avoid similar situations in other states.
1184
See supra notes 952–57 and accompanying text.
1185
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 185. The New Mexico Court of Appeals concluded that
Cotton “failed to show that the [State taxes] significantly interfered with the Tribe’s economic
development or sovereignty.” Brief for Appellants Cotton Petroleum Corp., supra note 1153,
at *19–20.
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Finally, he noted that New Mexico regulated the spacing and mechanical integrity of reservation wells,1186 and that the State regulations had to be
approved by the Bureau of Land Management. Additional federal spacing
requirements applied to Indian lands.1187 The record was thin on what New
Mexico actually did but the Court did not set the bar very high and concluded that “the federal and tribal regulations [although] extensive . . . are
not exclusive.”1188
New Mexico also argued that there was no agreement in this case, as there was in White
Mountain, Central Machinery, and Ramah, to refund this tax to the tribe. “This tax refund
would go right back to the oil company and any future savings, if the Court struck the tax
down, would go to the oil company.” Transcript of Oral Argument, Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S.
163 (No. 87-1327), 1988 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 114, at *22.
Professor Taylor states that
[b]y allowing New Mexico to impose its severance tax on top of the tribal severance
tax, oil and gas produced on the Jicarilla Apache reservation were among the most
heavily taxed products. This, of course, reduced future drilling and encouraged drilling on lands just outside the reservation where production was less heavily taxed. As
a result, much of the natural resources underneath tribal lands were taken away from
the Tribe. This in turn reduced royalty and tax revenue. These economic effects have
taken their toll on the Jicarilla Apache Tribe.
Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 890. His support for this empirical conclusion was a
general citation to Mark J. Cowan, Double Taxation in Indian Country: Unpacking the Problem
and Analyzing the Role of the Federal Government in Protecting Tribal Governmental Revenues, 2
Pitt. Tax Rev. 93 (2005), with no specific page reference.
1186
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 186. Cotton’s reply brief described the United States,
the Tribe, and New Mexico as coordinating well spacing on a volunteer basis. Reply Brief for
Appellants Cotton Petroleum Corp., Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 1988
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 163, at *13 n.12. The Tribe’s amicus brief pointed out that New
Mexico’s role in regulating well spacing is governed by a federal requirement that state well
spacing programs may be applied to Indian lands only with the approval of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs. Brief of Jicarilla Apache Tribe as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellants,
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 158, at *19
n.18. The Court of Appeals did not determine the cost to the State of providing that service.
Id. at *36.
1187
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 206 n.9.
1188
Id. at 186. Cotton’s brief claimed that “that during the past ten years not one of the
Cotton employees has ever seen a New Mexico oil and gas supervisor or policy enforcement
officer on the Reservation to supervise drilling or to review oil and gas drilling operations.”
Brief of Appellants Cotton Petroleum Corp., Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327),
1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 159, at *21. Professor Jensen speculates that the “purported
state interest seemed to have been an afterthought, made up for purposes of litigation.” Jensen,
supra note 9, at 76. “In form the Court engaged in balancing, but the state interest given controlling weight seemed absurdly trivial. If pretending to regulate well spacing and the mechanical integrity of wells is enough to prevent preemption, a state is almost always going to prevail,
a marked change from prior practice.” Id. at 80. Professor Jensen, of course, captures the subjectiveness of a balancing test, which is one of the reasons Justice Rehnquist is so opposed to
that analysis. See Jensen, supra note 9; supra notes 719, 872, 883 and accompanying text.
Another commentator concluded that the New Mexico taxes should have been preempted.
Oil and gas development on the reservation was regulated by a comprehensive and
pervasive federal scheme that established important federal and tribal interests. Even
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4

01-Pomp.indd 1176

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=244384612/23/2010

11:04:02 AM

INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE AND STATE TAXATION

1177

g. Possible Role of Economic Incidence
Seemingly uncomfortable by the District Court’s somewhat counterintuitive
economic findings in a case in which the Tribe was not a party, Justice Stevens
issued a caveat. This was not “a case in which an unusually large state tax has
imposed a substantial burden on the Tribe.1189 It is, of course, reasonable to
infer that the New Mexico taxes have at least a marginal effect on the demand
for on-reservation leases, the value to the Tribe of those leases, and the ability of the Tribe to increase its tax rate. Any impairment to the federal policy
favoring the exploitation of on-reservation oil and gas resources by Indian
tribes that might be caused by these effects, however, is simply too indirect
and too insubstantial to support Cotton’s claim of preemption.1190 To find
pre-emption of state taxation in such indirect burdens on this broad congressional purpose, absent some special factor such as those present in White
Mountain and Ramah, would be to return to the pre-1937 doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity.1191 He did not identify what those special factors
were, but earlier he had cited the District Court’s findings that the economic
incidence of the taxes in those cases fell on the tribes. Stevens conceded that
any “adverse effect on the Tribe’s finances caused by the taxation of a private

in the absence of evidence of a direct economic impact on the Tribe, the state severance taxes interfered with federal policy and tribal sovereignty. Because the burden
of the state taxes was not justified both by a sufficient state interest in the limited oil
and gas related services that New Mexico provided to Cotton and by minimal state
regulation of reservation oil and gas activities, the Court should have held that the
state taxes were preempted by federal law.
Katherine B. Crawford, State Authority to Tax Non-Indian Oil and Gas Production on Reservations:
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 495, 515.
1189
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 186. This caveat allowed the Court to avoid reexamining
Montana v. Crow Tribe, 484 U.S. 997 (1988), summarily aff’g 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987).
That case held that Montana’s severance and gross proceeds taxes could not be imposed on coal
mined on Crow tribal property; state taxes had a negative effect on the marketability of coal
produced in Montana, and the combined effective rate of taxes was more than twice that of
any other state’s coal taxes. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 187 n.17; see also Hoopa Valley Tribe
v. Nevins, 881 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1989) (federal law preempted state tax on timber because
the timber tax did not fund services that directly related to the harvesting of tribal timber);
Marty Indian Sch. Bd., Inc. v. South Dakota, 824 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1987) (state motor fuels
tax could not be applied to fuel purchased by on-reservation boarding school; in light of the
strong federal policy of promoting Indian self-determination and education and the pervasive
involvement of the federal government in the operation of appellants’ school, there was no
room for the additional burden of the state’s tax).
1190
Surprisingly, Stevens did not cite Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898), where a similar
argument was made in 1898 in upholding a property tax levied by the Territory of Oklahoma
on cattle owned by non-Indians grazing on reservation land under leases with the Indians. See
supra notes 354–75 and accompanying text.
1191
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 186–87. The Court did not discuss the impact of its finding in Blackfeet that one of the purposes of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 was to provide the
Indians with the maximum amount of revenue from their property. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe
of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 767 n.5 (1985).
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party contracting with the Tribe would be ground to strike the state tax.”1192
This last statement, a bone thrown to the Indians, is contradicted by the
Court’s opinion in Moe and Colville, where the Tribes’ retail sector (Moe) and
its tax revenue and profits (Colville) were severely impacted by the “taxation
of a private party” purchasing cigarettes on the reservation. Nonetheless, Stevens’s “bone” allows future litigants to describe Cotton as a failure of proof
case.
The reference to the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, which did
not figure prominently in the briefs of either Cotton or New Mexico, is curious as well. A decision for Cotton would not be turning the clock back to that
doctrine but rather endorsing Worcester and the Indian Commerce Clause.1193
Neither the majority nor the dissent even bothered to mention Worcester, nor
did Cotton’s briefs. As further evidence of the desuetude of the Indian Commerce Clause, Cotton made the Interstate Commerce Clause the centerpiece
of its position.1194
Apparently Stevens did not want to federalize every situation in which a
state tax is levied on a non-Indian just because it may be passed forward
to a tribe.1195 Hopefully in the future, the Court will not sit idly by and
allow a state to destroy a tribe’s major—perhaps exclusive—source of revenue
through the imposition of a tax on a non-Indian. At some point, a substantial
enough—albeit indirect—tax will have sufficient negative spillover effects on
a tribe’s economic development to invalidate it. It is one thing for the state
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 187.
“Turning Chief Justice Marshall’s clear-statement approach almost completely on its
head, the Court in Cotton Petroleum . . . concluded that the state could tax because Congress
had failed to prohibit it from exercising that power.” Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 199, at
422.
1194
Cotton did not argue that the Indian Commerce Clause excluded the New Mexico taxes.
“An unresolved question surrounding the preemption of state taxes need not be examined in
this appeal, namely whether in the absence of express congressional enactment, the Indian
Commerce Clause of its own weight protects the tribes from intrusive state regulation.” Brief
of Appellants Cotton Petroleum Corp., Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 1988
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 159, at *47 n.19. The Court as recently as Ramah Navajo School
Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. at 845–46, has declined to adopt a constitutional
doctrine that on-reservation activities are presumptively beyond the reach of state law even
in the absence of comprehensive federal regulation. Id. While not eliminating this approach,
the Court indicated its continuing satisfaction with relying on the presence of federal statutory and regulatory pronouncements, although it acknowledged that they are to be construed
“generously” in order to comport with traditional notions of Indian sovereignty and with
the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence. Id. at 846 (quoting White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980)). Brief of Cotton Petroleum, Corp., supra,
at *47 n.19.
The Tribe’s amicus brief argued that the Indian Commerce Clause prohibited undue burdens on Indian commerce, and required that New Mexico grant a credit against its taxes for
any functionally equivalent tribal taxes. Brief of Jicarilla Apache Tribe as Amicus Curiae in
Support of the Appellants, Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 1988 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs Lexis 158, at *48.
1195
See Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005).
1192
1193
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taxes in Moe and Colville to have virtually destroyed the on-reservation cigarette business, which the Court viewed as illegitimate.1196 It is quite another
thing for a tax to dry up a legitimate on-reservation business. Cotton can be
viewed as an idiosyncratic situation where the tribe was not a party to the
litigation at the trial level and thus could not shape the record.1197 Cotton
shaped the record consistent with its litigating posture. The Tribe was forced
to make its case through its amicus briefs and not through expert witnesses1198
1196
In its brief, Cotton Petroleum tried to distinguish Moe as “having no real reservation
connection and hence not truly a part of protected Indian commerce.” Brief of Appellants
Cotton Petroleum Corp., Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 1988 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 159, at *30.

Colville acknowledged that both tribal and state taxes may be imposed on Reservation
cigarette sales, the case is of no help to New Mexico, because in Colville, the Court
found no federally protected Indian commerce subject to multiple taxation. To the
contrary, Colville involved an attempt to obtain a competitive advantage on the
Reservation through the marketing of an alleged Reservation exemption from state
taxes imposed on the sale of cigarettes. Similarly while Merrion upheld tribal taxation and acknowledged overlapping state taxation, it is the very case where the Court
suggested that Cotton and other Jicarilla lessees may indeed not have to pay an ever
increasing penalty for electing to do business on the Reservation, and that a claim
of impermissible multiple taxation might be asserted against New Mexico, if New
Mexico’s responsibilities for Reservation mineral development were out of proportion
to its unabated imposition of five general statewide oil and gas taxes.
Id. at *22 n.21.
1197
The Tribe may have made a litigating decision not to intervene because it did not
have the best of evidence about the impact of the State taxes. As reported in the State’s Brief,
“[t]he fortuitous timing of the tribe’s own actions proved conclusively that the combined state
and federal tax load did not affect the tribe’s ability to raise the level of tax revenue it desired.”
Brief for Appellees State of New Mexico, Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 1988
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 160, at *27–29. In 1984,
the Tribe commissioned a study from Professor Alfred Parker, Chairman of the
Economic Department of the University of New Mexico, to determine its taxing
options. Dr. Parker’s study of revenue projections revealed that a tribal tax of either
three percent or six percent would have no appreciable impact on the mineral lessees and would not slow development or production. . . . The tribe knew from Dr.
Parker’s study that it could impose a tax of at least six percent, and perhaps considerably higher . . . . In the face of these facts, Cotton was unable to offer even a shred of
evidence that New Mexico’s taxes impeded collection of Jicarilla taxes or any other
aspect of tribal sovereignty.
Id. New Mexico accused the Tribe of purposely choosing not to be a party to the litigation but
instead participating as an amicus. Id. at *29 n.14.
1198
New Mexico had an expert witness who testified that “the substantial profits resulting
from oil extraction rendered taxes an insignificant factor in production decisions for oil companies.” Id. at *25.
The significant factors, he testified, were geology, access to markets, costs of drilling
and pumping, and government regulation. Pressed under cross-examination to agree
that state taxes are a factor, [the expert] was presented an unrealistic hypothetical
situation in which a producer has the opportunity to drill two equally lucrative wells,
one on the Jicarilla Reservation and one off, but only enough money to drill one well.
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or other trial testimony, and so could not rebut directly the District Court’s
findings.1199
Asked which well would be drilled [the expert] testified: My best judgment is that he
is going to drill both wells . . . . I think he will go to a banker and get enough money
to drill a second well too . . . . If the one well looks attractive and the other one is
going to be associated with a tax of five to six percent more, it is going to be more
attractive too; you can take that prospect to any banker and he will finance you. . . .
Cotton’s actual behavior confirmed this expert’s conclusion. The combined burdens
of federal, state and tribal taxes did not lessen Cotton’s interest in further developing
its reservation oil leases. [The production manager for Cotton] testified that Cotton
planned to drill 12 new wells in that year (1986)—the third highest annual increase
during its ten years on the reservation . . . . As a factual matter, no impact on tribal
economic development was shown.
Id. at *25–27.
1199
The New Mexico Court of Appeals understood that “[t]his appeal is unique in that the
primary parties differ sharply as to the proper legal approach to apply.” Cotton Petroleum
v. New Mexico, 745 P.2d 1170, 1172 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987). Cotton made a rather weak
Interstate Commerce Clause argument, inconsistent with Commonwealth Edison. It never
pushed the preemption argument. The Tribe asked the Supreme Court to dismiss Cotton’s
appeal for this reason:
Given this decision not to pursue a separate preemption claim, Cotton did not make
the effort at trial to prove any impact its state tax burden had on the Jicarilla Apache
Tribe. Neither did Cotton seriously challenge on appeal the trial court’s findings of
fact that there was no such impact. Id. at 1174; Jurisdictional Statement at App. 10 to
App. 11. Certainly, Cotton made no effort to analyze the impact on the Tribe caused
by state taxes on other producers on the reservation. The Tribe was not a party to this
litigation, and had no opportunity to establish the factual record that Cotton chose
not to develop on this critical point.
As long as Cotton relied on the preemption theory only as a “backdrop” to its
Commerce Clause argument and did not assert preemption as an independent basis
for its claim, the Tribe perceived no serious danger in Cotton’s limited trial record.
Now, however, Cotton has attempted to assert the preemption theory as an independent basis for its appeal to this Court. The Tribe therefore must oppose Cotton’s
appeal.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals took Cotton at its word and treated the
Commerce Clause theory as the real basis for the refund claim. The court therefore devoted most of its opinion to the consideration of Cotton’s argument that the
Commerce Clause requires a dollar for dollar equivalence between state taxes and
state expenditures on the reservation. The court briefly discussed the preemption
doctrine only because it felt “constrained” to do so in light of this Court’s criticism of
the New Mexico court in Ramah Navajo School Board v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S.
832, 846 (1982). While necessarily quite brief given Cotton’s litigation strategy, the
court of appeals’ discussion of preemption neither misstated the law nor misapplied it
to the facts in the appellate record. . . . The court of appeals concluded that the factual
record before it did not show any interference with the relevant federal policies. This
Tribe as amicus had urged the court to reach a contrary conclusion.
Nonetheless, the New Mexico Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for deciding
this case on the appellate record before it. Even though the Tribe vigorously rejects
the proposition that New Mexico’s taxes on oil and gas production reservation-wide
have no negative impact on the Tribe, in this litigation Cotton did not attempt to
prove the nature or full extent of those impacts. Instead, Cotton focused on its own
production and its own Commerce Clause theory, rather than federal preemption.
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h. Apportionment Not Required
Cotton argued that the Interstate Commerce Clause required that the New
Mexico severance taxes had to be apportioned.1200 Cotton relied on three
Cotton chose not to develop fully the factual record necessary to evaluate a preemption claim, and chose not to make the legal arguments in the state courts to support an independent claim based on federal preemption. Having made these strategic
choices below, Cotton should not be permitted to assert the preemption theory now.
On the record of this case, there is no substantial federal question concerning the
special preemption doctrine applicable in Indian reservation matters. The trial court’s
findings of fact support the conclusion stated by the New Mexico Court of Appeals
in its brief discussion of the preemption doctrine.
The Tribe agrees with Cotton Petroleum that the question whether states may tax
mineral production on Indian reservations is a very substantial and important issue
for the Indian tribes, the states and the mineral producers, especially in the West.
Precisely because it is such an important issue, this Court should not attempt to
address it on the inadequate and limited factual record presented by Cotton Petroleum
concerning its own economic situation. This is particularly true because Cotton did
not pursue the preemption theory below as an independent basis for its refund claim.
A case such as Cotton’s, which used the preemption doctrine only as a “backdrop” to
a very different legal theory under the Commerce Clause, is not the proper vehicle
for deciding the significant issues raised by application of the federal preemption
doctrine to state taxation of mineral production throughout the reservation.
Brief of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to the Appellants, Cotton
Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (87-1327), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 146, at *3–7. See also supra
notes 1140, 1199. Because of the peculiar procedural posture of the case, Cotton Petroleum
may not have strong precedential value.
One commentator asserts without citation that because of the dual state and tribal taxation,
“[m]ost tribes have experienced a definite and substantial impact, both in terms of continuing
production form marginal wells and in attracting new production.” Jeanne S. Whiteing, Tribal
and State Taxation of Natural Resources on Indian Reservations, 7 Nat. Resources & Env’t L.
Rev. 17, 59 (1993). The multiple taxation of activities on a reservation with no relief granted
by a state (or federal government) is part of what is called the “Indian differential,” which
includes the lack of an infrastructure. Michael J. Kurman, Indian Investment and Employment
Tax Incentives: Building a New Highway to Indian Country for Private Sector Businesses and Jobs,
41 Fed. B. News & J. 578, 583 (1994).
Another commentator also asserts without citation that “[m]ineral developers, for example,
could afford to pay either a tribal or a state severance tax, but they would not develop Indian
land if forced to pay both.” Robert S. Pelcyger, Justices and Indians: Back to Basics, 62 Or. L.
Rev. 29, 33 (1983).
Professor Frickey considered Cotton to be the “Rehnquist Court’s prime offender of the
Marshall legacy. [T]his case expressed the general proposition, completely contrary to Worcester,
that an Indian reservation is within the territorial jurisdiction of three sovereigns: the state, the
tribe, and the federal government.” Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism,
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 381, 433-34
(1993).
1200
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 187–88. When the Court initially granted review, it
requested the parties to address the question whether “the Tribe should be treated as a State
[under the Commerce Clause] for the purpose of determining whether New Mexico’s taxes
must be apportioned.” Id. at 191. Professor Clinton thinks the Court was almost unaware of
the existence of the Indian Commerce Clause. “Given the post-McClanahan efforts of certain
members of the Court to limit or take the dormant Indian Commerce Clause completely out
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facts: (1) the State and the Tribe taxed the same activity; (2) the total tax
burden on Cotton was higher than on its off-reservation competitors; and
(3) the New Mexico tax far exceeded the value of services it provided on the
reservation.1201
This was less of an argument and more of a description. The first point
was obviously just a description of the facts, and the second point is the consequence of having two severance taxes apply on the reservation rather than
only one severance tax applying off-reservation. The third point, in essence,
was a repackaging of Cotton’s rejected “proportionality” argument. In short,
Cotton gave the Court little to work with, and Stevens was not about to take
up the taxpayer’s cause on his own.
Cotton’s apportionment argument under the Interstate Commerce
Clause1202 faced a severe, and determinative obstacle. Severance taxes are not
normally apportioned.1203 Unlike a corporate income tax, which uses apportionment rules to mediate conflicting claims by states to taxing the same
transaction,1204 the simultaneous imposition of two state severance taxes does
not arise in a multistate context. The act of bringing oil or gas to the surface
is a unique event that can occur only within one state; the same oil or gas
cannot be severed simultaneously in two states. In Cotton, the severance took
place entirely on the reservation and entirely within New Mexico. The case
involved overlapping jurisdictions, not adjacent ones.
Consequently, Cotton had no relevant precedent to rely on. Because the
severance occurred solely in New Mexico, no other state would have a credof play in the analysis of state power in Indian affairs, such apparent ignorance of the dormant
Indian Commerce Clause perhaps is not surprising.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at
1219. The Court, however, distinguished the Indian Commerce Clause from the Interstate
Commerce Clause, which belies Professor Clinton’s suggestion. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S.
at 192.
Professor Clinton views Cotton Petroleum as overturning “two centuries of prior law by
authoritatively rejecting any claim that the dormant Indian Commerce Clause doctrine limited
state governmental action in Indian country.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1057–58.
Professor Clinton, however, classifies cases as involving the Indian Commerce Clause even if
they do not mention that provision, provided their results are consistent with that Clause. He
believes that in many cases, like Williams v. Lee, “the Court often relied on analyses that clearly
resonated in the Indian Commerce Clause, albeit without attribution.” Id. at 1186. The problem with this generous classification is that any case in which a state tax is struck down can be
characterized as consistent with the Indian Commerce Clause.
1201
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 188. Cotton argued that one reason New Mexico’s level
of services was so low was that the State constitution “prohibits state aid to any community
like a federal Indian reservation which is ‘not under the absolute control of the state.’” Brief
of Appellants Cotton Petroleum Corp., Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 1988
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 159, at *31 n.6. The relevance of this observation is unclear.
1202
According to the State’s Brief, Cotton and several of its amici intermixed references to
the Interstate Commerce Clause, the Indian Commerce Clause, and the Foreign Commerce
Clause. Brief of Appellees State of New Mexico, Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327),
1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 160, at *60.
1203
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617 (1981).
1204
See Richard D. Pomp, State and Local Taxation, ch. 10 (6th ed. 2009).
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ible claim that the same severance took place within their borders. Unlike
a corporate income tax, which commonly apportions the income of a multijurisdictional taxpayer to the states in which the activities generating the
income take place,1205 severance taxes are not apportioned because there are
no competing states asserting tax jurisdiction on the same activity. The relevant analogy in Cotton would be if a city or county also had a severance tax
in addition to a state tax, but that intrastate situation would not implicate the
Interstate Commerce Clause.
Moreover, the apportionment issue had already been resolved in Commonwealth Edison just eight years earlier and was cited by the State in its brief.1206
In Edison, the Court held that there was no question about apportionment
or potential multiple taxation because the severance could occur in only one
state.1207 Cotton was in the awkward posture of making an Interstate Commerce Clause apportionment argument that had been recently rejected in a
case authored by Justice Marshall, who was still on the Court.1208
Justice Stevens noted that because the federal government had not prohibited either the Tribal or the New Mexico severance tax, each jurisdiction
had the right to tax.1209 Although Stevens made this statement in the context
of Cotton’s Interstate Commerce Clause argument, it is consistent with the
framework he set forth at the beginning of the opinion when he asserted that
New Mexico could levy a nondiscriminatory tax on activities on the reservation provided Congress did not act affirmatively to preempt the tax.1210
The Court acknowledged (as it had to) that on-reservation activities bore
a higher tax than off-reservation activities, but that result was acceptable
because neither jurisdiction was imposing a discriminatory tax.1211 Cotton
was simply conducting activities that simultaneously fell within two jurisdictions, which triggered two taxes. Neither jurisdiction could be blamed for the
higher tax.1212 The higher burden was merely the adventitious consequence of
the Tribe and New Mexico sharing jurisdiction. And because of the unique
nature of severance taxes, there was no interstate precedent mandating a different analysis.1213
Id.
Brief of Appellees State of New Mexico, Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327),
1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 159, at *61 n.39.
1207
Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 617.
1208
Justice Marshall dissented in Cotton but not on the apportionment issue.
1209
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 189.
1210
Id. at 175.
1211
Id. at 189.
1212
Using more modern concepts, each severance tax would be described as internally and
externally consistent. See, e.g., Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159,
169–70 (1983).
1213
A leading treatise suggests that if the Tribe was analogized to a foreign country, the Court
might have invalidated the state taxes under Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434
(1979). Japan Line added two additional tests to Complete Auto’s four tests if foreign commerce
were involved. One test would strike down a tax if it created a substantial risk of multiple taxation. Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 7, at 274. There are three problems with this suggestion.
1205
1206
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i. Relationship of Taxation and Services
The Court described Cotton’s “most persuasive” argument to be based on
evidence that tax payments by reservation lessees far exceeded the value of
services provided by the State to the lessees, or more generally, to the reservation as a whole.1214 This argument, presumably based on the fourth prong
of Complete Auto, was nothing more than the same argument based on the
Merrion footnote that was already rejected by the Court1215 and also rejected
in Commonwealth Edison.1216 Instead of relying on these grounds, however,
Justice Stevens provided two new ones.
First, “the relevant services provided by the State include those that are
available to the lessees and the members of the Tribe off the reservation as
well as on it. The intangible value of citizenship in an organized society is not
easily measured in dollars and cents . . . .”1217
This response should have been the end of this type of argument. But he
quickly added that “the District Court found that the actual per capita state
expenditures for Jicarilla members are equal to or greater than the per capita expenditures for non-Indian citizens.”1218 No information was provided
on how this calculation was performed.1219 Nor was its significance apparFirst, Japan Line seems to have been greatly narrowed by the Court, albeit in income tax cases.
See, e.g., Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994); Wardair Canada Inc., v.
Fla. Dept. of Rev., 477 U.S. 1 (1986); Container Corp., 463 U.S. 159 (1983); Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Vermont, 445 U.S. 425 (1980). Second, it seems too late in the day to treat the tribes as
foreign nations, and none of the reasons given in Japan Line for the increased vigilance of a
state tax on foreign taxpayers would apply to the tribes. Third, a severance tax defies traditional
notions of multiple taxation. For a more sympathetic treatment of the relevance of Japan Line,
however, see Lester J. Marston & David A. Fink, The Indian Commerce Clause: The Reports of Its
Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 16 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 205, 236–42 (1986).
1214
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 189.
1215
Id. at 169–170; see supra notes 1175–82 and accompanying text.
1216
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 645, 646 n.10 (1981), discussed
supra notes 1102–07 and accompanying text.
1217
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 189.
1218
Id. at 189–90. Cotton’s Reply Brief accused New Mexico of misleading the Court when
it suggested that the state public school contributions were greater on the reservation than off
the reservation. “The record shows, to the contrary, that New Mexico’s general fund contribution to the Jicarilla Reservation public schools equals less than one half of its statewide level of
support for public schools.” Reply Brief of Appellants Cotton Petroleum, supra note 1141, at
*5. Cotton described the State as providing no courts, parks, recreation facilities, water, sewage, fire, public health facilities or university facilities on the reservation. Id. at *6–7.
1219
Cotton’s Reply Brief claimed that New Mexico’s own expert agreed that the assertion
that State spending on a per capita tribal member basis was equal to its per capita spending for
non-Indians off the reservation was based on the erroneous assumption that services benefited
only the 1700 reservation Indians. In fact, the State services also benefited the off-reservation
residents passing through the reservation as well as a significant number of on-reservation residents who were not members of the Tribe. Cotton also accused the State of rewriting the record
when it claimed that the evidence showed that it spends approximately $3 million annually
in reservation services. In fact, the State’s expert agreed with Cotton that expenditures were
only $2 million. Id. at *5 n.3. If anything, this kind of back and forth quantitative bickering
indicates the wisdom of the courts not entertaining this type of analysis.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4

01-Pomp.indd 1184

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=244384612/23/2010

11:04:03 AM

INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE AND STATE TAXATION

1185

ent. Why was a comparison of Jicarillas to non-Indians relevant? Finally, the
Court had opined in Ramah that off-reservation services provided to a contractor are “not a legitimate justification” for taxing on-reservation activity
because “[p]resumably, the state tax revenues derived from [the contractor’s]
off-reservation business activities are adequate to reimburse the State for the
services it provides,”1220 which was equally true in Cotton.
The Court may have felt uneasy about examining on-reservation expenditures because it acknowledged what should have been the starting point in
its analysis: “there is no constitutional requirement that the benefits received
from a taxing authority by an ordinary commercial taxpayer—or by those living in the community where the taxpayer is located—must equal the amount
of its tax obligations”1221 and proceeded to quote Commonwealth Edison discussed above, that “there is no requirement under the Due Process Clause
that the amount of general revenue taxes collected from a particular activity must be reasonably related to the value of the services provided to the
activity.”1222 Consequently, the reference to the per capita State expenditures
or the $90,000 services provided by New Mexico to Cotton turned out to be
irrelevant—as indeed it should have been. Given that Commonwealth Edison,
rejected Cotton’s arguments just eight years earlier, Stevens’s characterization
of the taxpayer’s position as its “most persuasive argument” seems to be a
polite, if not charitable, overstatement. And it is puzzling why Stevens even
addressed the argument under the Interstate Commerce Clause when he previously rejected Cotton’s invocation of the Merrion footnote where essentially
this same argument was raised.
Justice Stevens paraphrased Cotton’s argument as asking the Court to
“divest New Mexico of its normal latitude because its taxes have ‘some connection’ to commerce with the Tribe.”1223 In rejecting this argument, Stevens
once again noted that no evidence existed in the record showing that the tax
had an adverse effect on the Tribe’s ability to attract oil and gas lessees.1224 He
realized that it was reasonable to infer that the tax limited the profitability of

1220
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 844 n.9 (1982) (cited
by the dissent at Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 208 n.10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
1221
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 190.
1222
Id. (citing Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 521–23 (1937)).
1223
Id. at 191. See the language in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 623
(1981), upon which this is based.
1224
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 191. Because the Tribe was not a party to the case, it
did not have the opportunity to offer such evidence. See supra note 1199. Professor Clinton
criticizes Stevens for never citing or overruling “that portion of Colville that indicated such
discriminations against Indian commerce if demonstrated to be detrimental to Indian commercial development would be struck down on dormant Indian Commerce Clause grounds.”
Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1223. This criticism seems unfair because of the dearth of
evidence in the record on this point.
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Indian leases, but this sort of indirect burden had been rejected as a basis for
striking down a state tax in other cases, including Moe and Colville.1225
j. Why an Interstate Commerce Clause Analysis at All?
One mystery is why Justice Stevens engaged in an Interstate Commerce
Clause analysis at all.1226 The Court invited the parties to address the question
of whether the Tribe should be treated as a state for the purpose of determining whether New Mexico’s taxes must be apportioned.1227 All of the tribes that
filed amicus briefs, including the Jicarilla, uniformly answered with a resounding “no.” The Court seemed to agree, noting the language of “the Commerce
Clause draws a clear distinction between ‘States’ and ‘Indian Tribes.’”1228 The
“language of the Clause no more admits of treating Indian tribes as States
than of treating foreign nations as States,”1229 which makes one wonder why
the Court raised the issue in the first place. Stevens seems to ignore that the
question asked was whether “the Tribe should be treated as a State for the
purpose of determining whether New Mexico’s taxes must be apportioned,”1230 not
whether a tribe should be viewed as a state for all purposes.
Stevens also noted that the Interstate Commerce Clause is concerned with
maintaining free trade among the States even in the absence of federal legislation, whereas the
1225
The origin of the “indirect burden” argument in the Indian context is Thomas v. Gay, 169
U.S. 264, 273 (1898). See supra note 363 and accompanying text.
1226
Professor Clinton argues that Stevens “analyzed the Indian Commerce Clause, rather
than the Interstate Commerce Clause, as the potential source of any requirement that states
apportion taxes assessed on Indian commerce which also is subject to tribal taxation,” Clinton,
Dormant, supra note 22, at 1220, but that seems to be sheer conjecture.
1227
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 191. The actual question put to the parties was whether
the “Commerce Clause requires that an Indian Tribe be treated as a State for purpose of determining whether a state tax on nontribal activities conducted on an Indian Reservation must be
apportioned to account for taxes imposed on those same activities by the Indian Tribe.” Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 485 U.S. 1005 (1988).
Professor Clinton feels that because of this question, “the initial grant of review therefore proceeded almost as if the Court was completely unaware of the existence of the Indian
Commerce Clause.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1219. “[T]he question posed by the
Court seemed ludicrous in light of the language of the Commerce Clause which separately
mentioned commerce among the several states and ‘commerce . . . with the Indian tribes.’”
Id. The question was not ludicrous, however. The Court was not asking if a tribe should be
treated as a state, but rather whether the apportionment rules that had been developed under
the Interstate Commerce Clause should be applied to Indian commerce. For example, should
a credit be provided against the New Mexico severance taxes for the Tribal taxes?
The tribal amici briefs unanimously answered the question in the negative, presumably
because they did not want to concede in any way that their status was more similar to a state
than to a country or a nation. For the reasons suggested in the text, a severance tax was not an
appealing context in which to argue the apportionment issue.
The Internal Revenue Code treats a tribe as a state for some purposes. I.R.C. § 787
(2010).
1228
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 191–92.
1229
Id. at 192.
1230
Id. at 191 (emphasis added).
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central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with
plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs.1231 . . . The extensive case law that has developed under the Interstate Commerce Clause,
moreover, is premised on a structural understanding of the unique role of
the States in our constitutional system that is not readily imported to cases
involving the Indian Commerce Clause.1232 Most notably, as our discussion
of Cotton’s ‘multiple taxation’ argument demonstrates, the fact that States
and tribes have concurrent jurisdiction over the same territory1233 makes it
inappropriate to apply Commerce Clause doctrine developed in the context
of commerce ‘among’ States with mutually exclusive territorial jurisdiction
to trade ‘with’ Indian tribes. . . .”1234

In light of these comments, that the Court dealt with Cotton’s Interstate
Commerce arguments in the first place is indeed curious1235—unless Stevens
was looking to close down this avenue of attack in future cases. Presumably,
taxpayers will not receive a sympathetic ear to their arguments that double
taxation that would violate the Interstate Commerce Clause should be held
to violate the Indian Commerce Clause.
k. Rejecting the Indian Commerce Clause
He also shut down any argument that the Indian Commerce Clause preempted the New Mexico tax. It is unclear what sense of “plenary” the Court
was using1236 when it stated that the central function of the Indian Commerce
1231
Professor Prakash wonders how the Clause “might ever grant plenary authority over all
Indian tribes.” Prakash, Against, supra note 180, at 1079. “[T]he power to regulate commerce
with the Indian tribes hardly seems like a power to regulate the Indian tribes themselves.
Likewise, the authority to make treaties with Indian nations scarcely seems to grant federal
power to unilaterally legislate upon Indian nations.” Id.
1232
The Tribe’s amicus brief argued that if federal law does not preempt state taxation of
Cotton, then the New Mexico taxes must be evaluated under the dormant Indian Commerce
Clause. Brief of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellants,
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 27-1327), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 158, at *7.
1233
“Even the platonic notion of backdrop had disappeared . . . .” Ball, John Marshall, supra
note 193, at 1187. Stevens did not discuss New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S.
324 (1983), where the Court struck down the application of New Mexico’s fish and game
laws to non-Indians on the reservation. “The exercise of concurrent [regulatory] jurisdiction
by the State would effectively nullify the Tribe’s unquestioned authority to regulate the use of
its resources by members and nonmembers, interfere with the comprehensive tribal regulatory scheme, and threaten Congress’s firm commitment to the encouragement of tribal selfsufficiency and economic development.” Id. at 343–44. One difference with Cotton was that
the Mescalero Court found that New Mexico could not show any services it provided with the
activity it sought to regulate.
1234
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 192.
1235
The dissent saw “no purpose in the majority’s detailed application of Interstate Commerce
Clause analysis in [its opinion].” Id. at 193 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Professor Clinton
claims that Justice Stevens analyzed the Indian Commerce Clause and not the Interstate
Commerce Clause “as the potential source of any requirement that states apportion taxes
assessed on Indian commerce,” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1219–20, but I find no
support for that reading.
1236
See supra notes 167, 181, and accompanying text.
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Clause is to provide Congress with “plenary” power to legislate in the field of
Indian affairs. Presumably, Justice Stevens did not mean Congress had absolute, sole, and exclusive power; otherwise, he would have analyzed whether
New Mexico’s assertion of taxing jurisdiction violated the Indian Commerce
Clause instead of assuming the State had such power. Apparently, Stevens
used “plenary” in the more limited sense of “unlimited” rather than exclusive,
at odds with at least one plausible reading of the intent of the Founders and
with other statements by the Court.1237
Justice Stevens abruptly ended his opinion by agreeing with a comment in
White Mountain. “Tribal reservations are not States, and the difference in the
form and nature of their sovereignty make it treacherous to import to one
notions of pre-emption that are properly applied to the other.”1238 That statement in White Mountain was meant to be favorable to the Indians, and Stevens’s reference to it—coming after a truncated view of the Indian Commerce
Clause and an opinion that held against Cotton (and indirectly against the
Indians)—created a tension that made for an odd conclusion to his analysis.
As Professor Frickey recognized, Chief Justice John Marshall would not
have recognized the analysis in Cotton.
It should not matter that a non-Indian company [Cotton] was involved
. . . . for some of the practical effects of the tax fell upon the tribe, and in
any event a non-Indian—Worcester himself—was the subject of the asserted
state regulation in [the Georgia case], as well. Nor should it matter that the
case involved a conflict between the regulatory jurisdiction of a state and a
tribe; that is, of course, precisely the setting in Worcester. . . . [T]he quasiconstitutional, structural nature of Chief Justice Marshall’s approach is lost
on the current Court.1239

Similar sentiments could be expressed about the Court’s other tax cases.
l. Blackmun’s Dissent
Justice Blackmun wrote the dissent on behalf of Justices Brennan and Marshall.1240 The dissent described the majority as “faithfully reciting” the principles that define the “boundaries between state regulatory authority and [the
See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 192–93 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980)). An amicus brief of the Southern Ute Indian Tribe asked
the Court to adopt the preemption test suggested by the Solicitor General in Ramah. Brief of
Southern Ute Indian Tribe in Support of the Appellants, Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No.
87-1327), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 149, at *12–13.
1239
Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 199, at 423–24. Professor Clinton describes the Cotton
Court as “affirmatively misstat[ing] history, asserting, without any citation of historical sources,
that the original purposes of the Indian Commerce Clause only involved the grant of congressional power, without any limitations on state authority in Indian country.” Clinton, Dormant,
supra note 22, at 1245.
1240
These three were in the majority in Ramah, along with Burger and Powell, who were not
on the Court at the time of Cotton. As stated in the Introduction to this Article, cases involving the Indians can easily turn on the sympathies of particular justices. See supra note 14 and
1237
1238
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Tribe’s] self-government”1241—a remarkably generous description, especially
coming from Justice Marshall who authored some of the key opinions the
Court was dismantling. Taken literally, the dissent was agreeing with Justice
Stevens’s statement that “[a]t one time, [a state tax on non-Indians on the
reservation] was held invalid unless expressly authorized by Congress; more
recently, such taxes have been upheld unless expressly or impliedly prohibited by Congress.” The dissent took issue with the way the majority applied
the principles. The majority “talked the talk” but did not “walk the walk.”
The dissent would have held that the 1938 Act preempted the New Mexico
tax.1242 In addition, federal and tribal interests would preempt the state tax.
The dissent accused the Court of “distort[ing] the legal standard it purports to apply.”1243 The majority failed to engage in a careful examination
of state, tribal, and federal interests because of the distorted view that there
is no preemption unless the states are “entirely excluded from a sphere of
activity and provide no services to the Indians or to the lessees they seek to
tax.”1244 Because the majority found no “direct evidence of Congress’s intent
to preclude state taxation of non-Indian oil production on Indian lands,”1245
the Court “[must engage] in a careful examination of state, tribal, and federal
interests.”1246 The majority was wrong to assume that no preemption exists
unless the “States are entirely excluded from a sphere of activity and provide
no services to the Indians or to the lessees they seek to tax,”1247 an unfair accusation by the dissent that ignored the three grounds on which the majority
distinguished Ramah and White Mountain.1248
i. The New Mexico Tax Should Have Been Preempted. For Justice
Blackmun, a traditional preemption analysis would have prohibited the New
Mexico tax. Blackmun viewed the federal regulation of leasing Indian oil
as both comprehensive and pervasive.1249 In addition, the Jicarilla Apache
enacted their own regulations and created a Tribal Oil and Gas administration.1250 The dissent criticized the majority for accepting that there was sufficient state activity to support the New Mexico tax.1251 The majority’s reliance
on the proposition that “[t]his is not a case in which the State has had nothaccompanying text. Many commentators would not limit this statement to only Indian law
cases.
1241
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 193 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing White Mountain,
448 U.S. at 141).
1242
Id. at 193–203.
1243
Id. at 204.
1244
Id.
1245
Id. at 203.
1246
Id. at 204.
1247
Id. (emphasis in original).
1248
See id. at 176–87.
1249
Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of
Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 839 (1982)).
1250
Id.
1251
Id. at 206.
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ing to do with the on-reservation activity, save tax it,”1252 was criticized as
“mechanical and absolutist.”1253 Complete abdication or noninvolvement has
never been the applicable standard.1254
ii. The Majority Placed Undue Significance on State Expenditures. The
dissent also denounced the majority for placing undue significance on the
State having made some expenditures that benefited Cotton’s on-reservation
activities. The reality was that the federal and Tribal governments provided
almost the entire infrastructure supporting the production of oil and gas.1255
According to the dissent, the majority was also confused about the relevance of the disparity between the $89,384 in State services and the $2.293
million in taxes paid by Cotton. The majority characterized this disparity as
legally irrelevant in order to avoid imposing a “proportionality” requirement.
The concept that a tax is not a quid pro quo has no role to play in a preemption analysis.1256
Preemption analysis calls for a close consideration of conflicting interests
and of their potential impact on one another. Under the majority’s analysis, insignificant state expenditures, reflecting minimal state interests, are
sufficient to support state interference with significant federal and tribal
interests. The exclusion of all sense of proportion has led to a result that is
antithetical to the concerns that animate our Indian pre-emption jurisprudence.1257

iii. The Economic Impact of the State Tax Adversely Affected the Tribe.
Finally, the dissent chastised the majority for “sorely underestimat[ing] the
degree to which state taxation of oil and gas production adversely affects the
interests of the Jicarilla Apache.”1258 Taxes were 75% higher on the reservation. The trial court did not appreciate the negative effects of this differential because it misunderstood why new wells were being drilled on the
reservation.1259 In addition, “[i]n weighing the effect of state taxation on tribal
Id. (citing id. at 186).
Id.
1254
Id.
1255
Id. at 207.
1256
Id. at 208.
1257
Id. One commentator described the dissent as applying a “modernized” preemption
analysis. Under this standard, a state may tax Indian reservation land and activities unless
federal law or federal policies preempt the tax. The latter requires consideration of state, tribal,
and federal interests. Keith E. Whitson, State Jurisdiction to Tax Indian Reservation Land and
Activities, 44 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 99, 132–33 (1993), see also Rice v. Rehner, 463
U.S. 713, 735–44 (1983).
1258
Id. at 208.
1259
Id. New Mexico argued that Cotton substantially expanded its reservation oil and gas
production even after an increase in tribal taxes. Brief of Appellees State of New Mexico,
Cotton Petroleum Corp v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (No. 87-1327), 1988 U.S. S.
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 160, at *6. But the new wells could not be taken as a sign that the 75% rate
differential had no effect because they were “infill” wells. These are drilled between existing
producing wells to increase the efficiency of drainage on already leased lands. An infill well is
a no-risk proposition because oil has already been found. The willingness to drill infill wells
1252
1253
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interests, logic dictates that it is necessary to consider not only the size of the
tax, but also the importance of the taxed activity to the tribal economy.”1260
“[O]il and gas production is the Jicarilla Apache economy. . . .”1261 The use
of the term “weighing” makes clear what the dissent’s earlier comments also
suggested: the approach is one of balancing rather than of preemption.
The majority was also attacked for disregarding the long-term impact of
New Mexico taxation on the Tribe. “The market can bear only so much taxation, and it is inevitable that a point will be reached at which the State’s taxes
will impose a ceiling on tribal tax revenues.”1262
Finally, the dissent emphasized the inconsistency between Warren Trading,
White Mountain, and the majority’s opinion. In Warren Trading, the Court
struck down a 2% Arizona sales tax; in White Mountain, the dissent characterized the less than 1% tax as “relatively trivial” and “unlikely to have a serious adverse impact on tribal business.”1263 These cases were inconsistent with
the majority’s observation that Cotton is not “a case in which an unusually
large state tax has imposed a substantial burden on the Tribe.”1264 The dissent
concluded that “New Mexico asserts little more than a desire to increase its
general revenues at the expense of tribal economic development.”1265
Justice Blackmun thought that under established principles the New Mexico tax was preempted. The governing federal statute contained no express
authorization of state taxation. The statute was enacted in a period in which
tribal sovereignty and tribal self-sufficiency were at the core of federal Indian
policy. The federal government regulated every aspect of the producers’ activities. The statute encouraged tribes to assert their own sovereignty, which
the Tribe did through regulations and taxation. New Mexico’s interest, by
cannot be viewed as a sign that producers are willing to drill new wells. Cotton Petroleum, 490
U.S. at 208–09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1260
Id. at 209.
1261
Id. (emphasis in original) “[T]he oil and gas taxes, the rents, and the royalties provided the Tribe with 90% of its revenue.” Brief of Appellants Cotton Petroleum Corp., Cotton
Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 159, at *8. New
Mexico’s Brief emphasized that the Tribe imposed no taxes on its members, and distributed
over $9 million annually as a cash distribution to its members. In addition, the Tribe ran a budgetary surplus. A substantial portion of the Tribe’s taxes went into a permanent fund that contained approximately $50 million. Brief of Appellee State of New Mexico, Cotton Petroleum,
490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 160, at *9.
1262
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 210 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The State’s brief had
emphasized the lower court’s findings that the Tribe’s economic consultant reported that “a tax
rate even higher than that ultimately selected by the tribe would not adversely affect oil and gas
development on the reservation.” Brief of Appellees, State of New Mexico, Cotton Petroleum,
490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 160, at *8.
1263
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 210–11 (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,
448 U.S. 136, 159 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
1264
Id. at 210 (citing id. at 186).
1265
Id. at 211. For a discussion of the options that exist for economic development of the reservations after Cotton Petroleum, see Susan M. Williams, State Taxation on Indian Reservations:
The Impact of Cotton Petroleum Corporation v. New Mexico, 36 Fed. Bar News & J. 431
(1989).
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comparison, consisted of little more than raising revenue at the expense of
tribal development.1266 As Ramah held, “[t]hat purpose ‘is insufficient to justify the additional burdens imposed by the tax on the comprehensive federal
scheme . . . and on the express federal policy of encouraging Indian selfsufficiency in [this] area.’”1267
According to Professor Krakoff, “[l]ower court cases applying Cotton continue to follow the ‘flexible preemption analysis’ but the trend is increasingly
to marginalize White Mountain, Central Machinery, and Ramah as anomalies and to allow state taxation of non-Indians in Indian country [with some
exceptions].”1268 “After Cotton Petroleum, courts generally upheld state taxation of non-Indian businesses within Indian country.”1269 The Navajo Nation,
however, has been able to alleviate the concurrent taxation authorized by Cotton through intergovernmental agreements and state legislation.1270 There is
an incentive to cooperate because it is in neither a state’s nor a tribe’s interest
if multiple tax burdens constrain activity on the reservation and reduce tax
revenues for both parties.
G. The Gasoline Cases
1. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation1271 concerned two independent issues: the Oklahoma motor fuels excise tax and the Oklahoma income
tax, discussed infra.
The first issue involved the imposition of the Oklahoma motor fuels excise
tax on gasoline sold by the Chickasaw Nation at two convenience stores on

1266
Cotton’s Reply Brief cited “the testimony of the Bureau of Indian Affairs officer in charge
of oil and gas matters who stated that in his fourteen years on the Reservation he had never
seen New Mexico directly involved in any oil and gas monitoring or supervision.” Reply Brief
of Appellants Cotton Petroleum Corp. supra note 1141, at *5 n.3.
1267
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Ramah Navajo Sch.
Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 845 (1982)).
1268
Krakoff, supra note 12, at 1171.
1269
Anderson, Berger, Frickey & Krakoff, supra note 208, at 467 (citing Gila River
Indian Cmty. v. Waddell, 91 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 1996)).
1270
The New Mexico Legislature, for example, was more impressed with the unfairness of the
resulting multiple taxation from the Tribal and State taxes than was the Court. The Legislature
adopted a credit to mitigate the double taxation. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-29C-1 (1978); see
also Krakoff, supra note 12, at 1172.
Cotton had argued that a credit for the tribal taxes would cure the alleged constitutional
defect. Brief of Appellants Cotton Petroleum Corp., Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No.
87-1327), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 159, at *64–65. In order to distinguish Colville,
which rejected the use of a credit, Cotton described that case as not involving a “comprehensive federal scheme promoting the sale of cigarettes as Indian Commerce and no indication
that that the cigarettes reflected value generated by the reservation. . . .” Id. at *65.
1271
515 U.S. 450 (1995).
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tribal trust land. Justice Ginsburg,1272 writing for a unanimous Court on this
issue, struck the tax because its legal incidence fell on the Tribe on sales made
within Indian country.1273 Had the legal incidence not fallen on the Tribe but
rather on the non-Indian purchaser, presumably a balancing test would have
been triggered.1274
a. Legal Incidence is Determinative
Because no federal legislation existed,1275 the case could have been seen as
presenting a pure Indian Commerce Clause issue. The Court, however, had
a more direct (and easier) way of disposing of the tax. Rejecting a balancing
1272
For a general discussion of Justice Ginsburg’s Indian law opinions, see Carole Goldberg,
Finding the Way to Indian Country: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Decisions in Indian Law Cases,
70 Ohio St. L. J. 1003 (2009).
1273
The Court stated that “when Congress does not instruct otherwise, a State’s excise tax is
unenforceable if its legal incidence falls on a Tribe or its members for sales made within Indian
country.” Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 453 (emphasis added). The reference to the Tribe’s
members was dictum because the excise tax was imposed on the tribal retailer. Nonetheless, it
seems consistent with McClanahan, which the Court did not cite in support of its statement.
McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
The Tribe argued that “[t]he Constitution vests the Federal Government with exclusive
authority over relations with Indian tribes . . . and in recognition of the sovereignty retained by
Indian tribes even after formation of the United States, Indian tribes and individuals generally
are exempt from state taxation within their own territory,” Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 455
(quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 764 (1968)).
Oklahoma countered by arguing that, even if the legal incidence of the fuels tax falls on the
Tribe as retailer, “tax immunity should be disallowed here because ‘the state interest supporting
the levy is compelling, . . . the tribal interest is insubstantial, and . . . the state tax would have
no effect on tribal governance and self-determination.’” Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 456
(quoting Brief of Petitioner, Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (No. 94-771), 1995 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 85, at *39).
1274
After the decision below, the Tribe imposed its own tax on gasoline and diesel fuel that
was roughly equivalent to that imposed by the State. Presumably, this was to rebut any suggestion that the Tribe would be marketing a tax exemption if the Oklahoma tax were struck down.
This fact would distinguish the case from Colville and reduce that case’s relevance. Of course,
tribal rates can always later change or the tax can be eliminated. If the tax were eliminated, for
example, the case would then be similar to Colville.
As discussed elsewhere, see supra notes 890–93, 909–10 and accompanying text, and infra
notes 1315–17, 1349–55 and accompanying text, when a tribe is both the taxing sovereign
and the vendor, the adoption of a tax on the sale is a formality, having no independent economic significance.
Oklahoma’s brief argued that “the economic burden of the tax plainly falls upon the ultimate consumer of fuel, as the court of appeals itself understood.” Brief of Petitioner, Chickasaw
Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (No. 94-771), 1995 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 85, at *23.
1275
Oklahoma belatedly raised the argument that the Hayden-Cartwright Act, 4 U.S.C.
§ 104 (2009), authorized the tax. That Act authorizes the states to tax motor fuel sales on
“United States military or other reservations.” Id. § 140(a). The question is whether the Act’s
reference to “reservation” meant Indian reservations. The Court declined to address this argument. In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, the Court also refused to consider this
argument. 448 U.S. 136, 151 n.16 (1980); see supra notes 916–84 and accompanying text.
Cf. supra note 542.
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test advocated by Oklahoma,1276 Justice Ginsburg held that “when a State
attempts to levy a tax directly on an Indian tribe or its members inside Indian
country, rather than on non-Indians, we have employed instead of a balancing inquiry, ‘a more categorical approach: “absent cession of jurisdiction or
other federal statutes permitting it,” we have held, a State is without power to
tax reservation lands and reservation Indians.’”1277
The Constitution vests the Federal Government with exclusive authority
over relations with Indian tribes . . . and in recognition of the sovereignty
retained by Indian tribes even after formation of the United States, Indian
tribes and individuals generally are exempt from state taxation within their
own territory.1278
The initial and frequently dispositive question in Indian tax cases . . . . is who
bears the legal incidence of a tax.1279 If the legal incidence of an excise tax
rests on a tribe or on tribal members for sales made inside Indian country,
the tax cannot be enforced absent clear congressional authorization [Moe].
But if the legal incidence of the tax rests on non-Indians, no categorical bar
prevents enforcement of the tax; if the balance of federal, state, and tribal
interests favors the State, and federal law is not to the contrary, the State
1276
The taxed fuel was used almost exclusively outside of Indian country on state roads; the
fuel was brought into Indian country for resale; and the purchasers were for the most part
non-Indians. The Tribe did not construct or maintain roads for the use by the general public.
Oklahoma’s Brief argued that it was

the existence of state-funded public highways that makes possible the Tribe’s sale of
fuel, while the use of that fuel requires considerable expenditures for the maintenance
and construction of state roads. This particular ‘spillover’ effect is qualitatively different from any ‘spillover’ effects of income taxes or taxes on cigarettes. ‘A State’s regulatory interest will be particularly substantial if the State can point to off-reservation
effects that necessitate state intervention.’ And here—in contrast to other cases in
which state taxes have been invalidated the Tribe does not construct or maintain
highways for the use of the general public; that burden falls entirely on the State.
Brief of Petitioner, Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (No. 94-771), 1995 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 85, at *49–50.
1277
Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 458 (quoting County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes
and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 258 (1992)). In County of Yakima, the Court
allowed the county to impose a property tax on fee-patented lands owned by Indians and
permitted the State to foreclose on such land. The Court concluded that express authority for
taxation of fee-patented land was found in Section 6 of the Indian General Allotment Act of
1887. For an analysis of that case, see Christopher A. Karns, County of Yakima v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation: State Taxation as a Means of Diminishing the
Tribal Land Base, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1213 (1993).
1278
Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 455 (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471
U.S. 759, 764 (1968).
1279
Justice Ginsburg claimed that this “[j]udicial focus on legal incidence in lieu of a more
venturesome approach accords due deference to the lead role of Congress in evaluating state
taxation as it bears on Indian tribes and tribal members. Id., 502 U.S. at 267.” Chickasaw
Nation, 515 U.S. at 459. Professor Goldberg correctly asks “why this is so?” Carole Goldberg,
Finding the Way to Indian Country: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Decisions in Indian Law Cases,
70 Ohio St. L. J. 1003, 1020 (2009).
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may impose its levy [Colville] and may place on a tribe or tribal members
“minimal burdens” in collecting the toll.1280

Balancing has now clearly replaced “preemption” as the methodology for
evaluating taxes on non-Indians.
b. Formalism and Legal Incidence
The emphasis on legal incidence is a familiar one to state tax lawyers. Complete
Auto rejected that formalism in the context of interstate commerce, where
it was described as having “no relationship to economic realities. Rather it
stands only as a trap for the unwary draftsman.”1281 Oklahoma relied heavily
on Complete Auto, making a similar argument about economic realities.1282
The Court, however, endorsed formalism.
1280
Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 458–59 (emphasis added). Justice Ginsburg described
Moe as an attempt “to compel Indians to collect and remit taxes actually imposed on nonIndians.” Id. at 458.
1281
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). “There is no economic
consequence that follows necessarily from the use of . . . particular words . . . and a focus on
that formalism merely obscures the question whether the tax produces a forbidden effect.” Id.
at 288.
1282
Oklahoma’s Brief asserted that

there is no denying that the court of appeals’ invalidation of the fuel tax rested on
a formalism. The court properly did not suggest that the tax was preempted by the
terms of any treaty; instead, it found that the legal incidence of the tax falls upon the
retailer (and therefore, in this case, upon the Tribe), and proceeded to apply a conclusive presumption against the validity of such a tax. We explain below that the court’s
placement of the levy’s legal incidence was wrong. But even granting for the moment
that the legal incidence of the tax does fall upon the Tribe, it is beyond dispute that, at
least so far as sales to non-members of the Tribe are concerned, Oklahoma could permissibly impose a tax that is, in all essential respects, identical to the one invalidated
by the court of appeals. It has long been settled, and the Tribe does not dispute, that
a State may require an Indian tribe to collect a tax on on-reservation sales to nonmembers where the legal incidence of the levy falls on the purchaser. This means, as
the Tribe itself acknowledged in its brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari
that Oklahoma could cure the asserted defect in the tax with a ‘stroke of the pen’
simply by declaring the levy’s legal incidence to fall on the ultimate consumer rather
than the retailer.
Against this background, the question in this case is whether the formalism of
“legal incidence” precludes imposition of a state tax on tribal transactions that impose
enormous burdens on the State and no burdens at all on the Tribe, and that in large
part are concluded with non-members. In answering that question, the court below
expressly disregarded economic realities, declaring the competing state and tribal
interests “not relevant.” In our view, however, the court of appeals’ answer plainly
departed from this Court’s precedents: it elevated form over substance, ignored the
substantial extra-reservation consequences of the taxed activities, and imposed a dramatic restriction on state taxing authority.
Brief of Petitioner, Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (No. 94-771), 1995 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 85, *24–26. Before Complete Auto made them irrelevant, these arguments were commonplace under the Interstate Commerce Clause. Oklahoma’s Brief also emphasized that
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[A] tax’s legal incidence accommodates the reality that tax administration
requires predictability. . . . If we were to make ‘economic reality’ our guide,
we might be obliged to consider . . . how completely retailers can pass along
tax increases without sacrificing sales volume—a complicated matter dependent on the characteristics of the market for the relevant product.1283

Presumably, exactly that type of inquiry would be required if the legal incidence fell on the purchaser. Given the splintered opinions in Ramah and
White Mountain, Justice Ginsburg’s willingness to avoid another contentious
decision is understandable when a seductively easy legal incidence argument
was available. But the contrary lesson that had been learned from the nowdiscarded pre-Complete Auto cases was how easily a state could manipulate
legal incidence, and the premium formalism placed on draftsmanship.1284
Those cases demonstrated how easily a statute that improperly imposed the
legal incidence of a tax on the privilege of conducting an interstate business
could be redrafted and upheld without any change in the amount of tax that
would be owed.1285 Those cases made a mockery of formalism.
[t]he motor fuel subject to tax is used almost exclusively outside of Indian country on
state jurisdiction roads. And the tax revenues are used to defray the costs (of road construction and maintenance) imposed upon the State—and only upon the State—by
the use of that fuel; the Tribe does not construct, police, or maintain significant road
mileage.
Id. at 24–26. See also supra note 1276.
1283
Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 459–60.
1284
Oklahoma did not concede that the legal incidence of the tax fell on the Tribe. See Brief
of Petitioner, Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (No. 94-771), 1995 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS
85, at *58–68.
1285
See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959) (described in Complete
Auto, 430 U.S. at 284–85); Ry. Express Agency v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954). Much of
Oklahoma’s brief implicitly recognized the ease with which a statute could be redrafted.
Aside from its naked interest in raising revenue, the Tribe has no significant stake
here. After all, requiring a tribe to remit a tax on sales to non-members—a tax that
will be used to meet costs imposed on the State by use of the goods sold—in no sense
imposes a “burden which frustrates tribal self-government.” [Moe]. To the contrary,
it is difficult to see how such a tax has any bearing whatsoever on the tribes’ ability
“to control their own internal relations, and to preserve their own unique customs
and social order.” Indeed, any argument that immunity from the levy “is necessary
to . . . tribal government is refuted” by the fact that the State historically assessed
the tax and the Tribe until very recently paid it, so “that the parties to this case had
accommodated themselves to the state regulation.”
Moreover, the tax at issue here does not fall upon any value generated by Indians
on Indian land. Instead, this is the paradigm of a case in which the Court has indicated that there is no tribal interest supporting immunity from state law: the tax falls
on “on-reservation sales outlets which market to non-members goods not manufactured by the tribe or its members, in which the tribal contribution to [the] enterprise
is de minimis.”
As the Court has explained in very similar circumstances: “It is painfully apparent that the value marketed by the [retailers] to persons coming from outside is not
generated on the reservations by activities in which the Tribes have a significant
interest. . . . What the [retailers] offer these customers, and what is not available
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4

01-Pomp.indd 1196

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=244384612/23/2010

11:04:05 AM

INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE AND STATE TAXATION

1197

Indeed, Justice Ginsburg was well aware that a state could draft around the
legal incidence test, so that any “predictability” could be short-lived.
[I]f a State is unable to enforce a tax because the legal incidence of the
impost is on Indians or Indian tribes, the State generally is free to amend
its law to shift the tax’s legal incidence. So, in this case, the State recognizes
and the Tribe agrees that Oklahoma could accomplish what it here seeks ‘by
declaring the tax to fall on the consumer and directing the Tribe to collect
and remit the levy.’1286

The Court supported its emphasis on legal incidence by citing precedent
holding that the states are prohibited from levying a tax directly on the federal
government.1287 What the Court did not cite, however, were its own cases
allowing the states to draft around this doctrine, reducing the prohibition to
a mere formalism.1288

elsewhere, is solely an exemption from state taxation” . . . [T]he Court has repeatedly
‘rejected the proposition that principles of federal Indian law, whether stated in terms
of preemption, tribal self-government, or otherwise, authorize Indian tribes thus to
market an exemption from state taxation to persons who would normally do their
business elsewhere.’
Brief of Petitioner, Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (No. 94-771), 1995 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 85, at *46–48.
1286
Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 460; see infra note 1302.
1287
Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 460 n.9. The Court cited United States v. County of
Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 459 (1977) (“States may not . . . impose taxes the legal incidence of
which falls on the Federal Government.”). If the legal incidence of a state tax is not on the
federal government it will be upheld notwithstanding that the economic incidence falls on the
government.See supra note 357. County of Fresno actually demonstrated how a state could draft
around the legal incidence roadblock by upholding California’s tax on a possessory interest
held by an individual in government owned property. A tax on the property itself would have
been unconstitutional. See also City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1958); United
States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958). Unlike the cases involving the federal government, whether the economic incidence of a state tax falls on a tribe may influence the Court to
strike it down. See, e.g., Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 855–57
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (complaining that the majority’s striking down the New
Mexico gross receipts tax gave the Tribe more protection than the federal government would
have in that case). The federal government, of course, can easily protect itself by prohibiting the
state tax at issue. The Indians have no similar power to act on their own.
1288
See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720 (1982). Indeed, Oklahoma did
exactly that after the Court’s opinion. The amended statute reads as follows:
A: It is the intent of the Legislature that the taxes imposed on motor fuel have always
been and continue to be declared and conclusively presumed to be a direct tax on
the ultimate or retail consumer. When the taxes are paid by any person other than
the ultimate or retail consumer, the payment shall be considered as precollected and
as an advance payment for the purpose of convenience and facility to the consumer
and shall thereafter be added to the price of the motor fuel and recovered from the
ultimate or retail consumer, regardless of where or how the taxable fuel is ultimately
consumed.
[. . .]
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The Court should have been skeptical about the formalistic legal incidence
doctrine promoting predictability,1289 considering that the statute did not
expressly specify upon whom the legal incidence was placed and that the issue
was sharply contested below. Legal incidence would also prove to be elusive
in Prairie Band Potawatomi, where the Court disagreed on how to interpret
the statute.
2. Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation
a. Ambiguity of Legal Incidence
The failure of the legal incidence doctrine to promote predictability was underscored by the need for a detailed statutory analysis of that issue in Wagnon
v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, and the resulting disagreement between
the majority and dissent.1290 Justice Thomas was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Souter, and Breyer in upholding a Kansas tax on the motor fuel received by non-Indian fuel distributors
off-reservation.1291 The fuel was subsequently delivered to an on-reservation,
tribally owned gas station. The Court assumed that the distributors passed
C: It is also the intent of the Legislature that the recodification of the tax levied by
this act shall not be considered and construed to be a new tax or change in the motor
fuel tax, but a clarification of the motor fuel tax as it existed prior to the effective
date of this act. The purpose of this recodification is a result of the interpretation of
the motor fuel tax code of this state by the federal courts, specifically the decision by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw
Nation.
Okla. Stat. tit. 68, § 500.2 (2009).
In retrospect, was it was a good use of everyone’s time and money for the Court to issue an
opinion that could be de facto overturned with one stroke of the legislative pen? One virtue of
Complete Auto was that it made it unnecessary for legislatures to rewrite existing laws.
1289
The Court was probably reassured by an amicus brief it cited from eleven States with
large Indian populations arguing that legal incidence “provide[s] a reasonably bright-line standard which, from a tax administration perspective, responds to the need for substantial certainty as to the permissible scope of state taxation authority.” Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at
460 (quoting Brief for South Dakota et al. as Amici Curiae at 2, Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S.
450 (No. 94-771)). Given the ease with which a state can redraft an offending statute, the
position in the brief is understandable.
1290
546 U.S. 95 (2005).
1291
The tax was imposed on the receipt of motor fuel in Kansas by fuel distributors. Id. at
99. The Court rejected the Tribe’s interpretation of the statute as imposing the tax on the sale
taking place on the reservation. Id. at 103–06. One monograph reports that with “growing
frequency, states are turning to pre-collection of taxes at the wholesale level, before the product
ever reaches retailers. In the case of motor fuels, for example, a majority of state have shifted
to taxing at the ‘terminal rack’—the point where barges and shiploads of motor fuels are transferred into truck-size tankers. About 1,300 such terminal racks exist in the United States. Of
the 33 states that have federally recognized tribes, at least 27 states have enacted terminal rack
or first sale from distributor collection laws.” National Conference on State Legislatures and
National Congress of American Indians, Government to Government: Models of Cooperation
Between States and Tribes 74 (2002)
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along the cost of the State’s fuel tax to the Tribe.1292 The Tribe also imposed
its own, earmarked tax on the station’s fuel sales,1293 generating approximately
$300,000 annually for transportation infrastructure.1294
The Tribe owned and operated a casino, and apparently to accommodate
visitors it built its gas station nearby. The price of gas at the Tribal station fell
within two cents per gallon of the off-reservation prices,1295 and the overwhelming majority of the sales were made to casino patrons or those working
or living on the reservation.1296 Because the casino was built in a “remote
area,”1297 the Tribe could not be viewed as “marketing an exemption,” unlike
the tribes in Moe and Colville.1298
1292
The record in the case did not clearly establish whether the distributor passed along the
cost of the tax to the Tribe. At oral argument, however, the State made this representation. Id.
at 100 n.2. Presumably, this representation meant that the distributor raised its prices by the
amount of the tax, not that the actual economic incidence of the tax fell on the Tribe, which
is a much more difficult analysis. If, for example, the demand curve for gasoline at the Tribe’s
station were inelastic, an increase in price by the amount of the tax would not have affected
the retailer’s revenue and the economic incidence of the tax would have fallen on consumers. If
demand were inelastic, however, the logical question is why the Tribe had not already increased
its price to that level.
1293
Id. at 100.
1294
Id.
1295
Id. The Court does not state whether the reservation gas was sold above or below the
prevailing off-reservation market price. The Tenth Circuit opinion, however, suggests that the
Tribe did not sell gasoline below the prevailing prices: “[The State] does not argue that the
[Tribe] sells fuel below market prices.” Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Richards, 379 F.3d
979, 982 (10th Cir. 2004). This concession undercut any argument that the Tribe was marketing an exemption, like in Moe or Colville. But see infra notes 1349–54 and accompanying
text.
1296
Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 99. The opinions below provide a useful glimpse into the background of the case. The Tribe owned and operated a $35 million casino. Prairie Band, 379
F.3d at 981. Nation Station, a convenience store and gas station, was owned and operated by
the Tribe near the casino. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Richards, 241 F. Supp. 2d 1295,
1297 (D. Kan. 2003). Eleven of the store’s 15 employees were Indians and seven of these were
members of the Tribe. Prairie Band, 379 F.3d at 981. Seventy-one percent of the store’s revenue
was generated by the fuel sales. Prairie Band, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 1298. Revenue from the Tribe’s
fuel tax financed the maintenance of the roads and bridges that provided access to the casino
and for which the Tribe received no money from the State. Prairie Band, 379 F.3d at 982. The
Tribe’s expert at trial testified that “but for the casino, there would not be enough traffic to
support [the station].” Id. The latter testimony was part of the Tribe’s efforts at proving it was
not marketing an exemption. See infra note 1298 and accompanying text.
1297
Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 127 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1298
The Tribe had never advertised an exemption from the state fuel tax, Prairie Band, 379
F.3d at 982, unlike in Moe and Colville, where cigarettes were being marketed free of a state tax,
presumably to off-reservation persons who came onto the reservation specifically to purchase
them. In Wagnon, the Tribe apparently had a fairly captive market in casino customers, who
would have been on the reservation anyway, and there was no need to charge less than the offreservation price for gasoline. Seventy-three percent of sales were made to casino patrons and
11% were made to persons who lived or worked on the reservation. Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 99.
One commentator claimed that “[t]he fact that the tribal fuel tax and the state fuel tax are
mutually exclusive, i.e., only one can be collected without rendering the Nation Station’s fuel
prices uncompetitive, should have signaled to the Court the need for interest-balancing in
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The Tribe argued that the legal incidence of the state tax was imposed on
its on-reservation purchase and receipt of the gas,1299 and therefore the tax was
unconstitutional under Chickasaw Nation.1300 Alternatively, even if the incidence of the tax was on the distributor, the Tribe argued it was nonetheless
preempted under White Mountain.1301 To make this alternative argument, the
Tribe had to bring the taxable transaction onto the reservation.
b. White Mountain Balancing
After a lengthy statutory analysis, Justice Thomas concluded the legal incidence of the tax was imposed on the non-Indian distributor on its off-reservation receipt of motor fuel.1302 Justice Thomas then clarified White Mountain’s
this case.” Jesse K. Martin, Kansas v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation: Undermining Indian
Sovereignty Through State Taxation, 6 U. Md. L. J. Race, Religion, Gender & Class 251, 270
(2006). The fact that the Tribe was selling gas at competitive prices belies this assertion. The
comment misunderstands that the Tribe was wearing two hats: it was both the retailer and the
taxing sovereign. In other words, the Tribe was imposing the tax as well as keeping the profit
on the sale of the gas. Consequently, the line was blurred between what part of the station’s net
revenue from the sale of gas should be viewed as a profit and what should be viewed as a tax.
The concept of multiple taxation is meaningless if the Tribe wears both hats because whether
the Tribe imposes a tax or not, it will nonetheless receive the same net revenue. See infra notes
1345–54 and accompanying text.
1299
See Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 102. The statute provided that the incidence of the tax was
“imposed on the distributor of the first receipt of the motor fuel.” Id. Presumably, the statute
meant “imposed on the distributor on the first receipt of the motor fuel.” This reading is
consistent with section 79-3410(a) of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, which provides that
“[e]very distributor . . . shall compute and shall pay . . . the amount of taxes due to the state
on all motor-vehicle fuels or special fuels received or imported by such distributor.” Kan. Stat.
ann. § 79-3410(a) (West 2010) (emphasis added).
1300
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995). See supra notes 1271–89
and accompanying text.
1301
Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 102.
1302
Id. at 103, 110. The lower courts had reached the same conclusion. Prairie Band, 379
F.3d at 982; Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Richards, 241 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1311 (D.
Kan. 2003). Apparently in 2003 the Kansas Legislature accepted the Court’s invitation in
Chickasaw Nation to “amend its law to shift the tax’s legal incidence.” Chickasaw Nation, 515
U.S. at 460; see supra notes 1272–89.
Taking note of the United States Supreme Court’s equivocal language in Chickasaw
Nation, the Kansas legislature quickly acted to amend the Kansas fuel tax
statutes . . . [to place] the legal incidence of the fuel tax on the “distributor of the first
receipt.” This provision, as suggested by . . . Chickasaw . . . makes issues of preemption and Indian sovereignty inapplicable to the Kansas fuel tax.
Luke R. Spellmeier, A Winning Hand or Time to Fold? State Taxation of Fuel Sales on Kansas
Indian Reservations, 43 Washburn L. J. 141, 144–45 (2003). If the Tribe were to become a
distributor, instead of purchasing from a distributor, the legal incidence would then fall on the
Tribe on its receipt on the reservation of the gasoline. Under those circumstances, the holding
in Chickasaw would control, nullifying the tax.
Professor Jensen argues that the issue of legal incidence was murky, and should have triggered the Indian canons of construction. Jensen, supra note 9, at 40. If the canons have their
roots in the trust relationship between the federal government and the Indians, a question can
be raised about their application to interpreting state law. But neither the majority nor the disTax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4
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balancing test:1303 “[White Mountain] has never been applied where, as here,
the State asserts its taxing authority over non-Indians off the reservation.”1304
White Mountain was limited to situations when a “State asserts authority over
the conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity on the reservation.”1305 Under
the majority’s interpretation of the taxing statute, Kansas was taxing an offreservation activity, the receipt of motor fuel,1306 so that White Mountain had
sent mentioned the canons, a failure that presumably reflected the fact that neither the State
nor the Tribe raised this issue.
1303
Professor Jensen describes Wagnon as the “most explicit downgrading of balancing,”
Jensen, supra note 9, at 81, but like Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898), it illustrates a necessary line drawing. Wagnon was an easier case than Thomas because the tax was imposed on an
off-reservation activity, and it is difficult imagining that the Court would strike down a state
tax imposed off-reservation merely because it impacted on-reservation activities.
The district court applied the balancing test in favor of Kansas. Prairie Band, 241 F. Supp.
at 1309–11. The Tenth Circuit reversed. Prairie Band, 379 F.3d at 987. Before the Supreme
Court, Kansas pointed out the flaw of balancing: “The court of appeals found that [the Tribe’s]
fuel price is within two cents of market. But what if it was four cents, six cents, eight cents,
a dime below market? . . . Where and when does the balance tip?” Reply Brief for Petitioner,
Wagnon, 546 U.S. 95 (No. 04-631), 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 547, at *19 n.3.
1304
Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 110. One commentator claims Ramah contradicts this statement.
Martin, supra note 1298, at 269–70. But in Ramah, New Mexico was taxing construction services that took place on the reservation, which would seem to contradict Martin’s statement.
1305
Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 110 (emphasis added) (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144–45 (1980)). Justice Thomas described Warren Trading, Thomas v.
Gay, and Williams v. Lee as cases identified in White Mountain that were supportive of balancing. Id. at 111. But Warren Trading came to be described by the Court as a preemption case.
See supra note 436. Neither Williams v. Lee nor Thomas v. Gay engaged in a balancing test.
See supra notes 354–424 and accompanying text. White Mountain was also inconsistent with
Thomas’s description of it. White Mountain stated that “[o]ur decision today is based on the
pre-emptive effect of the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme, which, like that in [Warren
Trading], leaves no room for the additional burdens sought to be imposed by state law,” 448
U.S. at 151 n.15 (emphasis added), which would seem to be inconsistent with a balancing test.
White Mountain cited both Warren Trading and Williams v. Lee in support of the statement that
“[i]n a number of cases we have held that state authority over non-Indians acting on tribal reservations is pre-empted even though Congress has offered no explicit statement on the subject.”
Id. at 151 (emphasis added). Thomas v. Gay was cited once by White Mountain in support of
a “particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an
inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority
would violate federal law. Compare [Warren Trading] and Williams v. Lee . . . with [Moe] and
Thomas v. Gay.” Id. at 145. Apparently the White Mountain Court was not viewing Thomas v.
Gay as in the same camp as Warren Trading and Williams v. Lee, so that Justice Thomas’s statement in Wagnon is more puzzling and shows the blurring between a preemption analysis and
a balancing test.
1306
Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 106. The Tribe argued that what was taxed was the distributor’s use,
sale, or delivery of the fuel on the reservation. Id. at 107.
The Government as amicus curiae for the Tribe argued that the Indian Trader statutes and
Central Machinery should apply. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Wagnon, 546 U.S. 95 (No. 04-631), 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 440, at
*19–21. The Government argued that under the Kansas Uniform Commercial Code a sale
occurred on the reservation. Id. at *21 n.9. Although the distributor did not have a license
to trade with the Indians, Central Machinery held that fact to be irrelevant under the Indian
Trader statutes. Id. at *21. Neither the majority nor the dissent addressed this argument.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4
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no application.
The Court defended White Mountain’s application to only on-reservation
activities as reflecting the significant geographical component of Indian sovereignty.1307 Applying the balancing test to taxes imposed off-reservation would
not only be “inconsistent with the special geographic sovereignty concerns
that gave rise to that test, but also with our efforts to establish ‘bright-line
standard[s]’ in the context of tax administration.”1308
The Court in Mescalero1309 had upheld the taxation of the gross receipts of
an off-reservation, tribally owned ski resort, without any kind of a balancing
test. If a state could tax the off-reservation activities of a tribally owned business, then a fortiori it could tax the off-reservation activities of a non-Indian
business. There was one difference, however. The burden of the New Mexico
tax in Mescalero fell on an off-reservation activity, and in Wagnon the tax
arguably fell on a reservation activity:1310 the purchase of fuel. Under that
distinction, however, “any off-reservation tax imposed on the manufacture
or sale of any good imported by the [Tribe] or one of its members would be
subject to interest balancing.”1311 For example, a sales tax, an income tax, or a
property tax on a retailer’s off-reservation activities would trigger balancing if
the retailer sold a good to a tribe or an Indian for use in Indian country (and
there was evidence that the tax increased the price of the good). The chaos
that would result illustrates the wisdom of the majority rejecting a balancing
test under the facts of Wagnon.
The majority also dismissed the argument that balancing was appropriate
because of the Tribal tax. In essence, this argument was just another way of
complaining about the downstream consequences of a Kansas tax imposed
off-reservation.1312 The Tribe’s complaint was that the Kansas tax depressed
Id. at 112.
Id. at 113 (quoting Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 526 U.S. 32, 37
(1999)).
1309
See supra notes 592–652 and accompanying text.
1310
The dissent used this distinction to reject Mescalero as precedent. Wagnon, 546 U.S. at
123 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1311
Id. at 114. The motor fuels tax exempted fuel sold or delivered to other sovereigns. The
Court rejected the Tribe’s argument that there was no exemption for fuel delivered to its stations so that the statute was discriminatory. If the motor fuels tax, however, is viewed as either
a consumption tax or a crude user charge for using Kansas roads, an exemption for exports to
other sovereigns (presumably other states or foreign countries) would be justified because it is
unlikely the fuel will subsequently be used on Kansas roads. By contrast, most of the purchasers of fuel on-reservation presumably used the fuel off-reservation and in Kansas. Even if the
fuel were used on-reservation, arguably no exemption would be appropriate to the extent that
Kansas used the tax revenue to maintain the roads and bridges on the reservation. (The Court
stated that Kansas used the proceeds from its fuel tax to pay for a significant portion of the
costs of maintaining the roads and bridges on the reservation, including the main highway
used by the casino patrons. 546 U.S. at 115.) Many states exempt shipments made in interstate commerce from their general sales tax, Hellerstein, McIntyre & Pomp, supra note 426,
at 79, which mirrors the exemption in the Kansas motor fuels tax. The Court had no trouble
concluding that the tax was not impermissibly discriminatory.
1312
Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 114.
1307
1308
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the revenues from the gas station, but Moe and Colville had already rejected
that type of argument, unless those cases were to be limited to tax abuse situations involving the marketing of an exemption.1313
Moreover, because the Tribe was selling gas at prices very close to those
prevailing off-reservation,1314 this was not a situation like Colville, where a
business was essentially being shut down by a state tax. As long as prices were
similar on- and off-reservation, patrons and employees of the casino who
constituted the likely market had no reason to bypass the station. In Colville,
the smokeshops were servicing off-reservation consumers who were purposely
shopping on the reservation to buy tax-free cigarettes. If the price of cigarettes
on-reservation were the same as off-reservation, the smokeshops would lose
their market.
More subtly, whether the Tribe imposed its own tax or not was irrelevant.
When a tribe owns an enterprise like a gas station, it has a claim on all of the
revenue. It is economically irrelevant whether the tribe imposes a tax and pays
itself some of that revenue through the tax.1315 Had the tribe not imposed
its own tax, it could have sold the gasoline at the same price, and netted the
same amount of revenue.1316 Analytically, the case did not involve an issue of
multiple taxation but simply whether an off-reservation tax should be struck
down because it affected prices on the reservation. Put in those terms, the
answer was an easy “no.”1317

1313
If the Tribe were to eliminate its own “taxes,” see infra, the Court might then view it as
seeking to market a tax exemption. But the facts in Wagnon indicated that the gas station had
a fairly captive market so that the Tribe had no reason to try to exploit any tax differential
between on- and off-reservation sales. Nonetheless, at the margin, a substantial differential in
price could encourage some patrons of the casino to fuel up on the reservation rather than offreservation; persons working or living on the reservation, might be similarly encouraged.
Part of the difficulty in accepting the existing level of tribal taxes in determining whether
a tribe is marketing an exemption is that after a case is handed down in favor of a tribe based
on the existence of tribal taxes, the tribe might then eliminate the taxes. Justice Ginsburg
conceded that if the Tribe were to do this, the balancing test would likely come out in favor of
the State. Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 130 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). A more fundamental argument
is that the Tribe’s “tax” had no economic significance. See supra notes 890–96, 909–10, and
accompanying text; infra notes 1315–17, 1349–55, and accompanying text.
The government as amicus curiae on behalf of the Tribe argued that the Indians were not
marketing an exemption in part because the “fuel is sold at fair market price, [and] the rate
of the Tribe’s tax is roughly comparable to the tax imposed by the State.” Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 1306, at *25.
1314
See supra note 1295.
1315
See supra notes 890–96, 909–10, 1316–17, and accompanying text; infra notes 1349–55
and accompanying text.
1316
See infra notes 1349–51 and accompanying text.
1317
In a footnote, Justice Thomas perfunctorily dismissed the Tribe’s Williams v. Lee argument. Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 115 n.6.
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c. Ginsburg’s Dissent
i. White Mountain Applies. Justice Ginsburg dissented, writing for
herself and Justice Kennedy.1318 Justice Ginsburg relied on White Mountain,
which she read as a balancing test. In her discussion of White Mountain,
she did not distinguish between a balancing test and a preemption analysis.
She described Kansas’s position as rejecting White Mountain because the legal
incidence of the fuels tax fell on the distributor and the tax was triggered by
the receipt of fuel off-reservation.1319
She attempted to dismantle both legs of the State’s position. In exquisite
irony for a Justice who just a few years earlier in Chickasaw justified the formalism of the legal incidence test on the grounds of “predictability,”1320 she
went to great lengths to challenge the majority’s statutory analysis, which
accepted the State’s view. To her, the legal incidence was unclear, although her
reasoning was murky.
ii. Legal Incidence is Unclear. She started her opinion by declaring
that the “Kansas fuel tax at issue is imposed on distributors, passed on to
retailers, and ultimately paid by gas station customers.”1321 This statement
would suggest the legal incidence was on the distributor, unless the “passing on” of the tax to retailers was meant to suggest it was on the Tribe. But
whether the tax was passed forward was less clear than she suggested. The
“Kansas Legislature anticipated that distributors would shift the tax burden
further downstream.”1322 This may have been the expectation, but according to the majority, the statute stated only that distributors are “‘entitled’ to
pass along the cost of the tax to downstream purchasers,” not that they are
required to do so.1323 At oral argument, Kansas acknowledged that the record
on whether the cost was passed on was unclear, but represented that the distributor did in fact do so.1324
But even Justice Ginsburg seemed unconvinced by her own argument that
the legal incidence was on the Tribe. She recounted that Chickasaw Nation
allows a state to amend its law to shift a tax’s legal incidence and “Kansas took
the cue,” amending its fuel tax statute to provide that “‘the incidence of this
1318
Even if the dissent had prevailed, the Tribe might not have paid a lower price to a
distributor for its purchases. If there were no tax on the sale, a distributor might increase its
wholesale price to capitalize some or all of the lack of a tax. See supra note 706.
1319
Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 118–19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1320
See supra note 1283 and accompanying text.
1321
Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 116 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1322
Id. at 119 (emphasis added). She bolstered this argument by analyzing a panoply of
statutory exemptions. Id.
1323
Id. at 103 (emphasis added). Exactly what the statute was meant to accomplish with this
provision is unclear. In the absence of price controls, any taxpayer is free to pass along any taxes
to its customers, just the way other costs are passed along. Competitive constraints, of course,
affect the degree to which a taxpayer can pass forward its costs by raising its prices. The Kansas
tax was paid by the distributor and increased the cost of its inventory. That cost would have to
be recovered in order to stay in business.
1324
Id. at 100 n.2.
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tax is imposed on the distributor.’”1325
Ultimately, she abandoned any attempt to place the legal incidence on the
Tribe, and was content with arguing, contrary to the majority, that the tax
was triggered by a sale and delivery to the Tribe’s gas station. That was enough
to implicate an on-reservation activity,1326 which triggered a balancing test
under White Mountain. Had she believed that the legal incidence was on the
Tribe, balancing would have been irrelevant because the tax would have been
unconstitutional under Chickasaw Nation as she acknowledged.1327 Despite
her doubts about the majority’s conclusion that the legal incidence fell on the
distributor, she never based her opinion on a contrary interpretation and as
her statement above suggests, she apparently agreed with Justice Thomas.
Her grumblings about legal incidence aside,1328 she described the case as
involving taxes that are “formally imposed on nonmembers [but] nonethe-

1325
Id. at 121 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-3408(c) (2003
Cumm. Supp.)). In 1992, Kansas had entered into a five-year agreement with the Tribe, providing an exemption from the state excise tax on the condition that the Tribal tax was not less
than 60% of the state sales tax. In 1995, Kansas amended its statute to remove the exemption,
and in 1997 refused to renew the agreement. Brief for Respondent, supra note 1306, at *7–8.
1326
“With respect to sales and deliveries to the [Tribe’s gas station], however, the nontribal
entity can indeed be described as ‘engaged in [an on-reservation] transaction with [a tribe].’”
Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 123 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue v. Blaze
Constr. Co., 526 U.S. 32, 37 (1999)). Blaze, which rejected a balancing test, was an odd
case to cite in support of such a pedestrian statement that the distributor could be viewed as
engaged in on-reservation activities. Blaze involved a corporation formed in Montana under
Blackfeet tribal law and owned by a tribal member, which received gross proceeds from constructing roads on several Indian reservations in Arizona under a contract with the BIA. The
Supreme Court upheld the Arizona sales tax on the proceeds Blaze received for its construction
services. In rejecting Blaze’s argument that a balancing test should be applied, the Court said
that it has

never employed this balancing test in a case such as this one where a State seeks
to tax a transaction between the Federal Government and its non-Indian private
contractor. We decline to do so now. . . . The need to avoid litigation and to ensure
efficient tax administration counsels in favor of a bright-line standard for taxation
of federal contracts, regardless of whether the contracted-for-activity takes place on
Indian reservations. Moreover, as we recognized in New Mexico, the “political process
is ‘uniquely adapted to accommodating’” the interests implicated by state taxation of
federal contractors.
Blaze, 526 U.S. at 37–38. The Blaze Court saw the case as being controlled by United States v.
New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720 (1982); see supra notes 657, 1049, 1288 and accompanying text.
Perhaps the reason Blaze was cited was that Justice Thomas wrote that opinion.
1327
Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 120–21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). For a perceptive discussion of
Blaze, see Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and
Tribal Sovereignty, 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 1177, 1238–39 (2001); Richard J. Ansson, Jr., Protecting
Tribal Sovereignty: Why States Should Not Be Able To Tax Contractors Hired By The BIA To
Construct Reservation Projects For Tribes: Blaze Construction Co. v. New Mexico Taxation and
Revenue Department: A Case Study, 20 Am. Indian L. Rev. 459 (1995-96).
1328
“[O]ne can demur to the assertion that the legal incidence of the tax falls on the distributor, a nontribal entity.” Wagnon. 546 U.S. at 123 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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less burden on-reservation tribal activity.”1329 Although “burden” can be read
to mean the economic consequences on the Tribe of the off-reservation tax,
Justice Ginsburg’s view of the statute was that the tax was triggered by onreservation activity. Indeed, she quoted favorably from the Tribe’s brief in the
appellate court that it was not contending “that a non-discriminatory, offreservation state tax of general applicability may be precluded simply because
the tax has an adverse economic impact on a Tribe or its members.”1330
From that point on, the case became an application of the balancing test
under White Mountain, and Colville would seem to be a relevant precedent.
Colville upheld the Washington tax on non-members and non-Indians,
although no one would accuse the Court of having undertaken a serious balancing inquiry because it viewed the case as involving tax avoidance. The
dissent recognized that balancing had been criticized as rudderless,1331 but
reluctantly saw no alternative to “seek[ing] an accommodation between the
interests of the Tribes and the Federal Government, on the one hand, and
those of the State, on the other.”1332
iii. Colville Is Limited to Tax Avoidance Situations. In applying that
balancing test, she had to dispose of Colville. She did this by distinguishing
Colville as involving the marketing of an exemption. Here, by contrast, the
Tribal station “operates almost exclusively as an amenity for people driving to
and from the casino.”1333
1329
Id. (first emphasis added). Because 73% of the gas was sold to non-Indian patrons of
the Tribal casino, Professor Jensen argues Wagnon was a stronger case for preemption than
Colville.

In Colville, the Court had determined, with some reason that the tribe was seeking to
market only its tax exemption. In contrast, the gas station in Wagnon was largely an
amenity for the tribal casino’s customers, not a discount station marketing itself to the
world. One might have characterized fuel sales as part of the gaming enterprise—an
enterprise in which there was a decidedly strong federal and tribal interest.
Jensen, supra note 9, at 82.
1330
Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 124 n.9 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Professor Fletcher speculates
that the
Court [might have been] worried that the states and the federal government might
adapt the Nation’s theory for their own purposes . . . Perhaps the Court was worried
that states would demand a refund for money they paid in accordance with government contracts to construction contractors based out of state where that money could
be traced to another state’s taxation (a circumstance that occurs with regularity in
tribal construction projects).
Fletcher, Indian Problem, supra note 11, at 629 (footnotes omitted).
1331
Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 124 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 176 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in
part, concurring in result in part and dissenting in part)).
1332
Id. (quoting Colville, 447 U.S. at 156).
1333
Id. at 126.
In Colville, it was “painfully apparent” that outsiders had no reason to travel to Indian
reservations to buy cigarettes other than the bargain prices tribal smokeshops charged
by virtue of their claimed exemption from state taxation. . . . “[I]n stark contrast
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Having neutralized Colville, the dissent then relied on the uncontroverted
testimony of the Tribe’s expert witness at trial, that “the Tribal and State taxes
are mutually exclusive and only one can be collected without reducing the
[station’s] fuel business to virtually zero.”1334 The answer to the obvious question of why the station was able to sell gas within two cents of the prevailing
market price despite the application of both Tribal and Kansas taxes was a
statement made at oral argument that the Tribe was subsidizing the sales.1335
According to Ginsburg, the Tribe proved what the Colville Tribe could not,1336
although an assertion at oral argument is hardly rigorous empirical evidence.
The dissent quoted with approval the lower court’s finding that fuel sales
were “an integral and essential part of the [Tribe’s] on-reservation gaming
enterprise.”1337 “The [Tribe] built the [station] as a convenience for its casino
patrons and, but for the casino, there would be no market for fuel in this
otherwise remote area.”1338 In addition, the Tribal tax was earmarked for
“constructing and maintaining roads, bridges and rights-of-way located on
or near the reservation.”1339 Moreover, the “[Tribe’s] interests coincide with
‘strong federal interests in promoting tribal economic development, tribal
self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.’”1340
iv. Kansas Has No Strong Interest in Taxation. “Against these strong
tribal and federal interests, Kansas asserts only its ‘general interest in raising
revenues.’”1341 “By effectively taxing the [station], Kansas would be deriving
to the smokeshops in Colville,” the [Tribe] here is not using its asserted exemption
from state taxation to lure non-Indians onto its reservation. The [station] is not visible from the state highway, and it advertises no exemption from the State’s fuel tax.
Including the [tribal tax, the gas station] sells fuel ‘‘within 2 [cents] per gallon of the
price prevailing in the local market.’’ The [station’s] draw, therefore, is neither price
nor proximity to the highway; rather, the [station] operates almost exclusively as an
amenity for people driving to and from the casino.
Id. at 125–26.
1334
Id. at 126 (citing Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Richards, 379 F.3d 979, 986 (10th
Cir. 2004)). It is unclear whether an injunction against the collection of the tax on sales made
on the reservation had been issued. But even if it had been, there was a period of time when
both the state tax and the Tribal tax simultaneously applied and the Tribe was selling gasoline
at a price competitive with off-reservation stations.
1335
See id. at 127 n.11.
1336

In this respect, the case is indeed novel. It is the first case in which a Tribe demonstrated below that the imposition of a state tax would prevent the Tribe from imposing its own tax. Cf. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 185, (state and tribal taxes were
not mutually exclusive because “the Tribe could, in fact, increase its taxes without
adversely affecting on-reservation oil and gas development”).
Id. at 126–27. What is also novel is that the Tribe should be allowed to present this fact at oral
argument without briefing it or arguing it below.
1337
Id. at 127 (quoting Prairie Band, 379 F.3d at 984).
1338
Id. Professor Jensen is sympathetic to this argument. See supra note 1329.
1339
Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 128 (quoting Prairie Band, 379 F.3d at 985–86).
1340
Id. (quoting Prairie Band, 379 F.3d at 986).
1341
Id. (quoting Prairie Band, 379 F.3d at 986).
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revenue ‘primarily from value generated on the reservation’ by the [Tribe’s]
casino.”1342 Furthermore, the Kansas tax at stake was “less than one-tenth
of one percent of the total state fuel tax revenues.”1343 And none of the revenues from the Kansas tax was used for the upkeep or improvement of Tribal
roads.1344
The heart of the disagreement between the majority and the dissent
involved how to interpret the State’s fuel tax statute. For the majority, the tax
was imposed on the distributor on the receipt of fuel off-reservation and no
balancing was required. For the dissent, the tax was imposed on a reservation
activity, which triggered balancing. Colville was not controlling precedent
because that was a tax avoidance case and nothing similar could be argued
here.
d. Should the Tribe’s Tax be Viewed as Having Independent Economic
Significance?
Resolving this narrow statutory issue of legal incidence that divided the Court,
unique to the old Kansas statute, would take me far afield (even by the loose
standards of relevancy exercised throughout this Article), with little redeeming value. However, one point in the dissent’s analysis merits exploration, and
that is the uncritical acceptance that the Tribe was levying a “tax:”
Both the [Tribe] and the State have authority to tax fuel sales . . . . As a practical matter, however, the two tolls cannot coexist. If the [Tribe] imposes its
tax on top of Kansas’ tax, then unless the [Tribe] operates the [gas station]
at a substantial loss, scarcely anyone will fill up at its pumps. Effectively
double-taxed, the [gas station] must operate as an unprofitable venture, or
not at all. In these circumstances, which tax is paramount?1345

“As the [Tribe] points out and the Court of Appeals comprehended, ‘the
actual issue presented here [is] the permissibility of a state tax that effectively
nullifies a Tribe’s power to impose a comparable tax on fuel sold at market
price by a tribally owned, on-reservation gas station.’”1346 “[This] is the first
case in which a Tribe demonstrated below1347 that the imposition of a state tax
Id. at 128–29 (quoting Prairie Band, 379 F.3d at 986).
Id. at 129. In most imaginable circumstances, a state tax is going to raise an insignificant
amount of revenue from activities on the reservation compared to the total revenues raised by
the tax statewide. Such a comparison would seem to skew the balancing test in favor of the
Indians.
1344
Id. Professor Goldberg describes Justice Ginsburg’s dissent as displaying “real appreciation for the value of tribal sovereignty and the realities of tribal governments and economies.”
Carole Goldberg, Finding the Way to Indian Country: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Decisions in
Indian Law Cases, 70 Ohio St. L. J. 1003, 1032 (2009).
1345
Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 116–17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1346
Id. at 124 n.9.
1347
At trial, the Tribe had an expert testify that “the Tribal and State taxes [were] mutually
exclusive and only one [could] be collected without reducing the [station’s] fuel business to
virtually zero.” Prairie Band, 379 F.3d at 986.
1342
1343
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would prevent the Tribe from imposing its own tax.”1348
The difficulty with this reasoning is that the Tribe owned the gas station.
In that case, as the majority understood,1349 the Tribe will keep all revenue
above its out of-pocket operating costs. For example, suppose no Tribal tax
were imposed and that revenue above the station’s operating costs (including
the Kansas tax) were $100. Now suppose that the Tribe imposes a fuel tax,
which consists of $20. Economically, it makes no difference whether the Tribe
receives $20 in tax and $80 in profits or (with no tax) $100 in profits.1350
A similar analysis would apply even if the station operated at a loss, as was
asserted by the Tribe during oral argument.1351 Suppose without a Tribal tax,
the station had costs (including the Kansas tax) that were $60 more than its
revenues, so that it operated at a loss. Now suppose that a Tribal fuel tax were
imposed that resulted in additional costs of $20, increasing the loss to $80.
The tax revenue of $20, however, would be available to subsidize the loss, so
that the net loss would be $60, the same as before the tax were imposed.
The obvious question, then, is why did the Tribe bother to impose a fuels
Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 127 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 114.
1350
Using the figures in the text, if the station were clearing $100 before the tax and $120
after the tax because of an inelastic demand curve, then the tax could be eliminated and the
price increased by the amount of the tax so that the same $120 was generated. Apparently,
the price of gasoline on-reservation was set to match prices off-reservation. The Tribe had no
incentive to undercut off-reservation prices and was unwilling to test the market by exceeding
off-reservation prices. If off-reservation prices were $X per gallon, the Tribe would set its taxinclusive price at that point. It would make no difference if it had a tax or not—gas would sell
at that price and the Tribe would net all the revenues above its costs.
If the Tribe would have been better off at a higher price that $X, it should have been selling
gas at that prices whether it had a tax or not.
A possible wrinkle in this analysis is that the Tribal fuel tax was earmarked for “‘constructing and maintaining roads, bridges and rights-of-way located on or near the reservation.’” Id.
at 128 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Politically, the Tribe might not have been able to make these
expenditures without a dedicated tax, or to have been able to enact a tax without earmarking.
Nonetheless, earmarking could have been achieved without a fuel tax by the Tribe simply
providing that 16 cents per gallon of gasoline sold at the station (the rate of the tax prior to
January 2003) would be dedicated for maintaining the roads, etc. To be sure, earmarking a
fuels tax is an accepted technique used throughout the country, which might have made it
more politically attractive than this alternative.
1351
Id. at 127 n.11. It seems likely that the station was indeed operated as a “convenience”
to casino patrons and workers, the same way free drinks and food are provided to high-rollers
as a “convenience.” The reality, of course, is that the station, just like the free food and drinks,
is a convenience to, and benefits, both parties: the casino and its patrons.
State corporate income taxes recognize the illusionary nature of viewing synergistic activities in isolation from each other and apply the concept of a “unitary business.” The Tribe was
not subject to the Kansas state corporate income tax so that this issue was moot. However, if
a remotely located, privately-owned business also operated a gas station because it increased
sales at the business, the notion that the station operated at a “loss” would be rejected and the
operations of the station would be combined with the operations of the business for income
tax purposes. For a general discussion, of this combined reporting or unitary business issue, see
Richard D. Pomp, State and Local Taxation, ch. 10 (6th ed. 2009).
1348
1349
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tax in the first place? Nothing in the record addressed this question, but one
possibility is illustrated by the dissent’s (mis)analysis. Anticipating litigation, the Tribe might have hoped that a fuels tax would enable it to make
a multiple taxation argument, instead of being in the more pedestrian and
unsympathetic posture of arguing that the Kansas tax impacted its revenues.
Alternatively, the answer might lie in Tribal politics,1352 marketing,1353 or more
simply, that the issue was never considered as the Tribe simply mimicked the
Kansas tax.1354
The Tribe’s double tax argument was similar to the argument the Court
had previously rejected in Colville.1355 Kansas argued that if the Tribe were
to prevail, and the state tax were prohibited, “nothing would stop [it] from
reducing its tax in order to sell gas below the market price,”1356 a fear similarly
raised in Colville. The dissent, by contrast, felt confident that “[w]ere the
[Tribe] to pursue such a course, it would be marketing an exemption, much
as the smokeshops did in Colville, and hence, interest balancing would likely
yield a judgment for the State.”1357 The Tribe suggested that Kansas could
guard against this risk by providing a credit for the Tribal tax.1358
1352
Taxes like the fuels tax are sometimes earmarked in order to increase their political attractiveness. Although earmarking could have been accomplished in other ways, see supra note
1350, the tendency of a tribe is to wrap itself in the mantle of taxes that are already accepted,
such as the state excise tax on gasoline, which is often earmarked for transportation infrastructure.
1353
Perhaps the Tribe was able to advertise the price of gasoline without including its tax;
if there were no tax but a higher price, some potential customers might be discouraged. All
smoke and mirrors to be sure, but that is typical of much of marketing and advertising.
1354
If there were other non-Indian owned gas stations on the reservation, the tax would
have a very real economic impact by raising revenue from those sales. There was nothing in the
proceedings suggesting there were non-Indian owned stations.
Indian-run casinos and similar venues may be a mixture of privately-owned and triballyowned restaurants, hotels, theaters, and the like, so that a tribal tax may have a real economic
consequence under that situation.
There may be other, more subtle consequences that turn on the existence of a tax, but they
are unlikely to undercut the point made in the text.
1355
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
The cigarette taxes in Colville, see supra notes 740–915 and accompanying text, can be analogized to the Tribe’s gasoline tax in Wagnon. In both cases it was irrelevant whether the Tribe
received $100 in profits with no tax, or $80 in profits and $20 in tax. The double tax argument
had no role to play in the Court’s analysis in Colville so this point remained undeveloped in
that case.
1356
Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 130 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1357
Id.
1358
The Indian Commerce Clause did not figure prominently in the Tribe’s brief. An amicus
brief supporting the Tribe, however, argued that the Indian Commerce Clause

completely excluded state regulatory authority without assessment of countervailing
state interests only where tribes were involved in or directly and concretely affected
by the transactions that the state sought to regulate. . . . States were empowered to
exercise general regulatory authority, including taxing authority, over transactions not
involving, or only remotely affecting, tribes, even if those transactions took place in,
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H. The Income Tax
1. Chickasaw Redux
a. McClanahan Does not Apply to Indians Working on, but Living off, the
Reservation
The second issue in the Chickasaw case supra, involved whether Oklahoma
could tax the wages of members of the Chickasaw Nation who worked for the
Tribe on tribal lands, but resided outside Indian country.1359 The Court analogized the situation to the widely accepted principle in interstate and international taxation that allows a jurisdiction to tax residents on their worldwide
income. The Indians were being taxed not because they were Indians, not
because they were working for a tribe, and not because they had earned their
income on a reservation, but only because they were residents of Oklahoma.
Justice Ginsburg never explained why this was a relevant analogy. Further,
without any substantive discussion, Ginsburg asserted that the McClanahan
“principle does not operate outside Indian country”1360 ignoring the fact that
the income was earned on the reservation.
Considering that the other issue in Chickasaw, the gasoline tax, was controlled by the legal incidence of the tax falling on the Tribe, it is odd that
Ginsburg does not apply, or at least address the applicability of that test, to
an income tax. The legal incidence of the income tax was on the individual
Indians. The taxable activity took place on the reservation. Yet Ginsburg does
not try to justify the difference in result between the gasoline tax and the
income tax.
2. Rationale for the Holding
Presumably, the reason why the international rule has such currency is because
residents benefit from state provided services, protections, opportunities, and
or had some connection with, Indian country. But, federal authority was exclusive
with respect to transactions directly or concretely affecting tribes in Indian country.
Brief of Amici Curiae NCAI et al., Wagnon, 546 U.S. 95 (No. 04-631), 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 450, at *9. The brief described Worcester as relying in part on the Indian Commerce
Clause. Id. at *8. The brief also described Williams v. Lee as relying on Worcester, and thus on
the Indian Commerce Clause. Id. at *9. In response to this brief, Kansas offered a minimalist
view of the Indian Commerce Clause. The Clause “offers nothing other than justification for
federal legislation affecting Indians. [Cotton Petroleum]. Further, the Indian Commerce Clause
possesses no dormant component.” Reply Brief for Petitioner, Wagnon, 546 U.S. 95 (No.
04-631), 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 547, at *18–19.
1359
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 464 (1995). Professor Goldberg
notes that this fact pattern was “common on small reservations, where there is simply not
enough land to house all the tribal members who wish to live and work there. It is also common in Oklahoma, where a federal policy known as allotment broke up large reservations and
left tribes with small amounts of checkerboarded Indian country.” Carole Goldberg, Finding
the Way to Indian Country: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Decisions in Indian Law Cases, 70
Ohio St. L.J. 1003, 1020 (2009).
1360
Chickasaw, 515 U.S. at 464.
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benefits. In return, they can be taxed on their worldwide income, with a
credit usually granted for income taxes paid to other states. At its core, the
principle is based on due process considerations. McClanahan was limited to
an Indian living and working on a reservation, who was not the beneficiary
of state-provided goods and services. Apparently, these differences trump the
legal incidence of the tax.
The Tribe relied heavily on the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek. Specifically, the Oklahoma income tax was said to violate the provision that
[t]he Government and people of the United States are hereby obliged to
secure to the said [Chickasaw] Nation . . . the jurisdiction and government
of all the persons and property that may be within their limits west, so that
no . . . State shall ever have a right to pass laws for the [Chickasaws] and
their descendants . . . but the U[nited] S[tates] shall forever secure said
[Chickasaws] from . . . all [such] laws.1361

According to the Tribe, the Oklahoma income tax was a law “for the government of the [Chickasaws] and their descendants.”1362 The Tribe apparently
hoped for a generous application of the Indian canons of construction in
interpreting the treaty.
But Justice Ginsburg was not Thurgood Marshall.1363 She quickly disposed of this argument. After the de rigueur reminder that treaties should
be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, the Court emphasized that the
Treaty applied only to persons and property within Indian country.1364 “We do
not read the Treaty as conferring super-sovereign authority to interfere with
another jurisdiction’s sovereign right to tax income, from all sources, of those
who choose to live within that jurisdiction’s limits.”1365 Because the Tribe did
not levy its own income tax, there was no argument that the State tax should
be preempted or that Oklahoma should provide a credit against its income
tax for a Tribal tax. To the majority, the Tribe’s claim was “narrow,”1366 and fell
outside the language of the Treaty.

Id. at 465 (emphasis added).
Id.
1363
For example, see Marshall’s charitable reading of the relevant treaty and enabling act in
McClanahan, see supra notes 529–43 and accompanying text.
1364
Chickasaw, 515 U.S. at 466. The Court easily rejected the argument that the income tax
on a tribal employee should be treated as an unconstitutional tax on the tribal employer, a doctrine long discredited in the federal and state contexts. Id. at 466. “We doubt the signatories
meant to incorporate this now-defunct view into the Treaty.” Id. The dissent took issue with
this perspective. See id. at 469–70 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1365
Id. at 466; see also George v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 548 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1989).
1366
Chickasaw, 515 U.S. at 464 n.13.
1361
1362
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3. Breyer’s Interpretation of the Treaty in Dissent
The dissent had less trouble applying the Treaty. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor,1367 and Souter, downplayed the geographical limits
of the Treaty. Justice Breyer read the historical setting of the Treaty as suggesting the signatories “intended the language to provide a broad guarantee
that state law would not apply to the Chickasaws if they moved west of the
Mississippi . . . .”1368 Justice Breyer asserted, without any empirical support,
that the Oklahoma income would likely increase wages the Tribe would have
to pay, which would reduce the funds available for other expenditures. “The
impact of the tax upon tribal wages, tribal members, and tribal land makes it
possible, indeed reasonable, to consider Oklahoma’s tax (insofar as it applies
to these tribal wages) as amounting to a law ‘for the government of ’ the
Tribe.”1369
Breyer emphasized that the tax “(1) has a strong connection to tribal government . . . (2) does not regulate conduct outside Indian country, and (3)
does not . . . represent an effort to recover a proportionate share of . . . the cost
of providing state services to residents,”1370 and would leave for another day
whether the Treaty would cover a law with a weaker link to tribal government
or a stronger impact outside Indian country.1371
1367
Dean Getches describes Justice O’Connor as remaining “somewhat independent on
Indian issues, as is true of her position in other fields.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14,
at 1639.
1368
Chickasaw, 515 U.S. at 469 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1369
Id. Under this view, the tax might be struck down as violating the Williams v. Lee
infringement test. The Court declined to answer this question in Oklahoma Tax Commission v.
Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 126 (1993).
Justice Breyer tried to bolster his reasoning by arguing that in “1837, when the United
States made its promise to the Chickasaws, the law considered a tax like the present one to
be a tax on its source—i.e., the Tribe itself.” Chickasaw, 515 U.S. at 469. Two problems exist,
however, which undercut his argument. First, the case he cites, Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie
County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842), which held that a federal employee’s salary was exempt
from a state tax, was decided in 1842, after the Treaty was signed. Second, Breyer seems to
misstate the date the Treaty was signed, 1837 rather than 1830, which makes the Treaty seem
closer in time to Dobbins than it actually was. (The 1830 Treaty was between the United States
and the Choctaws; the 1837 Treaty was between the Choctaws and the Chickasaws, Treaty of
Jan. 17, 1837, 11 Stat. 573, art. I, under terms that were established in the 1830 Treaty.)
The court of appeals had a more straightforward argument. “All that matters is whether the
law—although facially neutral as between Indians and non-Indians—is being applied to members of the Tribe. If so, in the court of appeals’ view, the law is one ‘for the government of the
Chickasaw Nation’ and is invalid.” Brief of Petitioner, Chickasaw, 515 U.S. 450 (No. 94-771),
1995 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 85, at *73.
1370
Chickasaw, 515 U.S. at 470.
1371
Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, involved the State’s attempt to impose its personal
income tax on the income of Tribal members living within the boundaries of a reservation that
had been ceded to the federal government in exchange for an allotment within the ceded reservation. The income was earned on Indian trust land. Justice O’Connor rejected Oklahoma’s
argument that McClanahan should be limited to income earned on a reservation by a tribal
member living there. Id. at 123. The government as amicus curiae argued that McClanahan
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Breyer’s first point is debatable. He asserted there was a connection because
of the impact of the tax on the level of wages. The level of wages on the reservation reflects numerous factors, including the extent to which non-Indians,
subject to the Oklahoma income tax, work for the Tribe. There was simply
no evidence that the Oklahoma income tax on Indians living off-reservation
affected the level of wages paid on the reservation.
His second point is correct but irrelevant—an income tax is generally not
adopted to regulate conduct. This second point also begs the question of why
a non-discriminatory income tax cannot be applied. Justice Breyer did not
explore the rationale of McClanahan and whether it might apply to exempt
the employees.
His third point would overrule much of the case law that previously rejected—and rightfully so—the proportionality argument.1372 Income taxes do
not have to be proportionate to the cost of providing services. Moreover,
residents are presumed to benefit from state services even if they work outside
the state. Put differently, if the Indians commuted to Texas rather than to
the reservation, they would be precluded from arguing that their Oklahoma
income taxes should be reduced because they received less State services. The
same argument should be rejected just because they commuted to a reservation. Justice Breyer’s charitable and generous reading of the Treaty suggests he
is the heir apparent to Thurgood Marshall.
Neither the Tribe nor its amici argued that the Indian Commerce Clause
would prevent the Oklahoma income tax. Presumably, the parties thought it
was too late in the day to raise this argument.
VI. Conclusion
Those who have slogged their way through this Article deserve a satisfying (if
not definitive) answer to why the promise of the Indian Commerce Clause
has remained unfulfilled. I am afraid there will be no drum roll, just conjecture.
The Court has not relied on the Indian Commerce Clause in striking down
any state tax. Chief Justice John Marshall, one of the ratifiers of the Constitution from Virginia, had the opportunity in 1832 in Worcester v. Georgia to
shape the Clause into a powerful doctrine. As a ratifier, he was privy to the
debates over the Clause and the arguments and facts laid out in Sections II
and III of this Article. Instead of making the Indian Commerce Clause the
centerpiece of his opinion, however, he used the case as a platform for an eloquent and courageous defense of Indian sovereignty—a thumb in President
Jackson’s eye.1373
Despite the long discussion in Worcester describing and defending the preand extra-constitutional sovereignty doctrine—immunizing the Cherokees
required the presence of a formal reservation or a reservation community. Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 16–20, Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (No. 92-259).
1372
See supra notes 1177, 1182, 1202, 1256, and accompanying text.
1373
See supra notes 229–77 and accompanying text.
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from Georgia’s laws—he was apparently worried about resting the opinion
on that ground. The jurisdictional constraints on the Court imposed by the
Judiciary Act of 1789 required that the case be grounded in the Constitution
itself. He needed narrower grounds than the grandiose and sweeping pre- and
extra-constitutional concept of Indian sovereignty, especially in a case involving penal laws. It wasn’t enough that the laws of Georgia violated the sovereignty of the Cherokees—which they did—he had to show that they were
repugnant to the “constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.”1374
With an economy of language (and lack of verve) totally inconsistent with
the fervor and passion of his earlier discussion of sovereignty, Marshall satisfied the Judiciary Act’s requirement with a compact and conclusory reference
to Georgia’s laws being repugnant to the “constitution, laws, and treaties of
the United States.” Although he did not fully unbundle this reference, the
“constitution” encompassed the Indian Commerce Clause.1375 This lack of a
resounding endorsement of the Clause, however, led to its being overshadowed by Marshall’s championing Indian sovereignty, arguably dicta. Ironically, that part of the opinion which Marshall apparently feared would not
satisfy the Judiciary Act came to characterize Worcester and initially took center stage, while the Indian Commerce Clause receded into the wings.
Worcester set in motion the course of subsequent litigation. Tribes understandably feel passionately and deeply about their sovereignty. The briefs
involved in the tax cases discussed in this Article show that arguments based
on sovereignty, at least early on, figured more prominently than those based
on the Indian Commerce Clause. This was similarly true of arguments based
on treaties, federal statutes, and state enabling acts. In some cases, this ordering of arguments might have reflected concerns about whether sufficient
“commerce” existed to trigger the invocation of the Clause, but more generally it seemed to reflect the Clause’s lack of prominence in Worcester.
The Court’s early opinions ignored the Clause. For example, the 1867
cases, The Kansas Indians, and The New York Indians, emphasized the sovereignty of the tribes and the existence of a treaty.1376 The Indian Commerce
Clause was not cited (perhaps because of concerns that “commerce” might
not have existed). The 1885 case of Utah & Northern Railway1377 also ignored
the Clause (even though commerce was clearly implicated). In 1886, the
Kagama Court rejected the Clause as the source of Congress’s right to enact
the Major Crimes Act, although the rationale in that case was the lack of
“commerce.”1378
In the 1898 case of Thomas v. Gay,1379 there were no federal statutes, treaties, state enabling acts or the like to serve as a shield against state taxation.
See supra notes 267–77 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 278–96 and accompanying text.
1376
See supra notes 307–22 and accompanying text.
1377
See supra notes 323–32 and accompanying text.
1378
See supra notes 333–53 and accompanying text.
1379
See supra notes 354–75 and accompanying text.
1374
1375
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“Commerce” clearly existed. The case was thus perfect for an Indian Commerce Clause argument. But instead of breathing life into the Clause, the
Court disposed of the case with ipse dixit reasoning and a retreat into formalism. The Court also erroneously claimed that the Clause had been rejected
earlier in Utah & Northern Railway.1380 By the end of the 19th century, the
message to litigants was clear.
There were no major state tax cases implicating the Clause in the early
part of the 20th century. By the middle of that century, the Solicitor General took up the cause, attempting to rehabilitate and resurrect the Clause.
Starting with Warren Trading, and continuing with Moe,1381 Central Machinery, Colville,1382 and reaching its zenith in Ramah,1383 the government was an
aggressive advocate for using the Clause to create a tax-free zone on a reservation, exactly what Thomas v. Gay refused to do.
Inexplicably, Justice Thurgood Marshall, one of the Indians strongest allies,
did not even acknowledge the Solicitor General’s brief in Central Machinery.
Less surprising was that Justice Rehnquist also failed to mention the government’s brief in Moe (in a unanimous opinion in which Marshall joined). In
Ramah, the Solicitor General filed two briefs—the second of which was a
resounding and sweeping endorsement of the Clause. Justice Marshall rejected
the government’s efforts, arguing that current law apart from the Indian Commerce Clause was adequate to protect the Indians’ interests.1384 If an ally of
the Indians felt this way, it is not surprising that in the hands of more hostile
justices, such as Rehnquist and White, the Clause would be treated as merely
protecting Indians from discriminatory state taxes.1385 Because none of the
state tax cases before the Court involved a discriminatory tax, this revisionist
view of the Clause has more theoretical than practical significance. Moreover,
of all the Justices, only Stewart has been willing to interpret the Clause as
requiring a state credit for a tribal tax, and that position was expressed in
Colville, where the credit would have been meaningless.1386 A more robust
and invigorated Indian Commerce Clause would have reversed the results
in many of the cases discussed above. The states would have been the clear
losers. But Congress would have been expected to have intervened in some
manner to establish a new order—saying anything more than that would be
sheer conjecture. For the same reason, I will leave it to others to speculate on
whether the new composition of the Court provides a fresh opportunity to
raise the Indian Commerce Clause going forward.
See supra note 366 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 696–97 and accompanying text.
1382
See supra notes 447, 517–18, and accompanying text.
1383
See supra notes 1011–30 and accompanying text.
1384
See supra notes 1031–37 and accompanying text.
1385
See supra notes 807–13, 1041, and accompanying text.
1386
See supra notes 904–08 and accompanying text. In Cotton, Justice Stevens described the
central function of the Indian Commerce Clause as providing Congress with plenary power to
legislate in the field of Indian affairs. See supra note 1231 and accompanying text.
1380
1381
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If the Indian Commerce Clause has not fulfilled its promise, at least I can
try to fulfill my promise in the Introduction to help negotiate the “labyrinth of unpredictability,”1387 which characterizes state-Indian taxation. The
transactions discussed in this Article can be arrayed along a continuum. At
one end of the continuum are those transactions taking place on a reservation without any direct connection to off-reservation activities, the subject of
McClanahan.
McClanahan1388 immunized from state income taxation an Indian who
worked and lived on a reservation, having no direct off-reservation activities.
Chickasaw teaches that a state cannot impose a tax whose legal incidence falls
on a tribe (or an Indian) if the taxed activity takes place on a reservation.1389
McClanahan would seem to be an application of Chickasaw (which had not
yet been decided, although the cases upon which it relied had been). But
Chickasaw went on to draw a line between Indians who work and live on
a reservation and those who work on a reservation but live off-reservation,
and holds that a state can impose its income tax on the latter.1390 The Court
justified this distinction by relying on international custom and practice.
Although the Court did not elaborate, presumably the Indians living offreservation benefited from state-provided goods and services in a way that
on-reservation Indians did not, and that difference was enough to distinguish
McClanahan.
In the case of cigarette excise taxes, however, the Court has ignored the
Chickasaw line between residents and non-residents. From a policy perspective, ignoring that line is proper because cigarette excise taxes are consumption taxes, which do not incorporate a concept of residency—and there is no
custom or practice suggesting otherwise. The line the Court drew in Colville,
however, was whether an Indian was a member of the tribe or not, which
was unprincipled and unsupported by statute, precedent, or policy considerations, and contradicted by the Indian Trader statutes.
Moreover, in Moe1391 and Colville,1392 where the Court prohibited a state
from levying its cigarette taxes on member-Indians but not on non-members,
the legal incidence fell on the purchaser.1393 So much for legal incidence.
As state tax lawyers fully appreciate, legal incidence is a formal concept,
divorced of economic significance,1394 which is why Complete Auto rejected
it. The charm of a legal incidence test, according to Chickasaw, is predictability and certainty.1395 But Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation demonstrates that
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 1273–80 and accompanying text.
1389
See supra notes 519–91 and accompanying text.
1390
See supra notes 1359–60 and accompanying text.
1391
See supra notes 653–739 and accompanying text.
1392
See supra notes 740–915 and accompanying text.
1393
See supra notes 657 (Moe) and 744 (Colville) and accompanying text.
1394
See supra notes 1281–83 and accompanying text.
1395
See supra note 1283 and accompanying text.
1387
1388
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legal incidence is not always easily determinable, which undercuts its extolled
benefits.1396 Moreover, like most formalisms, a state can usually re-draft a
statute to shift the legal incidence from a tribe or an Indian to non-Indians.
Oklahoma did exactly that after losing Chickasaw,1397 and Kansas did the
same thing with respect to the tax at issue in Prairie Band.1398 So much for
formalism.
In the case of a state sales tax on reservation purchases, the Indian Trader
statutes would likely immunize the Indian consumer, notwithstanding that
the legal incidence is imposed on a non-Indian vendor. This is the lesson
of Warren Trading1399 and Central Machinery,1400 where the tax was imposed
on the vendor but nonetheless struck down under the Indian Trader statutes. Furthermore, unlike the unprincipled distinction drawn in Colville, the
Indian Trader statutes do not distinguish between member and non-member
Indians, only between Indians and non-Indians.1401 The Indian Trader statutes should have protected the non-member Indians in Colville.
The protection extended by the Indian Trader statutes is limited. Reflecting the era in which they were drafted, such statutes are limited to the sale of
property and do not cover services.1402
At the other end of the continuum is Mescalero,1403 which dealt with purely
off-reservation activities.1404 Indians or tribes conducting an off-reservation
transaction seem to receive no special protection from state taxation (unless
a statute provides otherwise). An Indian who buys and consumes a good
off-reservation is subject to a state sales tax like anyone else. Indeed, the sales
tax applies even if the Indian brings the good onto the reservation or has it
shipped. And as Chickasaw indicates, an Indian living off-reservation is subject to a state income tax under the same rules that apply to non-Indians, even
if the income is earned on a reservation. Finally, Prairie Band Potawatomi
illustrates that a tax on the off-reservation activities of non-Indians receives
no special consideration even if the economic incidence of that tax falls on
reservation activities.1405
As we move away from either of the polar points on the continuum,
things get murkier, especially when a transaction occurs on a reservation and
involves a non-Indian. A treaty, federal statute, or state enabling act can preempt a state tax under these circumstances.1406 In a preemption analysis, the
See supra notes 1290–1358 and accompanying text.
See supra note 1288.
1398
See supra note 1325 and accompanying text.
1399
See supra notes 425–68 and accompanying text.
1400
See supra notes 469–518 and accompanying text.
1401
See supra notes 725–31, 781–87, and accompanying text.
1402
See supra note 516 and accompanying text.
1403
See supra notes 592–652 and accompanying text.
1404
The case involved a ski resort on land adjacent to the reservation. Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 146 (1973).
1405
See supra notes 1290–1358.
1406
See, e.g., supra notes 916–1057 and accompanying text.
1396
1397
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Court’s mission should be to determine the scope of federal law by discerning
the intent of Congress. The Court can take into account a state’s interests in
inferring Congressional intent. Compelling state interests might be strong
evidence that Congress did not intend to immunize a transaction from state
taxation; an insignificant state interest might lead to an opposite conclusion.
From the perspective of the Indians, a preemption analysis contains an
undesirable tradeoff. The more Congress relaxes its control over the Indians
to encourage their self-government and economic development, the less likely
there will be a federal statute that can be used to preempt a state tax.
The Court has also applied a flexible preemption approach,1407 tantamount
to a balancing test, to determine when a state tax is valid. In a balancing test,
the Court is not trying to identify Congressional intent but instead is substituting its own evaluation of how the competing interests—a state on one
side, and the federal government and the Indians on the other—should be
accommodated. A preemption test is grounded on the Supremacy Clause; the
Constitutional roots of a balancing test are less easily identified.
One of the critical questions in a balancing test is the weight that should
be placed on the economic effects of a state tax on the Indians. In Moe and
Colville, the Court was willing to accept the near destruction of a tribe’s retail
cigarette sector, apparently because the Indians were characterized as “marketing an exemption.”1408 From the perspective of the Indians, however, they
were simply engaged in using a tax incentive the way other jurisdictions routinely do.
Colville created the concept of “value generated” to help draw a line between
legitimate and illegitimate transactions.1409 The latter will obviously be given
no weight in a balancing calculus. The “value generated” litmus test has gone
undeveloped in the tax cases, however, and probably cannot bear the weight
it is being asked to carry.
Moe, Colville, and Cotton indicate the Court has a high tolerance for state
taxes that severely impact activities on a reservation. If these cases can be
gently shunted aside, perhaps by limiting Moe and Colville to tax avoidance
situations, as well as failure of proof cases (which could also describe Cotton),
the tribes would have much more latitude to argue about the economic consequences of a state tax.
As part of its balancing inquiry, the Court will also take into account the
nature and extent of the services provided by a state on the reservation. Because
services come in so many sizes and shapes, and can benefit a reservation even
if provided off-reservation, conceptually this inquiry is bankrupt.1410 Nonetheless, it seems to have a certain emotional appeal for the Court.
Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176 (1989).
See supra notes 792–97, 811, 818–21, 1295–98, and accompanying text.
1409
See supra notes 789–802 and accompanying text.
1410
See, e.g., supra notes 462–63 and accompanying text. As just one example, what if a
state spends money on its off-reservation schools teaching a special program on tolerance? Or
a special program emphasizing the sovereignty, culture, and history of the Indians? Certainly
1407
1408
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What should also carry no weight in a balancing inquiry is a state’s interest in raising revenue. Almost every tax is intended to raise revenue. Placing
too much emphasis on the state’s revenue interests will skew the balancing in
every case. Moreover, the amount of tax at stake will typically be a de minimis
percentage of the state’s budget. But for the Indians, the consequences of a
state tax could be significant.
As part of the arguments about the economic effect of state taxes, litigants
sometimes request that the Court grant relief for double taxation, that is, relief
from the simultaneous imposition of a tribal and state tax on the same transaction. The Court has been relatively indifferent to issues of double taxation.
In Colville, the Court accepted the imposition of tribal and state cigarette
taxes without any kind of relief. Cotton accepted the same double taxation
involving tribal and state severance taxes. The Tribe, however, was not a party
in Cotton and was forced to make its case through amicus briefs. Cotton can
thus be viewed as a failure of proof case. With better facts about the harmful
effects of double taxation, the Court might be amenable to granting relief.
Only Justice Stewart in Colville seemed willing to relieve double taxation through a credit for a tribal tax.1411 Ironically, a credit under the facts of
Colville would have accomplished little because the Indians would still not
have had the advantage of selling cigarettes free of the Washington tax.1412 In
Cotton, where a credit for the tribal severance tax would have been significant,
Stewart was silent. (A credit would also be valuable in the context of sales
taxes, property taxes, and income taxes.)
More fundamental is the question of whether double taxation should be
viewed as even existing when a tribe is simultaneously the taxing sovereign
and the vendor of the taxed good. In that situation, the label “tax” seems a
formality, having no independent economic significance when applied to the
goods the tribe sells. The double taxation is chimerical and reduces to a complaint about the negative effects of the state tax.1413
*****
Case-by-case adjudication by a court is a notoriously difficult way of
imposing order and coherence on a body of doctrine. A court can only decide
the cases before it, not a very useful way of dealing comprehensively with a
field of law. That commonplace complaint is even more justified for the cases
discussed in this Article. The Supreme Court has not distinguished itself,
mischaracterizing the tax before it,1414 abusing precedent,1415 lapsing into ipse

the benefits of those programs would inure to the Indians on a reservation, notwithstanding
the services were provided at off-reservation schools.
1411
See supra notes 904–11 and accompanying text.
1412
See supra notes 814–19 accompanying text.
1413
See supra notes 890–903, 909–10, 1315–17, 1349–58 and accompanying text.
1414
See e.g., supra notes 544–47, 626 and accompanying text.
1415
See e.g., supra notes 366–67, 857–63 and accompanying text.
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dixit reasoning,1416 misreading or ignoring history,1417 and retreating into formalism.1418
With a stroke of the pen, Congress could intervene and change the rules of
the game, but has shown little inclination in doing so. Congress could formulate a tax code for state-Indian activities, but might not have the trust of the
tribes, which would be a precondition. A group of academics, practitioners,
states, tribes and those doing business with them, having both Indian law and
state tax expertise, and having the trust of the stakeholders, might be capable
of drafting a model code of taxation.1419 No groundswell for such a proposal
exists today, but the undertaking itself might create that support.

See e.g., supra notes 362–63, 369 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 216, 223, 336; see also Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law:
Title, Possession & Sacred Obligations, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 605 (2006).
1418
See supra notes 367, 893, 1281–89, 1329 and accompanying text.
1419
Precedent outside the Indian tax area exists demonstrating both the strengths and weaknesses of this approach. See, e.g., the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, and
the Streamlined Sales Tax Project. For a discussion, see Richard D. Pomp, State and Local
Taxation, ch. 6, 9 (6th ed. 2009). See also Jeanne S. Whiteing, Tribal and State Taxation of
Natural Resources on Indian Reservations, 7 Nat. Resources & Env’t L. Rev. 17, 59 (1993) ;
http://www.ncai.org/Taxation.31.0.html.
1416
1417
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